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A social revolution has changed drastically the last decades. But they are still
different across Europe. Welfare state scholars often presume that diversity
and change in women’s employment across Europe is based on financial
(dis)incentive structures embedded in welfare states. In other words: if
childcare is available and affordable. Most mothers will work. 
If tax and benefit schemes have no financial employment obstructions, most
mothers will work. How Welfare States Care shows, by in depth analyses of
women’s (and men’s) employment and care patterns as well as child care
services, taxation, leave schemes and social security in four different welfare
states (the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium) that this logic does
not hold. A mother is not primarily the homo economicus welfare state
scholars tend to presume. This book demonstrates that European women are
more motivated by culturally and morally shaped ideals of care embedded in
welfare states than by economic reality.
Monique Kremer is research fellow at the Scientific Council for 
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“This book offers a theoretically innovative and empirically compelling analysis of women’s
and men’s participation in employment and care, rebutting the conventional wisdom that
either social policy or cultural preferences can alone explain these patterns. Kremer
develops the concept of ‘ideals of care’ as an expression of the ‘cultural dimension of
welfare states’ to show how care and culture influence policy and everyday life.”
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CHANGING WELFARE STATES
Processes of socio-economic change − individualising society and globalis-
ing economics and politics − cause large problems for modern welfare states. 
Welfare states, organised on the level of nation-states and built on one or 
the other form of national solidarity, are increasingly confronted with − for 
instance − ﬁ scal problems, costs control diﬃ  culties, and the unintended 
use of welfare programs. Such problems – generally speaking – raise the 
issue of sustainability because they tend to undermine the legitimacy of the 
programs of the welfare state and in the end induce the necessity of change, 
be it the complete abolishment of programs, retrenchment of programs, or 
attempts to preserve programs by modernising them.
 Th is series of studies on welfare states focuses on the changing insti-
tutions and programs of modern welfare states. Th ese changes are the 
product of external pressures on welfare states, for example because of the 
economic and political consequences of globalisation or individualisation, 
or result from the internal, political or institutional dynamics of welfare 
arrangements.
 By studying the development of welfare state arrangements in diﬀ erent 
countries, in diﬀ erent institutional contexts, or by comparing developments 
between countries or diﬀ erent types of welfare states, this series hopes to 
enlarge the body of knowledge on the functioning and development of wel-
fare states and their programs.
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Nothing exists that does not touch upon something else
Niets bestaat dat niet iets anders aanraakt
 Jeroen Brouwers, Bezonken rood
Once upon a time, women stayed at home when they had children. 
Today, the majority of European mothers work. The sociologist Arlie 
Hochschild (1989) has labelled this the biggest social revolution of our 
time. Still, uniformity is not the rule in Europe. The number of women 
who work and the number of hours they work vary per country. My own 
country, the Netherlands, is considered to be very modern in many re-
spects but it has lagged behind when it comes to female labour market 
participation. Dutch mothers only started to enter the labour market 
in the 1990s. This is in stark contrast, for instance, to the Danish case. 
Danish mothers went to work in the 1960s and 1970s, and today most of 
them work full time. How to understand these changes and differences? 
And what is the role of politics and the welfare state? Is it really true 
that mothers in the Netherlands worked less because of a lack of state-
subsidised childcare and the existence of financial compensation via tax 
policies? This book tries to answer questions that have preoccupied me 
for a long time.
 The sowing. A book starts long before the first sentence. I think this one 
must have began in the early 1980s, when I was twelve or thirteen. When 
I came home from school I would find my mother waiting for me with 
the proverbial ‘pot of tea’, which has become the Dutch symbol of good 
motherly care. My mother only started to work when my younger sister 
reached the age of twelve, and often ended up in part-time, temporary, 
and poorly paid cleaning and home care jobs. While drinking tea, she 
– and my father too – urged us to have the best education possible, so we 
could have a good and rewarding career. And thanks to their incredible 
support (thank you!) we did. But I could not understand why my mother 
didn’t work, while she clearly dreamed of a different life. She felt regret. 

Later on, I asked her why she was at home with the pot of tea, she said: 
‘that’s just what you did at the time’.
 The growing. A Dutch feminist scholar once said that women start to 
become interested in emancipation not because of their jealousy or irrita-
tion at men, but because of the lives of their mothers. Indeed, for me, my 
mother’s life puzzled me and her answer didn’t satisfy me. When I went to 
school at Utrecht University, I quickly became interested in issues of gen-
der, citizenship, and social policy. Luckily I encountered Trudie Knijn and 
later on Peter van Lieshout, so I could start the research project that has 
now become this book. I am grateful I met Trudie. She has played a cru-
cial role in my personal and professional life. She is definitely my teacher 
in all the positive meanings of the word and I believe she will always be. 
Peter van Lieshout gave me a great sense of confidence and always posed 
pointed questions. Thank you both.
 The flourishing. This is the best period: the time you collect data, ideas, 
and useless thoughts, especially when it is abroad. It is the period in which 
a thousand flowers bloom. I talked to many people in Belgium, Denmark, 
and the UK whose names cannot be mentioned here, as there are too 
many, although I still remember each and every one. Some scholars have 
been particularly important to me, especially because of their hospitality 
and guidance while I carried out my research in their countries. Special 
thanks go to Bea Cantillon, Ive Marx, Lieve de Lathouwer, Tine Rostgaard, 
Jon Kvist, Niels Plough, Hans Hansen, Finn Kenneth Hansen, Henning 
Hansen, Anette Borchorst, Birte Siim, Helga Moos, Peter Abrahamson, 
Jane Millar, Ruth Lister, Clare Ungerson, Jane Lewis, Wilf Nicoll.
 Th e harvesting. Th is is mentally and physically the toughest period, as 
you have to make choices and restrict yourself to telling only one story. Dis-
covery is generally much more joyful than discipline, at least for me. Many 
people supported and touched me in diﬀ erent ways. I had people who hiked 
with me (Els Aarts, Egbert Rentema, Arjan Schuiling, Paul Weemaes), peo-
ple who helped me to forget about this book (Miriam  Schram, Suzanne 
Tan, Sandra Kremer), and people who laughed and cried with me (Berend 
Jonker). There were also many nice people who worked with me (at the 
Netherlands Institute of Care and Welfare, the Department of General 
Social Sciences, and the Scientific Council for Government Policy), and 
people with whom I had interesting academic discussions (the PhD group 
‘tgv’ and the Amsterdam/Utrecht reading group). There were also people 
with whom I could discuss all other social issues that are not in this book 
(Jelle van der Meer and the editors of TSS/ Journal of Social Issues, es-
pecially Loes Verplanke). Other people were crucial in the last months, 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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when I knew I could do better but had no words and thoughts left. Anton 
Hemerijck, whose apt comments certainly improved some chapters; and 
Evelien Tonkens, who with a mixture of pep talk, funny metaphors, and 
convincing criticism pointed how to get to the end.
 My love Shervin Nekuee has big shoulders, a golden heart, and a sharp 
tongue. In fact, he gave the most useful comments on this book with-
out having read one single word. I hope it will stay that way, and that we 
talk less about policy and more about poetry. Sheyda, the sun in our life, 
has not noticed my preoccupation with this book. That makes me just as 
proud as finishing it. His arrival may have postponed the final harvest-
ing but it certainly improved the quality. I became more convinced about 
what I had already discovered before he came: mothers do not work more 
hours per se when child care is cheap and available, or work less when 
they are financially compensated. They want to work when they have the 
feeling their children are well-cared for when they are not there.
 When my own mother had young children, the moral message of the 
Dutch welfare state was: women’s employment would harm children. The 
dominant ideal of care was full-time mothering. So, that is why staying at 
home is ‘just what you did at that time’. Now, 25 years later, social policy 
is based on the ideal of parental sharing. Children are cared for well when 
both parents work and care part time. Indeed, at home we try to do it ‘the 
Dutch way’. I am happy for myself, Shervin, Sheyda, and especially my 
parents that a social and cultural revolution has taken place.
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1 Introduction: Working Women and the Question of Care 
 and Culture in Europe
European governments are bidding farewell to the once-popular ideal 
of the male breadwinner model. Except for Scandinavia, this model has 
sat firmly in the welfare state saddle since the Second World War. But 
in the new millennium, the governments of Europe no longer expect 
women to be full-time mothers. In Europe, the icon of the happy house-
wife is fading. The European Union (eu) welfare states fully commit-
ted themselves to working women as part of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, 
the eu’s framework for action. If more women worked, this would con-
tribute to the European aspirations of becoming ‘the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’, while at the same 
time having ‘sustainable, active and dynamic welfare states’. This has 
been underlined by the Kok Report, which assessed the 2000 Lisbon 
strategy. The report states that if Europe wants to show its social face, 
the focus should be on economic growth and employment (European 
Communities 2004).
 The Lisbon targets – female employment rates of 60 percent by 2010 
– have not been reached. In 2003, the European average was 55 percent, 
but there is time left. More striking are the huge changes and large cross-
national differences. Denmark and Sweden already surpassed the Lisbon 
criteria in the 1970s, and today more than 70 percent of the women in 
these countries work. In the uk and the Netherlands the ‘score’ is around 
65 percent, although British mothers participate much less when they 
have young children (ages 0-2), namely 52 percent. Germany (59 percent), 
France (57 percent) and Belgium (52 percent), and especially Italy (43 per-
cent) and Spain (46 percent) are at the lower end of women’s participation 
in paid employment. Part-time and full-time rates of employment also 
vary substantially. The revolutionary growth in women’s employment in 
the Netherlands is mainly due to part-time work, as Dutch women rarely 
work full time (European Communities 2004; Eurostat 2005).
 In ‘Why We Need a New Welfare State’, originally written for the Bel-
gian presidency of the European Union, Esping-Andersen et al. (2002) 

suggest how to raise women’s employment rates. A new welfare archi-
tecture should bid farewell to the male breadwinner model and support 
women to work. ‘In many countries women constitute a massive untapped 
labour reserve that can help narrow future age dependency rates and re-
duce associated financial pressures’ (ibid., 94), and working mothers are 
‘the single most effective bulwark against child poverty’ (ibid., 9-10). At 
the same time, as birth rates are low, European women need to be encour-
aged to deliver more babies. Gender equality policies should therefore not 
simply be seen as a concession to women’s claims, the authors argue, sup-
porting working women is a social investment. A new welfare state should 
emphasise affordable childcare services and good maternity and parental 
leave schemes. When the welfare state supports mothers, they will go out 
and get a job.
 Seeing social policy as the cause of women’s employment patterns has 
become the dominant paradigm among scholars and policymakers. Espe-
cially popular is what can be called the ‘comparative welfare regime ap-
proach’. Esping-Andersen (1990, 1998, 2002) is indeed a well-known repre-
sentative of this stream, as are Lewis (1992a, 1993, 1997b, 1998), Sainsbury 
(1996, 1999), O’Connor et al. (1999), and Daly and Rake (2003). The basic 
idea is that welfare states are not the same; their design differs across Eu-
rope. This is due to variety in the strength of social movements (working 
class and women) as well as historical, institutional legacies. Such dif-
ferences in social policies also lead to different outcomes. In short, the 
composition of welfare states determines women’s employment patterns.
 It is also common to cluster welfare states in three ‘models’ or ‘welfare 
regimes’ along specific explanatory dimensions. Well-known are Esping-
Andersen’s (1990, 1999, 2002) ‘three worlds of welfare’ and Lewis’ gen-
der models (1992). Each regime or model has specific consequences for 
women, yet the explanatory logic is often as follows: the more available 
and affordable childcare services are, the more mothers work. The more 
work disincentives in taxation and social security, the less mothers work. 
The underlying notion is that women really want to work, but they can 
only do so when the social policy barriers are removed.
 Th e main empirical concern of this book is whether this logic is true. 
Does the variety in welfare states’ design really cause such a European 
patchwork of women’s employment rates? In other words, to what extent 
and how are European diversity and changes in work rates shaped by diﬀ er-
ent social policies? Have Danish women, for instance, started to work more 
because the state oﬀ ers aﬀ ordable and suﬃ  cient childcare services? And are 
Belgian women more likely to stay at home due to a lack of these facilities, 
INTRODUCTION
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or because of tax and beneﬁ t disincentives? Why do women’s employment 
patterns change more in some countries than in others? Will all European 
countries meet the Lisbon targets if they have ‘a new welfare state’?
 To answer these questions, the study of welfare states will be linked to 
the concepts of care and culture. That is the main theoretical contribution 
of this book.
 The Caring Dimension of Welfare States
The first contribution of this book is to link care to social policy. If we 
analyse how welfare states care, we may understand women and gender 
relations better (Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; Lewis 1997a; Knijn and Kremer 
1997; Daly and Lewis; 1998; Jenson and Sineau 2001; Daly 2002; Daly and 
Rake 2003; Anttonen et al. 2003; Bettio and Plantenga 2004). Care in this 
book, as will be introduced in chapter 2, is defined as the provision of 
daily, social, psychological, emotional, and physical attention for people. 
This can be given paid or unpaid, informally or professionally, and within 
the state, market, or families. For women, care is crucial. It is not only an 
activity, it also shapes their identity. Women’s decisions, especially when 
they concern work, are often made in the context of care. In other words, 
without looking through the lens of care it may be hard to understand 
women’s work patterns.
 Focusing on care has a different departure point than the exclusive 
focus on paid work. Care also urges us to rethink the normative assump-
tions about what a citizen is or should be. The concept of citizenship has 
become a popular yardstick by which to judge social policy outcomes, 
both in the political and the academic world (Marshall 1950; Esping-An-
dersen 1990; Hobson and Lister 2002). Traditionally, a person is seen as 
a full citizen when he is in paid work. Of course, women’s employment is 
important – as Lisbon, Kok, and Esping-Andersen also stress – but not 
only in a functionalist, instrumental way aimed at saving the economy or 
the welfare state. Many women today desire to continue working even 
when they become mothers. Becoming a full-time mother is no longer a 
cultural given. This has not only changed the structure of labour markets 
but also the balance of power within families as women became earners 
too. The American sociologist Hochschild (1989) argues that women are 
involved in the biggest social and cultural revolution of our time.
 But Hochschild also spoke about the ‘stalled revolution’: what happens 
to caring when mothers enter the labour market? During the industri-
THE CARING DIMENSION OF WELFARE STATES

al revolution, men moved out of their houses and lands into factories, 
shops, and offices while women moved inside the home. This became the 
dominant division of labour. But now that women are moving outside the 
home, men do not behave accordingly and move inside. As a result, many 
women now have two jobs: one outside the home and another one, when 
they come back, in the home, not only in the us, but even in Scandinavia 
(Borchorst and Siim 1987). To put it mildly, this is not the gender equality 
women wanted. Rather than a primary focus on women’s participation 
in work, men’s participation in care is important too. In that sense, care 
– surprisingly – also brings men into this book. What are European men 
doing? Can we see variety in men’s participation in care across Europe?
 Care is not just a matter of equal distribution: it is also an important 
value in people’s lives. Both men and women like to give care and feel it 
is part of living the life of a social, human being. Caring time gives peo-
ple the possibility to relate to children, parents, neighbours, friends, and 
significant others. In both the Lisbon Strategy and Esping-Andersen’s 
(2002) new Beveridge plan, care is made subordinate and instrumental 
to the European interest of economic growth and employment. Care is 
primarily seen as a hindrance for working women. But is time to care 
not important in its own right – also with an eye to the social future of 
Europe?
 This book will propose how care can be included in the concept of citi-
zenship. If T.H. Marshall (1976 or 1949), one of the founding fathers of the 
theory of citizenship, were still alive, he could have easily included care in 
the concept. The focus on paid work and having ‘a modicum of economic 
welfare and security’ (1976 or 1949: 72) was also common in his time, but 
he also saw citizenship as living ‘the life of a civilised being, according to 
the standard prevailing in society’ (ibid., 72). For Marshall, citizenship 
meant the right to participate and be a member of society. Citizenship 
in this new interpretation offers people the right to participate in work 
as well as in care. In this book, participation in work is one indicator of 
citizenship, participation in care another.
 Taking care seriously also urges us to study welfare states more pre-
cisely and study them as ‘caring states’. In Marshall’s view, rights are seen 
as admission tickets for participation in society. This book studies three 
caring rights. The first is the right to give care. This can include exemp-
tions from work obligations, as lone mothers had in the Netherlands and 
the uk, or the more popular parental leave schemes. These rights may 
reduce women’s employment rates but increase their (individual) income. 
A second right is the category of derived rights to give care, such as the 
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so-called male breadwinner bonuses in taxation. Breadwinners receive 
extra income to allow their wives to give care. Such rights have the poten-
tial to reduce women’s employment rates as well as their income. A third 
right is the right to receive care, such as home care for elderly or childcare 
services. Such services may increase the employment rates of potential 
carers and raise their income.
 Studying these care rights crosses many social policy domains. For this 
reason, taxation, social security, leaves, and childcare services are studied 
and connected in this book. Welfare states make sure in different ways 
that children, the frail elderly and disabled people are cared for. They can 
provide or subsidise care services, or compensate caregivers financially 
via taxation, leave schemes, or social security. Together they show how 
welfare states care.
 The question is: what has happened the last decades to caring rights? 
Can we see convergence or divergence in care policies? Does caring grad-
ually become part of citizenship in all countries, as Jenson and Sineau 
(2001) argue? (see also Daly 2001). At the same time, in the last two de-
cades many welfare states were in a state of permanent austerity (Pierson 
2001), and the right and duty to work have become increasingly important 
– more important than caring (Lister 1997; oecd 2000b; Kvist and Jæger 
2004; Orloff 2006). To put it differently, T.H. Marshall writes that civil 
rights like freedom of speech developed in the eighteenth century. Po-
litical rights, such as the right to vote, came into being in the nineteenth 
century. Social rights – the ‘crowning stage’ of citizenship – have been 
struggled for in the twentieth century. Will the twenty-first century go 
down in the history books as the age of work or that of caring rights?
 The Cultural Dimension of Welfare States
The second contribution of this book is to include a cultural dimension in 
the study of welfare states. The Lisbon targets seem to show that European 
leaders still believe that politics can influence women’s decisions: social 
policy matters. A ‘cultural approach’ stresses that the impact of welfare 
states is heavily overestimated. In contrast to the ‘comparative welfare 
regime approach’, it is said that women’s own wishes and values can best 
explain the diversity in Europe. A cultural approach also claims it can un-
derstand change much better. Inspired by Giddens (1991), Hakim (2000, 
2003a) argues that women in Europe are now free to choose to work or to 
care for the first time in history. Consequently, women’s employment and 
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care patterns are a direct result of their work-life preferences. Also Pfau-
Effinger (1998, 1999) stresses the importance of the interplay between 
gender arrangements – the work-and-care practices of men and women 
– and gender culture, such as norms, values, and attitudes towards work 
and care.
 The cultural approach states that changes in women’s employment 
cannot simply be enforced by social policies or Lisbon strategies. Chang-
es come, so to speak, ‘from below’: women themselves sew the European 
work-and-care patchwork. In the cultural approach, women are not held 
back by social policy bars. If mothers do not work it is because they do 
not want to: they want to care. This book tries to sort out empirically 
what best explains the changing gendered division of labour, care, and 
income across European countries: women’s (and men’s) own values or 
care policies?
 Four countries are studied: the uk, the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Belgium. A detailed analysis is made of citizenship and the changes in 
the last two decades: the gender division of labour, care, and income. 
What is the dominant work-and-care practice in each country, and what 
do women and men want? The focus is on mothers and care for young 
children. This analysis will be confronted with the cross-national study of 
the origins and mechanisms of social policy in four domains: taxation, so-
cial security, leaves (chapter 5), and childcare services (chapter 6). Let me 
summarise the conclusions in a few sentences: it is not true that the more 
abundant or cheaper childcare services are, the more mothers will work. 
Or that the more work incentives in taxation, the more women will work. 
But neither it is true that women (or men) behave according to their own, 
individual wishes and preferences. There is no straightforward, clear-cut 
relationship between womens’ and mens’ participation in work and care 
in welfare states, nor with womens’ and mens’ values and preferences. In 
other words, both approaches – the comparative welfare regime as well as 
the cultural – cannot be empirically grounded. Diversity in Europe cannot 
be explained sufficiently by either theory.
 This book argues that what may help explain European diversity and 
change is when culture is seen as a dimension of welfare states (Rothstein 
1998; Chamberlayne 1999; Clarke 2004; Van Oorschot 2003). While the 
cultural approach downplays social policy too much, social policy stud-
ies have little tradition of including culture in their analyses? To connect 
both, I propose using the concept of ‘ideals of care’.
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Ideals of Care
When I go to work, I feel guilty, is the title of a much-sold advice book for 
working mothers (Gilliband and Mosley 1998). According to the subtitle, 
this is a self-help book ‘for sanity and survival’, advising mothers on how 
to say goodbye at the kindergarten gates. This book was popular in the uk 
and has also been translated into Dutch. It points out that mothers’ move 
into the economy is related to discussions around care. It also indicates 
that mothers do not feel the transition to employment has been paved 
with roses: their decision to work is surrounded by morality issues.
 For mothers, to work or to care is a moral predicament. The feeling 
that their child is well cared for is a condition for being at ease at work. 
When mothers decide about work, they do not simply make a cost-ben-
efit analysis – how expensive is childcare or what are my tax returns – as 
the comparative welfare regime approach tends to assume (Pfau-Effinger 
1998; Duncan and Edwards 1999; Duncan et al. 2004; Lewis 2001). Their 
decision-making is based on ‘a logic of appropriateness’ (March and Ol-
sen 1989). Appropriate childcare that fits parents’ notion of what good 
care is helps working women. An ideal of care, as Hochschild (1995, 2003) 
points out, is an image of what is considered good childcare. In my view, 
ideals of care are moral images that are shaped culturally.
 In each of the countries covered by this study, mothers entered the 
labour market in large numbers in different points in the period of time 
covered by this study but in each period and in each country mothers’ 
interests were often placed against the interest of the child in the public 
debate. After the full-time motherhood ideal, new care ideals arose and 
old ones were revived. These new ideals softened the moral clash between 
working mothers and childrens’ interests. In this study, four ‘new’ ideals, 
which came after the care ideal of the full-time mother, are distinguished: 
intergenerational care, surrogate mothers, parental sharing, and profes-
sional care. This book attempts to show that each welfare state promotes 
different ideals of care. In Dutch social policy, for instance, the ideal of 
parental sharing is dominant; in Denmark the ideal of professional care.
 The concept of ideals of care may be useful on two levels. First, ideals 
of care may help us understand the origins and development of caring 
policies: they reveal why some policies are in place in one welfare state 
while others are not. Why do Denmark and Flanders have such high rates 
of state-subsidised childcare services? Secondly, ideals of care may help 
understand different policy outcomes, i.e., European variety in gendered 
work-and-care patterns. The Danish welfare state promotes the ideal of 
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professional care. This means the belief that it is better for children to 
be socialised together, under the supervision of highly educated profes-
sionals, than to stay at home ‘alone’ with their mother. Such a care ideal 
may be the best guilt-reduction strategy for working mothers. Welfare 
states are often examined as structures of financial (dis)incentives – as if 
a mother was just a homo economicus. Studying ideals of care will help to 
examine welfare states as ‘moral agents’ or ‘cultural catalysts’.
 In short, this book will attempt to understand European differences 
and changes in women’s work patterns and to link the study of social poli-
cy with two perspectives: care and culture. Both perspectives will meet in 
the concept of ‘ideals of care’. Will such a study of ideals of care contribute 
to our understanding of why women across Europe are so different?
 The Empirical Study
Studying the origins and impact of welfare states on work and care pat-
terns requires a comparison, preferably across time and across countries. 
This book builds on a detailed country-by-country analysis of four wel-
fare states – the uk, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark during the 
1980-2000 period, although it is sometimes necessary to go back further 
in history or forward to the present. This period is particularly interest-
ing as welfare states were under permanent austerity and caring policies 
under a turbulent star (Lewis 1998; Daly 2002). At the same time, women’s 
employment rates increased but still showed diversity.
 Th e speciﬁ c countries were chosen because especially mothers’ employ-
ment patterns varied signiﬁ cantly among them. In the mid-1990s, Denmark 
had the highest employment rate fors of mothers, followed by Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and uk respectively. More recently, the Netherlands surpassed 
Belgium. In Denmark and Belgium mothers were more likely to work full 
time, while in the uk and especially in the Netherlands working mothers 
held predominantly part-time employment. In Belgium, mothers now in-
creasingly work part time (ecnc 1996; Eurostat 2002; Eurostat 2005).
 The four countries were also selected because they are representa-
tive of the dominant theoretical welfare state models. These models are 
clustered by specific explanatory policy mechanisms. Since generalisa-
tion power for case studies is relatively weak, using prototypes improves 
it: the mechanisms found may also apply to the cluster as a whole (Ragin 
1987; Guy Peters 1998). Thus in Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) welfare 
regime approach, the uk tends towards the so-called liberal regime while 
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Denmark is seen as typically social democratic. Belgium and the Nether-
lands are examples of Christian democratic regimes (appendix I gives an 
overview of governments in the four countries between 1980-2000). In 
Lewis’ gender models (1992), two countries represent the male breadwin-
ner model: the uk and the Netherlands. Belgium stands for the modified 
male breadwinner model, meaning that both routes – to work and to stay 
at home – are in place, while Denmark can be seen as a weak male bread-
winner model. This selection of countries offers us the opportunity to 
compare welfare states ‘across families’ and ‘within families’.
 It is important to note the specific situation of Belgium. In 1980, a cru-
cial law made Belgium’s three regions – Flanders, Walloon, and Brussels 
– responsible for ‘personal matters’ such as childcare and services for the 
elderly. This means that in this book sometimes Belgium is referred to, for 
instance when it concerns tax policy or social security, which are nation-
al responsibilities, and sometimes I refer to Flanders, when it concerns 
childcare services. I focus on this region because it can be fruitfully com-
pared with the Netherlands, as it has a shared past and a shared language. 
For the uk, which is comprised of England, Northern Ireland, Wales, and 
Scotland, a similar story holds. When it concerns childcare services the 
focus is on England.
 In cross-national studies one classic problem needs specific attention, 
the ‘comparability problem’: are we really sure that we are comparing sim-
ilar things? (Guy Peters 1998). For this reason, it is important to use con-
textualised knowledge (Daly 2000) as well as the strategy of ‘functional 
equivalences’ (Dogan and Pelassy 1990). Functionalists have emphasised 
that different structures may perform the same function. Conversely, the 
same structure may perform several different functions. In one welfare 
state women may be encouraged to stay at home via taxation, whereas 
in another social security functions as such. In one country children are 
cared for by childcare services when parents are at work, whereas in an-
other grandmothers care. This study therefore has a broad scope and is 
very detailed at the same time: it studies how welfare states care and how 
children are cared for.
 Keeping this in mind, the first set of sources are cross-national statis-
tics and studies, preferably those that have attempted to make data com-
parable (e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(oecd) and eu studies). Second, four-month stays in each country facili-
tated the collection of appropriate national data, such as studies of the 
origins and evaluations of social policies, with specific attention for social 
policy mechanisms. These stays helped me to gain contextualised knowl-
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edge. I nevertheless encountered many national-specific blind spots, of-
ten the inverse mirror of the dominant policy ideals. (In Denmark, for 
example, little is known about the male breadwinner bonus in taxation, 
while childcare services are studied abundantly.) More than 70 interviews 
were carried out with national experts to fill in these national gaps (ap-
pendix II). These interviews gave me the additional opportunity to verify 
or falsify my Dutch-biased interpretations of their welfare states.
 Outline of the Book
Chapters 2 and 3 contain the theoretical and analytical framework of the 
study. In chapter 2, ‘Cinderella and Snow White are Fairy Tales’, care is 
linked to citizenship. I will show that care is often portrayed one-dimen-
sionally and will try to offer a more adequate definition of care. Such in-
terpretation of care is easily linked to citizenship, the dominant yardstick 
in welfare state research to measure outcomes. I will argue that if T.H. 
Marshall, one of the theorists of citizenship, were still alive he would have 
included care rights as part of social rights in a modernised conception 
of citizenship. Chapter 3, ‘Policy or Culture?’, outlays the two dominant 
approaches that help explain European diversity in women’s work: the 
‘comparative welfare regime approach’ and the ‘cultural approach’. How 
do these theories explain variation? Special interest is given to the image 
of human decision-making that presuppose these theories: the homo eco-
nomicus and the ‘preference person’.
 The next chapters are devoted to the empirical analysis of caring states 
and citizenship. Chapter 4 describes gendered employment, care and in-
come patterns in Belgium, the uk, Denmark, and the Netherlands. I am 
especially concerned with (lone) mothers and the practice of (and wishes 
for) part-time work. These indicators of citizenship will be juxtaposed 
with caring policies in the four countries. Chapter 5 is devoted to the right 
to give care, financial compensations for care-giving, such as tax and so-
cial security arrangements, and leave schemes. What are the origins and 
consequences of these care-giving rights? Chapter 6 deals with the right 
to receive care: the state of childcare services. What are the origins and 
outcomes of childcare policy in these four countries? Together, these two 
chapters describe the cross-national history and impact of the right to 
give and receive care in the period between 1980 and 2000. These chap-
ters show that there is no clear-cut relationship between welfare states 
and work-and-care participation of both men and women. Nor are wom-
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ens’ and mens’ behaviour in line with their values when it comes to work 
and care. The existing theories fall short. Additionally, these chapters in-
dicate a change of paradigm: the ideal of full-time mother care is no lon-
ger dominant practice.
 Chapters 7 and 8 show which ideals of care have replaced the tradition-
al one, why, and what the consequences are. Chapter 7, ‘After full-time 
mother care’, focuses on policy change. This chapter examines which new 
ideals have become dominant in public policy and how they originated. 
Attention is given to the women’s movement – in its broadest sense – as 
its ideals of care have had an important impact. Chapter 8, ‘How wel-
fare states work’, studies the practice and consequences of care ideals. It 
shows that culturally-shaped moral care ideals are more adequate for un-
derstanding women’s decision-making in work-and-care than the images 
of human behaviour in the other two approaches (referred to in chapter 
3). Care ideals can help to explain the European differences in women’s 
employment and the differences between women of different countries.
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
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2 Cinderella and Snow White Are Fairy Tales:
 Linking Care and Citizenship
The story of welfare states is also the story of citizenship. In general 
terms, citizenship describes the relationship between the individual and 
the state, but in welfare state theories it often acts as a yardstick by which 
progress can be measured. T.H. Marshall (1976 or 1950: 29), one of the 
concept’s formative fathers, sees citizenship as ‘an image of an ideal citi-
zenship against which achievements can be measured and towards which 
aspirations can be directed’. Any interpretation of the concept is thus per 
definition value-led: it contains a normative definition of what a full citi-
zen is, and the rights and duties that belong to citizenship.
 A citizen, however, is often assumed to be a ‘he’. The exclusion of wom-
en has been firmly imprinted within the historical template of citizenship. 
The question of this book is, then, how to refashion the yardstick so that 
it is not based on the lives and aspirations of only the male half of society 
(Hobson and Lister 2002).
 This chapter will put forward how the concept of care can help to in-
clude women in the concept of citizenship. According to Daly and Lewis 
(1998: 4), ‘care is one of the truly original concepts to have emerged 
from feminist scholarship’. Putting the focus on care brings gender into 
the study of welfare states. When care is linked to the social and po-
litical analyses of welfare states, new insights may be produced into the 
gendered outcomes of welfare states. In other words, studying caring 
states may contribute to an understanding of the citizenship status of 
care receivers – such as the elderly, children, or disabled people – as 
well as caregivers, who are primarily women. The main objective of this 
book however is to understand the latter, i.e., the citizenship status of 
(potential) caregivers.
 This chapter will present a new yardstick with which to empirically 
measure citizenship. It is based on a reinterpretation of Marshall’s legacy 
and shows how care rights can be integrated into his notion of citizenship. 
In other words, if Marshall were still alive, how would he integrate care 
into his conception of citizenship? Before discussing citizenship, the next 
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sections are devoted to the question of how important care is and how to 
describe and define it.
 What is Care?
At least at one moment during their lives, every person is likely to be in 
need of care. No matter how much money one earns, no matter how ‘in-
dependently’ one can live from family and friends, everyone has been a 
child in the past, has been ill, and may need help when they are elderly. 
The need for care is inevitable. In practice, nobody can be left to his own 
devices all of the time. Care, in this sense, can be seen as a process of care 
receiving, but it is also a process of caregiving (Tronto 1993).
 Caregiving is a very gendered practice and gender is also about car-
ing. Providing care is often considered to be an activity that requires 
feminine qualities, and femininity is often considered to have a caring 
nature. Whereas women are more likely to be caregivers and men receiv-
ers, caring is not only an activity – it is also a matter of identity. Women 
are approached as potential caregivers, often seeing themselves as such, 
and their identity is constructed in relation to caring. Men’s activities 
and identity are constructed on the basis of the opposite premise, an 
absence of caring. Femininity and care are thus two sides of the same 
coin. Gender, however, is not equal to care; gender is broader than care. 
Conversely, care is not the only activity and identity that shapes gender 
relationships, but it is nevertheless a crucial one (Finch and Groves 1983; 
Graham 1983; Waerness 1984; Ungerson 1987, 1990; Knijn and Kremer 
1997).
 Care is also a multidimensional concept. Thomas (1993) distinguishes 
many dimensions to it: the identity of the provider and the recipient of 
care, the relationship between the two, the social content of care, the eco-
nomic character of the relationship and of the labour involved, and the so-
cial domain and institutional setting within which care is provided. From 
a gender perspective it is impossible to separate the informal from the 
formal practice of caring (Ungerson 1990), therefore I use the following 
description: care is the provision of daily, socio-psychological, emotional, 
and physical attention to people. This can be provided by paid or unpaid 
work, on the basis of an agreement or voluntarily, and it can also be given 
professionally or on the basis of moral obligation. Caring can be done 
for different human beings: the frail elderly, children, and people with a 
handicap (Knijn and Kremer 1997).
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Such a broad notion of care has several advantages, as it includes paid 
and unpaid labour across the politically decided boundaries of market, 
state, and family. This definition links British scholarship, which has 
had a strong focus on informal care and care for the elderly (e.g., Finch 
and Groves 1983; Ungerson 1987), with Scandinavian scholarship, which 
stresses the importance of public care (Waerness 1984; Borchorst and 
Siim 1987), and new European forms of marketised care (Lewis 1998). 
What they share is that the work of caring, paid and unpaid, is very un-
equally shared between men and women, and it is also undervalued (Daly 
and Lewis 1998).
Snow White and Cinderella
A broad definition of care goes beyond the highly normative debate on 
what care is about. In the political and academic debates on care, caregiv-
ers are often one-dimensionally portrayed as either Cinderella’s or Snow 
Whites. This is problematic, as the debate on care should not be guided 
by fairy tales.
 In the story of Cinderella, care is pictured as a burden, it is hard work. 
Cinderella sweeps the floor, does the laundry: caring means sweating. Poor 
Cinderella gets little recognition for her heavy burden: on the contrary, 
the caring work makes her dirty and ugly. She obviously does not provide 
this care of her own free will: she is forced to do so by her stepfamily. The 
only way she gets relief is by being saved by a prince, so she can escape 
from her caring duties. Snow White, on the other hand, loves caring for 
her little dwarfs. Her caregiving is not a job but a joy. Never portrayed on 
her knees sweeping the floor, she hangs out the wash in sunny weather 
while singing and whistling. In the image of Snow White, caring is more 
an attitude than an activity. She receives a lot of gratitude for her caring 
– the dwarfs caress and adore her. Caring makes Snow White beautiful, 
and it is because of her caregiving nature that a young prince falls in love 
with her. With tears in her eyes, she has to say goodbye to her care receiv-
ers. But she lives happily ever after and gives birth to a couple of children 
so she can continue caring.
 Both images of care contain ideas about the content of care, the moti-
vation to care, the relationship between gender and care, the qualification 
of caring, the role of the state, the role of care in family relationships, and 
an image of the care receiver. They are summarised in the table below.
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The fairy tales of Cinderella and Snow White have become real, both in 
political debates in various countries and in academic discussions. The 
social democratic welfare states, notably Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, 
are more likely to depart from the notion of Cinderella (see Ungerson 
1990). Because of feminist intervention, strong labour movements, and a 
strong work ethic, caring is more likely to be considered work. When it is 
performed informally within the family, caring can become a real burden 
for women as well as for family relationships, as an excess of it is dis-
ruptive to individual lives. Women should therefore be relieved from the 
oppressive load of care, as it is compulsory and consequently not a free 
choice. In socialist-feminist language, the ‘patriarchal societal structures’ 
are Cinderella’s stepfamily. Since caring resembles paid work, the solution 
to the problem of care is relatively simple: society has to value caring as 
such. Caregiving needs a wage, preferably paid by the state, Cinderella’s 
prince. In the ‘people’s home’ – as the Scandinavians see their state – pro-
fessional care is warm.
 Fairy tales about care are not only depicted in the political arena, aca-
demic contributions also contain similar stories. The Cinderella notion 
of care is particularly visible in the economic approach to welfare states, 
especially in the feminist and Marxist traditions, and can still be found in 
comparative welfare regime theories. Caring is then labelled as ‘unpaid 
work’, which immediately puts the focus on the socio-economic loss of 
those who care. These studies show that women would win economically 
and career-wise if they had no burden of care, and discuss care in terms of 
‘the cost of caring’ (Joshi 1992), ‘the cost of familyhood’ (Esping-Ander-
sen 1999) and ‘child penalties’ (Meyers et al. 1999). Liberation from care 
Table 2.1 Models of care
Cinderella Snow White
Burden/trouble Joy/pleasure
Compulsory altruism Free will/reciprocal relationships 
Labour Moral attitude
Oppression of women Gift of women to society
Money-saver for the state Protection against the state
Informal care is worse than formal care Informal care is better than formal care 
Economic value Moral value
Disruption of family relations Strengthening family relations
Negative image of care receiver Positive image of care receiver
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would give women the right to work and the right to economic indepen-
dence. The representatives of this Cinderella notion focus exclusively on 
the economic aspects of caring and cannot imagine that caring can also be 
a choice.
 Th e fairytale of Snow White is more likely to be told in Christian demo-
cratic and liberal welfare states. In the Netherlands in the 1980s, the Chris-
tian democratic answer to the crisis of the welfare state was the introduc-
tion of the concept of the ‘caring society’. If people cared more for each 
other, this would beneﬁ t social cohesion. Mutual care is not only desirable, 
it is a citizen’s virtue, a moral attitude – caring is not perceived as an eco-
nomic activity. Th is caring society paradigm is similar to the British policy 
of ‘community care.’ Although the concept has existed for more than ﬁ fty 
years, during the Conservative Th atcher regime ‘care in the community’ 
changed into ‘care by the community’ (Finch 1990). This social philosophy 
of Snow White argues that women’s caring is a credit to society. Concep-
tions of ‘a caring society’ and ‘community care’ stress that informal care is 
much better – warmer – than care by the cold state. A family is a ‘haven 
on earth’, which protects the individual from the careless state.
 In the academic debate, Snow White is often implicit in the writings 
of communitarians and scholars concerned about morality (e.g., Adriaan-
sens and Zijderveld 1981; Wolfe 1989; Etzioni 1993). For these scholars, 
Scandinavia is a living nightmare. A state that cares too much is a careless 
state, as it destroys the fabric of society. The American political scientist 
Wolfe, who studied the Danish welfare state, warns against ‘public fami-
lies.’ He writes (1989: 142): ‘A people’s home suggests that the caring which 
characterizes the intimate sector ought also to characterize the public 
sector … But the term raises as well the opposite possibility: if commit-
ments in the home weaken, so will commitments to the people.’ Wolfe 
warns against the social democratic welfare state, which he sees as the 
strongest ‘moral state’ in the world. If the state takes over care respon-
sibilities, people have no moral energy left to care for each other. The 
most prominent communitarianist Etzioni (1993: 60) even distrusts care 
outside the family: ‘We must acknowledge that as a matter of social policy 
(as distinct from some individual situations) we have made a mistake in 
assuming that strangers can be entrusted with the effective personality 
formation of infants and toddlers.’ Historically, these scholars are neither 
concerned about Snow White’s socio-economic situation nor with the 
gendered character of moral obligations to care. Today, however, Snow 
White storytellers – including Etzioni – may argue for a moral campaign 
to demand fathers to care too. The more care, the more morality.
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Conditions of Care
For informal caregivers, caring can surely resemble work sometimes, and 
it can be a heavy load. Professionalizing care thus becomes very impor-
tant. For others, caring is indeed a choice; caring full-time for their chil-
dren or frail parents makes them happy. Sometimes caring is a joy, some-
times a burden. It can resemble paid labour – or not. It can be driven by 
moral pressure – or not. Caring can pull people out of the labour market, 
yet sometimes people happily combine paid employment with family life. 
State care can be warm while at home it can be cold, but it can equally be 
the other way around. Caring is not a heavy load or a joyful activity per se, 
warm or cold; it depends on the relationship between caregiver and care 
receiver, the conditions under which care is given, and whose choice it is. 
A framework to study caring states should therefore go beyond a priori 
Cinderella and Snow White notions of care.
 The next sections will connect two issues that are not often linked: 
care and citizenship. If caring is so important, how can it be written into 
the concept of citizenship?
 Rethinking Independence and Participation
When Marshall wrote his famous essay on citizenship, just after the Sec-
ond World War, rights related to caring were not included; he spoke about 
the rights to work, housing, and social security. Like most of his con-
temporaries, he assumed that women would take responsibility for caring 
and be dependent on their husbands. Participation in the family was not 
questioned and considered as irrelevant. This is however a falsification 
of the past, as there had been public intervention into what is known as 
the ‘private sphere’ long before that. In the early twentieth century, for in-
stance, rights connected to motherhood, such as maternity cash benefits, 
were developed all over Europe (Bock and Tane 1991).
 In Marshall’s essay, labour market participation was the entrance tick-
et to full citizenship. He saw it as a status vis-à-vis the (labour) market. As 
in most liberal theory, care was considered as part of the private domain 
and therefore irrelevant to the public sphere as well as public politics and 
the notion of citizenship (Pateman 1989; Tronto 1993; Lister 1997). The 
spotlight on care, however, pulls the so-called ‘private domain’ into the 
discussion of citizenship. Or, as Leira (1990: 208) has put it: ‘What is lack-
ing is a concept of citizenship which recognises the importance of care to 
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society.’ Linking care to politics and policies can yield more insight into 
gender relations within welfare states. At the same time, looking through 
the lens of care may also help to understand how the welfare state itself 
is developing. For this reason, nowadays many scholars propose placing 
care at the heart of a gendered analysis of citizenship and welfare states 
(Leira 1990, 1992, 2002; Anttonen and Sippilä 1996; Lewis 1997a; Knijn 
and Kremer 1997; Daly and Lewis 1998; Daly 2002; Jenson 1997; Jenson 
and Sineau 2001; Daly and Rake 2003; Bettio and Plantenga 2004).
 Looking at citizenship through the lens of care has two merits. It helps 
us redefine the notion of participation, the topic of the next section, and 
it helps us rethink the concept of independence, which is so crucial to the 
citizenship debate. This will be discussed first.
Interdependencies
Citizenship theories often argue that an independent status is necessary 
to express political rights. The philosopher James (1992) shows that in lib-
eral theory conditions for citizenship are not only physical and emotional, 
but also economic. Citizens need to speak freely ‘in their own voice’, free 
from bodily violation or the threat of it. It is important to take emotional 
distance to think and judge. Economic independence is crucial because 
citizens are not in the position to express their political views if by doing 
so they run the risk of losing the means to provide for themselves or their 
dependants. In this approach, independence is a condition for democratic 
citizenship.
 Economic dependence can also trap women in a vicious circle within 
the family: their bargaining power in the family is low; they do not have 
the leverage to negotiate that caring is shared equally. At the same time, 
when their care load is high, their potential earnings and income in the 
labour market will be affected. Hobson (1990) describes this trap by us-
ing Hirschman’s framework. The more dependent a person is, the less 
exit possibilities she has, the less of a voice. If a woman has a better job 
and brings more money into the family, she can more easily demand that 
her husband do the dishes or take parental leave. Conversely, the more a 
woman is responsible for the house and children, the more difficulties she 
will have in finding a good, well-paid job.
 Independence, particularly economic independence, is thus consid-
ered to be crucial for citizenship (e.g., Lister, 1997; Daly 2000). Citizen-
ship rights, as Lister (1990: 460) argues, need to be individual rights, and 
can never be family rights. Family-based citizenship rights are a contra-
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diction in terms. ‘It is not good enough that rights come to women second 
hand, mediated by their male partners, so that in practice, they cease to be 
rights at all.’ Citizenship rights given to the family via the male breadwin-
ner make women dependent and even disempower them.
 Stressing the importance of independence and individualisation has 
had an important function. It was a wake-up call for those who fused the 
interests of families and individuals. The concept and practice of care, 
however, reminds us that we should not depart from the image of com-
pletely independent individualised people without ties. The problem with 
citizenship is that men have always been constructed as independent be-
ings and citizens while women have been constructed as dependants. But 
men are of course also dependent on women’s caregiving. Recognising 
the dependence of all human beings is one step forward in recognising 
women’s activities. The keyword should not be independence, but recog-
nising interdependencies (Pateman 1989; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Knijn 
and Kremer 1997; Sevenhuysen 1998).
 An interesting empirical example of such an approach is provided by 
Sørensen (2001). She shows that the increase of women’s economic in-
dependence in various countries actually increases the interdependence 
within the family, arguing that where women gained economic indepen-
dence men also become more dependent on women’s earnings for main-
taining a satisfactory standard of living. They share more equally in the fi-
nancial risks associated with the loss of one income due to the breakdown 
of marriage. This suggests that as a society moves towards more earnings 
equality between spouses, both husband and wife will gain ‘some finan-
cial independence’, yet at the same time will become quite dependent on 
each other. More independence for women, claims Sørensen, may not un-
dermine interdependence between spouses but rather strengthen it. The 
study of care thus entails different shades of dependencies.
 Moreover, the concept of care offers us a tool to study these dependen-
cies within families. Care also puts the spotlight on informal relations 
between generations. A good example is provided by Millar and Warman 
(1996), who studied family obligations in Europe. They distinguish a cat-
egory of welfare states in which family obligations are based on the ex-
tended family (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain); a category based on 
the nuclear family, (Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and the uk); and Nordic countries, which have minimal for-
mal family obligations (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden). An even 
more illuminating alternative would be to distinguish within the nuclear 
family and to study partner dependencies, dependencies between chil-
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dren and their old and frail parents, and dependencies between parents 
and their young children.
 Such studies of horizontal and vertical dependencies are profound and 
come closer to reality than those based on a simple and unrealistic notion 
of independence.
Participation
The second merit of looking at citizenship through the lens of care is that 
it contributes to notions of participation. It is impossible to rethink citi-
zenship without acknowledging the so-called Wollstonecraft dilemma, 
described by Pateman (1989) and modernised by Lister, who puts it like 
this (Lister 1997: 178):
We are on the one hand torn between wanting to validate and support, 
through some form of income maintenance provisions, the caring work 
for which women still take the main responsibility in the private sphere 
and on the other hand, we want to liberate them from this responsibil-
ity so that they can achieve economic and political autonomy in the 
public sphere.
The main dilemma is, then, should women become citizen-workers, 
thereby achieving the corresponding rights and duties, or should the sta-
tus of citizen-carer be upgraded so as to entitle women to full citizenship 
rights on the basis of caring?
 When women behave just like men and take up paid employment, this 
may indeed give them full citizenship status. But acting like men may 
cause more problems than it solves. This is shown in very different ways 
in Scandinavia and the United States. When women work just as much as 
men, they still have more responsibilities at home. Even the Scandinavian 
welfare state cannot completely socialise social reproduction; individual 
management and responsibility in the provision of everyday care is still 
important (Leira 1993, 2001). This means that women have double work 
shifts (Borchorst and Siim 1987; Hochschild 1989). In the United States, 
where state intervention is lacking, this may also lead to a corrosion of 
care, as children do not get the care they need (Hochschild 2003). Besides, 
in this model, women have been integrated into a labour market that is 
structured by the male norm: working conditions and hours are related to 
male working patterns. At the same time, their wages are much lower, due 
to gender segregation in the labour market
RETHINKING INDEPENDENCE AND PARTICIPATION

 The route to valorise caring and to pay for caregiving is equally prob-
lematic, as it has the tendency to capture women in the private domain so 
that they have less time and spirit to join the labour market or the political 
domain. This is not only problematic because individual women will lock 
themselves in, but also because caring will keep being ascribed to women. 
In addition, economic dependence seems to be an inevitable consequence 
of caring. When payments for caring exist, they are usually in the less 
generous league of benefits; payments based on employment are always 
more generous (Daly and Lewis 1998).
 According to Lister, the Wollstonecraft dilemma is a creative one. The 
challenge is to go beyond the Wollstonecraft dilemma and acknowledge 
the importance of caring without downplaying the importance of work 
and income. One way of doing so is to go back to Marshall’s notion of 
participation, which is central to citizenship.
Participation in Three Spheres
Marshall (1976: 72) has deﬁ ned the social dimension of citizenship as ‘the 
whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security 
to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised 
being, according to the standard prevailing in society.’ Th is not only points 
to speciﬁ c rights of social security, education, and housing but also to the 
right of participation. He sees social rights as admission tickets for mem-
bership and participation in society. Citizenship rights are rights of par-
ticipation. Or as Barbalet (1988: 67) writes: ‘Social rights may be required 
for the practice of citizenship in so far as they enable such participation.’ 
In many welfare state approaches the onus is on income guarantees, which 
make it possible to exit working or caring. But participation is not only a 
route to income, it can also be considered a right on its own.
 Citizenship is then a guarantee to participate in the various spheres of 
society, also including participation in income (Fraser 1989). Th ese can be 
summarised as the spheres of the state, the market, and families (Evers 
1987; Esping-Andersen 1990; O’Connor 1999). Th e ﬁ rst sphere is the state. 
Various rights are attached to participation in the state. Th e ﬁ rst ones are 
relatively old – as old as democracy itself – namely voting and participation 
in political parties. Locally and nationally, citizens should have a voice in 
public policy. Th is type of participation is in fact a condition for democracy. 
But when the ‘state’ became ‘the welfare state’, new rights of state partici-
pation came into being. Primarily Scandinavian researchers have pointed 
out how citizens participate in the state as clients of state services (Hernes 
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1987; Siim 2000). In the uk too a ‘Citizens Charter’ was introduced, and in 
various countries a national ‘ombudsman’ has been institutionalised – this 
to increase people’s voice in the service state. Also client rights have been 
installed : rights to complain, rights to participate in client boards, etc.
 Th e second sphere in which citizens have the right to participate is that 
of the market – or more precisely, the sphere of the markets, as there are 
two: the market of labour and the market of goods and services (Fraser 
1989). A condition of citizenship is that every human has the possibility to 
participate in the labour market. Women, the lower educated, the handi-
capped, racial or ethnic minorities: they are included if they are in paid em-
ployment , not only because paid employment oﬀ ers the possibility to earn 
a decent income but also because it facilitates having power in family rela-
tionships and public decision-making. Th e right to work is important, as 
Orloﬀ  (1993) and Lewis (1992a) also stress, but just as in the ﬁ rst sphere one 
also needs voice, thus power in the workplace. Th e second market is that of 
goods and services. Marshall describes this as the right to a ‘modicum of 
income’: low but qualitatively good. Th e practical translation is a claim for 
suﬃ  cient income, a claim against poverty. A woman-friendly interpretation 
is that this right should be an individual one – a modicum of income of her 
own. Women also have to be involved in ‘earning’, as Lister (1997) puts it, 
because when income is granted via a partner it is no citizenship right at all.
 The third sphere of participation is the sphere of the family and inti-
mate social networks. Citizens should also have the possibility to partici-
pate in the family and broader networks. Citizenship is about being able 
to live the life of a human, social being; to paraphrase Marshall (1976: 72), 
‘to live the life of a civilised being’. Having care relationships is part of such 
a life. Liberals have always worried about including the private sphere in 
the domain of citizenship, but the sphere of the family has opened up 
to the domain of citizenship exclusively for care issues. In other words, 
people should have the capacity to have time for care. As with the other 
citizenship rights, its practice is already visible in European welfare states. 
The right to parental leave, for instance, is now in place in many welfare 
states (see chapter 5).
Why it is Necessary to Include Care
Citizenship, in most theories – including feminist theory – means that in-
dividuals have an equal right to participate in the sphere of the market and 
that of the state. The often-called ‘private sphere’ is seldom recognised as 
a separate sphere of citizenship. Participants in the private sphere are con-
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sidered to be supporting the participants in the two other spheres, mainly 
men. For Voet (1998: 24), for instance, it is ‘equal participation of men and 
women in private care as a precondition of equal citizenship rather than as 
being itself a type of equal citizenship.’ For many scholars, the right to work 
– the right to be commodiﬁ ed – has been much more pivotal.
 This became clear again in the proposals of Hobson (2000) and par-
ticularly Kessler Harris (2002), who plead for a new dimension to citizen-
ship: economic citizenship. According to Kessler Harris (2002: 159), this 
is a new category of citizenship that supplements social rights, which ‘can 
be measured by the possession and exercise of the privileges and oppor-
tunities necessary for men and women to achieve economic and social 
autonomy and independence.’ Economic citizenship embraces both the 
right to paid work and the social rights attached to paid work. Although 
Kessler Harris believes that economic rights should be attached to care, 
all the practical solutions she gives relate to outsourcing care or sharing 
the care. Solving the ‘problem of care’ seems a prerequisite for paid em-
ployment. Here the Cinderella image of care pops up again.
 There are at least three reasons why care is not just a condition for paid 
labour and should be valued on its own terms. First, I reiterate that care 
has an important value to society: all people need care at some point of 
their lives. As Pateman (1989) already noted, it is most paradoxical that 
women have a lesser citizenship status whereas what they actually con-
tribute to welfare states is welfare itself. Recognition that care is good for 
society is not enough though: policies should be put in place to achieve its 
valorisation (Fraser 1997; Daly 2002).
 Secondly, care should be valued on its own because it contributes to 
its degendering (Knijn and Kremer 1997). Why is such a degendering of 
care necessary? If care is less strongly attached to the idea of femininity, 
women and men are freer to decide whether they want to be involved in 
informal or professional caregiving. They can do what suits their personal 
qualities and commitments, rather than being bound by gendered norms. 
Besides, if men were more involved in caregiving and felt responsible for 
caring at home, this would also support working women and decrease 
their ‘double shift’. Finally, if men connected themselves to care – and this 
is a strategic argument – care would not be undervalued as much as it is 
now. ‘Sullerot’s law’ stipulates that when women enter a specific profes-
sion, its status and wages decrease. The ‘reverse law of Sullerot’ means 
that when men perform a specific task, its status will increase (Grünel 
2001). It follows that once men become involved in care, caregiving will 
be valorised and this would also be to the benefit of many women.
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 Thirdly, care is important in the light of the social and economic future 
of Western societies. Most European welfare states are confronted with 
the double greying of society (‘younger’ seniors and the very elderly), a 
decreasing birth rate, and increasing female labour market activity rates. 
What is left is a growing and worrying care gap (van Lieshout 1994; Esp-
ing-Andersen et al. 2002). How are we going to care for the frail elderly 
in society? If societies do not want people being left to their own devices, 
caring must remain attractive for all people, women as well as men.
Citizenship is Both Work and Care
Citizenship, according to Fraser, refers to a social world in which citizens’ 
lives integrate wage earning, caregiving, community activism, political 
participation, and involvement in the associational life of civil society 
while also leaving some time for fun (Fraser 1994: 613). In the citizenship 
interpretation presented here, working, caring, and earning should be 
available and viable options at the same time. If one possibility is lacking, 
citizenship is second-class.
 The right to participate in all spheres means that citizens should not be 
captured in one sphere, be it work or care. In incorporating care, we have 
to also acknowledge the importance of work (Orloff 1993; Lewis 1997a). 
If lone mothers only have the right to give care, this must be recognized 
as a denial of full citizenship. They should also have the right to work, by 
providing good quality care for children. If people only have the right to 
work and are not allowed to give care, full citizenship is also denied. Peo-
ple are captured in the sphere of the labour market. Inclusive citizenship 
includes the right to paid work as well as the right to care. The question 
now becomes: how can welfare states guarantee such an interpretation of 
citizenship?
 Caring Rights and Duties: How Welfare States Care
A generous handful of social rights are defined in modern welfare states: 
rights to social security, rights to education, and rights to healthcare. 
Rights with respect to care are still less pronounced, but welfare states 
keep expanding and they often do so in the area of care. In other words, 
most European welfare states are redefining their care responsibilities. 
The question is: how do welfare states care? Can they guarantee inclusive 
citizenship?
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 Following Knijn and Kremer (1997), the different routes of participa-
tion can be reached via two rights: the right to give care and the right to 
receive care. Together, these rights guarantee citizens the option to be 
involved in paid work, receive an income, and participate in caregiving. 
They also guarantee citizens participation in families and social networks 
as well as in the markets of labour and goods. These rights can influence 
gender relations: they degender caring and paid work. Although the state 
needs help from the market and families, it has to guarantee this partici-
pation; citizenship is a status and a practice in relationship to the state. It 
is the only democratic and law-enforcing institution in society (Marshall 
1976; Barbalet 1988). Moreover, rights only become rights when they can 
be used in practice. A right to childcare laid down in law becomes a citi-
zenship right when childcare is indeed available. Rights to care and rights 
to receive care constitute what can be labelled as ‘caring states’.1
The right to receive care and to give care
This first right is the right to receive care. This right implies accessible and 
qualitatively good institutionalised care to meet the demands of different 
groups of citizens who are in need of care. Not only are home care, nurs-
ing homes, and childcare part of this dimension, but also social services 
such as social work and day centres for the elderly. The right to receive 
professional care is only enforced when the services are good and afford-
able so all citizens can and will want to use their rights, which cannot be 
demanded from the family or the market. Of course, receiving informal 
care from a relative, significant other, or volunteer who has the right to 
caring time is often a good solution for both the person in need of care 
and the caregiver. But the person in need of care can never enforce this 
right because this type of care is conditional upon the character of the re-
lationship with the potential caregiver. In other words, the family cannot 
and should not guarantee this citizenship right. Neither can the market 
grant citizens’ right to receive care, as it is inherent to market logic that 
citizens in need of care but unable to pay will not be granted care services. 
The only possibility left is good institutional care financially organised by 
the state, the collectivity.
 The right to receive care guarantees that citizens can participate in 
employment and earn income. A citizen may become a professional carer, 
but this will reduce the time that can be spent on caring in the private 
domain. Perhaps more important for women than for men, it guarantees 
people also having the right not to care. This is certainly not the same 
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as turning your back on your family. It is quite possible to have a strong 
relationship with the family while deciding not to provide care.
 The right to give care contains the option to do this for people one 
cares about. Clear and increasingly popular examples of the right to have 
time for care are labour market-related paid parental or care leave. This 
enables citizens to continue labour market participation while caring at 
home. Also, the exemption from the obligation to work for parents and 
carers on welfare should be considered as a citizenship right to time to 
care, just as other payments for care. In this case, the right to care full 
time enables citizens to (temporarily) give priority to care responsibilities 
instead of paid work.
 The right to give care means the right to participate in both caring and 
earning income. In practice, this right will reduce employment. This right 
to time for care acknowledges that care is an aspect of interdependency, 
as it recognises the needs and rights of the citizen as caregiver. The right 
to time to care is an important condition for informal caregiving, at least 
when it is not perceived as a moral claim and when it is not frustrating 
caregivers’ right to make an autonomous choice not to give care. The right 
to time to care may be more crucial for men than for women, insofar that 
it can help them to legitimise taking care of their children and dependent 
others.
 The right to give care and the right to receive care are not the only 
ways in which welfare states care. In order to get the full picture, it is nec-
essary to include all care policies, including those that downplay certain 
aspects of citizenship and have ambivalent consequences. There are other 
care interventions, such as indirect ‘rights’ to give care. These measures 
give citizens the right to participate in caring without granting income. 
Two policy programs are crucial. First, unpaid leave and statutory regula-
tions for part-time work. These measures make it possible to participate 
in care, but award no income. They are favourable towards time to care 
and therefore contribute to the caring dimension of citizenship. At the 
same time, citizens – mainly women – have to solve the dilemma of care 
and work at their own expense, as they do not get financial compensa-
tion.
 A second set of derived ‘rights’ are benefits mediated via a male part-
ner, such as male breadwinner bonuses in taxation and benefits. They al-
low for caregiving but do not offer direct income to carers, and often low-
er women’s employment participation. Again, social citizenship rights are 
per definition individual rights. If compensation is given to male bread-
winners, it may even disempower women as they become dependent on 
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men. These indirect ‘rights’ should consequently be placed between quo-
tation marks, as they do not really contribute to full citizenship.
 Hobson (1994) expresses worries that in the practice of welfare states it 
is impossible to develop participation in both work and caregiving. Social 
policy tends to value one route over the other. This is an important em-
pirical issue. To what extent are both the right to give care and the right to 
receive care in place in the various welfare states?
Duties
‘If citizenship is invoked in the defence of rights, the corresponding duties 
of citizenship cannot be ignored,’ writes Marshall (1976: 117). He defines 
the duty to pay taxes and insurance contributions. Education and military 
service are also compulsory. The other duties are vague, he says: ‘They are 
included in the general obligation to live the life of a good citizen, giving 
such services as one can promote the welfare of the community’ (ibid.). 
But in the liberal tradition of citizenship duties are not a condition for cit-
izenship, argues the philosopher Dahrendorf (1988). Indeed, as Marshall 
(1976: 111) stresses: ‘Rights are not a proper matter of bargaining.’
 Many politicians and scholars have argued for some time that too 
much emphasis has been placed on citizenship rights instead of on obli-
gations and duties (e.g., Mead 1986; Wolfe 1989). Others argue that today’s 
problem is not that women feel obliged to care, but that men withdraw 
from their caring duties. Too often, men exercise the right NOT to care. 
Their right to not be engaged in unpaid work has already been exercised 
(Orloff 1997). Cass (1994) therefore argues that care (as work) should be a 
condition for citizenship. One cannot be a citizen without the willingness 
to participate in caregiving. People have to first fulfil their responsibilities 
for caregiving work. Rather than developing rights, she argues, the duty to 
care should be extended particularly to men.
 Such an approach conflicts with the Marshallian interpretation pre-
sented in this chapter. One of the aims of proposing care rights is to give 
people – women, but also men – some freedom from moral pressures. 
People should not be captured by what Land and Rose (1983) have called 
‘compulsory altruism’. Besides, forced care is not positive for the caring 
process either, as it hinders the relationship between the caregiver and 
care receiver. Nobody wants to receive care that has been given under 
pressure, portrayed as a duty. This argument is often expressed within the 
disability movement: better a good professional than an informal carer 
who does not want to care, but feels obliged to do so (Morris 1991). Stress-
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ing the duty to care, finally, also reinforces the Cinderella image that care 
is a burden, one which has to be spread equally between the sexes. Pre-
senting care as a problem of redistribution will not seduce men to care.
 Some argue that Scandinavian welfare states indeed force fathers to 
care. For instance, in 1993 Norway was the first country to introduce a 
father’s quota or a daddy’s month as part of the national leave scheme, 
followed by Sweden. The scheme is set up so that if men do not take up 
some part of the parental leave, the family will lose this time (Bergqvist 
1999; Leira 2002). These ‘seduction policies’ should not be seen as a duty 
to care though, they are a right to give care but with a specific closure. In 
fact, the fathers also see it as a right (Brandt and Kvande 2001).
 Duties are nevertheless an important feature of citizenship, but in a 
very specific, contractual way. Rights should never be made conditional 
on vague descriptions of moral behaviour: specific duties always need to 
be connected to specific rights. In other words, duties should be in place, 
but only as a derivation of rights. In practice this can mean that if a person 
claims unemployment benefit, she has the duty to apply for paid work. If 
a citizen receives money when ill, he is obliged to do all he can to become 
healthy again. If a citizen uses the right to give care, for instance via pa-
rental leave, he has to give that care. Rights and duties should be linked 
clearly and contractually. This also means that the act of caregiving can 
not be a condition for the citizenship rights to vote or to receive health-
care. It is only a condition to give care when a citizen receives financial 
compensation for it. The duty to give care can only exist when it is linked 
to the right to give care.
 Conclusion: Including Care in Citizenship
Th ose who study the outcomes of welfare states cannot refrain from devel-
oping a yardstick by which policy eﬀ ects can be measured. Some scholars 
choose redistribution of income between families, others the position of 
people vis-à-vis the labour market, or the level of protection from poverty. 
Th ese yardsticks are always normative: they capture what researchers be-
lieve to be crucial. In order to understand gendered relations, this chapter 
shows how to include care in citizenship. Care is not only crucial towards 
understanding women’s position in society, it is also an essential activity in 
society – past, present, and future. Especially when looking at Marshall’s 
legacy – with his focus on participation in the community – it is not dif-
ﬁ cult to modernise his conception of citizenship and include care.
CONCLUSION: INCLUDING CARE IN CITIZENSHIP
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 A new yardstick has been proposed in this chapter: that of inclusive 
citizenship, defined as the possibility of men and women to participate in 
employment and care relations and to receive income at the same time. 
This ads to other citizenship interpretations that care rights also have to 
be studied (as part of social rights): the right to give care and to receive 
care. The right to give care, such as paid parental leave, entails participa-
tion in caring while receiving income. The right to receive care, such as 
state-subsidised childcare services, means the right to work, which also 
produces income. In addition to these rights, it is important to study the 
whole assortment of care policies. Important are derived ‘rights’ to give 
care, such as unpaid leave or the male breadwinner bonus in taxation or 
social security. These ‘rights’ allow citizens to participate in caregiving 
but without having an individual income. As a result, they may reduce 
rather than improve women’s citizenship status as this makes women 
more dependent on a male breadwinner.
 Th is book studies the caring rights of four European welfare states. To 
what extent can they explain gendered participation in work, care, and 
income across Europe? Although few studies have focused on caring states 
and participation in care, a long tradition exists in studying welfare states 
and women’s work. Th e next chapter outlays two strands of theory that 
aim to explain the diversity of women’s work patterns across Europe: the 
comparative welfare regime approach and the cultural approach. In addi-
tion, an alternative approach is presented which combines the best of both 
worlds and is based on the practice of caring: the ideals of care approach.
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3 Policy or Culture? Explaining Women’s
 Employment Diﬀ erences in Europe
Why do Danish mothers work more than their Dutch counterparts? And 
the Belgian more than the British? What explains gender diversity across 
Europe? And why are female employment rates changing? Fingers often 
point to welfare state policies. Th eir design can result in high or low female 
activity rates. Th e key question raised in this book is whether this is true, 
and if it is true, how can social policy inﬂ uence women’s decision-mak-
ing with respect to work. More recently, a cultural approach has gained 
ground. It stresses that the impact of social policies should not be over-
estimated, as they only play a modest role in women’s lives. Instead, this 
approach suggests that diversity of work patterns among European women 
can best be explained by women’s own wishes, values, and preferences.
 This chapter is devoted to a discussion of these two approaches. How 
do comparative welfare regime theories as well as cultural theories ex-
plain European diversity in women’s work patterns? Important issues in 
describing these theories are: what is the role of the state and what are 
the mechanisms that make women act? Which (micro)theories of human 
behaviour are used to understand how or if welfare states affect women’s 
decision to work. Another issue is how care is portrayed. Do these ap-
proaches acknowledge the importance of care in women’s lives? In the 
last section, a new approach is presented, borrowing the best of the two 
theories above and derived from the empirical practice of caring. In this 
approach the concept of ideals of care is centrally placed. To put it shortly: 
the different ideals of care that are embedded in welfare states can help to 
explain the differences in women’s citizenship in Europe.
 Welfare States Matter Most: The State as a Catalyst
The first approach to try to understand women’s employment patterns in 
Europe are comparative welfare regime theories, theories that are often 
inspired by the tradition of political economy. Stressing distinctive coun-

try-specific employment patterns in Europe, these theories argue that di-
versity in work and care can be explained to a large degree by the design 
of welfare states. People’s behaviour is shaped by the constraints and op-
portunities of specific social policies.
 Comparative welfare theories often study women’s employment pat-
terns as a consequence of social policy. They acknowledge that first 
women started to work and then welfare states acted upon care-related 
demands, and that some welfare states were more responsive then oth-
ers (Esping-Andersen 2002; Lewis 1992a). For instance: in a cross-na-
tional study of Norway, Spain, and Italy, Leira et al. (2005) show that the 
mass entry of mothers into the labour market preceded generous pub-
lic support for childcare. When women entered the labour market, they 
used informal care sources and then pushed the state to take over some 
of their caring responsibilities. Women’s entry into the labour market 
started social policy reform, but at a subsequent stage, state interven-
tion facilitated the employment of latter generations of mothers. In other 
words, the state is not seen as an initiator but as a catalyst for women’s 
employment.
 Comparative welfare state regimes theories stress that diversity of em-
ployment patterns is shaped by diversity of welfare states. This dates back 
to Esping-Andersen’s groundbreaking work The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (1990, see also 1999, 2002), in which the world is split in three: 
the conservative corporatist, the liberal, and the social democratic welfare 
regime. These are clustered along three lines: welfare regime, the configu-
ration of state, market, and family (which in its empirical part has been re-
duced to state-market relations); stratification, which by and large equals 
class inequality (rather than age, ethnicity, or gender); and social rights, 
which was translated into the concept of de-commodification, meaning 
independence from the (labour) market. The latter ‘occurs when a service 
is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a liveli-
hood without reliance on the market’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 22). This 
comes straight from T.H. Marshall’s (1976 or 1950) interpretation of citi-
zenship in which citizenship is seen as a status vis-à-vis the market. In his 
The Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies a fourth dimension 
is added to stress the state-family relationship: de-familialisation, mean-
ing ‘policies that lessen individuals’ reliance on the family, maximising 
individuals’ command of economic resources independently of familial or 
conjugal reciprocities’ (Esping-Andersen 1999: 44).
 The main claim is that each welfare regime, which has its own con-
sistencies, produces specific gendered employment and income trajec-
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tories. Before The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism was published, it 
was acknowledged that different models of welfare states existed, which 
even resemble the ones of Esping-Andersen (Titmuss 1974). It was also ac-
knowledged that welfare states had an impact on women’s work and eco-
nomic dependence. Women and the Welfare State by Wilson (1977) was 
one of the first to ‘dismantle’ the British welfare state, arguing that social 
policy – to sustain capitalism – maintained the institution of the family 
and within it the motherhood ideology. Welfare policies, she wrote, come 
wrapped in ideology. It was also acknowledged that in this respect the 
Scandinavian welfare state was different, and for women even preferable 
to the British or the Italian. In Women and the State (Showstack Sassoon 
1987: 19), the differences between welfare states were shown with a focus 
on the ‘differentiated analysis of different national and historical contexts’. 
In the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism these insights came together 
and showed that welfare states can be clustered along analytical and ex-
planatory lines, creating specific and predictable outcomes for women’s 
employment careers.
 Many scholars have added a fourth and ﬁ fth model to Esping-Anders-
en’s three worlds, renamed one or two, or incorporated a new dimension 
(e.g., Leibfried 1991; Siaroﬀ  1994; Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997), but a huge 
overlap remains with the original regime typology (see also Arts and Gelis-
sen 2002). Th e three worlds remain of important heuristic and descriptive 
value and this is how they will function in this book. Th erefore, I will give a 
short description of the three welfare state models and how women fare in 
them. I will not only copy Esping-Andersen’s description but also add what 
other scholars have contributed since then (and before).
 In social democratic welfare states, citizens are independent of the 
(labour) market; the welfare state protects them. This interpretation of 
citizenship can be ascribed to the social democratic movement, which 
strived to protect employees against the vagaries of the market as much 
as possible. The benefits are therefore generous – high-income replace-
ments rather than residual social assistance – and universal. This model is 
very women-friendly. As Sainsbury (1996: 45) argues, ‘entitlements based 
on citizenship neutralize the influence of marriage on social rights’. The 
social democratic model is the only one that gives citizens individual 
rights and produces independence from family ties (de-familialisation). 
It takes responsibility from family life and has extended the service state. 
Because of childcare and other services, women can engage in paid la-
bour. In addition, a major commitment exists to the right to work, which 
has equal status to the right of income protection. Sweden and Denmark 
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are archetypical social democratic regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). 
Norway seems to be a different model, also in terms of ‘women-friendli-
ness’ (Leira 1992).
 The social democratic model has often been praised for what Hernes 
(1984-1987) terms being ‘women-friendly’. The Danish scholars Borchorst 
and Siim (1987) even speak about a ‘new partnership’ between the state 
and the family. The same scholars also reveal the backside of the model, 
arguing that the social democratic welfare state institutionalises women’s 
double burden. While the welfare state was built on women’s employ-
ment, it offered no solution for inequalities at home. While women are 
busy at work, men have not shouldered responsibilities at home. Just as in 
the us – as Hochschild (1989) has shown – Danish women are also doing 
a second shift at home (Borchorst and Siim 1987). Others argue that the 
social democratic model is not more than a shift from ‘private patriarchy 
to public patriarchy’, with women still doing the less-valued caring work. 
The only difference is that they now do it in the public care sector. This re-
sults in high gender segregation in the labour market as well as low wages 
for women and few women in top positions (Borchorst and Siim 1987; 
Langan and Ostner 1991; Orloff 2006). Finally, women may have become 
less dependent on their husbands, but they are now dependent on the 
state. Hernes (1987) even writes about women’s triple dependence on the 
state as workers, citizens, and clients of welfare services (Hernes 1987). 
Therefore Leira (1993: 25) argues that ‘if the welfare state established a 
“partnership” with women, women would be their junior partners’.
 Whether social democracy is the cause of this so-called women-friend-
liness of these welfare states remains a question. Does this ideology pro-
duce social policies per se that are ‘good’ for women? Siim (2000) shows 
that particularly in the pre-war years Danish social democracy had its 
fair share of patriarchy. The emphasis on social equality and equity in the 
political culture was combined with a belief in the sexual differences be-
tween women and men. This passion for (class) equality while maintain-
ing women’s inequality was also visible in the other European countries 
central to this study (Bussemaker 1993; Lewis 1992a).
 The second regime is the Christian democratic, labelled as conser-
vative corporatist by Esping-Andersen (1990). In such a welfare state, 
citizens’ independence from the market is moderate. With churches play-
ing a pivotal role and continually warning against unbridled capitalism, 
the state has indeed intervened in the society, but only to the extent that 
formulations of social rights do not ignore the ‘natural order’ or turn it 
upside down. Van Kersbergen (1995) speaks of social capitalism being at 
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the core of this model. The Christian democratic regime preserves status, 
class, and gender differentials. The underlying idea is that differences as 
well as inequality are natural and ultimately unproblematic because men 
are bound together by ties of love, charity, and recognition of their mutual 
needs. Only the extremes of inequality must be eliminated (Daly 1999). In 
practice, this means that benefits are based on employment record; that 
benefits and taxation encourage full-time motherhood; and that social 
insurance is based on dependency relations within the family – that is, 
women are presumed to be financially dependent on their partners. As 
a result, few women work. This is also a cause and effect of the lack of 
care facilities. In the Christian democratic model, the family is the most 
important social foundation, not only for income but also for services. In 
the family people should have their natural roles, the man as breadwinner 
and head of the family, the mother as homemaker and wife. This fits an 
organic societal image in which societal spheres or subsystems are homo-
geneous and the autonomy of market, families, and state are presumed 
(van Kersbergen 1995).
 The Catholic principle of subsidiarity is considered crucial for under-
standing both the reluctance of state intervention and the fact that states 
do intervene (Esping-Andersen 1990; van Kersbergen 1995; Daly 1999). 
The state only gets involved when the family’s resources are exhausted, 
but also to make sure that the sphere can do what it ought to do itself. 
Or more precisely: ‘Subsidiarity is the state’s function to guarantee and 
facilitate the steady and orderly proficiency of the lower social organs 
up to a point where these components can operate independently of po-
litical arbitration’ (van Kersbergen 1995: 181). In that sense, subsidiarity is 
open-ended and the actual likelihood and boundaries of politicisation are 
historically contingent.
 Consequently, the Christian democratic cluster is very broad and 
which countries fall into this category is up for discussion. According to 
Esping-Andersen’s first regime study (1990), countries such as Germany, 
Austria, and France are part of this cluster, while Belgium and the Nether-
lands fit into the social democratic model. In 1999, he argued that France’s 
and Belgium’s membership in the conservative cluster was problematic in 
that familialism is less dominant (following Gornick et al. 1997). Native 
researchers however emphasise that countries like Belgium and the Neth-
erlands are part of the Christian democratic cluster, particularly because 
of their strong family dimension in social policy (van der Veen 1994; Knijn 
1994; Knijn and Kremer 1997; Andries 1997; Cantillon 1999; Bussemaker 
and van Kersbergen 1994, 1999).
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 The question is whether so many different countries can be lumped 
together. Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have always 
showed significant variety in women’s employment rates (Pott-Buter 
1996). More recently, the Netherlands has experienced a revolutionary 
increase in mothers’ employment (Eurostat 2005, see chapter 4). What is 
the analytical benefit of all of continental Europe ascribing to the same 
welfare state logic? Van Kersbergen (1995) argues that Christian demo-
cratic forces or, more precisely, Catholic forces have lead to a distinct 
type of welfare state. Their core is a religiously inspired politics of media-
tion in which social adjustability and the integration of social interests 
are crucial. These ‘politics of mediation’ help explain the diversity within 
the cluster. Daly (1999) argues, along similar lines, that the differences 
between Catholic countries – she herself studied Ireland and Germany 
– relate to which social forces and pressures Catholic forces have to bat-
tle, such as a powerful socialist labour movement or a rival Protestant 
Church.
 Finally, in the liberal regime people are very dependent on the market. 
They are commodified and thus forced to work, regardless of age, health, 
and family situation. Therefore, women have high activity rates. If wel-
fare state services are in place, they are lean and exclusively for the most 
needy. The ideological point is that the free market produces the best 
results in terms of social emancipation and economic efficiency. Only 
when the market and the family are short can the state be the last resort. 
The consequences of such a regime are huge differences between those 
who are and those who aren’t dependent on stigmatising welfare (Esping-
Andersen 1990). On the other hand, since benefits are low for everyone 
– men and women alike – liberal welfare states do reach gender-equality, 
but on a very low level. Women and men are just as likely to become poor, 
so gender differences may not be as strong as class differences. There is 
an implicit claim that class-related dimensions determine the gendered 
outcomes (O’Connor et al. 1999; Daly 2000). The us and Canada are part 
of this cluster, while the uk tends towards it: it is one of the few countries 
in Europe that can apply for the liberal label.
 Empirical analysis of the liberal regime shows that in practice it is not 
exclusively based on class: gender matters too (Lewis 1992a; Sainsbury 
1996; Daly and Rake 2003). A liberal model is based on a sharp split be-
tween the public and the private, the individual being the primary policy 
object. But in practice, social benefits are seldom built on the individual 
but on the family, and liberal regimes do have male-breadwinner arrange-
ments. In a country like the uk protective rights exist for carers, such as 
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benefits for lone mothers and informal carers. O’ Connor et al., compar-
ing four liberal countries, concluded that Esping-Andersen was wrong 
when he argued that in liberal regimes the sanctity of the market is more 
important than gender concerns. In fact, ‘the sanctity of motherhood has 
shielded women from the sanctity of the market’ (1999: 154).
 To conclude, the three worlds of welfare have had a crucial impact on 
analysing gender diversity in policy and practice across Europe. The mod-
els have an important heuristic value, even though each regime offers new 
questions: is social democracy per se connected to women-friendliness? Is 
liberalism blind to gender and care? Does the Christian democratic model 
have enough analytical power to understand gender diversity in Europe? 
And importantly: can these welfare regimes explain the recent changes in 
women’s work patterns? How can the dynamics at play in women’s lives be 
understood?
It’s a Man’s World: Care and Gender Models
In recent work of Esping-Andersen et al. (2002), gender has become a 
crucial concept. Why We Need a New Welfare State argues that gender 
equality is not only a women’s affair but a social one. Working women 
contribute to the economy, offer the best protection against (child) pov-
erty, and support the welfare state financially. Therefore, an important 
policy objective should be the harmonisation of the dual aims of career 
and motherhood. Childcare policy and parental leave are the crucial pol-
icy instruments to increase the possibilities for mothers to work. The 
other objective is to aim at full gender neutrality in the allocation of 
opportunities, life chances, and welfare outcomes. For Esping-Ander-
sen a new welfare state is built on women’s economic participation. In 
1999 Esping-Andersen also included the concept of de-familialisation as 
a fourth dimension in his analytical framework of welfare regimes, in 
addition to the three he already outlined in 1990. Citizenship not only 
means being independent from the market, but also being independent 
from the family.
 Esping-Andersen included gender in his three worlds of welfare, but 
many scholars argued that he did not do it well. The first criticism was 
that in analysing social rights he fused families and individuals. This is 
quite visible in his definition of de-commodification: ‘the degree to which 
individuals or families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living 
independently of market’ (1990: 173). But what is good for the family may 
not be good for women. Families may receive sufficient benefits, but when 
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these benefits are given to the male breadwinner that does not necessarily 
mean that women will fare well financially. Women are often financially 
dependent on a male breadwinner, even though they have recently gained 
much more economic power. In other words, equality between families 
can be high even when equality within families is low (Hobson 1990; List-
er 1991, 1997; Sainsbury 1996). McLaughlin and Glendinning (1996), as 
well as Lister (1994), subsequently proposed to include the concept of 
de-familialisation. The latter defines the concept as the degree to which 
individual adults can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living, in-
dependently of family relationships, either through paid work or social 
security provisions.
 The second criticism was that in the regime approach women’s caring 
responsibilities in the home are hidden. Citizenship is primarily concep-
tualised as a status related to the labour market, as in Marshall’s original 
approach. Women only appear when they enter the labour market. But 
in fact, many women in Europe have to be commodified first, before be-
ing decommodified. And after that they will be re-commodified, to use 
Pierson’s term (2001). The right to work may be just as important as being 
independent from the labour market, or at least a necessary condition 
for achieving such independence (Taylor-Gooby 1991; Lewis 1992a; Orloff 
1993). Alber (1995) also points out that the concept of decommodification 
does not say anything about the citizenship status of care receivers such as 
the frail elderly and children. Their first concern is not being independent 
from the labour market but the organisation of care.
 It is doubtful whether the notion of de-familialisation includes caring 
well in the comparative welfare regime approach. The previous chapter 
showed that for women the organisation of care is important to under-
stand their citizenship status. The way children and the elderly are cared 
for also reveals the conditions under which many women live. For caregiv-
ers (and care receivers) it does not matter per se in which domain care is 
provided – the state, the market, the family – but who provides care and 
under which conditions it is provided. In that sense, notions that start 
with ‘de’, such as de-commodification or de-familialisation – articulating 
independence from one domain – are inadequate.
 Moreover, the concept of de-familialisation seem to suggests ‘no fam-
ily at all’, even though the scholars wanted to capture the terms and condi-
tions under which people engage in familial or caring arrangements. It is 
unlikely that all care can be taken over by the state, not only because care 
is more than work or an activity – it also has a moral dimension (Lewis 
2001). And even in Scandinavian welfare states families still have respon-
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sibilities (Leira 2002). O’Connor et al. (1999: 32) criticise the concept 
of de-familialisation because ‘it conjures up exactly the sort of illusions 
about individuals capacities to operate without interdependencies.’ The 
concept and practice of care reminds us that we should not depart from 
the image of completely independent individualised people without ties. 
They prefer to include ‘the capacity to form an autonomous household’, or 
the shorter ‘autonomy’. In other words: are women – like most men – in 
the position of being able to choose freely whether or not to enter marital 
or other relationships, and to some extent have a voice in their character? 
(Orloff 1993) This book stresses the more active notion of participation in 
work and care, while also sharing in income. This citizenship interpreta-
tion stresses the importance of care.
 The notion of de-familialisation is also a missed opportunity to inte-
grate family sociology into the study of the welfare state. Also, the right 
to an autonomous household is too narrow a concept to study care and 
dependencies within families, including generations. Welfare state analy-
ses have always had a strong emphasis on women as wives and as mothers 
(e.g., Wilson 1977; Leira 1992; Silva 1996; Sainsbury 1996). This however 
highlights only two categories of caring women and two types of caring 
relationships. Looking through the lens of care can also help deconstruct 
gendered relations within the family: care not only highlights horizontal 
dependency relations, but also vertical (generational) dependencies (see 
Millar and Warman 1996; Knijn and Komter 2004).
 Moreover, the concept of de-familialisation reveals a Cinderella image 
of care. In the Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (Esping-
Andersen 1999), the concept of de-familialisation is empirically translated 
as the right to receive care, rather than the right to give care. It includes 
child allowances and day care provision only, and no possibilities for car-
ing at home, such as would be facilitated by parental leave. Welfare states 
are doing well when they take over ‘the costs of familyhood’, meaning that 
the state has to provide services. In Why We Need a New Welfare State 
(Esping-Andersen et al. 2002), paid leave is considered to be a crucial pol-
icy instrument, but only to increase mothers’ employment rate. Between 
the lines, citizenship is again translated as the right to work. Care policy 
is only instrumental to get mothers to work, not so much to provide good 
care for children. The previous chapter argued that citizenship cannot 
stand on one leg, it staggers without the recognition of care.
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Breadwinner Models
Other scholars like Lewis (1992, 1997) and Daly and Rake (2003) argue 
that it is impossible to simply attach women to a framework that is com-
pletely built upon a male norm. Lewis therefore developed new gender 
models rather than integrated gender dimensions into the existing wel-
fare regime framework. These gender models should not only diminish 
problem one – individualisation – but also get rid of problem two, the 
invisibility of unpaid work. The models are based on the variation in pol-
icy support of the male breadwinner norm and the gendered division of 
labour. In other words: Lewis stresses that unpaid and paid work are not 
divided equally in the various welfare states. The first is the strong male 
breadwinner model, visible in the uk (and probably in the Netherlands), 
which is based on married women being excluded from the right to work, 
subordinated to their husbands for purposes of social security and taxes, 
and expected to undertake the caring work within the home. The second 
is the modified male breadwinner model, seen in France (and probably 
Belgium), in which a parallel strategy is observable: women claim rights 
as workers and as mothers. Third, the weak male breadwinner model, as 
seen in Sweden (and probably Denmark), where mothers’ employment is 
supported by generous childcare services. Lewis focuses most clearly on 
the way welfare states have reproduced and contested gender inequality. 
Her typology ‘serves as an indicator of the way in which women have been 
treated in social security systems, of the level of service provision particu-
larly in regard to childcare; and the nature of married women’s position in 
the labour market’ (1992: 163).
 While also using these insights, Sainsbury (1996, 1999) criticises the 
models. She argues that the weak male breadwinner category is particu-
larly problematic, as ‘it seems to indicate what a country’s policies are 
not, rather than what they are’ (Sainsbury 1996:43). Hence she re-labels 
the weak breadwinner model as the individual model and contrasts it with 
the male breadwinner model. The difference between those two models 
can be deduced from 10 (!) separate dimensions, which are from a very 
different order, such as the basis of entitlement to social security, caring 
work, taxation, and family ideology. Sainsbury’s model has the advantage 
that it gives a name to the weak breadwinner model, namely the individual 
model.
 Unpaid work has been a crucial concept in these gender models. The 
problem is that the notion of unpaid work may reinforce the idea that 
welfare states are primarily about ‘work’ and ‘workers’. This is however 
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inadequate, as in practice much of the care work, also within the home, 
has been paid for (often collectively) via taxation or social security. The 
notion of care as described in the previous chapter includes caregivers 
at home as well as those who are paid via the state or the market. This 
is helpful as it goes beyond (nationwide) politically-decided boundaries: 
caring can be done privately as well as through the market and the state. 
Sometimes it is paid for, sometimes it is not. Again, unpaid work refers 
too much to the Cinderella notion of caregiving. Care resembles labour, 
and it is unfair that it is not paid for well.
 Later on, Lewis (1997a) herself was one of the first to focus on caring 
regimes to capture the gender dimension of welfare states. She argues that 
it is important to study under which conditions caring for dependants has 
been undertaken. This indicates women’s position in society. Bettio and 
Plantenga studied these care regimes cross-nationally and also conclude 
that ‘care regimes also act as independent incentive structures that im-
pinge on patterns of women’s labour market participation and fertility’ 
(2004: 85). This book, as chapter 2 shows, attempts to contribute to such 
an approach by linking the concept of care to the study of gender citizen-
ship and social policies (see also Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; Knijn and Kre-
mer 1997; Daly and Lewis 1998; Jenson and Sineau 2001; Daly 2002; Daly 
and Rake 2003; Anttonen et al. 2003).
 Still, the male breadwinner models have important heuristic value as 
they tried to catch three distinctive cross-national logics. As with Esp-
ing-Andersen’s typologies, only the Scandinavian countries will probably 
fit into the ideal of the weak male breadwinner model or the individual 
model. What is valuable about Lewis’ models is that while nearly all of 
continental Europe fits into the Christian democratic/conservative clus-
ter, there may be distinctions within continental Europe based along the 
lines of a moderate or strong breadwinner model. Lewis’ models are espe-
cially useful as ideal types. To what extent can we understand the differ-
ences between countries and the recent changes by using these models?
 It is problematic that in both Sainsbury’s and Lewis’ models cause and 
effect are not clear (Hobson 1994). In Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime 
theory, as we will elaborate upon in the next section, a specific ideology 
led to a specific regime, which led to specific outcomes. By proposing 
new models, the theory’s explanatory power is lost. What is actually the 
driving force behind a strong male breadwinner model or the individual 
model? The importance of class differences is also lost. Gender has re-
placed class differentials, while the (class) differences among women are 
not theorised. In other words, differences between women are not stud-
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ied within the gender models. Orloff (1993) and O’Connor et al. (1999) 
therefore argue that Lewis’ and Sainsbury’s models are descriptive rather 
than theoretical. Orloff (1993) especially makes a case for integrating 
gender into the male stream models because the explanatory notion of 
power resources can then be used. The next section will deal with this 
topic.
Origins of Welfare States
The strength of Esping-Andersen’s approach is that welfare states are not 
only studied as independent variables but also as dependent variables. 
This approach offers explanations of the outcomes of welfare states and 
studies welfare states’ origins. The main claim is that social policy is 
shaped by the ideologies that have been struggled for by power resources, 
mainly working class, trade unions, and other social democratic sources 
(e.g., Korpi 1983). Different welfare regimes are then shaped by different 
class coalitions, but within the context of inherited institutions. History 
not only defines the past, but also the present.2
 Rather than class-based power resources, scholars have claimed that 
women’s power resources are crucial. A long tradition exists of studying 
women’s representation: the extent to which women are present and pow-
erful in political movements and corporate channels (e.g., Bergqvist 1999). 
While some scholars claim that women’s presence in the political domain 
explains the woman-friendliness of the Scandinavian welfare state (Rug-
gie 1984), others argue that women are still lesser citizens exactly because 
they are not as well-represented as men in the crucial corporatist institu-
tions of welfare (Hernes 1984, 1987).
 Another strand focuses on the achievements of the women’s move-
ment (e.g., Bock and Thane 1991; Koven and Michel 1993) and especially 
on how collective actors make claims in what Fraser (1990) has labelled as 
the ‘politics of needs interpretation’ (e.g., Bertone 2003; Naumann 2005). 
When studying liberal regimes, O’Connor et al. (1999) made an important 
analytical difference between the way women put forward their political 
claims: is it through claiming gender-sameness or gender-difference? For 
the uk they found a weak women’s movement with a strong ‘difference’ 
approach and thus a strong adherence to the traditional male breadwin-
ner-female household model.
 Finally, women’s agency has been stressed, which in the broadest sense 
means a conscious capacity to choose and act on a personal and political 
level (see Lister 1997; Siim 2000). What binds these three approaches is 
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that women should not be simply seen as objects of a particular type of 
political ideology: they are actors of social policy.
 Neo-institutionalists link power resources to institutional settings, 
claiming that these resources are themselves partly the result of institu-
tional variables such as the rules of electoral competition, the relationship 
between the legislative and executive branches, the role of the courts, the 
place of subnational governments, and the administrative body in poli-
tics. Since these institutions are part of a stable historical legacy, the no-
tion of path dependency is central to this school of thought. While the 
power-resource school can be summarised as ‘politics matter’, the neo-
institutionalism’s credo is ‘governance matters’.
 Skocpol (1992) made a crucial bridge between power-resource ap-
proaches and the increasingly influential school of neo-institutionalism. 
Why, she asks in Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, in the early nineteenth 
century in a country with few welfare policies and no vote for women, 
did women have social rights, as evidence by the provision of ‘mothers 
pensions’? She argues that gender – as well as identity, agency, and rela-
tionships – has to be brought into the analysis, but this does not explain 
everything. Crucial is the fit between politicised social identities and 
group political orientations and capacities within governmental institu-
tions, political party systems, and the rules of the game. In other words, 
the overall structure of political institutions provides access and leverage 
to some groups and alliances, thus encouraging and rewarding their ef-
forts to shape government policies. Others are denied access and leverage. 
Skocpol also found that, once enacted, policies restructure subsequent 
political processes. This feedback has two routes: new policies structure 
the administrative arrangements or affect the social identities, goals, and 
capabilities of action groups. As Skocpol (1992: 58) puts it: ‘As politics cre-
ate policies, policies also remake politics’.
 Neo-institutionalists have more recently argued that power resources 
may explain the origins of welfare states but cannot explain the new poli-
tics of welfare states – politics of popular entrenchment (Pierson 1994, 
2001; see also Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002). The emergence 
of powerful groups surrounding social programs may make the welfare 
state less dependent on the political parties, social movements, and la-
bour organisations that expanded social programs in the first place. Pier-
son (1994: 29-30; see also 2001) therefore argues that ‘the analysis of the 
welfare state’s supporters must shift from organised labour to the more 
varied constituencies of individual programs. Interest groups linked to 
particular social policies are now prominent political actors’.
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 At the same time, in this approach changes are hard to understand: 
there is no impetus or struggle as in the power resource theory. Path de-
pendency and historical stability are crucial; what is explained is continu-
ity rather than change. Hence its scholars advocate the notion of policy 
learning, often seen as ‘puzzling and powering’. Social learning does take 
place when policy fails, anomalies occur, or new insights of policy effects 
arise (March and Olsen 1989; Visser and Hemerijck 1997).
 More recently, culture is increasingly being studied as the foundation 
of welfare states (van Oorschot 2003; Bonoli; 2000; Gelissen 2002; Arts 
and Gelissen 2002). In this approach, culture helps to explain the design 
of value systems like the welfare state. In other words, social policy is 
seen as the sediment of culture; welfare states are solidified values. Power 
resources alone cannot explain welfare regimes, people’s values are also 
important. What is problematic however is that by looking at surveys 
there is no clear relation between value orientations of people in differ-
ent nations and the type of welfare regime they live in. In most European 
welfare states, public support for welfare states is high, yet systems are 
very diverse. Even in a country like the uk, which had strong retrench-
ment politics in the 1980s and in the 1990s, support for the welfare state is 
strong. Culture may thus help explain different welfare regimes, but how 
exactly is unclear.
 Finally, the question is whether these theories are still valid when 
we study caring states rather than welfare states. When T.H. Marshall 
(1976) wrote his essay ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, his argument was 
very much ‘power resource-like’: social rights empower the poor, and 
the development of these anti-market rights has been achieved through 
conflicts between social institutions and social groups. In a later essay, 
‘The right to welfare’, when he was more concerned about care, he wrote: 
‘It cannot be said that society needs happy old people in the same way 
that it needs a healthy and educated population. Nor would it suffer any 
great loss if the mentally handicapped were not assisted (at considerable 
cost in time and money) to make the most of their limited capacities. The 
motive that inspires the services rendered to these people is compas-
sion rather than interest’ (Marshall, 1981, or 1965: 91-92). Marshall thus 
felt that care rights should be otherwise explained. One of the questions 
this book takes up is whether this is true. Can the development of car-
ing rights be explained by power resources (class-or gender-based) and 
institutional factors?
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Homo Economicus in Welfare States
So far, I have discussed theories of how different sets of social policies are 
supposed to create specific gendered employment and income patterns. 
The question is, what are the mechanisms of social policy, and why do 
they affect the actions of people? How do welfare states effectively ‘work’? 
Most welfare regime theory is not explicit about the mechanisms driving 
human behaviour. Implicit however is a focus on the financial incentive 
structures. Therefore, Duncan and Edwards (1999; see also Duncan et al. 
2004) argue that when (female) labour market patterns are explained, the 
image of the homo economicus is often implicit. Women’s actions seem 
motivated by economic gains and constraints. This is the more surprising 
as cultural notions are crucial in describing welfare state models as well as 
their origins (e.g., Esping Andersen 1990, 1999; Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; 
Sainsbury 1996, 1999; Gornick et al. 1997; O’Connor et al. 1999).
 Comparative studies often see the relationship between employment 
and social policy as follows: if breadwinner arrangements are rewarded by 
tax policy and social security, women stay at home. If childcare is cheap 
and available, women will go to work. Women enter the labour market 
when the state takes over the ‘costs of familyhood’, but stay at home when 
they are compensated for caregiving. Hidden in many such studies is also 
a normative assumption that women should and want to enter the labour 
market as they would then be accorded full citizenship. The assumption 
is often that people make rational decisions on the basis of financial costs 
and benefit analysis. In understanding the outcomes of social policy, an 
economic logic prevails.
 When the political economist Esping-Andersen describes the ‘three 
worlds of welfare’, cultural notions are prevalent. These three worlds are 
distinctive historical categories and the way they are described stresses 
distinctive ideologies. Inherently cultural notions like ‘Folkhemmet’, the 
‘people’s home’ – a place for everyone, based on equality and mutual 
understanding – help understand the social democratic regime, while 
the ‘family as the cornerstone of society’ is a cultural notion indicative 
of the Christian democratic regime. At the same time, Esping-Ander-
sen is most explicit in using a Beckerian theory to understand gendered 
employment. Nobel prizewinner Becker (1981) argues that when deci-
sions are made within the family, people behave altruistically and aim at 
the best financial profits for the family as a whole. This decision-making 
process within households is different from market processes. In fami-
lies, people’s actions are not based on straightforward individual calcula-
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tions as in the marketplace: household behavioural rules are altruistic. 
Consequently, the gendered division of labour is based on the idea that 
the household’s aim is to maximise economic gains. The person with the 
highest productivity in the household will specialise in household tasks 
(women), the other person will enter the labour force (men). This ex-
plains why women and men sometimes act contrary to their individual 
economic self-interest, as they are thinking about the economic profits 
of the family as a whole.3
 In his Social Foundations, Esping-Andersen argues that in most Euro-
pean families it is less financially beneficial when men perform more un-
paid work, as it is more profitable to bring a child to day care. Only when 
the gender pay gap is small, as in Sweden, are men more likely to take up 
unpaid work. ‘Lamentable as it may be, it is perfectly consistent with a 
standard neo-classical joint-decision model of household behaviour’, he 
claims (1999; 58). In Why Do We Need a New Welfare State he writes that 
women’s labour is guided by two kinds of ‘opportunity costs’: ‘One follow-
ing straight from Becker’s (1991) model, has to do with prospective earn-
ings, relative to their husbands. A second has to do with the implicit tax 
on mothers’ earnings that childcare incurs’ (2002: 80).
 Other welfare state studies do regard women not as family members 
but as individuals, and nevertheless base themselves on economic logic. 
Concepts like ‘opportunity costs’ and ‘financial incentives or disincen-
tives’ or ‘traps’ are used to describe the mechanisms that determine wom-
en’s behaviour. Economic cost-benefit analyses are made to understand 
gendered patterns. Tax and benefit schemes have been sifted through to 
find financial (dis)incentives. Childcare costs are seen as a hindrance to 
women’s labour market participation. The recent oecd study ‘Babies and 
Bosses’ (2002) that compares several welfare states is a good example of 
such an approach. It tries to show that childcare costs and male bread-
winner arrangements in tax and benefit structures result in low female 
employment rates. In welfare state analyses, as Pfau-Effinger (1998: 147) 
argues, ‘women are treated as rational individuals who orient their behav-
iour according to financial incentives’.
 Scholars who study gender in social policy often refer to cultural no-
tions. In fact, gender itself is a cultural concept. It can be defined as the 
social, cultural, and historical construction of ‘women’ and ‘men’ with an 
explicit focus on power relations. It follows that those who work with the 
concept of gender study the cultural dimension of welfare states. But few 
of them do so explicitly, based on a clear theory and methodology (e.g., 
Lewis 1992a, 1993, 2001; Leira 1993, 2002; Langan and Ostner 1991; Knijn 
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1994; O’Connor et al. 1999; Daly and Rake 2003; Knijn and Komter 2004). 
At the same time, financial cost-benefit analysis also prevails in gender 
studies. Examples can be found for instance in Sainsbury’s (1999) collec-
tion Gender and Welfare State Regimes. Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 
(1999) argue that means-tested pensions create a disincentive for employ-
ment. In the same collection, Meyers, Gornick, and Ross (1999) link child-
care to mothers’ employment by positing that the cost of childcare can be 
viewed as a ‘tax’ on mothers’ wages. Even when gender is used as a central 
concept, it seems difficult not to describe women as being locked up in 
financial traps.
 When analysing which image of human behaviour is used to un-
derstand welfare state policies, an ambivalence is thus revealed. Most 
welfare state scholars, including those quoted above, implicitly stress 
the cultural dimension of welfare state regimes. They reject the image 
of humans as motivated purely and exclusively by economic gains for 
themselves or their families. They do not see people as financial dupes 
only. Esping-Andersen for instance argues that the welfare state’s ‘insti-
tutions, incentive systems and inscribed norms of proper conduct’ shape 
behaviour in different countries (1999: 172). The oecd study ‘Babies and 
Bosses’ (2002) stresses that social norms are a crucial factor in under-
standing women’s employment. And Lewis (2001; also with Giullari 2005) 
emphasises the importance of social norms and notions of ‘the proper 
thing to do’. Yet neither theoretically nor empirically is an alternative 
model of human behaviour used. The underlying, often implicit logic of 
human behaviour in comparative welfare regime theories is often purely 
economic; people strive for economic gains, either for themselves or for 
their families.
 Culture Matters More: The Modest Role of the State
A second approach stresses that to understand the gender differences in 
work, culture matters the most. Women’s values and gendered arrange-
ments are more important than financial cost-benefit analyses. In con-
trast to the comparative welfare regime approach, diversity and incon-
sistencies are emphasised and so is the potential for social change. While 
social policy studies tend to stress deeply grounded structures, cultural 
theories are more concerned with how to understand changes such as 
women’s revolutionary move into the economy. The role of the welfare 
state is considered to be modest, although its impact is not denied.
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 Given the dominance of the comparative welfare regime approach, 
cultural approaches on this issue are thinly sawn and often problematic. 
The first problem is that culture has no consistent, productive definition. 
It is often summarised with a few nouns such as values, beliefs, norms, 
traditions, and practices (Freeman and Rustin 1999). Culture is often said 
to be the force at work which makes human behaviour apparent and dis-
tinctive. It embraces what goes on in people’s heads and hearts, and re-
lates to practices. Perhaps a nice way of defining culture is to see it as ‘the 
noise of a society’s conversation’ (Inglis 2004), but it is probably more 
useful to define culture as shared values legitimating different patterns of 
social practices (Freeman and Rustin 1999; Inglis 2004). A second prob-
lem with culture is that it is often a rest category: if nothing else can ex-
plain human behaviour – economics, demography, social facts – it must 
be culture (Chamerlayne 1999; Clarke 2004). If social policy cannot ex-
plain specific patterns, a cultural explanation is presented. Social policy 
and culture are then seen as two separate variables, they are considered 
each other’s opponents.
 Given the dominance of the comparative welfare regime approach, 
few cultural approaches exist. This section focuses on two of them, by 
Pfau-Effinger (1998, 1999) and Hakim (2000, 2003), which are not ad hoc 
explanations. Rather than seeing culture as a rest category, they focus on 
the independent power of gendered norms and practices (Pfau-Effinger), 
concrete values, or work-life preferences (Hakim). Although in a very dif-
ferent way, they locate culture primarily as a source of power from ‘below’. 
Both consider themselves as critics of the comparative welfare regime ap-
proach, but they also differ: Pfau-Effinger uses a ‘thicker’ notion of culture 
which is nationally and historically grounded, whereas Hakim uses a ‘thin’ 
notion in which values and preferences change fairly easily. Pfau-Effinger 
stresses social norms and values, whereas Hakim emphasises individual 
preferences.
Gender Culture, Order, and Arrangement
 The German sociologist Pfau-Effinger in an important advocate of a cul-
tural approach (1998, 1999; also Duncan and Pfau-Effinger 2000). She 
argues that in understanding European diversity in women’s work schol-
ars have placed too much attention on the explanatory power of welfare 
states. Social policies cannot explain the rapid changes in women’s lives, 
she argues. How to understand the increased numbers of working mothers 
in the Netherlands? And why did German mothers not enter the economy 
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en masse? The reason why social policies cannot explain these changes is 
that ‘the assumptions about the impact of state policies on the behaviour 
of individuals are too deterministic’ (1998: 150).
 ‘There is no doubt that institutional conditions such as the amount of 
public childcare, or the tax/benefit system, are of substantial importance 
for the employment behaviour of women’, she writes, but due to the focus 
on the welfare state and its policies, ‘the relationship between culture and 
structure has not been theorised well’ (1998: 150).
 To understand women’s employment patterns, Pfau-Effinger argues that 
the interplay of three dimensions is important. The first is gender culture, 
which she defines as norms and values towards spheres of work, women 
and men, childhood and childcare, and power relations and dependencies 
between women and men. Gender culture can be relatively autonomous 
but does influence the gender order, which is the second dimension and 
includes the labour market as well as the welfare state (among many other 
things). Both gender order and gender culture produce the gender ar-
rangement – the division of labour within families. Gender arrangements 
are also important in themselves as the practice within households also 
changes the gender culture and the gender order. As Pfau-Effinger (1998: 
160) puts it: ‘It is not the institutions [referring to social policies] per se 
that create employment behaviour. Rather it is the interplay of gender cul-
ture, gender order and the behaviour of women within the framework of 
gender arrangements which influences this behaviour’. This theory lacks a 
clear causal chain : institutions, gender practices, and gender culture can 
lag behind or come first. This is both a weakness of the theory and one of 
its strengths.
 Pfau-Eﬃ  nger also presents ideal types: the family economic gender 
model (as in family business), the male breadwinner/female childcare pro-
vider model, the dual breadwinner/state childcare provider model and the 
dual breadwinner/dual childcare provider model. Th ese models refer to 
speciﬁ c cultural practices and are nationally determined. She describes the 
‘modernisation paths’, as she calls it, of three countries: Finland, the Neth-
erlands, and Germany. While Finland is moving from a family economic 
gender model to a dual breadwinner model, Germany and the Netherlands 
have moved from a traditional male breadwinner model to a male bread-
winner/female part-time carer model. Th e Netherlands, however, has gone 
one step further and is now a dual breadwinner/dual carer model.
 What distinguishes this approach from the previous is the stress on 
the possibility of cultural change as well as the importance of people’s 
practices. People can influence both value systems and institutions. Fol-
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lowing Archer (1996), Pfau-Effinger stresses four basic assumptions about 
culture and cultural change. The first is that societies have long-lasting 
cultural traditions that have an impact on behaviour. The second is that 
although there is usually a set of dominant cultural values and ideals, 
there is no cultural coherence in society, as alternative and competing 
cultural systems may exist. Third, cultural change depends on the way 
social actors deal with contradictions and alternatives in value systems. 
And finally, cultural change is connected to structural change but it can 
also be autonomous.
 Such stress on alternative and sub-cultures and the space for change 
differs from structural approaches like the comparative welfare regime 
approach, but also from cultural-structural approaches as represented 
for instance by Douglas (1986), the anthropologist. In How Institutions 
Think, Douglas argues that an ‘institution works as such when it acquires 
… support from the harnessed moral energy of its members’ (1986: 63). 
At the same time, she argues that ‘people have no other way to make big 
decisions except within the scope of institutions they built’ (1986: 128). 
Cultural change is then hard to imagine. Today, however, we witness ma-
jor cultural shifts with regard to gender norms and arrangements. Women 
have entered the labour market en masse, a practice that was ‘not done’ in 
many European countries after the Second World War. Hochschild (1989) 
describes this as the biggest cultural revolution of our time. Pfau-Effinger 
thus argues that women and men can make a change. People are not ‘cul-
tural dupes’: they are able to change institutions, even though it takes a lot 
of energy and it is a slow process.
 State policies and collective actors, on the other hand, cannot always 
change culture. If the gap between policies, gender order, and gender cul-
ture is too big, little will change. But if the gap is small, state policies are 
especially important to understand the degree and speed of actual chang-
es. This is how Pfau-Effinger tries to explain why the Netherlands has 
moved towards a dual breadwinner/dual carer model while Germany has 
not. In the Netherlands, women, social policy, and the labour market were 
supportive of part-time work. This indicates that the theory should not be 
positioned too far from the comparative welfare approach. Especially the 
empirical analysis stresses the state and its social policies as a catalyst for 
the gendered division of labour.
 Two issues remain unanswered or at least less theorised. It is unclear 
how economics fits into Pfau-Effinger’s approach. Are material conse-
quences subordinate to culture? Or are financial structures part of the 
gender order? Secondly, how does Pfau-Effinger take care into account? 
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To her, care is no crucial concept. Care is only explicitly dealt with in the 
first dimension: the gender culture. This gender culture has two related 
sides: attitudes towards mothers’ employment (work preferences) and 
ideals of childhood. According to Pfau-Effinger, attitude studies show that 
especially in the Netherlands the employment of mothers today is much 
more accepted than in Germany. At the same time, the traditional ideal of 
childhood, according to which it is best for children to be cared for in the 
private household, is still dominant (see Knijn 1994; Plantenga 1993, 1998). 
Hence the supremacy of part-time work in the Netherlands. For Pfau-Ef-
finger, care is especially located at the cultural level and conceptualised as 
the opposite of paid work.
It Is a Woman’s Choice: Work-life Preferences
A second approach, which can arguably be labelled as cultural, is pre-
sented by Hakim (1999, 2000, 2003a, 2003b). According to her, women’s 
changing employment in Europe can be explained only by women’s diverse 
values or work-life preferences. In Europe, women and men now have 
‘genuine choices for the first time in history’ (1999: 33). They can follow 
their own life preferences, their individual life goals. This follows Giddens 
(1991), who wrote the preface to one of Hakim’s books, as well as Beck and 
Beck Gernsheim (2002). They argue that in modern times people have no 
option but to choose how to be and how to act. In this ‘thin’ definition of 
culture, in contrast to Pfau-Effinger, preferences can change rapidly. The 
main claim of Hakim’s theory is that personal preferences and goals now 
determine women’s fertility as well as their employment patterns.
 This new scenario, in which women are no longer constrained, is a re-
sult of two revolutions and three changes: the contraceptives revolution, 
the equal-opportunities revolution, the expansion of white-collar occu-
pations (which are more attractive to women than blue-collar jobs), the 
creation of jobs for secondary earners (part-time work) and the increasing 
importance of attitudes, values, and preferences in lifestyle choices. Only 
in countries in which these conditions are fulfilled are women really free 
to choose.
 If these conditions are fulfilled in a country, women will hold three 
divergent work-lifestyle preferences, which can be summarised in three 
different models of the ideal family (table 3.1). Some women’s preferences 
are work-centred – family life is fitted around their work and mother-
hood is not their main priority. These women are the minority (about 20 
percent of women in Europe). The second group, women with an adap-
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tive work-lifestyle preference, who try to combine work and care, is the 
majority (60 percent). These are the ones that enter the labour market 
but may not be actively seeking work during recessions. Part-time work-
ers also belong in this group. The third, smaller group is home-centred 
women (20 percent), who prefer to give priority to private and family 
life. Thus these preferences focus around how women want to deal with 
work and motherhood. Care is not a crucial concept, work-life prefer-
ences are.
Table 3.1 Hakim’s (2000) classiﬁ cation of women’s work-life preferences in the 
twenty-ﬁ rst century
Home-centred Adaptive Work-centred
20% of women
Varies 10-30%
60% of women
Varies 40-80%
20% of women
Varies 10 to 30%
Children and family are the 
main priorities throughout 
life.
This group is most diverse 
and includes women who 
want to combine work and 
family, plus ‘drifters’ and 
unplanned careers.
Childless women are 
concentrated here. 
Main priority in life is 
employment or equivalent 
activities such as politics, 
sport, arts.
Prefer not to work. Want to work but are not 
totally committed to career.
Committed to work or 
equivalent activities.
Qualiﬁ cations obtained for 
intellectual dowry.
Qualiﬁ cations obtained 
with the intention of 
working.
Large investment 
in qualiﬁ cations for 
employment or other 
activities.
Number of children 
is aﬀ ected by e.g., 
government social policy, 
family, wealth.
This group is very 
responsive to government 
social policy, employment 
policy, equal opportunities 
policy/propaganda, 
economic cycle/regression/
growth.
Responsive to e.g.. 
economic opportunity, 
political opportunity, 
artistic opportunity.
Not responsive to 
employment policy.
Such as: income tax and 
social welfare beneﬁ ts, 
educational policies, school 
timetables, childcare 
services, public attitude 
towards working women.
Not responsive to social/
family policy.
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Women’s values or work-life preferences are different from the way Pfau-
Effinger (and many others) have tried to capture gender culture, mainly 
by using national attitude studies. According to Hakim (2003b), national 
cultures are completely ambivalent about the appropriateness or neces-
sity of working women. No relation exists between general social attitudes 
– those that indicate public morality – and behaviour. As in Pfau-Effin-
ger’s article, Hakim uses the example of the Netherlands, however she 
draws the opposite conclusion. While in national attitudes studies Dutch 
women and men report that they are in favour of gender equality and ac-
cept women’s work, their behaviour is diﬀ erent. For a long time the Neth-
erlands has had one of the lowest female employment rates in Europe (see 
Halman 1999/2000; Knijn and van Wel 2004). Consequently, writes Ha-
kim, only personal goals and personal concrete preferences have a causal 
relation to individual behaviour. When people say that they are in favour of 
gender equality, this does not mean they practice this belief. Hakim argues 
that the crux lies in the diﬀ erence between choice and approval. Dutch 
people may approve of other mothers working, but for a long time it was 
not their choice. Work-life preferences are therefore able to explain work-
and-care diﬀ erences, general value studies cannot.
 Hakim seems to argue, more in line with Pfau-Effinger’s approach, that 
welfare policies are only effective when they fit women’s work-lifestyle 
preferences. In fact, her theory can be seen as a revision and strengthen-
ing of welfare state theories that sometimes have difficulty taking into 
account the differences between women. The table above (3.1) indicates 
which categories of women are adaptive to specific welfare state policy 
and which are not. Home-centred women are not sensitive to employ-
ment policy, but they are susceptible to welfare policies in deciding how 
many children they want. Work-centred women will not change their be-
haviour due to policy aimed at keeping them at home, but are suscep-
tible to equal-opportunity policies. The critical majority of women (60 
percent), however, are of the adaptive type. They are very responsive to 
social policy as well as to labour market opportunities. The majority of 
European women are thus receptive to tax and benefit structures as well 
as to the existence of childcare services. This however is at odds with the 
main claim of Hakim’s theory that in the new European scenario women 
have few constraints and follow their own preferences.
 Additionally, in contrast to all the previous theories presented in this 
chapter, Hakim tries to show that there are no longer nationally distinc-
tive gender patterns. Diversity across Europe as a whole is bigger than 
between countries, she suggests; there are no nation-specific patterns. 
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In other words, variation within each European country is greater than 
between countries. Most countries, she shows – although the focus is pri-
marily on the uk, the us, and Spain – have a mixture of home-centred, 
work-centred, and adaptive women. These countries also see a growing 
polarisation between home-centred, adaptive, and work-centred women: 
women within the countries have different preference sets. European so-
cieties are therefore not converging into any single dominant model of 
the family, and certainly not towards what is often seen as the final stage 
of modernisation: Scandinavia. Hakim emphasises that in contrast to the 
assumptions of the comparative regime approach, not all women want 
to work: some of them (around 20 percent) are home-centred and will 
always be. Hakim highlights that some women prioritise caregiving.
 While comparative welfare state theories tend to show that prefer-
ences are shaped by social policy, Hakim argues that public policy has to 
follow the preferences of women and develop structures that support all 
three family models. She criticises the European Commission (and thus 
also the Lisbon agreement), as it aims at high employment for all women. 
With this normative statement she stresses the importance of ‘the right 
to give care’. Her justification however differs substantially from the care 
approach presented in the previous chapter, in which the right to give 
care is not primarily justified because women want it. Other reasons are 
more crucial: it increases gender equality, decreases the care gap (which 
is especially important in light of the greying of society), and contributes 
to the possibility to participate in society as a human being. Additionally, 
the right to give care in combination with the right to receive care should 
ensure that women (and men) are not imprisoned by caregiving duties. 
The latter does not worry Hakim, probably because she believes women 
are free to choose anyway.
Human Behaviour
Finally, in contrast to the (Beckerian) homo economicus that often under-
lies the comparative welfare regime approach, Hakim’s theory is explicitly 
based on the micro-notion of preference, a concept borrowed in fact from 
economics rather than from cultural theories.
 Hakim challenges (mainstream) economic logics. Micro-economics 
in general do not matter much, she suggests, and certainly not to every 
woman to the same extent. In Europe, she tries to show, families are gen-
erally rich enough to support women to stay at home. Earning sufficient 
income is no longer a reason to work, according to Hakim, women’s pref-
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erences are. In addition, economic human capital theories, which claim 
that the more highly educated women are the more they want to put their 
knowledge and skills into practice, also fail to explain women’s employ-
ment patterns. Even when educational levels rise, some women still want 
to stay at home and indeed will do so. Cross-national surveys show that 
more highly educated women in the uk, the us, and Spain do not neces-
sarily want to work. In short, economic factors are not determinant when 
it comes to explaining employment patterns.
 Hakim argues that in modern societies preferences are not simply a 
post-hoc rationalisation of prior decisions but a motivational force. They 
are a cause, not a consequence of behaviour. British and Dutch women, 
for instance, work part-time because they prefer it. But the question is 
whether people have not changed their preferences (or concrete val-
ues) according to what is possible or what they are used to do. In Pfau-
 Effinger’s theory, the gender arrangement influences both gender culture 
(norms) and the gender order. People’s own behaviour in work and care 
affect their attitudes. This is supported by research on the basis of the 
European Value Study (Kalmijn 2003). It may thus well be that British and 
Dutch women prefer part-time work because they work part time (Fagan 
2001; Visser 2002).
 A final remark is that Hakim’s theory is incomplete. What it lacks is an 
explanation of the origins of preferences. Why are some women home-
centred, while others are adaptive or work-centred? And why do women 
have different lifestyle choices than men, who play no role at all in this 
theory? Hakim’s answers to these questions are not very convincing. In 
her 289-page book, four pages are devoted to this issue. While trying to 
debunk socialisation theories that stress the importance of upbringing 
to women’s preferences, she devotes some attention to the different psy-
chological backgrounds of women. She argues roughly that work-centred 
women have more self- esteem. Ironically, this can just as well be used 
to challenge her belief that home-centred women are genuinely free to 
choose: if they just had more self-esteem, they would do something else 
besides home-keeping (Hakim 2000).
 The image of the ‘preference person’ and the homo economicus have 
been heavily discussed in sociological, anthropological, and economic 
debates (e.g., Sen 1977; Gardiner 1996; Douglas and Ney 1998; Nussbaum 
2000; McRea 2003). Scholars also developed alternative concepts such as 
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1957), ‘purposeful choice’ (Folbre 1994), and 
even four new ‘whole persons’: the ‘person robust’, ‘person unpredictable’, 
‘person needs structure’, and ‘person under duress’ (Douglas and Ney 1998: 
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109). Rather than going into this theoretical and philosophical debate, my 
approach – see the next section – is more empirical and inductive. What 
kind of image of human behaviour resembles most women’s decision-mak-
ing? How do people with care responsibilities decide how to live?
 To conclude: the comparative regime approach has produced im-
portant heuristic frames to understand the relationships between social 
policy and women’s employment. Women’s differences in Europe can be 
explained by different (economic) incentive structures. The cultural ap-
proach adds that the recent changes in Europe cannot be explained by 
welfare states, not in the least because economic mechanisms do not af-
fect women. Women’s individual preferences (Hakim) or the interplay be-
tween gender and culture (Pfau-Effinger) can explain the recent changes 
and increased diversity in Europe.
 Yet, both theories do not satisfy because of empirical (see also chapter 
4) and theoretical reasons: neither the image of human behaviour nor the 
image of the state are helpful. If we turn to the practices of caring and 
welfare states, a new approach will come to the fore, which combines the 
cultural approach and the welfare regime approach. A cultural approach 
to welfare states in which the best of both are combined seems more ap-
propriate, locating culture within welfare states and not outside them. 
The next section is therefore devoted to the cultural dimension of wel-
fare states, or more precisely the culturally shaped moral notion of ‘ideals 
of care’ which are also embedded in welfare state policy. These ideals of 
care – which are expressed in social policy – do have consequences for 
women’s employment behaviour.
 Ideals of Care: Culture within Policy
When mothers wanted to work moral debates took place in many Euro-
pean welfare states. Who was going to care for the children? By working, 
some said, mothers harmed their own children. They were ‘bad mothers’, 
egoistic, careless. They placed their own lives, their wishes, and demands, 
before their children’s. In many social and political arenas, children’s in-
terests were played off against women’s interests: the debate took place 
in moral absolutes (Bussemaker 1993, Somers and Peters 1991, Bertone 
2000). When mothers wanted to work, they had to overcome this debate. 
In every welfare state such a debate has taken place and in every welfare 
state country-specific solutions were made to resolve the moral clash be-
tween motherhood and women’s employment. When the full-time moth-
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erhood model became outdated in practice what new moral ideal of care 
was put forward? What new ideals of care have arisen, or have old ones 
been revived? And what have been the consequences – especially for 
women’s work – of these new care norms? To understand gender differ-
ences and gender changes it is crucial to study which new ideal of care has 
been put forward in social policy and by whom, and what has been the 
impact of these new cultural care norms on women’s citizenship. Ideals of 
care are thus an instrument to understand the culturally defined, moral 
impact of welfare states.
What are Ideals of Care?
A care ideal ‘implies a definition of care, an idea about who gives it, and 
how much of what kind of care is “good enough”’ (Hochschild 1995: 333; 
see also 2003).4 More specifically, it implies something about where care 
should be provided: the child’s home, the carer’s home, or a day care cen-
tre; by whom it should be provided: who is trustworthy and well-equipped 
for the ‘job’; and in what way care contributes to the upbringing of chil-
dren: are children supposed to be socialised with other children, educated 
individually, cherished, or simply ‘looked after’? In my definition, care 
ideals identify what is ‘appropriate care’. Care ideals are the answer to 
the moral predicament of working and caring that many parents – often 
mothers – feel they face.
 Care ideals are existing practices, but they are more than that: they con-
tain a specific normative legitimation, a logic of appropriateness (March 
and Olsen 1989). Care ideals are highly gendered, they are part of a gender 
culture: their legitimation is framed in terms of whether they are better, 
worse, or just different from mother care; motherhood is a vital frame 
of reference. Ideals of care are not rigid moral rules: they can be negoti-
ated, are diffuse, and imply some form of negotiation and change. Ideals 
of care are not hegemonic or mutually exclusive. The moral predicament 
of work versus care is likely to be solved through a pick-n-mix strategy, 
it’s a cultural toolkit allowing for a bricolage of ideals. At the same time, it 
is hard to make some ideals compatible with others. While countries are 
not culturally coherent, some ideals are more dominant then others (see 
Pfau-Effinger 1998; Archer 1996; Swidler 2001).
 When the four caring states are unravelled, five ideals of care arise: 
full-time mother care, parental sharing, intergenerational care, surrogate 
mother care, and professional care. Of course, other ideals can be found 
too, but these five cover most images of good care. The five ideals listed 
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below are more precise about caring practices as well as policies than 
the gender models developed elsewhere (Lewis 1992a; Leira 1992, 2002; 
Pfau-Effinger 1998, 1999) or work-life models (Hakim 2000). They are 
also much more precise than the six items that measure attitudes towards 
work and care in the European Value Study (see also Halman 1999/2000; 
Kalmijn 2003). Examples are: a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his 
mother works. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a 
relationship as a non-working mother. No questions are asked about the 
proper solution for childcare. Care ideals not only deal with the (ruden-
timentary ) question of whether women should work or stay at home, but 
focus on what are perceived as appropriate care solutions when mothers 
are at work at a given time, in a given country.
 The ideals are exaggerations of realities and are thus constructed for 
analytical purposes, but they are not constructed as Weberian ideal types. 
Ideal types in the Weberian sense are built inductively. The purpose is to 
confront these ideal types with reality and search for deviation. This gives 
insight into causal relations (see Ritzer 2000; Zijderveld 1988). It is the 
way models such as those of Esping-Andersen and Lewis are used in this 
book. Ideals of care, on the other hand, came into being deductively: they 
arise out of the study of the four countries as well as cross-national studies 
of care (e.g., Millar and Warman 1996; Rostgaard and Fridberg 1998; Lewis 
1997b, 1998). Moreover, in this book care ideals are not used as ideal types: 
they are real types. They tell a story about welfare states and are not used 
as confrontational strategies.
The first ideal is obviously that of full-time mother care. In this ideal, con-
tinuous mother care performed at home is seen as the best way of bring-
ing up children. It is the ideal of Madonna and child. In the wake of the 
Second World War this ideal became hegemonic in every welfare state, 
although it quickly disappeared in some Scandinavian countries after the 
1950s. The ideal of full-time mother care was strongly reinforced by psy-
chologists, paediatricians, and other children’s professionals who stressed 
the importance of a strong mother-child bond as a necessary condition 
Table 3.2 Gendered ideals of care
Gendered by deﬁ nition Gender-contested Gendered in practice
Informal full-time mother parental sharing intergenerational
Formal surrogate mother professional care
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for the development of a child. The work of the psychologist Bowlby was 
important for this theory, which was made popular by Dr. Spock. Bowlby 
is the founding father of attachment theory. Using subhuman primates, 
he showed in numerous studies that the natural social formation is the 
mother and her children rather than the family, including the father. The 
father is of no direct importance to the young child, only as an indirect 
value as an economic support and in his emotional support of the mother. 
These theories of Bowlby and Spock enjoyed their prime in the 1950s and 
1960s but their legacy has lived on (Singer 1989, Soomers and Peters 1991, 
Lewis 1992b). The ideal of full-time mother care is increasingly outdated 
and has been replaced by others (and sometimes these have been replaced 
again).
 The second ideal is that of parental sharing. This model is based on the 
assumption that men are able to care for children just as well as women. 
Advocates for this model sometimes go as far as to argue that an increase 
in fathers’ care would be better for children (Lamb 2004 or 1981), who 
then would have another role model in addition to the more feminine 
one. Another line of reasoning suggests that parental sharing contributes 
to gender equality; at a time when women work outside the home men 
must also take up a share of the caring duties. Good examples of efforts to 
increase parental sharing include a 1998 intervention by the Dutch gov-
ernment, which ran a campaign entitled: ‘Who is that man that comes to 
our home every Sunday to cut the meat?’ and the Norwegian and Swedish 
laws on ‘daddy leave’, parental leave with special rules for fathers. In the 
ideal of parental sharing, caring is just as important as working. There-
fore, men should exchange time at work for time at home, whereas moth-
ers should do the opposite. Parental sharing is thus built on two legs: not 
only should fathers be involved, it also assumes that both partners in a 
couple are allowed to work on a part-time basis. The ideal of parental 
sharing is subversive because it degenders caregiving. In this model, good 
childcare is still presented as home-based.
 The ideal of intergenerational care is also home-based. The basic idea 
is that the first generation (grandmothers) cares for the third generation 
(children). In return, the second generation (the daughters who are now 
mothers) will care for the grandparents when they become frail (Millar 
and Warman 1996; Leira et al. 2005). This is not just a calculated system 
of family exchange. It also guarantees good childcare, because who could 
care better than the mother’s mother? She is not only experienced and 
can be trusted more than anyone else, she will also love the children the 
most. The ideal of intergenerational care is not gendered in theory, but 
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is in practice. Grandmothers, daughters, daughters-in-law, and grand-
daughters are the ones most likely to provide care. The system is gener-
ally matrilineal. The ties that bind are familial, and the extended family is 
regarded as a haven that protects its members from having to seek care 
in the outside world, from the market or the state. Care is best performed 
at home, either the grandmother’s or the daughter’s. Taking your parents 
into your home, rather than ‘putting them’ in an old-age home, is also an 
important expression of the ideal of intergenerational care. This is the 
way to pay back all the care work they did for you when you were young 
and when you needed help while raising your children.
 The ideal of professional care strongly contests the ideal of full-time 
motherhood because it maintains that professionals provide a different 
kind of care than that performed by mothers, but offer something extra 
that should still be part of the upbringing of every child. Professional care 
often takes place in childcare centres or is part of the educational system, 
and its purpose is defined in various ways: improving children’s welfare, 
enhancing their development, socialising them, and preparing them for 
school or for the labour market. Crucial to the ideal of professional care is 
that carers are educated and are accountable in a professional way. In fact, 
all welfare states implement the ideal of professional care for children 
aged five, six, and seven – this varies per country – through schools.
 The ideal of professional care for younger children (0-3) is mainly 
manifest in a country like Denmark, which has the best-trained childcare 
workers in Europe (Siim 2000; Borchorst 2002). As we already saw in 
the previous chapter, the Danes believe that childcare improves children’s 
welfare. Day care can give children the ‘social pedagogical’ attention that 
is not available at home. In the uk, education rather than welfare seems to 
be the most important rationale for professional childcare at the moment. 
This is a fairly recent development. Professional care in the uk used to 
be only for problem families, just as in the United States. There are thus 
already three different meanings for the ideal of professional care for chil-
dren: welfare (for the needy), social-pedagogical, and education.
 The last ideal is that of the surrogate mother. According to this model, 
good-enough caring is still done best by a mother, even if it is not the 
mother of the children (Gregson and Lowe 1994; Nievers 2003). Care is 
done by a childminder, babysitter, or family provider, usually for little pay, 
and because it is offered at the provider’s home it most closely resembles 
home-based care. ‘It may not help, but it can’t do any harm either’ is the 
way this type of care is legitimised. The purpose of such care is to ‘look 
after’ or ‘keep an eye on’ the child when the mother is at work. Surrogate 
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mothers are not supposed to change or influence children’s upbringing. 
They do not give something ‘extra’ to the child. In contrast, profession-
als have different qualities and qualifications than parents, but surrogate 
mothers are considered to have the same kind of qualities mothers have 
– motherly warmth, attention, patience – even though they remain sur-
rogate. In this model it is still better if motherly warmth and attention is 
given by the real mother.
A Caring Image of Human Behaviour
The ideals-of-care approach is based on an image of human behaviour 
other than that of homo economicus or the preference person. For moth-
ers, being a full-time carer is no longer obvious, but their decisions about 
work are always made in the context of care. To understand gendered 
patterns of work, care is therefore crucial. When women make decisions 
about work, the question is: how am I making sure that my children are 
cared for properly? And can I find a solution for care that fits my ideal of 
good caring? (Finch and Mason 1990, 1993; Morée 1992; Hays 1996; Bran-
nen and Moss 1999; Duncan and Edwards 1999; Knijn and van Wel 1999, 
Hochschild 1989, 2003).
 A second characteristic of decision-making is that it is not based on 
economic logic alone. Who cares is shaped and framed – although never 
exclusively determined – by gendered normative guidelines (Finch and 
Mason 1993), gendered moral rationalities (Duncan and Edwards 1999), 
or feeling rules (Hochschild 2003). In other words: ‘to work or to care’ 
is not exclusively a question of economics but a moral predicament, and 
morality is often linked to gender identity. This is nicely put forward in 
Duncan and Edwards’ (1999) study on lone mothers. They were puzzled 
by the question of why British lone mothers make the choice to care full 
time and postpone a working career that would lift them out of poverty. 
They concluded that lone mothers’ decisions are led by gendered moral 
rationalities that are constructed, negotiated, and sustained socially in 
particular contexts. According to Duncan and Edwards, lone mothers try 
to behave in line with their identity, their socially constructed ‘self ’. Only 
when the identities of worker and good mother are reconciled do lone 
mothers take up paid employment.
 The importance of morality as well as gender identity is also visible in 
two-parent families. In Hochschild’s (1989, 1997) studies on couples’ jug-
gling work and care, economic rationality often conflicts with morality. 
In The Second Shift (1989) she questions why men have not taken part in 
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the cultural revolution and taken over some of women’s responsibilities at 
home. With money in their pockets, women’s kitchen-table power should 
increase much more. But some working women, she found out, did not 
even ask their husbands to do a little more. And men did not do it them-
selves. Hochschild seeks the explanation not in economic theories but 
in the moral accounting systems within marriage and the importance of 
gender identity for both men and women.
 Studies on working and caring also show that decisions about work-
ing and caring are rational and purposeful; we no longer live in an era 
in which habits are the compass in life, although no human being lives 
without the weight of the past and the values he is brought up with. Car-
ing is no longer an unconscious habit, a routine passed from mother to 
daughter. Caring has been modernised, it has lost its self-evidence, as 
Sevenhuysen (2000) puts it. It is no longer a cultural given (Hays 1996). In 
that sense, Hakim (2000) – following Giddens (1991) and Beck and Beck-
Gersheim (2002) – is right in stressing that people must make decisions 
about their life, whether they want to or not. Normative guidelines are 
no longer clear-cut. For that reason, Finch and Mason (1993) called their 
book on caring for next of kin Negotiating Family Responsibilities. Family 
responsibilities are still in place but they are debatable.
 They also show that people use their brains when they negotiate who 
will care for their frail parents, people are involved in rational process-
es. This is also the case for mothers (Hays 1996), including lone mothers 
(Duncan and Edwards 1999). For them it is a rational decision not to fol-
low their wallet but their values. People in couples can also behave very 
calculative. Hochschild (1989) shows they use gender strategies – a strat-
egy of action – to push what they want.
 Action is not only rational but also relational and done in context. Or, 
as Finch and Mason argue (1990: 356), ‘There is a sense of interwoven-
ness between decisions being made by different members of the fami-
ly’. The concept of individual, autonomous choice, they argue, is not the 
right word for the process of decision-making about caring. Caring as 
also described in chapter 2 reveals various interdependencies. For this 
reason, the concept of individual preferences as put forward by Hakim 
(2000) is inadequate to understand women’s (and men’s) lives. Even in 
Hochshild’s studies, where households resemble battlefields, an ongoing 
(power) struggle coincides with the fact that partners make decisions in 
the continuous knowledge of dependence. This may be for love or because 
in modern times real efforts have to be made to keep marriages together. 
Hence rather than describing dependence within households as an altru-
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istic haven, as Becker does, households are better presented as an ‘arena 
of cooperative conflict’, as Sen puts it (in Gardiner 1997).
 Ideals of care are thus culturally shaped moral rules that are followed by 
rational people who make their decisions in relation to others. People do 
not follow these guidelines blindly nor will they always make the most ap-
propriate moral decision (Wolfe 1989), simply because they cannot or be-
cause of conﬂ icting moralities. As a woman in one of Hochschild’s books 
(1997: 219) says, ‘I do not put my time were my values are’. Human action 
is not decided by ideals of care, it is only shaped and framed by them. Ide-
als of care do not simply aﬀ ect the strategic calculations of individuals or 
prescribe what one should do, but what one can imagine oneself doing in 
a given context. Th ey are ﬁ lters for interpretation, and in that way guide 
human action. Care ideals oﬀ er scripts on what to do. And these scripts are 
still gendered – not only for women, for men too.
Economics vs. Morality?
Ideals of care offer us a more adequate understanding of work-and-care 
decision-making in families, much more than for instance the individual-
istic preference person or the homo economicus. Still, the caring rational-
ity should not be placed completely outside economic logics. For Finch 
(1989), economic factors are just part of the context of decision-making. 
Duncan and Edwards (1999) argue that individual economic calculations 
are placed in the framework of gendered moral rationalities, while Hoch-
shild (1989, 2003) presents a cultural alternative to economic cost and 
benefit analyses. Financial structures are not simply context though: they 
are more important than that. In some countries more than in others – 
the uk in this book – decisions around work and care can lead to poverty. 
In addition, culturally defined morality itself can be shaped by material 
circumstances: financial structures often indicate the proper moral hier-
archy in behaviour.
 In many welfare state studies, financial conditions and social norms 
are too often seen as two separate causes of employment patterns. Homo 
economicus is put against homo morales. Researchers test which variable 
is more important (e.g., Fagan 2001; oecd 2002, O’Reilly and Fagan 1998, 
Esping-Andersen 2002). But it is more important not to separate them 
cruelly (Knijn and van Wel 1999; Wheelock and Jones 2002). Financial 
measures have a normative meaning too. In the 1990s Dutch and Brit-
ish social assistance laws exempted lone mothers from the obligation to 
work. These women were in fact paid to stay at home. Such financial ar-
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rangements shape what is considered to be proper. Not all financial mea-
sures and structures have similar important consequences. For example, 
the male breadwinner bonus in the Danish tax system has not had the ef-
fect that women or men stayed at home to care for children (chapter 5).
 The crucial condition for being effective is that financial incentives 
must fit the dominant normative guidelines, moral rationalities, or feel-
ing rules which I have labelled as ideals of care. Economic incentives can 
become extremely powerful when they fit these norms, but they have little 
power when morally isolated. Affordable, state-subsidised childcare ser-
vices are therefore probably only effective when they fit smoothly into a 
broader moral context and fit the dominant ideal of care. In other words, 
financial incentives should be examined within the context of a larger 
moral framework. This reveals whether they are powerful or not.
Cultural Institutionalism
Decision-making within this ideal of care approach is described most ad-
equately by what March and Olsen (1989) have labelled as the logic of 
appropriateness. They argue that behaviour (beliefs as well as actions) is 
intentional but not wilful. For them, action stems from a conception of 
necessity rather than preference. Within the logic of appropriateness a 
sane person is one who is ‘in touch with identity’ in the sense of maintain-
ing consistency between behaviour and a conception of self in a social 
role. Ambiguity or conflict in rules are typically resolved not by shifting 
to rational calculation but by trying to clarify the rules, make distinctions, 
determine what the situation is, and what definition ‘fits’.
 March and Olsen’s theory fits into what Hall and Taylor (1996) have 
labelled as ‘cultural institutionalism’. They argue that institutions indeed 
provide strategically useful information, but also affect the very identi-
ties, self-images, and preferences of actors. In this approach institutions 
not only includes formal rules, procedures, or norms, but also the symbol 
systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the frames 
of meaning guiding human action. Such a definition breaks through the 
conceptual divide between ‘institution’ and ‘culture’ (see also Zijderveld 
1988). What is particularly valuable about March and Olsen’s approach is 
that the logic of appropriateness is open to change: it can be a result of 
historical experience (including socialisation and education) but also the 
destabilising of older sets of rules and norms. As one logic of appropriate-
ness is destabilised, for instance because of a war but also due to inconsis-
tencies with practice, space opens up for deliberation over specific norms 
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and values. Ideals of care are in fact a logic of appropriateness: they can be 
seen as an ‘institution’ or a ‘culture’ that is open to change. In one period 
a specific ideal of care is dominant while in a different period another.
Understanding Policy Change
The shift in ideals of care from full-time motherhood to another ideal 
has some logic to it. In most cases, the state changed its policy only when 
quite a number of women were already in the labour force. Most of the 
time, women started to work first and later welfare states acted upon their 
demands for child care (implicit or explicit), although some welfare states 
were more responsive then others (Lewis 1992). For instance in a cross-
national study of Norway, Spain, and Italy, for example, Leira et al. (2005) 
show that the mass entry of mothers into the labour market preceded 
generous public support for child care. This was also the case in Flanders 
and Denmark – as we will see later – which had higher employment rates 
for women prior to state provision (Pott-Buter 1990).
 In other cases, the state intervened out of economic necessity, al-
though economic necessity takes different shapes. An important catalyst 
for the early and strong development of childcare provision in Denmark, 
for instance, was the huge demand for women in the labour market in the 
1960s (in addition to women’s desire to work, since they regarded earning 
their own income as crucial to the emancipation process). While other 
countries engaged immigrants to fill in gaps in the work force, Denmark 
recruited women. Ironically, the large influx of women as employees was 
reinforced by the subsequent development of state services, especially in 
the 1970s, which also needed female workers (Borchorst and Siim 1987). 
In Flanders and Belgium, childcare provision was also motivated by an 
economic factor: micro-economics. Childcare was regarded as a neces-
sary evil to protect families from poverty. And in the Netherlands macro-
economic factors – saving the welfare-state – have been an important 
factor to move away from the full-time motherhood model. Thus both 
women’s need and desire to work as well as a sense of economic necessity 
could serve as necessary preconditions for initial state intervention into 
the realm of childcare. But this does not explain the extent to which states 
became engaged in policy, or which ideal of care came to be promoted as 
an alternative to the full-time mother-care model.
 How can we explain why a certain ideal of care became dominant 
in one country? As we will see in chapter 5 and chapter 6, the classic 
class-based power resource theory of Korpi (1983) and Esping-Andersen 
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(1990) is inadequate to the task of explaining the promotion of specific 
ideals of care. The assumption of a clear relationship between ideological 
movements and the extent of women-friendliness in European welfare 
states cannot hold. Social democratic forces, for one, have not resulted 
in women-friendly welfare states per se. In each country, social demo-
cratic movements struggled with the question, ‘which is more important, 
class or gender?’ and gender often lost (Lewis 1992a; Siim 2000; Busse-
maker 1993). Moreover, party ideologies have different meanings and con-
sequences in different countries: Dutch Christian democracy is not the 
same as Belgian Christian democracy, so outcomes also differ. The Chris-
tian democratic regime has invested much more in childcare in Belgium 
than has its counterpart in the Netherlands (Daly 1999). Political groups 
other than the social democrats have also been important for caring pol-
icy. For example, liberals, seldom considered women-friendly in welfare 
state theory, fought for the individualisation of taxation in Denmark and 
the Netherlands (chapter 5). Thus power resource theory can indicate 
some but not all of the power relations in each country.
 What could be an alternative explanation? In many ways, the transfor-
mation of one ideal into another resembles a paradigm shift in science as 
described by Kuhn (2003, 1962). Th e old paradigm – the male breadwin-
ner-female caretaker model – is criticised, dismantled, and reconstructed 
by various politicians, the women’s movement, and the media. At the same 
time, people themselves, acting as primary agents, begin to develop new 
practices. Problems (anomalies) with the dominant care ideal, or paradigm, 
become visible. Th is period of ‘crisis’ is followed by a competition between 
pre-paradigmatic schools; some ideals develop in contrast to others. As 
Billig (1991) points out, our argumentation and actions are part of a wider 
social context of controversy; what we think and how we act refer not just 
to our own position or practice but also to other positions in a public argu-
ment that we oppose. We not only express our own position, we seek to 
criticise and thereby negate the counter-position. In other words, in the 
moral and cultural arena. Th ere is a struggle over what type of care is most 
appropriate when mothers are at work. Some groups advocate the ideal of 
professional care while others push for fathers’ involvement. Meanwhile, 
some parents simply embark on new caring practices.
 In Kuhn’s view, one paradigm grows in strength because of powerful 
arguments and the number of advocates, while the other pre-paradigmat-
ic schools and the previous paradigm fade. This is also the case with ideals 
of care: when alternative ideals of care become stronger, the traditional 
model disappears. Thus, in Europe, the ideal of full-time mother care has 
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been nearly eradicated by now. Finally, according to Kuhn, the reason one 
paradigm wins over another has nothing to do with its inherent ‘quality’ 
but with whether proponents of such a paradigm have good networks and 
alliances. In other words, paradigm shifts are a matter of politics.
 Th e crucial condition for explaining why some ideals ‘win’ over others is 
thus the strength of a powerful alliance built by actors united around simi-
lar beliefs. Th is has been stressed by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994), 
who propose the concept of the ‘advocacy coalition framework.’ Th ese 
scholars regard public policy in the same manner as belief systems, i.e., 
sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realise them. 
Th e systems involve value priorities, perceptions of important causal rela-
tionships, and perceptions of the state of the world, which are core values. 
Advocacy coalitions are based not on common interests but on common 
beliefs. Th ese beliefs are hard to change, so advocacy coalitions are rather 
stable over time. Th ey argue that to understand policy change, it is impor-
tant to focus on policy subsystems or domains. Th is includes a variety of 
actors, not only regular interests groups, but also journalists and research-
ers. Pierson (1994, 2001) also shows that powerful new groups may have 
emerged, surrounding social programs; he argues that ‘the analysis of the 
welfare state’s supporters must shift from organised labour to the more 
varied constituencies of individual’ (1994: 29-30; see also 2001).
 Building on Jenkins and Sabatier, one would assume that ideals of care 
are always constructed as positive notions. One cannot imagine people – 
even politicians – just ﬁ ghting for spending money per se. Actors ﬁ ght for 
something they more or less believe in, what they consider as appropriate 
in a given context (March and Olsen 1989). In other words, ideals of care 
are something to be strived for; they can connect people who have simi-
lar notions about the good life. Actors cannot make good alliances with 
groups that do not ﬁ t their belief system. Th is approach is thus diﬀ erent 
from a rational choice perspective of actors (see Hall and Taylor 1996). Of 
course, actions are sometimes instrumental and strategic (this is especially 
how actors deﬁ ne their actions afterwards, argue March and Olsen 1989). 
But actors are not seen as purely strategic operators who are continuously 
trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma – what will give me the best chance to win: 
cooperation or individual strategies – as rational choice academics see the 
world. Th ey do not usually act against their belief systems.
 But in order to explain policy change with regard to the care of children, 
two more factors must be added. One is parents’ preferred ideal of care. 
Women’s entry into the labour market and the ‘dismantling’ of the male 
breadwinner model has constituted a sea change – one of the most pro-
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found shifts of the last decades; a ‘revolution’, writes Hochschild (1989); a 
‘paradigm shift’ in Kuhn’s terms; ‘deep core’ change in the words of Jenkins-
Smith and Sabatier. But such change can never be conﬁ ned to the policy 
communities or the political elite; profound changes such as this must be 
supported by the principal agents – by people. Kuhn already stressed this 
when he drew a parallel between scientiﬁ c revolutions and political revolu-
tions; in the latter, he said, the ‘masses’ need to be persuaded. Th us the advo-
cacy coalition framework must take into account the feelings and opinions 
of the broader community. Transformations of ideals, or paradigm shifts, 
engage not only those who are directly involved in policymaking but must 
also mobilise the support of a critical mass of the population. At the same 
time, the larger community can also be part of an advocacy coalition.
 With regard to care, one advocacy group has been more important than 
all the others: the women’s movement. Th is movement was key not only 
because of its presence or absence, but especially because of its orienta-
tions and alliances. Women, as groups or embedded in other organisations, 
do not, however, have a constant set of interests or ideals across countries 
(Naumann 2005). For O’Connor et al. (1999), the principal line of opposi-
tion or cleavage among women’s movements was where they stood with 
regard to the question of ‘sameness’ or ‘diﬀ erence’. But this cleavage is not 
exhaustive; when it comes to care policy, the most important line of cleav-
age falls between ideals of care. In addition to the care orientation of a par-
ticular women’s movement – in the broadest sense of the word movement 
– it is also important to look at whether women used opportunities to form 
alliances with other powerful groups, movements, or power resources such 
as trade unions, professional organisations, or the dominant political coali-
tion, and whether they were able to mobilise parental opinions.
 In short, what kind of new ideal has been promoted is a result of a 
battle in which the argument for one ideal is often developed against a 
counter-ideal, but the result is often proposed by a wider advocacy coali-
tion in which (parts) of the women’s movement are crucial – often sup-
ported by general opinions about care.
 Conclusion: Women’s Work, Welfare States, and Ideals of Care
Care ideals can be loosely translated as ‘what is considered to be good-
enough caring’. Ideals of care are an answer to the moral predicament of 
working and caring. Care ideals are an instrument to study caring states: 
they place caring in the centre, are more accurate than the usual welfare 
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state models, and shake hands with the broad notion of culture. They help 
study the moral and cultural dimension of policy and practice. What’s 
more, care ideals can be seen as part of an adaptation process on the level 
of individual mothers (sometimes fathers), and are also embedded in so-
cietal structures such as schools, enterprises, social service agencies, po-
litical parties, and social movements, and also in welfare state regulation. 
Ideals of care are country-specific. In different welfare states, different 
ideals of care have come into being, for different reasons, and with differ-
ent consequences.
 Ideals of care operate on two levels, and thus contribute to the theo-
retical framework of welfare states in two ways. First, ideals of care can 
help explain cross-national differences in the development of social policy 
in the last decades. Few welfare states, political parties, or social move-
ments still embrace the ideal of full-time motherhood. To understand why 
and how various patterns of state intervention in childcare developed as 
they did, ideals of care offer an analytical framework to understand social 
policy. Care ideals account for why some policy choices can and have been 
made, and others have not or cannot be made. In other words, studying 
specific care ideals may shed new light on existing welfare state theories 
such as the power resource approach and (neo)institutionalism.
 Second, ideals of care can help explain gender relations and citizenship 
(outcomes). Th ey oﬀ er a precise instrument to analyse the cultural (and 
moral) consequences of welfare states. In other words, care ideals can con-
tribute to an understanding of why employment rates have not increased 
everywhere as much as they could, given the high levels of childcare (Flan-
ders), or why there are country-speciﬁ c diﬀ erences between categories of 
women (e.g., grandmothers, lower-class women, and care professionals). 
Th e notion of care ideals can be seen as a replacement of the micro-im-
age of human behaviour underlying much comparative welfare regime re-
search: the homo economicus as well as the notion of work-life preferences 
(Hakim 2000). Care ideals are perhaps better seen as a speciﬁ cation of 
Pfau-Eﬃ  nger’s (1998) notions of gender culture and arrangements. In the 
approach presented here, care ideals have an important moral and rela-
tional dimension, and are also institutionally and collectively shaped.
 The usefulness of this approach will be shown in the following chap-
ters. Women’s changing and diverse patterns of employment and care in 
the four European countries are explained in the following chapter.
CONCLUSION
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4 Citizenship in Practice: Work, Care, and Income
‘Women’s move into the economy … is the basic social revolution of our 
time’, writes the American sociologist Hochschild (1989: 249). This has 
not only changed the structure of labour markets but also the balance 
of power within the family. This present chapter demonstrates that all 
four countries have waved goodbye to the ideal of full-time motherhood, 
though this has happened during different decades and at different speeds 
and in different manners. Hochschild also signals a ‘stalled revolution’: 
while women moved out of the house, men did not move into the house: 
parental sharing is not a common practice. Men’s behaviours changed lit-
tle, although some European diversity of behaviour among European men 
in relation to childcare is visible. This chapter is thus not only concerned 
about women’s employment and income patterns, it also tries to reveal 
what men did when women were having their revolution.
 Central to this fact-finding chapter are three indicators of citizenship 
as described in a previous chapter: paid employment, caring, and income. 
This chapter shows that it is still possible to distinguish country-specific 
patterns and trajectories, but it is questionable whether the welfare re-
gimes (Esping-Andersen 1990), the breadwinner models (Lewis 1992a or 
Sainsbury 1996), or Pfau-Effinger’s cultural models (1998, 1999) are still 
relevant. Can they capture the radical changes between 1980 and 2000 
and at the same time catch the subtle country differences? Or can we see 
a move towards a European division in Hakim’s three categories (2000) – 
home-centred women (around 20 percent), work-centred women (around 
20 percent), and the adaptive types (around 60 percent)? 5
 This chapter begins with a description of women’s and men’s employ-
ment patterns over the last decades in the four countries (section 4.1). Spe-
cial attention is given to gendered difference in part-time work (section 
4.2). Are there country-specific patterns? Can we see any convergence? 
And more importantly: are women ‘forced’ to work part time because of 
institutional barriers, or do women wish to work part time? Consider-
ing part-time work is crucial, not only because it is hardly addressed in 
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welfare models but also because studying people’s part-time preferences 
together with their labour patterns reveals whether women (and men) are 
indeed free to choose.
 After discussing paid employment, the focus is on the ‘care factor’, and 
especially on caring for young children (section 4.3). What are the conse-
quences for gendered working patterns when women have children? How 
will they spend their time: on paid work or on informal care? Lone moth-
ers are of special interest. The next section (4.4) deals with men who care 
for children. What happens when men become fathers? Do they reduce 
working hours to care more, or work long hours precisely because they 
consider earning money as a way to show their caring nature? The final 
section (4.5) deals with the third indicator of citizenship: income. What 
are the gendered economic dependencies in the four countries?
 Change and Diversity in Gendered Employment Rates
Denmark as a forerunner
As table 4.1 shows, women’s employment rates in Europe still vary, although 
all countries show increasing employment rates and smaller gender gaps. 
Denmark is undoubtedly the archetypical Scandinavian example. More 
than in any other country, including Sweden, Danish women work outside 
Table 4.1 Male and female employment rates (as a percentage of working age 
population), 1975-2000, four countries
1975 1985 1990 1994 1998 2000 Gap 
1975-2000
BE women
men
gender gap
37
81
44
37
69
41
68
45
66
48
67
52
70
18
+ 15
–  11
DK women
men
gender gap
61
84
24
69
85
72
84
69
80
73
84
72
81
 9
+ 11
–    4
NL women
men
gender gap
33
89
56
40
76
47
77
51
75
57
80
63
82
19
+ 30
–    7
UK women
men
gender gap
54
88
34
55
77
63
82
62
76
64
79
65
78
13
+ 11
–  10
Source: EC (2000); Eurostat (2001)
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the home. Their employment rates are nearly just as high as men’s – and 
they work even more than men in some continental countries, such as 
Belgium. Only for a short period, around the 1950s, was being a housewife 
a common ‘job’ for married women when three-quarters of women stayed 
at home (Borchorst 2002). Employment rates were high by the 1970s, and 
in the mid-1980s employment rates had already surpassed what are now 
the current rates for Dutch, Belgian, and British women. The Danish gen-
der gap – the difference between men’s and women’s employment rates 
– has also been the smallest of all four countries (see also Daly 2000b).
 Danish women had thus already entered the labour market in the 1960s. 
Th is early access is often explained by two factors: a labour market shortage 
– employers desperately needed workers – and a strong women’s movement 
which demanded women’s employment and economic independence.
 While other countries invited migrant workers, women filled the 
shortages in Denmark (Pott-Buter 1993; Borchorst 2002). The 1960s were 
followed by a period of welfare state expansion, and in the 1970s many 
women worked in the newly developed service state: they became social 
workers, nurses, and group leaders in childcare centres. The welfare state 
was a catalyst for women’s employment, as it not only provided the servic-
es that enabled women to go out to work, it also provided jobs (Borchorst 
and Siim 1987; Daly 2000b).
 In 1975, as table 4.1 above shows, Denmark had already broken away 
from the other countries. When the debate about women and work was 
at its height in countries like the Netherlands and the uk in the mid-
1980s and 1990s, in Denmark the process of ‘entrance’ had nearly finished. 
Women’s employment was more self-evident than anywhere in Europe, 
and the word husmor (housewife) was no longer part of people’s daily 
vocabulary. By the mid-1990s, just 4 percent of women (between ages 
25-59) could be called a housewife in Denmark. This is remarkably low 
compared to Belgium (23 percent), the uk (27 percent), and especially the 
Netherlands (36 percent) (Eurostat 1997).
The United Kingdom and its Liberal Features
The uk, at first sight, indeed resembles the liberal model. Historically, 
women’s employment rates there have been much higher than in Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Already in the early 1960s, British women’s em-
ployment rates were comparatively high, also compared to countries like 
France and Germany (Pott-Buter 1993). This was probably a result of the 
Second World War, when the government asked women to work in the 
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war industry. After the war, women were no longer needed and childcare 
institutions, which had been quickly built up, were just as quickly closed 
down: 50 percent of the wartime nurseries were closed by 1955 (Lewis 
1992b). The practice of being a housewife, which had always remained 
part of the British mindset, regained strength, and the entry of women 
into the labour market became a matter of incremental change.
 Slowly, women’s employment rates increased, but due to the relaxed 
pace the uk had lost its position as a forerunner in women’s employment 
in Europe. The Netherlands came very close in 2000, although table 4.1 
shows that the gender gap in the uk (13) is smaller than in Belgium (18) 
and the Netherlands (19).
 Welfare state theory always points out that class diﬀ erences in employ-
ment patterns are more crucial in the uk than anywhere else (Esping-An-
dersen 1990; Lewis 1992a; O’Connor et al. 1999). Class diﬀ erences are most-
ly captured by the level of education. Th e assumption is often that lower 
educated women are more likely to work because of ﬁ nancial need. In the 
uk, wages are low and it is diﬃ  cult to qualify for social security beneﬁ ts. 
Consequently, less-educated women are ‘forced’ to work. Human capital 
theories, on the other hand, stress that the more highly educated women 
are, the more likely they are to enter the labour market (see Hakim 2000).
 Table 4.2 shows that more highly educated women in all countries are 
indeed most likely to work: there is little variety across Europe, and the 
gender gap – the difference between men’s and women’s behaviour – is 
relatively small. In that sense, welfare regimes may not matter much for 
highly educated women. The employment behaviour of less-educated 
women however differs from men’s, although this is least the case in Den-
mark. In Belgium, the Netherlands, and, indeed, the uk, women’s employ-
ment rates are much lower for the less educated.
 Do welfare states have more impact on less-educated women? Strik-
ingly, it is not the uk but Belgium which has the lowest level of labour 
market participation for this category. Together with the Netherlands, the 
gender gap is much bigger (32 and 33 respectively). In the uk, both less-
educated men and women are more likely to be out of work. The gender 
division in paid work is less pronounced than the class division in the uk, 
while in Belgium and the Netherlands less-educated women are much 
more likely to work less than their husbands. Thus, while Hakim (2000) 
argues that class or education no longer matter – women’s preferences 
do – the level of education is still an important factor in three of the four 
countries. In fact, there are important cross-national differences in the 
employment of less-educated women.
CITIZENSHIP IN PRACTICE: WORK, CARE, AND INCOME

Belgium as a Conservative Country
Belgium is a country that seems to fit the ‘conservative corporatist’ model 
better than Lewis’ ‘modified male breadwinner’ model. As we saw in table 
4.1, employment rates are modest. While 37 percent of women worked in 
the mid-1970s, this increased to 52 percent in 2000. Until the early 1980s, 
Belgian women used to work more than in the Netherlands but they have 
always worked less than in France and Germany (Pott-Buter 1993). Due 
to slow, incremental change, Belgium has moved to the lower end of the 
European employment league of Europe.
 Two factors lower the Belgian female employment rate substantially. 
First, employment rates of older women are very low. In 2000, just 15 
percent of Belgian women aged 55-65 were employed. Rates in the Neth-
erlands are also low: 26 percent of Dutch women in that age category 
were employed in 2000. In Denmark and the uk this percentage is much 
higher, at 46 and 41 percent, respectively. This is however in line with the 
employment levels of older men in these countries: Dutch and Belgian 
older men are much less likely to work than Danish and British men (Eu-
rostat 2001).
 In addition, unemployment rates of Belgian women are comparatively 
high, as is the rate of long-term unemployment. Men are also more like-
ly to be unemployed, but the gender difference is significant. This may 
be related to the fact that the Belgian industry, which employed many 
women, did not change rapidly enough into a service economy. The ben-
efit system may also be important, as we will see in chapter 5. The uk is 
the only country in which women are less likely to be unemployed than 
men.
Table 4.2 Female employment rates and the gender employment gap (between 
brackets) by educational attainment, ages 25 to 54, year 2000, four 
countries
Total Up to secondary University/higher
BE 68 (20) 47 (32) 87 (9)
DK 81 (8) 68 (9) 89 (5)
NL 71 (21) 53 (33) 87 (9)
UK 73 (14) 50 (17) 86 (8)
Source: OECD (2002b) 
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Statistics on gender differences within different parts of Belgium are not 
readily available. The statistics that are available show higher female em-
ployment rates for Flemish women than for Walloon women (Brussels 
always had higher rates), but the difference is less than two percent. The 
pattern is similar for men, who have slightly higher employment rates 
in Flanders. Moreover, unemployment rates for women have been much 
higher in Walloon, heading towards 20 percent in the early 1990s, com-
pared to about 12 percent in Flanders. Again, the same pattern is visible 
for men. Thus the differences between Flemish and Walloon women may 
be attributed to overall regional diversity (Steunpunt WAV 1995).
The Netherlands: A Booming Laggard
Until the late 1980s, labour market participation of Dutch women was 
extremely low. Together with Spain and Greece, in this respect the Neth-
erlands could be grouped with the ‘laggards’ of Europe. This has puzzled 
many researchers. ‘How come this otherwise “modern” country has such 
an “old fashioned” practice?’ In trying to answer this question, Pott-Buter 
(1993) and Plantenga (1993, 1998) offer an overview of the ‘usual suspects’ 
used to explain this situation. The first suspect is late modernisation. 
Dutch society was still rural when other European countries moved into 
industrialisation and urbanisation. The birth rate also remained high, so 
labour market shortages were not common. There were enough labour re-
sources. A second, very popular explanation is the ‘typically Dutch’ soci-
etal structure of ‘pillarisation’. Social and political life was organised into 
four pillars: Catholic, Protestant, social democratic, and neutral. These 
Table 4.3 Percentage of unemployed (m/f) as percentage of the labour force, 1990-
2000, four countries
1990 1995 2000
BE men
women
 4
10
 8
13
6
9
DK men
women
 7
 8
 6
 8
4
5
NL men
women
 4
 9
 6
 8
2
4
UK men
women
 7
 6
10
 7
6
5
Source: EC (2003)
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pillars helped to keep the norm in place that women’s only role is that of 
mother and homemaker. The system of pillarisation was extremely con-
ducive to this end. The pillars offered channels for communicating atti-
tudes from above, by imposing them forcefully on the whole population.
 After comparing the Netherlands with Germany, Plantenga (1993, 
1998) concludes that pillarisation is an important factor especially be-
cause there was a strong agreement between pillars. The system of pil-
larisation existed in many other countries as well (Switzerland, Germany, 
and Belgium), but nowhere was the ideal of mothers’ staying at home 
expressed with such a powerful passion. It seems unlikely though that 
ideological passion alone would have sufficed. Wishes must also have at 
least some possibility for fulfilment. Most European countries such as 
Belgium and Germany, have similar values about women’s proper place, 
but the Netherlands is the only country that was wealthy enough to afford 
this practice. Plantenga argues that, in the end, Dutch prosperity explains 
women’s low employment rates. The economist Pott-Buter (1993) comes 
to a similar conclusion: there was no financial need to sidestep the Dutch 
cultural tradition of women as homemakers.
 This theory helps to understand Dutch social history, but it may be less 
applicable to other countries or recent times. In Denmark, for instance, 
labour market rates rose in the 1960s, but not because the country was so 
poor and women needed to work. The women’s movement, which played 
a crucial role, demanded employment – not because they wanted to sup-
port women who worked out of financial need but because work offers 
individual emancipation (Borchorst 2002).
 Moreover, for European women in general, financial need is no longer 
the main reason to work. Belgian research from the mid-1970s already 
demonstrated this (Pauwels 1978). Women wanted to work because they 
could have contact with other people. Financial reasons came fifth in the 
ranking of motivations, although less-educated women indeed mention 
this motive more often. When married women in the Netherlands and 
Belgium were compared in the mid-1980s, Belgian women in the same 
financial circumstances as their Dutch peers were still more likely to work 
(Henkes et al. 1992). Economic motives seem to have lost power. Eco-
nomic needs have also become less diverse in Europe. Since the late 1980s, 
countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark have had similar 
wage structures and minimum wages (also in terms of purchasing power 
parity). The uk is a somewhat different story (oecd 1994).
 Th is means that from the 1970s onwards Plantenga’s (1993, 1998) and 
Pott-Buter’s (1993) theory of economic needs can no longer suﬃ  ciently ex-
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plain the diﬀ erences between the four countries examined in this book. Th is 
is not only because economic necessity has acquired a diﬀ erent meaning, 
but also because values towards work have reversed: women are no longer 
pushed to work because of economic needs; women demand to work.
 The crucial turning point in the Dutch history of women’s employ-
ment occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A report by the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy entitled ‘A Working Perspective’ (wrr 
1990) summarised the problem, and in so doing marked a turning point, 
particularly for women. The report said that in the Netherlands a large 
amount of human capital was wasted because women were largely ‘inac-
tive’, and for a sustainable welfare state, particularly in the light of the 
ageing of society, it is crucial to invest in female labour market participa-
tion. As table 4.1 shows, in 2000 the percentage of employed women had 
indeed risen to 63 percent, which means a huge increase compared to 39.5 
percent in 1985. Today, Dutch women are more likely to work than their 
Belgian sisters. In none of the other countries has such rapid revolution 
taken place.
 So far, the countries more or less fit the welfare regime models de-
scribed by Esping-Andersen, and less the gender models as described by 
Lewis. The Netherlands as well as Belgium score relatively low on wom-
en’s employment levels, although in the Netherlands a real revolution is 
taking place. British female employment rates are higher and class divi-
sion is indeed more important there. As the archetypical example of the 
Scandinavian welfare state, Danish female employment rates have the top 
ranking, as Danish women already entered the labour market in the 1960s 
and 1970s. To understand gendered citizenship not only the level of par-
ticipation is important, the number of hours is essential too. What do dif-
ferences in part-time work reveal: are welfare regime theories still more 
adequate than cultural theories?
 The Meaning of Part-time Work
Part-time work is a crown witness for testing the welfare state theories 
described in chapter 3. Comparative welfare regime theories stress insti-
tutional barriers and tend to regard part-time work as a negative result of 
the lack of childcare services or tax policies that penalise double-earners. 
Hakim (2000, 2003a) on the other hand stresses that women work part-
time because they want to. The cultural approach of Pfau-Effinger (1998) 
adds that welfare states followed women’s demands. Both stress that there 
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will always be women who want to work part time and combine work and 
care. The incidence of part-time work is an important indicator of what 
Hakim has labelled the adaptive type of woman, which is supposed to 
make up 60 percent of European women.
 In most European countries, women’s work is part-time work and part-
time work is women’s work. Part-time work has expanded rapidly since the 
1970s and especially since the 1980s. In many European countries, part-
time work acted as a lever for women to enter the labour market. As they 
could now combine paid work with care, homemakers became attracted 
to paid employment. The part-time revolution also had a second impulse. 
In the 1980s in some European countries, especially the Netherlands and 
Belgium, part-time work became a measure to combat unemployment, 
as part of a larger program of redistributing labour (O’Reilly and Fagan 
1998).
Two countries have a tradition of women working full time – Belgium and 
Denmark – and two countries have a tradition of women working part 
time – the Netherlands and the uk. While in most European countries 
part-time work increased, in Denmark part-time rates have fallen signifi-
cantly. In the 1970s and 1980s, Danish women were also more likely to 
work part time than full time, but from the 1990s onwards Danish women 
increasingly turned to full-time employment. A dual full-time breadwin-
ner model is now standard practice in Denmark.
 A high level of part-time work is often considered as a transitional 
phase between the male breadwinner model and the equality model where 
both men and women are fully integrated into the labour market (oecd 
2002a). This is not a standard trajectory though. Belgium, for instance, 
was also on the move towards female full-time employment, but things 
changed: women are leaving full-time jobs and part-time work has be-
Table 4.4 Part-time employment of women and mothers with children under age 6 
(as part of all women aged 25-55), year 2001, four countries
Country Women Mothers
BE 33 45
DK 21  6
NL 58 69
UK 41 66
Source: OECD (2002b)
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come the norm (Cantillon et al. 1999). The Belgian trajectories are very 
different from the Dutch and the British. Before women worked part time 
in Belgium they worked full time, but before women worked part time in 
the uk or the Netherlands they were housewives. Indeed, in these coun-
tries, the possibility of working part-time meant a mechanism for women 
to work (Plantenga 1996).
 Today in the uk and the Netherlands, large numbers of women work 
part time. In the uk, full-time employment for women is growing: there 
has been a net increase of working hours since the 1990s (oecd 2004). 
The Netherlands however is different from the other countries – since 
the 1980s it has been moving towards the first part-time economy in the 
world. In the Netherlands, part-time work is not some transitional phase 
but standard practice (Visser 2002). In that sense the Netherlands is in-
deed moving to what Pfau-Effinger (1998) has labelled a dual breadwin-
ner/dual carer model.
Force or Choice?
In comparative welfare state theory, part-time work is often seen as a pat-
tern that is forced upon women. Due to a lack of child care services or 
disincentives in social security and taxation, women cannot work longer 
hours. Scholars like Pfau-Effinger (1998) or Hakim (2000) nonetheless ar-
gue that part-time work is what women wish for; it is their preference. 
One indication of whether women have a say in the hours they work is 
the difference between actual and preferred number of hours. On the one 
hand, the number of hours women want to work follows the same pattern 
as women’s actual practice. In other words, Dutch women prefer to work 
fewer hours than Danish women. On the other hand, in all countries a gap 
exists between actual and preferred working hours: nowhere do people 
work the hours they want, but the gap is smaller in Belgium, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands than in the uk (in that order). This is shown by the 
Employment Option for the Future Survey of 1998 (Fagan 2001; Bielinski 
and Wagner 2004). In general, women are more satisfied with their work-
ing hours than men, and this is especially the case in the Netherlands.
 Whether women want to work more or fewer hours often depends on 
the number of hours they work. In general, women with ‘small jobs’ (with 
few hours) want to work more, women with ‘big jobs’ (with many hours) 
want to work less. In the Netherlands, the average number of hours of 
work for women is 26, the lowest in Europe. The average is 31 in the uk, 34 
in Belgium, and 34 in Denmark (Fagan 2001). In addition, a relatively large 
CITIZENSHIP IN PRACTICE: WORK, CARE, AND INCOME

number of Dutch women work less than 20 hours (one-third), compared 
to one-fifth for the uk, and much less in Denmark (8 percent) and Belgium 
(11 percent). The many women with ‘small jobs’ in uk and the Netherlands 
are particularly dissatisfied, while women with relatively ‘big’ part-time 
jobs are very satisfied with the hours they work. In general, British and 
Dutch women with ‘small jobs’ would like to work more (Keuzenkamp 
and Oudhof 2000; Fagan 1996).
 On the other side of the spectrum – Belgium and Denmark – women 
work comparatively long hours but they want to work less. In Belgium, 
this desire has indeed come into being, as women have moved towards 
part-time work. This is not the case in Denmark, where the increase in 
working hours does not coincide with people’s wishes. In general, Danish 
women do not want to work full time on such a large scale. To sum it up: 
there is more convergence in dreams than in realities. Most women in the 
four countries want to work between 20-34 hours per week, but in reality 
they work more (in Denmark) or less (in the Netherlands) (Fagan 2001). 
As Bielinski and Wagner (2004: 160, 161) conclude, ‘Working-time pref-
erences in general, and those of men and women in particular, are more 
similar than actual working times, both within and across countries.’
Why do people not work the number of hours they wish? Table 4.5 shows 
that in all countries workers perceive problems with their employer or in 
their careers. Only the last two columns show interesting cross-national 
differences. Dutch and Belgian employees do not believe part-timers have 
fewer employment rights, in contrast to the British and Danish. Except 
Table 4.5 Perceived barriers to part-time work: all full-time employees, percentage 
of those who mentioned one or more of the following items (multiple 
responses), four countries
It would not 
be possible to 
do my current 
job part time
My employer 
would not 
accept it
It would 
damage 
my career 
prospects
Part-timers 
have fewer 
employment 
rights
Could not 
aﬀ ord to 
work part 
time
BE 55 50 50 29 37
DK 52 59 49 50 28
NL 47 55 51 25 32
UK 63 60 53 66 61
Source: Fagan (2001) on the basis of the Employment Options for the Future 1998 (EOF)
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for the uk, money is hardly a reason to work full time. Common assump-
tions that Danish women (and men) have to work full time because of the 
needs of the family economy are thus untrue. It is only in the uk, known 
for its high incidence of low-paid jobs, that full-timers prefer not to work 
part-time because they cannot afford to do so. Only in that country do 
economic factors seem very important.
Men
The final question is whether men also work part time. In any country in 
Europe men are more likely to work full time, but in some countries men 
are more likely to work part time than in others. In 1998 Belgium had 
the lowest score (3.5 percent), followed by the uk (4.4), Denmark (10.9), 
and the Netherlands (18.1) (ec 2000). The uk is especially known for its 
extremely long working hours for men, 44.3 on average. In Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark men work shorter hours, on average 41.6, 41.1, 
and 39.8 a week, respectively. Thus in the country that is often reported to 
have such a strong work ethic, Denmark, men work the least hours (Fagan 
2001).
 Do British men really want to work such long hours? A 1996 survey 
showed that 10 percent of men working long hours would like to reduce 
hours, indicating that actually few men behave against their wishes. How-
ever, an even higher percentage (18) would want to work even more hours. 
The reason given is to increase their income. According to Fagan (1996), in 
the uk increased overtime has been stimulated by low wages (at the bot-
tom side of the labour market) and shortages of skilled labour (at the up-
per side of the labour market). The above-mentioned survey on working 
time preferences (eof) found that 28 percent of British men would prefer 
a job of less than 35 hours. Men in other countries have a slightly stronger 
desire to work parttime: 30 percent of Belgian men prefer to work less 
than 35 hours, 33 percent in Denmark, and 42 percent in the Netherlands 
(Fagan 2001). Thus, overall, quite a number of men want to work less than 
they actually do. But the more men prefer to work part time, the more 
they actually do.
 If men also worked less than full time, this would degender part-time 
work. Moreover, if men worked part time they could take responsibility 
for caring. Part-time work could reduce women’s second shift. So what 
do men do when they work part time? In the 1970s, the male chairman of 
the Danish trade unions (lo), Nielsen, was very much against part-time 
work because he was sure that ‘men would just go fishing’ (int. 59). Sta-
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tistics show that despite national differences one thing is common: men 
are more likely to work part-time when they are very young (15-24) and 
when they are older (55+, and even more 65+), but not in the period when 
they have young children (25-40) (e.g., oecd 2001; ec 2003). The major-
ity of part-time workers are mainly students who need the supplementary 
income and older men who are tired of their career. Perhaps there is only 
a loose connection between men working part time and participation in 
caring.
Part-time Work as the Crown Witness
Part-time work in some countries (Denmark, perhaps the uk) can be seen 
as a transitional phase: it acts as a mechanism for women to start working 
and eventually turn to full-time employment. In other countries, part-
time employment is the next stage for working women full-time (Bel-
gium), while in others it seems to be a stable standard practice (the Neth-
erlands). As Pfau-Effinger (1998) stresses, many diverse modernisation 
trajectories exist. Comparative welfare theories and welfare state models 
such as those of Lewis (1992a) and Esping-Andersen (1990) neither cor-
respond nor deal with part-time diversity in Europe. These models are not 
equipped to deal with the radical social change that has taken place.
 Moreover, part-time work is indeed the wish of many women as well as 
men, as cultural theories stress. But a scholar who focuses on culture such 
as Hakim (2000) is not fully right either. There are country-specific pat-
terns in employment behaviour, and not in every country (see Denmark) 
are the majority of women adaptive types. Besides, men and women do 
not exactly behave according to their wishes. Many men want to work 
fewer hours while many women want to work more hours (if they have 
‘small part-time jobs’) or fewer hours (if they have ‘big full-time jobs’). 
Work behaviour and work preferences have no one-to-one relationship. 
In addition, in the uk economic motives may still explain the difference 
between reality and dreams.
 When Women Become Mothers
So far, we have examined women’s and men’s employment patterns, but 
what happens when men become fathers and women become mothers? 
Are employment patterns affected by having children? To what extent are 
mothers and fathers involved in caring at home? Clearly, the ideal of full-
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time motherhood is less practiced. Women are more likely than ever to 
continue working when they become mothers. In the twenty-first century, 
having children is less decisive for women’s employment than it used to 
be. The age of the child is important, but it is becoming less so. The num-
ber of children also matters. With one child people feel they are ‘a couple 
with a child’, two or three children means ‘a family’. The latter increasingly 
leads to a new lifestyle in which women are more likely to stay at home. 
But the extent to which motherhood matters varies per country.
Danish Mothers
In Denmark motherhood is hardly decisive for employment patterns. Th e 
phenomenon of working mothers was largely accepted there prior to the 
mid-1980s and the percentage of employed mothers was stable: around 
three-quarters had a paid job (table 4.6). Th is applies to mothers with one, 
two, or more children. Th e diﬀ erence with men is negligible, although the 
gender gap increases when mothers have two or more children. Th e age of 
children does not matter much either: mothers with children under three 
are nearly as likely to be employed as those with older children (ecnc 1996; 
Eurostat 2005). Full-time rates for mothers are generally high (table 4.6) 
and educational attainment does not make a signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence (Ru-
bery et al. 1999). Denmark is indeed the archetypical Scandinavian country 
where women work just like men, and it hardly matters whether they have 
children, how old they are, or how many there are. Full-time motherhood 
is an ideal that disappeared long ago (see also Plantenga and Siegel 2004).
Table 4.6 Women’s employment rates by presence of children (0-15), persons aged 
25 to 54, percentage of persons working part time in total employment, 
2000, four countries
No children One child Two or more 
children
BE
Part-time rates
66
29
72
35
69
46
DK
Part-time rates
79
19
88
13
77
16
NL
Part-time rates
75
38
70
73
63
83
UK
Part-time rates
80
47
73
63
62
39
Source: OECD (2002) 
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Belgian Mothers
Historically, Belgian mothers were more likely to work than the British 
and Dutch. This was especially the case in the 1980-1995 period. Belgium 
had higher employment rates for mothers (with children 0-10) in 1985 (51 
percent of mothers were employed in Belgium, 23 percent in the Neth-
erlands). This difference was still the case in 1993 (62 percent were em-
ployed in Belgium, 46 percent in the Netherlands) (ecnc 1996). At the 
same time, Belgian mothers were more likely to work full time than in the 
uk and especially the Netherlands (tables 4.6). Although in this period 
employment rates for Belgian mothers were relatively high, they could not 
reach the Danish rates. Belgium never reached ‘Scandinavian’ levels (table 
4.6, 4.7; ecnc 1996; see also Plantenga and Siegel 2004).
 More recently, mothers’ employment rates have not grown rapidly. The 
most recent statistics from Eurostat (2005) show that the Belgian rates of 
working women with children under 12 is 68 percent. This is much lower 
compared to Denmark (80), and even lower than in the Netherlands (70). 
Only the uk has lower employment rates for mothers (62). This cross-na-
tional pattern is also visible in table 4.7. In addition, mothers increasingly 
participate in the workforce on a part-time basis, although the level is still 
comparatively low. While in 1985 only 14 percent of mothers (with a child 
aged 0-10) worked part time, this doubled to 27 percent in 2003 (ecnc 
1996; Eurostat 2005). Highly educated mothers are more likely to work 
part time while less educated mothers are a little more likely to work full 
time (Rubery et al. 1999).
 While the previous section showed low female employment rates in 
Belgium, this is less the case for mothers. In Belgium, mothers were al-
ways more likely to be in paid work than women in general and they also 
worked full-time. This challenges the idea that Belgium is a conservative 
corporatist country and instead shows it to be a modified male breadwin-
ner model. More recently however, mothers’ employment rates have been 
stagnating and were surpassed by the Netherlands. Mothers also tend to 
move from full-time employment to part-time work.
British Mothers
In the uk, employment rates of women in general are higher than those 
for mothers. In other words, having a child is crucial for women’s employ-
ment, full-time motherhood is sometimes still an ideal. This emphasises 
the uk’s male breadwinner dimension rather than its liberal sides. Espe-
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cially since the 1990s, the uk has dropped to last place among the four 
countries in terms of mother’s employment rates; it has even been sur-
passed by the Netherlands. More than in the other countries, motherhood 
matters (Plantenga and Siegel 2004; Eurostat 2005).
 First, more than in Belgium, the number of children is important. Two 
children or more significantly reduces mothers’ employment rates. Table 
4.5 indicates that when women have one child they continue working but 
preferably on a part-time basis. When the second child arrives, women 
are more likely to quit altogether. Those who continue working do so on a 
full-time basis. According to Rubery et al. (1999), highly educated moth-
ers are slightly more likely to work full time, while less educated women 
are more likely to work part time. This is the opposite of Belgium.
 Secondly, the age of the child is crucial for mother’s employment. 
Many mothers take their first steps back into the labour market when 
their child reaches the age of three, but most of them go back when the 
child reaches the age of six or seven and starts school (Rubery et al. 1999). 
In the early 1990s, 44 percent of mothers with a child aged 0-3 and 59 per-
cent of mothers with a child aged 3-10 were employed. Also, more recent 
statistics indicate significant differences between mothers with younger 
and older children (Eurostat 2005). This is a typically British practice: 
mothers start to work when the children go to school (ecnc 1996).
Dutch Mothers
Dutch mothers have always had very low employment rates, but a spec-
tacular increase in working mothers has taken place. In the mid-1980s 
only a quarter of mothers worked. At that time, having one child meant 
the start of a career at home. Women returned to paid work when their 
Table 4.7 Employment rate (percentage) for women with a child under age three, 
1992-2003, four countries
1992 2000 2003
BE 61 68 63
DK 70* 71* 72
NL 42 63 70
UK 40 53 52
Sources: Moss (2004) on the basis of the European Labour Force Survey, Eurostat (2005)
* Since Denmark was not included, the OECD Labour Force Survey (2002b) is used for 2000. 
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child reached 12 to 14 (Rubery et al. 1999). These women even had a spe-
cial name: herintreders (returners). But much more pronounced than in 
the uk, which also had low employment rates for mothers, a real social 
revolution took place in the Netherlands, away from full-time mother-
hood, which pushed the uk to the lowest ranking of the four countries. 
Table 4.6 shows that in 2000 much more than half of Dutch mothers with 
young children worked (63 percent). Recent statistics report that in 2003, 
80 percent of mothers of children aged 0-12 were employed. At the mo-
ment in the Netherlands, the age of the child is not a very significant fac-
tor in whether or not the mother is employed (ecnc 1996; Eurostat 2005). 
However, the gender gap between mothers and fathers is still the biggest 
in Europe. Typical for the Dutch case is that if mothers work, they do 
so on a part-time basis, no matter what their educational background is. 
Part-time work is standard practice for mothers and full-time work hardly 
an option (table 4.6; Eurostat 2005).
When Mothers are Lone Mothers
So far, we have discussed the incidence, volume, and class dimension of 
women in general and mothers in particular. But a very important catego-
ry of women is that of lone mothers, who are often seen as test cases. The 
way they fare reveals the citizenship status of women: are they workers or 
carers? Lone mothers are the litmus test of female citizenship (Hobson 
1994; Knijn 1994; Lewis, 1997).
 Although different studies show different levels of employment, the 
picture in the mid-1990s is nearly always the same: the Dutch and British 
employment rates of lone mothers with young children (ages 0-6) are the 
lowest of all four countries, even though we can see a steady increase in 
both countries, also since 1999 (see also Evans 2003; Knijn and van Berkel 
2003). Still, lone mothers are less likely to work than mothers in two-par-
ent families. Moreover, in the uk and the Netherlands part-time work is 
the most important option (table 4.8). In Belgium and Denmark employ-
ment rates for lone mothers are higher. In Denmark little difference exists 
between mothers: nearly all of them work full time, regardless of whether 
there is a father at home. In Belgium, employment rates of lone mothers 
have always been higher than those of married mothers, but since the 
mid-1990s they are nearly the same. In Belgium, most lone mothers work 
full time (Cantillon and Verbist 2003; Millar and Rowlingson 2001; Peder-
sen et al. 2000).
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Do mothers’ employment patterns falsify the logic of welfare models? 
There are clear country-specific patterns, but they show more similari-
ties with breadwinner models (Lewis 1992a) than with the three worlds of 
welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990). The employment rates of mothers show 
that mothers in the ‘conservative corporatist’ countries – Belgium and 
the Netherlands – are historically more likely to work than in the ‘Liberal’ 
welfare state of the uk. At the same time, a big difference exists between 
Belgium and the Netherlands when it comes to mothers: the Netherlands 
has always had lower employment rates, even for lone mothers. Belgium 
in this respect does resemble Lewis’ (1992) modified model. Belgian moth-
ers, whether lone or married, are much more likely to work than in the 
uk and the Netherlands, and they are also more likely to work full time. 
Nevertheless, there remains a distinction between Belgium and Denmark. 
In Denmark, motherhood hardly matters for employment patterns, and 
again Denmark fits into the models it is ascribed.
When Men Become Fathers
Th e previous section showed that when women become mothers they are like-
ly to work fewer hours. But when men become fathers they are likely to work 
more, and fathers are the least likely of all men to be unemployed. Men still 
translate caring responsibilities into bringing home money. At the same time, 
a ‘new man’ arises who wishes to work part time and spend more time with his 
family. Parental sharing has become a new ideal that replaces the traditional 
full-time moderhood utopia. Contrary to mothers, men’s employment pat-
terns hardly vary across Europe, although in a few countries we can see signs 
of change. And in some countries, fathers work more hours than in others.
Table 4.8 Employment rates of lone mothers with a child under age six, 1984-1999, 
four countries
1984 1989 1994 1999
BE 47 35 43 46
DK N.A. 65/83* 53/71* 51/70*
UK 19 24 26 34
NL 13 NA 26 38
Source: OECD (2001)
* The Danish rates are not included in OECD (2001). Danish rates are based on OECD 
(2002a). 1989 =1991, 1994 =1995. The left side of the slash refers to employment rates of 
single parents with children aged three or under, the right side refers to single parents with 
children aged 3-6.
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 In the mid-1990s, Belgian, Dutch, and Danish fathers who were em-
ployed worked on average 40-41 hours per week. British fathers worked 
more hours: 48. Dutch fathers are most likely to work part-time (7 per-
cent). This is much less in Belgium (1 percent) and Denmark and the uk (2 
percent) (ecnc 1996). Table 4.9 shows that both male and female in a cou-
ple working part time is the most common in the Netherlands (Denmark 
is not included). The percentage is negligible though. In that sense, Pfau-
Effinger’s (1998) classification of the Netherlands being a dual breadwin-
ner/dual carer model does not fit reality. Besides, in Belgium more fathers 
work part time while their wives work full time.
A second question is, what do fathers do when they work part-time: are 
they indeed involved in caring, or do they go fishing? Time budget studies 
are the only source to find out how people spend their daily lives, but it is 
not a very trustworthy source. Definitions often vary across countries as 
to what caring is exactly; people may not report well on what they do, and 
their answers may be culturally shaped. Besides, comparing time budget 
reports shows contradictory results and none of the comparisons includes 
all four countries. Keeping this in mind, what can still be said about men’s 
participation in care?
Table 4.9 Households with at least one working partner, with one child, in 
percentages, year 2000, three countries
Male part time
Female part time
Male part time
Female full time
Male full time
Female part time
Male full time
Female full time
BE 1.9 1.7 28.3 40.8
NL 2.3 1.3 52.9 10.8
UK 0.7 0.9 40 28.6
Source: Eurostat (2002), based on the European Labour Force Survey
Table 4.10 Childcare among parents living as couple with children up to age six, hours 
and minutes a day, 1998-2000, three countries
Women Men Gender gap
BE 1.40 0.50 0.90
DK 1.44 0.57 0.87
UK 2.08 0.58 1.50
Source: European Commission (2004)
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Most comparative studies show little cross-national differences in men’s 
caring behaviour. Table 4.10 reports on European Commission research 
(2004). The difference between women in the three countries – the Neth-
erlands is not included – is significant: the country with the highest part-
time rate, the uk, shows the highest rates in time spent on care. The dif-
ference between men is rather insignificant. Cross-national research that 
includes the Netherlands shows that Dutch men are similar to those other 
countries (oecd 2002a; scp 2000).
 Gershuny and Sullivan (2003: 219) confront ideal typical welfare states 
with men’s contributions to the household, and do not find many country-
specific patterns in men’s involvement in caring and domestic tasks either: 
‘Contrary to what we might have expected on the basis of the discussion 
concerning the relationship between regime type, gender, and the use of 
time, it appears that there is no clear pattern of differentiation in the divi-
sion of unpaid work according to public policy regime type.’ Instead, they 
find a differentiation according to level of education – higher educated 
men contribute more to the household – and a general trend over time 
towards a convergence of men’s and women’s time spent in unpaid work 
across countries. Thus men are slowly changing, but not according to a 
country-specific pattern.
 In sum, time budget studies come to an ironic conclusion: men’s time 
spent on childcare is similar in Europe and is not related to women’s em-
ployment patterns. This is what Hochschild (1989) refers to as the ‘stalled 
revolution’. When rapid industrialisation took men out of the home and 
placed them in the factory, shop, or office, an analogous revolution en-
couraged women to stay in the home. Now another revolution is taking 
place and women are moving out of the home, but men have not shared in 
the social revolution of women’s move into the economy. In other words, 
while the ideal of full-time motherhood became outdated, the alternative 
ideal of parental sharing has not replaced it. At the same time, fathers and 
men do work less than before, and especially Danish and Dutch men work 
fewer hours and would like to work less. The question is whether they will 
also care more.
Money of Her Own: Gender and Income
So far, I have discussed women’s and men’s participation in work and 
care: two indicators of citizenship. The third indicator is income. Welfare 
state theory has a long history of studying poverty and income distribu-
tion. For a long time this has been the core of such analyses, but studying 
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how income has been distributed within the family has a much shorter 
tradition.
 A handful of researchers have done pioneering work to examine the 
interdependencies within the family and women’s economic position 
(Hobson 1990; Bianci et al. 1996; Bonke 1999; Daly 2000; Sørensen 2001). 
Most appropriate for this study is the analysis done by Bonke (1999), be-
cause unlike other studies it covers all four countries taken up in this book 
and uses an innovative perspective. He shows that although women’s eco-
nomic position within households is never equal to men’s, in Denmark 
their positions are the closest: women earn 42 percent of the household 
income, followed by Belgium (37 percent), the Netherlands (33 percent) 
and the uk (32 percent). This overall picture is supported by the other 
studies.
 Table 4.11 also highlights which types of income distribution within 
couples are most common in the four countries. A distinction is made 
between women who earn less than 40 percent of the household income, 
women who earn about as much as men (between 40-59 percent of the 
income), and women who earn more than men (more than 59 percent). 
In half of the Danish cases, the partners have nearly the same wages. In 
other words, half of the couples are really ‘interdependent’, as Sørensen 
would have put it (see chapter 2). The other three countries lay far behind 
Denmark, including Belgium where only a quarter of couples show real 
‘interdependence’. The difference between the uk and the Netherlands is 
the fact that in the latter few women belonging to a couple have higher 
wages than men: ‘role reversal’ hardly exists. In the uk, more than in the 
other countries, high-earning women do exist, and they probably have 
more bargaining power at the kitchen table.
Table 4.11 Woman’s share of income (personal net income) in couples, 1994, in 
percentages, four countries
<40 40-59 >59
BE 66 27 7
DK 44 51 6
NL 78 19 3
UK 72 20 8
Source: Bonke (1999) on the basis of the 1994 ECHP
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Th e outcomes of this analysis of economic independence are completely in 
line with labour market participation rates, as Bonke himself also stresses. 
Many more double-earners exist in Denmark than in Belgium, the uk, and the 
Netherlands. Th is could indicate that only employment activity matters. In 
the previous chapter I discussed that carers could also gain economic equality 
when they received direct payments for care, such as paid leave or beneﬁ ts. Do 
the above statistics mean that the route taken by state payments for caregiving 
has no signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect on economic equality within households?
 Individual income is an important indicator of citizenship, but not 
all women (or men) seem to demand economic equality. A European ba-
rometer survey (1993) questioned whether women should have their own 
income. ‘Yes’, said nearly 80 percent of Danish women and men, and 40 
percent of Dutch women and men. Sixty percent of Belgian women but 
only 50 percent of men said so, and for the uk 50 percent of women and 
40 percent of men wanted women to have their own income. The Danish 
score highest and the Dutch lowest, while Belgian and British women take 
a middle position. (The latter may also have slightly more discussions and 
fights with their men because the gender gap is biggest.)
 A similar pattern is shown in a more recent European Value Study, al-
though the uk takes a different position (Halman 1999/2000). In response 
to the question of whether both the husband and wife should contribute to 
household income, 71 percent of the British agree, 68 percent of Danish, 74 
percent of Belgians, and only 35 percent of the Dutch. Clearly, the British 
answers differ from the above results but the Dutch are always the least 
likely to want economic independence. Of course, the answers may have 
been adapted to reality. At the same time, it may well be that the meaning 
of economic dependence or independence varies across countries (Daly 
2000), and that in the Netherlands it is valued the least. According to 
Morée (1990), who interviewed many women on this issue, Dutch women 
do not really want economic equality but value having some money in 
their pocket. They want the ‘illusion of economic independence’.
 So far, studying economic interdependencies is concerned with in-
come distribution within families rather than between families. But this is 
also a one-sided picture – as if women were indeed better off when they 
are extremely poor but just as poor as men. The best way to reveal eco-
nomic interdependencies is through the analysis of ‘individual poverty’ in 
the context of ‘family poverty’, or ‘individual income’ in the context of the 
‘family income’. Since to my knowledge such comparative studies do not 
exist, table 4.12 gives at least an impression of the cross-national differ-
ences in poverty among household types.
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As expected, the uk shows the highest incidence of poverty (17.5 percent). 
Belgium scores the lowest (5 percent), but also Denmark (6.1 per cent) and 
the Netherlands (8.3 per cent) have reasonable poverty rates. The Dutch 
poverty rates are perhaps higher than expected, as there has been a strong 
increase since the 1980s. Poverty is also strongly linked to paid employ-
ment; earnings indeed give the best protection against poverty. But if one 
does not earn, the uk as a liberal regime indeed gives the least protection 
to single earners and non-earning families. Jobless citizens are best pro-
tected in Denmark, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands.
 The working poor, associated with liberal welfare states, is not a typi-
cal British reality: it is a problem for many single earners living on their 
own. Strikingly, the incidence of poverty among single earners is even 
higher in the Netherlands than in the uk. Marx et al. (1999) go as far as 
to argue that low wages and the working poor should not be exaggerated, 
not even in the uk. But the picture changes when we look at families. 
Especially in the uk, two incomes may be necessary to fulfil the needs of 
the family (see Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). Nearly 13 percent of families 
with one income is poor. At the same time, the uk has a relatively low 
incidence of double-earner families. This is puzzling. Why aren’t double-
income families more common in the uk, as this offers the best protection 
against poverty? Danish single-earner families, compared to the Belgian 
and Dutch, are the least likely to be poor. Does this mean that in Denmark 
too one wage will suffice for the family income, or can only families that 
can afford it chose the single-earner model?
 Interdependencies within the family (the gender gap) should be placed 
in the context of household poverty in general. Income equality increases 
women’s citizenship status, but when the family as a whole can barely survive, 
Table 4.12 Poverty rates for diﬀ erent household types, head of household of active 
age, mid-1990s, four countries
Single adult Two adults
All Earning Non-
earning
Dual 
earners
Single 
earner
No earner
BE 5.0 1.3 16.1 0.1 2.4 18.0
DK 6.1 8.6 20.1 0.4 2.0 7.9
NL 8.3 12.1 27.8 0.7 3.5 17.1
UK 17.5 7.0 57.7 1.0 12.7 52.3
Note: Poverty is <50 percent of the median equivalent disposable income
Source: Marx et al. (1999) on the basis of LIS
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women’s citizenship is threatened. Th is dilemma is most pronounced in the 
uk. Another question revealing diﬀ erences in women’s European citizenship 
status is whether mothers can survive economically when they are on their 
own. How do lone mothers fare? Can they do ﬁ nancially without a husband?
In all countries, lone mothers are more likely to be poor than two-parent 
families. If they want to improve their income, they better ﬁ nd a husband 
or a job. If they are employed they are less likely to be poor. Hence Danish 
lone mothers are less likely to be poor than lone mothers in the other three 
countries , as many of them work on a full-time basis. But even when Dan-
ish lone mothers do not work, they are better protected than Dutch and 
notably British mothers. British mothers and less so Dutch mothers are 
more likely to be part of the working poor; one of the reasons is because 
they tend to be employed part time. Belgian lone mothers are doing com-
paratively well, regardless of whether they work (often full time) or not.
 Conclusion: Cross-national Diﬀ erences in Work, Care, and Income
First of all, distinct country-speciﬁ c patterns and trajectories still exist (see 
also Daly 2000b). But especially when we look at caring and employment 
patterns, women’s and men’s lives can hardly be captured by Esping-An-
dersen’s models. Denmark does ﬁ t the social democratic model perfectly, 
but other countries are more problematic. Belgian mothers are much more 
likely to work (also full time) than the Christian democratic welfare regime 
predicts. Until very recently, Belgian mothers worked much more than 
Dutch mothers, who resembled the British practice to a higher degree. 
Mothers’ employment rates have been low in both countries, also for lone 
mothers. In that sense Lewis’ models seem to be better suited.
Table 4.13 Lone parent poverty, mid-1990s, four countries
Mother works Mother inactive
BE 11 23
DK 10 34
NL 17 41
UK 26 69
Note: Poverty is <50 percent of the median equivalent disposable income 
Source: Esping Andersen (2002) on the basis of LIS
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 At the same time, neither welfare state model is able to properly ad-
dress the diverse composition in part-time work and the recent changes 
in women’s employment, including the farewell to full-time mother-
hood. How can the incredible increase of mothers’ (part-time) employ-
ment in the Netherlands be explained? Or the Belgian decrease in female 
full-time employment rates and increase in part-time rates? Moreover, 
the welfare models do not address the slight increase in the diversity of 
fathers’ citizenship. In other words, perhaps Lewis’ breadwinner mod-
els revealed the reality of the 1980s well, but European work-and-care 
patterns are modernising rapidly and what is happening after the male 
breadwinner/female caretaker epoch cannot be adequately expressed by 
the dominant theories.
 This chapter also showed that there is no standard ‘modernisation’ tra-
jectory in which women first work part time and then move en masse to 
full-time employment (oecd 2002). While Danish and perhaps British 
women have moved or are moving towards a full-time female economy, in 
Belgium women who used to work full time are now moving to part-time 
jobs while in the Netherlands part-time work is becoming standard prac-
tice. Hakim is thus both right and wrong. She is right because there are no 
signs that all European women will move towards full-time jobs or wish 
to do so. She is wrong because there are countries, notably Denmark, in 
which most women work full time: her classifications of adaptive, work-
centred, and home-centred women do not make sense in this part of the 
world. The question that still remains to be answered is how to under-
stand these ‘part-time’ and ‘full-time’ changes.
 It is also true that part-time work is something that many women and 
men both wish for and demand. This reveals the importance of women 
as agents over their private lives (Pfau-Effinger 1998; Hakim 2000). At 
the same time, the study of part-time works shows a large gap between 
words and deeds. Only in the uk does the financial necessity to work full 
time seem important. The cultural approach gives few answers as to why 
people of both sexes abstain from following their wishes.
 How to understand and explain the European differences and chang-
ing employment and care patterns is still a matter of research. The next 
two chapters will unravel social policy and study if, how, and to what ex-
tent the composition of welfare states can explain diversity in gendered 
citizenship. I start with an examination of the right to give care. Chapter 
5 discusses taxation, social security, and leave schemes. Chapter 6 exam-
ines the right to receive care and raises the question of whether state-sub-
sidised childcare has an impact on women’s and men’s citizenship.
CONCLUSION: CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK, CARE, AND INCOME
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5 The Right to Give Care: Tax, Social Security, and Leave
Can financial compensation for caregiving explain different and changing 
patterns of women’s employment in Europe? Will women indeed work 
less when they receive money to provide care, such as a male-breadwinner 
bonus in taxation, or compensation via social security and leave schemes? 
This chapter confronts the existing welfare state typologies with women’s 
participation patterns. Following welfare state theories such as those of 
Esping-Andersen (1990), Lewis (1992a), and Sainsbury (1996), we expect 
strong breadwinner bonuses in the Belgian and Dutch systems, work in-
centives in the Danish system, and a more diffuse picture in the United 
Kingdom. Is this indeed the case? And how to understand policy origins 
and policy change?
 Fiscal Care
When Titmuss (1958) described the welfare state, he distinguished be-
tween three types of welfare provision. The first two, benefits and ser-
vices, are well known, but the third is less obvious: he calls it ‘fiscal wel-
fare’, benefits through tax deductions. He complained that this aspect of 
European welfare states has had too little coverage. Nearly half a century 
later, such studies are still in their infancy, although tax policy has re-
ceived increased attention in the welfare state debate – not in the least 
because fiscal instruments gained popularity in the neo-liberal decades of 
the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter tries to unravel the impact of tax policy 
on citizenship. The topic is more specific than Titmuss’ broad area of fis-
cal welfare: it is fiscal care. How does the tax system care?
 Historically, man and wife were taxed together. This meant a huge work 
disincentive for second-earners because when the wife went to work, the 
household would fall into a higher tax bracket. After individualisation of 
taxation took place, mostly in the 1980s, some welfare states incorporated 
a transferable allowance, the ‘male breadwinner bonus’: a compensation 
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for men who had a wife working at home. This gives women the opportu-
nity to provide care, but it is a derived ‘right’, as it makes them dependent 
on their husbands (and they are only entitled to this right if they have 
a husband). The bonus is also seen as a major disincentive for working 
women. Many economic calculations have been made to prove its neg-
ative impact on female employment rates (e.g., Gustafsson and Bruyn-
Hundt 1991; Grift 1998; oecd 2002a). The following paragraphs examine 
which welfare states have incorporated such derived ‘rights’ and what are 
the consequences of fiscal care for women’s employment. And what are 
the origins of changes in taxation? Is it social democracy or the women’s 
movement?
Individualisation and Transferable Allowances
First, it is important to consider when countries introduced an individual 
system of taxation in which women and men are seen as independent earn-
ers. Scandinavian countries (as well as Austria!) introduced individualisa-
tion early. The key period was the early 1970s. Denmark individualised 
tax on income in 1970, but on wealth only in the mid-1980s. The Scandi-
navian countries may well have taken this step because individualisation 
was seen as urgent due to high marginal tax rates; working was hardly 
worth it for a second earner (int. 43, 66, 67). Most continental countries 
introduced individualisation one or two decades later: the Netherlands in 
1984 (although already in 1973 an individualised system existed which still 
discriminated against working women, as we will see in the next section), 
Belgium in 1989, and the uk in 1989 (Dingeldey 2001).
 But even in individualised systems, the family can come in through the 
back door: individualisation can, and often does, go along with a bonus 
for single breadwinners: the transferable allowance. In most tax systems, 
people have either a set allowance of income for which no tax needs to 
be paid or for which they receive a tax credit. In some tax systems, this 
personal allowance can be transferred from a non-working (and non-tax-
paying) person to the working partner. In other cases a special dependent 
spouse allowance is given. The tax systems of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Austria contain a substantial tax ben-
efit for families with a single earner (Rubery et al. 1999).
 At ﬁ rst glance, this tax beneﬁ t gives women the possibility to stay at 
home to care. In that sense, taxes can contribute to citizenship rights to 
care. On second thought, this beneﬁ t is generally given to the male worker 
rather than to the care-giving woman. Th erefore, one cannot speak about an 
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individual citizenship right, as it reduces women’s economic independence 
as well as the urge to participate in the labour market. Feminists therefore 
refer to transferable allowances pejoratively as a ‘male breadwinner bonus’ 
(Lewis 1992a, Sainsbury 1999b). Such a bonus indicates the dominance of 
the ideal of full-time motherhood. Which countries have such a bonus?
Calculated from oecd tax studies, table 5.1 shows the extent to which tax 
systems favour single-earner families. In many countries, notably Belgium 
and Denmark, having children also leads to tax deductions, but in the 
present chapter the eﬀ ects of having children is left out as this book deals 
with rights to give care. Relative to the average production wage (apw), the 
Belgian tax system contains the highest bonus for single breadwinners, fol-
lowed by the Dutch system. In that sense, both countries do ﬁ t the Chris-
tian democratic model as well as the male breadwinner model. Th e British 
system contains the lowest beneﬁ t for single earners. In fact, it is one of 
the few European countries that actually encourages women to work (Daly 
2000b). While low tax rates already show its ‘liberal’ face, we can now also 
see its ‘individual’ face. Th e biggest surprise however is the Danish tax sys-
tem. Th eoretically, it should be as individualised as the British turns out to 
be. Instead, the Danish tax system contains a substantial bonus for single 
breadwinners and discriminates against double earners.
 Many researchers have been surprised by the Danish system of fiscal 
care, particularly given the ‘high rate of female labour force participation 
and settled recognition of the two-earner family as the norm for social be-
haviour and public policy’ (Shaver and Bradshaw 1995: 22; see also Sains-
bury 1999b; Montanari 2000; Dingeldey 2001). The British fiscal system 
does not correspond with employment patterns either. The uk has a very 
low number of double-earner couples and many mothers stay at home, 
much more than in the other countries. In addition, following the logic 
Table 5.1 Single Breadwinner Bonus in Taxation for 100 percent APW per year, 1998, 
four countries
BE DK NL UK
Single breadwinner bonus in euros 2324 2537 1256 460
As percentage of the APW 8.4 7.1 7.3 1.6
Calculations on the basis of OECD (2000)
In cooperation with Hans Hansen, The Danish Institute for Social Research/SFI.
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of the tax structure, married Belgian women should work less than Dutch, 
but they do not. Th e tax systems of the four countries thus bear many sur-
prises: they neither ﬁ t the models nor correlate with women’s employment 
patterns. How then to explain the outcomes and origins of ﬁ scal care?
Understanding the Origins
Although welfare state theory as well as feminist theory stress the effects 
of social democracy on gender relations, the social democrats continu-
ously stumble on the class-gender debate. Individualisation of taxation 
should thus not been seen as a trophy of social-democratic movements 
but of the women’s movement, often in alliance with liberal forces and the 
women’s movements.
 In Belgium, the 1989 tax law replaced the joint system that heavily pun-
ished dual-earner families. The Flemish tax compromise had two compo-
nents: individualisation (decumul) and the marriage quotient (huwelijks-
quotient). The latter is the name of the transferable allowance but it can be 
used exclusively by married couples, as in Denmark but unlike the Neth-
erlands (Van Haegendoren and Moestermans 1996). This law is a compro-
mise of two claims, typical for Belgium. Belgian policy, according to the 
Belgian sociologist Dumon, always had a strong family dimension as well 
as a sound history of women working outside the home (int. 11). On the 
one hand, feminists, often social democrats but also Christian democrats, 
were the most pronounced advocates of individualisation. The new law 
thus needed to comply with women’s wishes to work outside the home as 
well as to honor marriage and caring responsibilities. On the other hand 
the strong christian democratic movement as well as the very influential 
Organisation for Large and Young Families (bgjg) which represents about 
300,000 families, was against complete individualisation. The argument 
was that men and women should have a free choice to stay at home to 
provide care, and they also wanted to support marriage. A mostly male 
division of the social democratic movement was also in favour of the fam-
ily rather than the individual as the crucial unit of the welfare state (int. 1, 
11, 15, 23).
 The objective of the 1989 tax law was to institutionalise free choice 
between working and providing care. Individualisation offers married 
women the choice to work, while the marriage quotient offers them the 
choice to stay at home (Marques-Pereira and Paye 2001). Demeester, the 
(female) Christian democratic (cvp) minister responsible for the policy, 
indeed argues that the marriage quotient is a compensation for caregiv-
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ing. It should be seen as ‘a direct compensation for the work done by 
the woman at home’, she said (Vanistendael 1989). Indeed, the benefit 
is colloquially called an opvoedersloon, which literally means ‘parenting 
wage’.
 In the Netherlands, in the 1980s, nearly all Dutch political parties sup-
ported the penalty on double-earner families. In none of the countries has 
‘double earner’ been such a swearword as in the Netherlands. The social 
democrats motivated their position by ‘the strongest shoulder principle’: 
since double earners are richer, they have to pay more. This principle was 
also advocated by the Christian democrats, but they emphasised a sec-
ond reason: taxation policies should support the ties that bind a family, 
the cornerstone of society. Both parties, but mostly the social democrats, 
struggled with the gender and class dilemma, personified in ‘Mrs. Philips’, 
the imaginary wife of the director of the Dutch multinational of the same 
name. The dilemma presented itself as ‘should we treat Mrs. Philips as 
an individual with independent rights and independent income, despite 
her rich husband?’ or ‘is Mrs. Philips “the wife of ” and should the state 
refrain from supporting rich families?’ During the period of high unem-
ployment in the 1980s, Mrs. Philips was certainly seen as ‘the wife of ’. It 
was considered to be unjustified for a family to have double incomes while 
the number of no-income families increased. In both parliament and the 
media, unemployment in one family was played against double incomes 
in another family (TK 1980-1981).
 Two ‘parties’ were in favour of dismantling the male breadwinner 
bonus, primarily to increase women’s employment. Already in 1984, the 
Women’s Alliance (1998) proposed a system of individual tax credits. 
The returns (19 billion guilders), which are spent on male breadwinner 
arrangements, should be invested to improve conditions for women’s 
employment. As a party of higher-income members, such as business-
people, the right-wing Liberal Party (vvd) was also not impressed by the 
‘Mrs. Philips’ rhetoric , who at that time was indeed highly imaginary: 
only eight percent of all second earners had a substantial income, argued 
a vvd member of parliament.
 A decade later, in the mid-1990s, the vvd proposed to dismantle the 
transferable allowance cohort-wise. At that time, consensus did exist on 
the necessity of women’s independence and entry into the labour market, 
as described in chapter 4 (wrr 1990). However, all parties, including the 
vvd itself, voted against the proposal. Calculations showed that single-
earner families earning a minimum wage would be hurt – a Dutch taboo. 
Dismantling the male breadwinner bonus could only occur if the treasury 
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was rich enough to compensate single-earner low-income families and 
if the Christian democrats could not block such a plan. This was the 
case in the late 1990s, when the Dutch government included a liberal 
minister of finance (Zalm) who wanted to end the situation of money 
being given to ‘the husband who was able to keep his wife at home’ (nrc 
Handelsblad 1998) and a ‘work-minded’ social-democratic secretary of 
state (Vermeend). Together they were responsible for modernising the 
tax system.
 Even in Denmark, a country which is considered to be social demo-
cratic it was not this movement that stressed women as individuals. Al-
ready in the 1940s and 1950s, the traditional Danish women’s movement 
(dk) problematised the tax system. At that time, quite a number of wom-
en were already working and because of the high tax rate it was hardly 
worth it. For women, individualisation was a major topic. It was not un-
til 1967 that the law on individualisation was passed. Still, it was one of 
the earliest in Europe (Ravn 2000). The social democrats, including the 
powerful trade unions, were no advocates of individualisation. Although 
welfare state theory as well as feminist theory stress the effects of social 
democracy on gender relations, the Danish social democrats continuously 
stumbled on the class-gender debate (Siim 2000; int. 63). Individualisa-
tion of tax, they argued, was only beneficial for bourgeois women, not for 
working-class families. Appearing on television in the mid-1960s, the so-
cial democratic finance minister claimed that individualisation was only 
a request of well-educated women (int. 60). Social democrats were not 
against working women, they were afraid of punishing lower-income sin-
gle-earner families (int. 60, 63). Venstre, the right-wing bourgeois party, 
the party of farmers, was also against individualisation for farmer’s wives, 
and promoted ‘family values’ more than social democrats.
 It was a small radical liberal party of intellectuals, teachers, and en-
lightened farmers, Det Radikale Venstre, that pushed the case of individu-
alisation of taxation – or more precisely, its female members. They were 
able to stimulate a female cross-parliamentary alliance as many female 
members of the Social Democratic party were in favour of individuali-
sation. The traditional Danish Women’s Society (Dansk Kvindesamfund) 
supported this alliance. Radikale pleaded for individualisation because 
they believed that women and men should have individual rights, not 
so much because they sought to stimulate women’s employment, since 
women were already working. The Danish political scientist Birte Siim 
has argued that ‘the driving force of the universal welfare project was the 
Social democratic party in alliance with the small radical liberal party’ 
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(2000: 113). Individualisation in taxation, however, is thus much more a 
liberal trophy (int. 60, 66).
 In Denmark, in contrast to the Netherlands and Belgium, the bread-
winner allowance was never labelled as a male breadwinner bonus. Indi-
cating that it was meant to support low-income single-earner families, 
the transferable allowance – in contrast to Belgium and the Netherlands 
– was nearly flat-rated and excludes higher incomes. In the 1982 tax re-
form, however, the possibility of transferability was broadened so that 
middle-income bracket families could profit too (Montanari 2000). The 
party responsible was the Kristeligt Folkeparti, arguing that married cou-
ples in the higher-income group should also be able to transfer the allow-
ance as it stimulates marriage and offers people a choice to stay at home. 
Although the Christians now have very little support from Danish voters 
and have only a few seats in parliament, they were powerful at that time. 
Venstre and the conservative party needed them to form a government. 
‘This taxation policy should, however, perhaps rather be viewed as one 
part in alternative political packages which support specific forms of the 
gendered division of work in a society’, argues Montanari (2000: 237).
 The British tax scheme, finally, has indeed – as a typical liberal re-
gime – always been favourable towards working women, even when it 
had a joint system (Daly 2000b). Not only because taxes have always been 
comparatively low in Britain: uniquely, working women received a finan-
cial bonus which signiﬁ cantly reduced the impact of the joint tax system 
(Cmnd. 8093, 1980). As early as 1918, the ‘married man’s allowance’ was 
introduced ‘to fulﬁ l the obligations to support his wife’: a single-earner 
married man was thought to need more money. Th is was soon considered 
unfair to men whose wives worked. Th erefore a (lower) ‘wife’s earned in-
come allowance’ was introduced already in 1920. In 1942 this bonus was 
increased substantially to encourage married women to remain in employ-
ment during the Second World War. Unlike many other war measures, 
such as childcare, the income allowance was not cut back after the war. 
Th is was not only due to the administrative hassle but also because remov-
ing the incentive for women to work seemed inappropriate (Cmnd. 8093).
 The pro-individual tax system is thus not a direct consequence of party 
beliefs but of a broader historical country-specific ideology. In fact, in 
the 1980s, the Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher flirted 
with a male breadwinner bonus. At that time, high unemployment hit 
the uk, especially for men. As the tax system has always displayed incen-
tives for working women. ‘Isn’t it about time now to support single-earner 
families?’, argued the government in a Green Paper (Cmnd. 8093, 1980). 
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In 1986, a transferable allowance was proposed for married single-earner 
couples, as it would bring the uk in line with continental Europe. Ironi-
cally, the liberal non-discrimination argument was also put to the fore: 
‘The Government believes that the tax system should not discriminate 
against families where the wife wishes to remain at home to care for young 
children’ (Cmnd. 9756, 1986: 15). To protect the proposals from attacks, 
the government used a strategy that Pierson (1994) has labelled as obfus-
cation: to downplay the salience of the consequences. The 1986 Green Pa-
per pointed out that Denmark also had transferable allowances – which is 
true – and at the same time had the highest proportion of married women 
in the labour market of the European Community.
 The proposal was never implemented. Although the conservative 
women’s groups were very much in favour, the Green Paper received an 
unfriendly reception from a wide range of groups, including some of the 
government’s traditional supporters. ‘Sending women back to the kitchen’ 
was the dominant accusation, and the massive administrative costs were 
also criticised. The main reason why the proposal was not implemented 
was because the Treasury ruled it out on expensive grounds: the reform 
would cost 4.5 billion pounds (Dilnot 1989; Parker, 1995). For a Conser-
vative government that is attempting to retrench the state and cut down 
its expenses, investing a large sum of money in people who care at home 
would be at odds with the policy line. The financial aspects turned out to 
be more essential than ideology. The Conservative party did not want to 
pay for its conservative values.
The Impact of Tax
Two ﬁ scal regimes do not seem in line with their employment rates for wom-
en: Denmark and Britain, while two seem more related: the Netherlands 
and Belgium. But on a closer look, this correlation also raises doubts.
 British fiscal care is indeed in line with a liberal system, and has al-
ways encouraged married women to work. So, the question remains as to 
why British women do not work more. Dean and Shah (2000) argue that 
low-income British families are hardly aware of taxation. They are more 
knowledgeable about the benefit system. Perhaps financial measures oth-
er than tax incentives are more decisive for women’s employment.
 The Danish breadwinner bonus is an anomaly to the system, a holdover 
from the past, supported by only a few Danes, yet in practice the system is 
used quite substantially: 400,000 individuals transferred the allowance to 
their partner around the year 2000. The transfers are very modest, lead-
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ing to discounts of around 400 euros a year, a negligible sum of money 
in the Danish economic context. This indicates that the users are likely 
to be students and people with very small part-time jobs (int. 54). Thus, 
although in theory the breadwinner bonus could be used to support the 
provision of care at home, it is not used as such. Denmark’s early indi-
vidualisation of taxation may thus be more crucial than the anachronism 
of the (male) breadwinner bonus. Dingeldey (2001) stresses that in Den-
mark, the official political and social model largely encourages egalitar-
ian family patterns of labour market behaviour. Against this background, 
the tax concessions granted to sole earners are of no significance. They 
are not an incentive for a permanent pattern of labour market behaviour. 
What we can learn from the Danish case is that high financial incentives 
in theory can become petty in practice when they oppose a policy context 
in which working women have become a cultural given.
 After comparing various tax regimes, Sainsbury concludes that ‘In the 
Belgian case, the tax system provides an explanation for the puzzle of wom-
en’s low rate of employment despite ambitious policies supporting women’s 
employment’ (1999: 195). Th e Belgian tax system indeed ﬁ ts the Christian 
democratic model (and less the modiﬁ ed male breadwinner model) and 
Belgian mothers have moderate employment rates. Employment activity, 
however, is still higher than in the Netherlands and the uk. In fact, the 
relationship between employment and taxation is not clear cut.
 First, the tax system set up in Belgium in 1989 is friendlier to working 
women than the previous joint system, but women’s employment rates 
have increased only slightly since the 1990s. There has not been a mas-
sive move towards work (chapter 4). Second, the Belgian tax system dis-
proportionately benefits single-earner families with high incomes, yet in 
Belgium highly educated women are much more likely to be employed 
than less educated women. Finally, research by Pittevils and Timmer-
mans (1995) about the take-up of this fiscal care arrangements shows that 
the marriage quotient is not used as a parenting wage: half of those who 
make use of the allowance do not have (dependent) children; the majority 
are older, low-income couples. Therefore the researchers conclude that 
‘the marriage coefficient … can in no way be considered as a payment for 
bringing up children, but as a payment for retired women at the hearth’ 
(Pittevils and Timmermans 1995: 69; also Verbist 1999). The Belgian fi-
nancial scheme offers the highest bonus for caregiving of all four coun-
tries. Strangely enough, this does not clearly relate to mothers’ fairly high 
work rates. The tax system is not used as much by mothers as a wage for 
parenting.
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 Finally the Dutch scheme. Until 2001, the Dutch welfare state was 
completely in line with the Christian democratic model as well as with 
the strong male breadwinner model. The low employment rates of Dutch 
women seem to be in line with tax policy. But doubts are expressed about 
the correlation in the Netherlands too. The Dutch economists de Jonge 
and de Kam (2000), who composed table 5.2 about the history of marginal 
tax rates for a second earner, question a clear-cut relationship. Through-
out history, the marginal tax rates have fluctuated substantially, while 
labour market participation of women continuously increased. Addition-
ally, in the 1970s marginal tax rates were lower than in the 1990s, yet at 
that time fewer women worked. Even after the dual-earners law was intro-
duced, which penalised second earners, women’s employment rates rose. 
Th erefore they conclude: ‘Now that paid work for married women is widely 
accepted, things other than tax measures, such as the expansion of child-
care, could be more important to mobilise the supply of (married) women 
than a ﬁ scal trapeze act by policymakers’ (2000: 842). Th ey implicitly ar-
gue that now that the cultural battle has been won, ﬁ nancial measures are 
less important than facilities to make sure women can work.
To Conclude
Tax studies, argues Sainsbury (1999b), estimate that a fiscal system tai-
lored to dual-breadwinner couples can increase women’s labour market 
participation by as much as 20 percent (see also Gustafsson and Bruyn-
Hundt 1991; Grift 1998). This is an overstatement. The design of the tax 
system cannot sufficiently explain women’s employment patterns. While 
the Danish tax system promotes single earners and the British system 
double earners, the realities are exactly the opposite. Although the Bel-
Table 5.2 Marginal tax rates, as percentage of the gross wage, including social 
security contributions, of the average production worker, 1970-2001, the 
Netherlands
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
Marginal tax pressure for 
the average production 
worker
36.0 43.4 51.0 58.5 43.1 42.6 49.5
Marginal tax pressure 
when a wife is employed
28.9 34.8 32.0 39.7 33.4 33.1 29.2
Source: De Jonge & de Kam (2000)
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gian and Dutch tax systems seem to coincide much more with women’s 
employment patterns, correlations can also be questioned. First, due to the 
progressiveness of the systems high-income families benefit more from 
transferable allowances, but in fact low-income families are more likely 
to be single-earner families. Secondly, the historical pattern of employ-
ment does not coincide with the pattern of fiscal care. In the Netherlands, 
for instance, women’s substantial increase in the labour market occurred 
right at the time that double earners were penalised the most. Thirdly, 
in Belgium the tax scheme has often been regarded as the explanation 
for moderate female employment levels, but in practice Belgian mothers 
hardly draw on this ‘parenting wage’. In her cross-national study, Ding-
eldey (2001:653) comes to the same conclusion: ‘In ten different European 
countries … a clear shaping effect of tax systems can not be found.’
 Fiscal care is thus neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause for wom-
en’s employment and income patterns. Hakim is simply wrong when she 
writes that ‘fiscal policy is one of the most effective tools of social engi-
neering’ (2000: 227). This chapter found that while tax incentives should 
fit into the broader design and objectives of caring states (Montanari 
2000; Dingeldey 2001); perhaps services (De Jong and de Kam 2000) or 
social security arrangements (Dean and Shah 2002) are more important. 
The latter is the focus of the next section.
 Rights to Care, Duties to Work: Social Security
What are the consequences of social security for women’s citizenship? 
This section is concerned with the following hypothesis: If people have the 
right to give care, women are more likely to participate in caregiving and 
be more financially independent. The danger is that they may be captured 
in the sphere of caring and excluded from employment. Furthermore, if 
caring is compensated indirectly, via male breadwinner arrangements, 
this not only reduces women’s labour market participation but also their 
economic independence: a ‘derived right’ to give care has negative effects 
on citizenship. This section tries to empirically sort out the relationship 
between social security and work, especially when care responsibilities 
come in. Besides: to what extent do social security schemes fit into the 
theoretical welfare state models? What is the (political) background as 
well as the direction of social security restructuring?
 The focus is on rights but also on duties, as the latter is stressed less in 
academic research than in political debates in the period between 1980s 
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and 2000. I will be focusing on unemployment insurance and income sup-
port because these schemes lie at the heart of the work-and-care dilemma. 
Special attention is given to two test cases of women’s citizenship. The 
first is part-time work: does social security facilitate or obstruct part-time 
work? The second are lone mothers as they are the litmus test of female 
citizenship. Are they workers or caregivers? (Hobson 1994; Knijn 1994; 
Lewis, 1997).
Britain: Worker or Carer
The British social security scheme has strong liberal features but liberal 
ideology is not consistently put into practice. Work is not the only valued 
action: caregivers do receive protection (see also O’Connor et al. 1999 and 
Lewis 1992a). But one has to choose between being a worker or a carer. A 
worker has to comply with stringent rules.
 First, the British unemployment scheme was comparatively care-
friendly. Until 1988, no working record was needed to receive unemploy-
ment benefits – something unique for Europe. A person could receive 
credits – called ‘home responsibility protection’ – for caring for children 
under the age of 16, those seriously ill, or for invalids. Work, however, 
became increasingly important as a basis of entitlement. After the 1988 
reform just receiving credits was no longer enough; the claimant should 
have worked in one of the two years before unemployment. Due to the 
introduction of the 1996 Job Seekers Allowance (which merged unem-
ployment benefits with income support) compensation for caring for 
children disappeared altogether and only caring for the seriously ill or 
invalids had a right to compensation (cpag 1996). Unemployment ben-
efits moved from a care-friendly to a work-based system. It became ‘more 
liberal’. Hence women’s right to income decreased, as we see in the table 
below, at a time when more women were working.
 The obligation to work also became more important. Moore, the sec-
retary of state to the social security department under Thatcher, said: ‘For 
more than a quarter of a century public focus has been on the citizens 
“rights’ and it is now past time to redress the balance’ (quoted in Lister 
1990a: 7). At first glance, the discourse on duties addresses men only. The 
image of the unemployed was the idle scrounger, a man sitting on the 
couch in front of the television (during the day) with a bottle of beer, 
who after years of getting the dole has become lethargic and lazy. When 
Moore introduced the 1988 Actively Seeking Work test he said: ‘Each and 
everyone of those vacancies is an opportunity for an unemployed person 
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to gain the self-respect and independence that comes from supporting 
themselves and their families by their own effort’ (Hansard 1989: 714; em-
phasis added).
 A closer look shows that married women are also deemed to be abusers 
‘because they are not unemployed but care at home’, as a chief of a local 
employment service said (Kremer 1994). The 1981 Rayner report was the 
start of the toughening of duties. Although the factual difference between 
men and women was not that significant, the writers nonetheless con-
cluded of women that ‘many had small children and did not wish to work 
but had realised that claiming ub was an easy source of money for a year’ 
(de/dss 1981: 29). Consequently, the availability test was made stricter 
and from then on married women applying for benefits were looked at 
with particular suspicion. They have to prove that they can have childcare 
within 24 hours. This ‘24-hour rule’ rather than ‘at once’ is already seen as 
a nice gift from legislators. If an applicant cannot prove that they can ac-
cept employment within 24 hours, they do not qualify for unemployment 
benefits (Bryson and Jacobs 1992).
 People receiving unemployment benefits have to fulfil all obligations 
as workers, even when they have care responsibilities. They have to live 
up to the worker model. The strong division between the citizen-care-
giver and the citizen-worker is typically British: you are either a worker 
or a carer. This is especially problematic for those who want to combine 
both or want to work part time. Being available for a part-time job is 
only possible in the first period of unemployment (13 weeks). And a 
Table 5.3 Men and women who receive unemployment beneﬁ ts (UB) compared to 
the number of unemployed, November each year, Great Britain*
1986 1991 1996
Men receiving UB 578 626 398
Women receiving UB 346 462 275
Number of unemployed men 1817 1470 1525
Number of unemployed women 1214 891 796
Percentage of male claimants as a percentage of 
unemployed men
31.8 31.4 18.0
Percentage of female claimants as a percentage of 
unemployed women
28.5 18.4 15.5
* Statistics after 1996 are not comparable because of the merging of the income support 
and unemployment beneﬁ ts programmes into the ‘Jobs Seekers Allowance’. 
Source: DSS (1996); DSS (1997); NS (1997)
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part-time job is often not sufficient to qualify one to receive benefits 
either: access to benefits is not directly based on an applicants record 
of employment but on the contributions they have paid, however such 
contributions can only be paid if one reaches a certain threshold, the 
lower earnings limit (lel). In the mid-1990s, 2.2 million working women 
are estimated to be excluded from contributions because their income is 
too low, while this is the case for 0.8 million working men (Koopmans et 
al. 2003).
 In contrast to liberal ideology, British unemployment benefits were 
also family-based. For a long time the unemployed received a supple-
ment for an adult dependant as well as for children. This derived right 
to provide care dates back to ‘Beveridge Married Women’s Option’. Un-
til 1978 women could pay reduced national insurance contributions, 
thereby renouncing benefits. Until 1988 the installed supplement was 
not equal for men and women, who received less. Feminists have al-
ways argued in favour of individualisation of benefits, but they have 
been concerned about the consequences of a simple abolishment of the 
supplements for wives and children because benefits are so low (Lister 
1992). Since the introduction of the Job Seeker’s Allowance, supple-
ments have been cancelled and the uk now has an individualised sys-
tem. However, since the allowance is very low, claimants with a partner 
at home often have to turn to family-based income support to top up 
the insurance.
 While women with care responsibilities have difficulties in qualifying 
for unemployment benefit, lone mothers on social assistance in the uk are 
still allowed to be ‘full-time mothers’ until their youngest child reaches 
the age of 16. Until that time, they have no duty to work. This is quite 
unique in Europe and has been considered to be a telling anachronism to 
the liberal welfare model (Lewis, 1992; O’Connor et al. 1999; Millar and 
Rowlingson 2001). As a consequence by far the majority of lone mothers 
receive social assistance. This exemption of duties is, again, not linked to 
a specific party ideology. For a long time a political and social consensus 
has existed on lone mothers’ right to provide care. Indeed, Conservatives 
were preoccupied with the amorality of lone mothers; they saw them as 
the epitome of the failure of the family, as irresponsible mothers whose 
motives and capability for motherhood were questionable (Millar 1996). 
Conservatives also saw them as the epitome of the failure of the welfare 
state, since these women ‘choose’ a life of benefit dependency, yet they 
never dared to force them to work: this was not in line with the idea that 
care is best provided inside the warm and homey haven of the family. 
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Instead of forcing lone mothers to work, Conservatives were mostly inter-
ested in getting dads to pay, as the primary Conservative policy objective 
was to reduce the costs of benefits (see Lister 1996; Millar and Rowlingson 
2001).
 The Labour government however has not changed the policy towards 
lone mothers drastically either, although a more active approach has 
been introduced (Lister 1996). The Labour government wants to move 
towards a citizen-worker model and tries to encourage all mothers, in-
cluding those married to an unemployed man, to work. Policy towards 
lone mothers carried out via two routes. First, by ‘making work pay’ – 
via the improvement of the work benefit of Family Credit to the Working 
Families Tax Credit (wftc) and the establishment of a (low) minimum 
wage. Secondly, by ‘making work possible’, by setting up a ‘New Deal’ for 
lone parents (Millar and Rowlingson 2001). But unlike other ‘deals’, the 
New Deal for lone parents (and partners of the unemployed) is volun-
tary.
 As Table 5.4 shows, most British lone mothers indeed lived off of social 
assistance benefits. The problem is that this does not lead to a substan-
tial income. British benefits have the lowest replacement rates of all four 
countries (table 6.7), hence 70 percent of British lone mothers on benefits 
are poor (chapter 4). However, compared to other categories of claimants 
in the uk – such as the disabled or the unemployed – they are just as poor. 
‘Equality on a poor level’ seems to be the flagship of the British social 
security system. Gender differences – in line with the liberal model – in-
deed may not be as strong as class differences (see O’Connor et al. 1999; 
Daly 2000).
Table 5.4 Lone mothers: social beneﬁ ts and employment status, in percentages, 
1994, four countries
Social beneﬁ ts main 
income source
Employed Employed full time
BE 32.0 66.5 51.8
DK 32.1 77.6 70.8
NL 66.3 42.7 22.6
UK 65.6 37.6 18.4
Source: Pedersen et al. (2000), on the basis of the ECHP, 1994
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The Netherlands
The Dutch social security scheme has never been social democratic for 
women: it most resembles the British scheme, since Dutch women have 
had little access to individual income unless they are lone mothers. But 
the latter is also changing.
 While in the early Esping-Andersen study (1990) the Dutch unemploy-
ment scheme achieved the highest decommodification score, already at 
that time few women received unemployment benefits (see also Sainsbury 
1996). Since then, women have nonetheless gained spectacular access to 
unemployment insurance, as table 5.5 shows, but this stagnated after the 
mid-1990s.
The present system is built on the 1987 restructuring of social security. 
Because of the huge cost explosion of social security, the Christian demo-
cratic and liberal ‘no-nonsense’ government made reducing expenditures 
a priority. The architects of the restructuring were Christian democrats, 
but they received no fierce opposition from the social democrats (Bannink 
1999). In addition to cutting the level of benefit, access to unemployment 
benefits was more closely connected to employment history. The con-
nection to employment histories was again tightened in 1995, under the 
‘Purple Coalition’. In the Netherlands it is comparatively easy to receive 
Table 5.5 Men and women who receive unemployment beneﬁ ts compared to the 
number of unemployed, various years, the Netherlands*
1987 1990 1995 2000
Men receiving beneﬁ ts 103,900 102,300 226,900 109,600
Unemployed men 168,000 234,000 99,000
% unemployed men receiving 
beneﬁ ts
61 96 110
Women receiving beneﬁ ts 56,400 74,600 168,300 84,000
Unemployed women 222,000 244,000 126,000
% unemployed women receiving 
beneﬁ ts
33 69 66
* These statistics only give an impression as statistics on unemployment beneﬁ ts and 
unemployment rates are collected in a diﬀ erent way (for instance year averages versus 
picking out one month in the year).
Sources: SVR (2001), European Commission (1997, 2003), based on European Labour Force 
Survey
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a short-term benefit but it is now much harder to receive benefits for a 
longer period. No matter which political parties are in power, the Dutch 
reflex has been to strengthen the link between employment and access to 
benefits, so that hierarchies in the labour market are perpetuated.
 Linking access to benefits to employment history is especially problem-
atic for Dutch women because they have weak work histories. At the same 
time, the ‘no nonsense’ government also improved the system for women. 
Forced by the eu directive on equal treatment, the existing discrimination 
between men and women was abolished in 1985. Until then, only bread-
winners could receive a prolonged benefit (at that time wwv) (Righter et 
al. 1995). Motivated by Dutch rather than European policy consensus, the 
1987 reform also protected part-time work. Already in 1982 in the Was-
senaar Regulations, the social partners (trade unions and representatives 
of employers) had agreed on the necessity of a flexible labour market to 
combat the economic crisis. ‘A flexible labour force is fine’, said the trade 
unions, ‘but then part-time workers must be socially protected’. This deal 
– flexibility for employers and social security for flexible workers – not 
only resulted in the eight-hour rule, which means that eight hours of work 
per week is enough to claim unemployment benefits, but also resulted 
in the rule that one can apply for benefits (on top of wages) when their 
employer reduces their working hours by five or more hours per week 
(Righter et al. 1995; Teulings et al. 1997).
 In addition, the verzorgingsforfait was introduced in 1987, a moderate 
compensation for providing care. Only in order to receive the prolonged 
unemployment benefits can caregiving be included in someone’s ‘work 
history’, but only childcare qualifies. Providing care for children under the 
age of six counts as full-time work, while caring for children between ages 
six and 12 is only considered half-time work. The debate in parliament, in 
1985-1986, was nearly a women-only debate and agreement was reached 
across political parties (Wentholt 1990).
 In contrast to the uk, Dutch women covered by unemployment insur-
ance have not been subjected to an intensification of requirements to seek 
work, on the contrary: women were hardly sanctioned for not applying 
for work. Males, unmarried and young, were, simply because for them 
sanctions were considered to be a real incentive (Teulings et al. 1997). The 
discussion of whether unemployment benefits should cover care activi-
ties was sorted out in 1987. When a claimant is partially available – for 
a certain number of hours per week – benefit will be paid in accordance 
with the number of hours (Wentholt 1990; Beckers and Verspagen 1991). 
This means that in the Netherlands a part-time duty to work is perfectly 
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possible, unlike in the British case. The caveat is that if one is available 
for part-time work and one has worked full-time before becoming unem-
ployed, the person herself must carry the financial loss. This citizenship 
right to give care thus reduces people’s income.
 Lone mothers have been the epitome of a real paradigm shift. From the 
1970s onwards, lone mothers (and married mothers) receiving social as-
sistance were informally and unintentionally exempted from the require-
ment to work until their children reached the ages of 12, 16, or 18 – the 
exact practice depended on the municipality. In the 1980s this became of-
ficial policy, to the delight of lone mothers. The state-as-their-breadwin-
ner offered them peace of mind (Stolk and Wouters 1982). But in 1996 the 
paradigm shifted drastically and the state turned out to be less trustwor-
thy than lone mothers had hoped. Under the ‘Purple’ regime lone mothers 
of older children (over age five) ‘gained’ the obligation to work.
 Unlike the British case, Dutch lone mothers are not morally stigma-
tised. They are just a case study of the larger paradigm shift from the male 
breadwinner/female caregiver model into a (part-time) double-earner 
model – a move away from the Christian democratic regime. The under-
lying idea is that the best way for women to be emancipated is to work 
and become financially independent. This will not only bring women self-
development, autonomy, and self-esteem, it will also liberate them finan-
cially. Although they are better-off than the British, Dutch lone mothers 
are also relatively poor – not in the least due to the freezing of social as-
sistance (chapter 4).
 The changes are supported by all political parties and social organi-
sations (including the women’s movement). The discussions that took 
place are about the age limit of children and whether the requirement to 
work should be full-time or part-time. When the social democratic sec-
retary of state (Wallage) proposed the new law, he wanted mothers of all 
children, no matter what the age of the children, to be obligated to work. 
Taken up by the small Christian orthodox party (gpv), most political par-
ties agreed that there should be children’s age limit, which was set at five. 
More recent debates showed that all parties and social organisations are 
against a univocal requirement for lone parents to work full time. In the 
new 2003 law municipalities are allowed to place work requirements on 
lone mothers of children up until the age of 12, but they have to take into 
account the wishes of lone mothers and make sure enough childcare is 
available.
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Denmark
Belgium and Denmark show the opposite story. In these countries women 
have many more individual rights and greater financial autonomy. The 
right-wing Schluter government in Denmark had nearly 11 years to re-
trench, but Green-Pedersen (2002) shows that compared to the Nether-
lands cutbacks in rights and budgets were comparatively mild. If cutbacks 
took place it was after the 1993 election of a social democratic govern-
ment. But with the introduction of its 1994 labour market reform eventu-
ally the right and the duty to work were installed.
 Table 5.6 shows that Danish women are well covered by unemploy-
ment benefits. Unlike the British and Dutch security scheme, insurance 
rather than social assistance is the main benefit for all those unemployed. 
Why is women’s access well guaranteed? Pure citizenship-based benefits, 
the dream of researchers like Daly (1996) and Sainsbury (1996), do not 
exist, not even in the Danish social democratic welfare state. Women do 
not have high access because of easy eligibility criteria either. In Denmark 
one year of employment (out of three) plus being a member of a fund 
is necessary for entitlement. Prior to 1997, when eligibility criteria were 
toughened, 26 weeks were sufficient. Moreover, compensation for provid-
ing care has no tradition in Denmark.
Table 5.6 Men and women who receive unemployment beneﬁ ts compared to the 
number of unemployed, various years, Denmark*
1985 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999
Unemployed men 107,257 109,054 134,176 91,071 76,478 72,774
Unemployed women 127,955 124,858 144,677 102,601 92,513 85,416
Men on beneﬁ t 80,609 64,086 59,356
Women on beneﬁ t 105,061 87,321 74,532
% unemployed 
women on beneﬁ t
102 94 87
% unemployed men 
on beneﬁ t
89 84 82
* These statistics only give an impression as they are not fully comparable. Beneﬁ t statistics 
are year averages; unemployment statistics are compiled at the closing of the year.
Sources: DS (1999b) Ligestillingsrådet (1999) Ministry of Labour/Ministry of Economic Aﬀ airs 
(2000)
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The Danish system is not friendly to part-time work either. It has become 
impossible – unlike in the Netherlands, and especially different from Bel-
gium (next section) – to receive benefits when working part-time. In the 
1970s, many part-time workers received a supplement but by 1979 the 
minister of labour demanded that part-time workers get a signed state-
ment from their boss that they could immediately quit their job if offered 
full-time employment elsewhere. As a result, many women resigned: they 
were better off receiving full-time benefits than working at a mere part-
time job (int. 50, 59). In 1983 a second discouragement was implemented: 
the rate for supplementary benefits was reduced and a time limit was set. 
A policymaker at the ministry of labour explains (int. 69): ‘The govern-
ment has always been afraid that companies would use the benefit as a 
wage supplement and people would continuously work part time. Part-
time work is a short-term solution and women should not be locked into 
it’. Secondly, part-time insurance is less beneficial than full-time insuranc-
es: recipients of part-time insurance receive relatively lower benefits and 
those who work less than 15 hours cannot be insured. The trade unions 
wanted to place disadvantages on part-time work because they prefer to 
reduce working hours collectively and leave little opportunity for indi-
vidual arrangements. (int. 59). Indeed, part-time insurance and part-time 
work are marginal and diminishing in Denmark. In 1998, only 2.3 percent 
of workers were insured part-time (DS 1999b).
 One factor which helps to explain women’s good access to the right to 
income is the trade union protection against marginal jobs, another the 
length of beneﬁ t. Until the mid-1990s, when the 1994 labour market re-
form was introduced, people could be on beneﬁ t for a very long time. Th e 
maximum was seven years but since temporary jobs were oﬀ ered to renew 
the rights, beneﬁ ts could be lifelong in practice. As a result, people would 
not fall out of the social insurance scheme. Hence Danish unemployed 
women are likely to be covered by individual beneﬁ ts not so much because 
of lax eligibility criteria or care compensation but because they have full-
time and long-term work histories, and beneﬁ ts are comparatively long.
 In Denmark, all people – including (lone) mothers and caregivers 
– are obligated to work but the state has to offer childcare as well as 
paid employment. If unemployed are unavailable to work, benefits are 
withdrawn. Typical of the Danish case are again the disadvantages for 
part-time workers: even if they have smaller part-time jobs, they have to 
be available for 30 hours a week. For a long time, however, the practice 
was much looser than the principles. The funds, which are connected to 
trade unions, did not monitor the claimant’s availability and job-seek-
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ing activities: they protected the unemployed, who are union members 
(oecd 1993). A small-scale study in the mid-1990s shows that profession-
als who worked for the unemployment fund, A-kasser, often sided with 
the claimants. One fund employee said that childcare problems ‘are none 
of our business’, while another explained: ‘We would rather not know 
whether people have childcare problems’ (Kremer 1994). In 1993, for ex-
ample, few unemployed people were refused benefits: just 117 men and 
199 women (dfa 1993).
 In fact, it was the former social democratic minister Bent Rold Ander-
sen (1987) who started the debate about citizenship and strongly argued 
that duties should be reinstalled. Only after 1994, when the Social Demo-
cratic government started the move from a passive to an active system, was 
the right and duty to work really enforced. The 1994 labour market reform 
not only cuts unemployment benefits to a maximum of seven years but 
gives the unemployed the right and the duty to seek employment (Madsen 
et al. 2001). It is only because of the labour market reform that the Danish 
welfare state has really become ‘social democratic’.
Belgium: Too Much Access for Women?
Perhaps surprising for a Christian democratic welfare regime, Belgian 
women are also well covered by unemployment insurance, which in the 
Belgian context is also far more important than social assistance. The Bel-
gian unemployment insurance coverage level is the highest in Europe: the 
oecd (1994) calculated that as many as 150 percent (!) of the unemployed 
receive benefit (see also table 6.6). And of all people of an active age, 
one in four claims unemployment benefits (De Lathouwer 2003b). What 
makes the Belgian unemployment scheme so friendly – some would say 
too friendly – for the (female) unemployed?
 One of the reasons is obviously women’s high level of unemployment, 
but there is more to it. First, eligibility criteria are not too stringent and 
unlike any other welfare state, unemployment benefits in Belgium is in 
principle lifelong, a practice heavily criticised by the oecd. As in Den-
mark, strong trade unions have prevented the development of jobs that 
would not be covered by benefits, so marginal, short-term jobs were rela-
tively absent in Belgium. Since 1985, when the Belgian leave scheme was 
introduced, there has been compensation for care.
 In Belgium, unemployment benefits are not individualised. The sys-
tem of ‘derived rights’ was introduced before the Second World War. As in 
the uk, women were directly discriminated against: they were entitled to 
RIGHTS TO CARE, DUTIES TO WORK: SOCIAL SECURITY

lower benefits than men. In 1971, however, the ‘neutral’ terms of ‘supple-
ments’ and ‘head of the households’ were introduced. A dependant can 
be a child, a wife, or even a live-in family member up to the third degree 
(only if they have no substantial income for themselves).
 In Belgium, a fierce debate took place on the issue of derived rights. 
In 1991, the Comité de Liason, a French-speaking women’s organisation, 
took the Belgian state to the European Court of Justice. The Belgian ben-
efit system, they argued, was discriminatory and derived rights unjust 
and problematic for several reasons: marriages are unstable (what hap-
pens to married women who become lone parents?), the current system 
did not fairly give back to women what they had paid into the system 
(women who had worked should see their contributions back in the ben-
efits they received, argued the Comite, but instead their benefits were 
lower), and, they charged, the importance of the right to work as de-
rived rights reduce women’s labour market participation. In response, 
the Belgian state presented unemployment benefits as a system of social 
assistance and argued that due to a limited budget, priority be given 
to protecting the weakest group: heads of households with a dependant 
wife and children. This ideology is very dominant in Christian democ-
racy. The Belgian state won the case (Cantillon 1994; Peemans-Poullet 
1995; int. 1,4, 24). In Belgium, individual rights are less important than 
rights that protect the family, concludes the law professor Van Buggen-
hout (1994) (int. 4).
Table 5.7 Men and women who receive full-time unemployment beneﬁ ts compared 
to the number of unemployed, various years, Belgium*
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Men receiving beneﬁ ts 106,393 196,234 129,101 207,563 154,314
Percent men unemployed 134 111 109
Women receiving beneﬁ ts
Percent unemployed
188,477 259,234 202,666
126
282,734
129
207,450
129
Percent women 
unemployed
126 129 129
Women as a percentage of 
all claimants
64 57 61 58 57
Total number of claimants 294,870 455,530 331,767 490,297 351,864
* Beneﬁ t and unemployment statistics are not fully comparable – as in Denmark and the 
Netherlands. They just give an impression.
Source: Ministerie van Tewerkstelling en Arbeid (2000), European Commission (2003)
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While rights are easily accessed, duties are lax, as the oecd has warned. 
Claimants hardly have to prove their availability (oecd 2000) and the 
number of sanctions is very low compared to other countries, including 
the Netherlands and the uk (see oecd 2000; De Lathouwer 2003). To-
day, in Belgium, activation policy is hardly developed, and benefits are 
coupled with a lack of assistance in seeking employment (De Lathouwer 
2003). Why is control and verification of job-seeking activities negligible? 
First, institutional factors are important. The organisation and responsi-
bilities of activation and benefit delivery are spread between federal and 
regional organisations, which leads to communication problems and dis-
cussions about responsibilities (int. 17). Moreover, trade unions, which 
play an important role in the organisation of the system, protect their 
members against harsh sanctions. Moreover, unlike the British and Dutch 
schemes, Belgian women receiving unemployment benefits are allowed to 
provide care if they are ‘unavailable because of social and familiar reasons’ 
(which includes caring for relatives and children). A substantial number 
of women – as it is only women who take it – use this option. Nearly half 
of them (43 percent) are highly educated, indicating that the wish to be a 
full-time mother is not limited to the lower classes, as also Hakim (2000) 
has pointed out. The drawback is that an unemployed person only re-
ceives a very limited sum of money; caregivers are less valued than those 
classified as ‘real unemployed’. It is thus financially safer to be silent about 
care responsibilities, as a huge number of women receiving unemploy-
ment benefits are.
 In fact, it is fair to say that unemployment benefits are used as ‘a wage 
for bringing up children’ (int. 7, 8). A well-published study in the mid-
1990s showed that a substantial number of married mothers receiving 
benefits did not apply for work at all (De Hooghe and Witte 1996). A 
cross-national study also shows that while by far the majority of Dan-
ish (84.4), Dutch (83.1), and British (76.2) unemployed women want to 
work – even more so than men – Belgian women show much less of a 
commitment, with only 56.6 percent committed to work (Gallie and Alm 
2000).
 Therefore the Christian Democratic, female minister Smet introduced 
in 1991 the infamous ‘article 80’, which is one of the few social security 
changes in a comparatively tranquil welfare state (De Lathouwer 1996; 
Kuipers 2004) This article requires that if claimants are unemployed for 
an abnormally long time – twice as long as the average period of unem-
ployment – benefits can be withdrawn, except when one can prove that 
they are seeking work or when one’s partner does not earn enough to 
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prevent the family from falling into poverty. With this rule Smet wanted 
to protect single-breadwinner families, as in Belgium these families are 
most likely to be poor (as we saw in chapter 4). Feminists have labelled the 
changes as the re-instatement of the male breadwinner model. ‘In the case 
of expenditure it is always working women and double-income families 
which are treated with a visit’, write Van Haegendoren and Moestermans 
(1996: 97). Policy change often focuses on double-earner families, instead 
of on single-earner families. Representing the Belgian Christian demo-
cratic ideology, Smet is more concerned with family poverty than with 
individual rights. Although it seems reasonable to reduce the length of 
benefit, penalising double earners or protecting single earners is a Chris-
tian democratic reflex in times of budgetary restrictions.
 What has also been typically Belgian is the huge number of part-time 
workers receiving benefits: the so-called ‘involuntary part-time worker 
to escape unemployment’. Many social security schemes have had (Den-
mark) or still have (the Netherlands) such a measure, but the usage in 
Belgium breaks all records. In 1992, at the height of the rule, more than 
200,000 part-time workers received extra benefits. By far the majority 
were women (Simoens and Put 1996). The rule was introduced in 1982 and 
fit the Cabinet’s plan to redistribute employment – the Belgian answer to 
save the economy. Employers wanted to fire people or have them work 
part time, but labour laws in Belgium were very strict. The powerful trade 
unions however opposed what they saw as a ‘normalisation of part-time 
work’: part-time workers, they said, had many financial problems. The 
Christian democratic minister Hansenne (psc) intervened and compen-
sated workers for loss of income via unemployment benefits. Since there 
was little monitoring of whether part-time workers indeed applied for 
full-time work, the income guarantee became a great success for employ-
ers as well as the mostly female recipients.
 Again, Minister Smet introduced a guarantee that was not as gener-
ous as the previous. Her intervention had an enormous impact on many 
women receiving benefits: they received substantially lower benefits. 
Her motivation was that research had shown that 30 to 40 percent of the 
women working part time who received these benefits did not want to 
work full time at all (Holderbeke 1991). She said that the rule was unfair 
towards women working part time who had never worked full time, as 
they did not receive benefits in addition to their wages. In contrast to the 
Dutch model, where part-time work is more of an individual choice, she 
nevertheless argued that compensation for part-time work was needed, 
although not as generous compensation as was available before (Stan-
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daard magazine 1995). The women’s movement, in particular the wom-
en’s committees of the trade unions, were furious. In their view part-time 
jobs were always marginal jobs. ‘Smet’, they said, ‘recognised part-time 
jobs as appropriate work’. The rule means ‘the end to the idea that every-
one has the right to a decent, full-time job, and adequate wage’ (int. 8, 15, 
24, 29).
 When female and married, in terms of social security, it is better to 
avoid Christian democratic countries, argue Esping-Andersen (1990), 
Langan and Ostner (1991), and Daly (1996). These countries’ policies make 
you dependent on your husband. But the Belgian welfare state shows that 
a strong notion of familialism in which dependency within marriage is the 
starting point of social policy can go along with a huge number of women 
who used unemployment benefits as a wage for caregiving. They used it to 
practice the ideal of full-time motherhood. Reinforcing dependence thus 
goes hand in hand with implicit individual rights and financial autonomy. 
‘Moderate male breadwinner model’ and ‘Christian democratic model’ 
are thus not adequate labels for this welfare regime, as also the Christian 
democratic movement stresses women’s work as well as women’s care re-
sponsibilities.
Questioning the relationship between social security and employment
So far we have seen that social security schemes do not fit the classic wel-
fare regime labels when women’s finances, care responsibilities, and part-
time work are examined. Moreover, changes cannot be directly linked to 
specific (party) ideologies: they are often a result of a new cross-national 
consensus on the rights and duties of men and women. The next issue is 
whether the (changing) social security schemes as described above cor-
relate with female employment patterns.
Low and Reduced Beneﬁ ts
Economic logic, as expressed well by the oecd (1994a, 2002a), states that 
low benefits will increase employment whereas high benefits decrease 
people’s need to find work (oecd 1994a, 2002a). Daly (1996), for instance, 
argues that for this reason the uk system may have more potential for 
gender equality than some continental systems. It encourages everyone, 
including women, to work. The question is whether this logic can be em-
pirically confirmed. Table 5.8 shows the replacement rates of social se-
curity in the four countries. British replacements rates are the lowest, as 
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are mothers’ employment rates. No clear-cut relation is found in other 
countries either. Dutch replacement rates are by far the best, followed 
by Denmark, but female employment patterns in countries with high re-
placement rates show few similarities. Women apparently do not fall into 
the standard (oecd) thesis.
This also comes to the fore when we look at policy changes in Belgium. 
What happened, for instance, when minister Smet introduced article 80? 
This has indeed had huge consequences for women. Between 1993 and 
1995 nearly 10 percent of all female claimants lost their benefits. And 
over the 1990s, 200,000 people – most of them cohabiting women with 
children – lost their benefits (Steunpunt wav 1996). But what happened? 
Most of them withdrew from the labour market altogether. This not only 
indicates that unemployment benefits have actually been used on a large 
scale as direct compensation for caregiving – as an implicit unintended 
right to provide care – but it also indicates that micro-economic theory 
does not hold. When financial compensation for care was withdrawn, 
women did not take up jobs. Instead they stayed at home without pay (De 
Lathouwer et al. 2003).
 It is also not true that unemployment benefits were mainly used by 
less-educated women to stay at home. In fact, women with secondary and 
higher educational levels are overrepresented in the number of claimants 
who lost their benefit. One explanation is the fact that in Belgium women 
from the lower classes have a higher work ethos than women from high-
er-income families. They do not want to be unemployed and are slightly 
more likely to seek work. Higher-income women have a higher care ethos 
– they prefer the ideal of full-time motherhood – and are more likely to 
Table 5.8 Net replacement rates for four family types at 100 percent of APW, after tax 
and including unemployment beneﬁ ts, family and housing beneﬁ ts in the 
ﬁ rst month, around 2002, four countries
Single Married Married two 
children
Lone parent 
two children
BE 64 61 64 65
DK 63 63 73 78
NL 82 89 89 91
UK 46 46 49 49
Source: OECD (2002c)
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stay at home because their partner likes it (De Lathouwer et al. 2003). 
This contrasts with the notion that low educated women are more likely 
to work because they need to financially.
 Another test case to understand the relationship between women’s 
work and social security rights and duties is the change of law concerning 
part-time employment. For one decade – between 1981 and 1992 – Bel-
gium had generous compensation for those working part-time and this 
was used in large numbers, mainly by women. After 1992 the compensa-
tion was significantly reduced. What did women do? If we look at the fi-
nancial gains, we would expect fewer women to work part-time after 1992 
and move towards full-time work. But the facts show that women moved 
to part-time jobs, they did not behave as a homo economicus. Perhaps the 
normative ideas underlying policy are more important. The rule before 
1992 stressed that part-time jobs were inappropriate as people needed 
compensation. The new rule however stresses, to the anger of women’s 
organisations, that part-time jobs are decent work. This may have attract-
ed women to work part time.
 Moreover, it is unclear why Belgian women used unemployment ben-
efits as a wage for bringing up children and Danish women did not. They 
could have done so, at least before the 1994 labour market reform which 
effectively installed duties. But they did not on such a scale as occurred in 
Belgium. Danish studies show that women did want to work (Mogensen 
1995) as also the previously mentioned study by Gallie and Alm (2000) 
shows: nearly 85 percent of Danish unemployed women are very com-
mitted to work, in contrast to the Belgian ( 56.6 percent). In Denmark, 
only a minority of women do not want a job (see also Finansministeriet 
1995). The question is, then: while the Belgian and Danish social security 
schemes prior to 1994 are similar, why did Belgian women use unemploy-
ment benefits as a wage for bringing up children and Danish women did 
not?
Breadwinner Bonus – or Indirect Payments
Another issue is whether men on benefits receive a supplement for a non-
working wife – a ‘breadwinner bonus’ or ‘double unemployment bonus’. 
This indirect financial compensation to care, according to the theory, 
would not only make women dependent on their husbands, it also keeps 
them at home (Esping-Andersen 1990, Lewis 1992a; Sainsbury 1996; Daly 
1996; Gallie and Paugam 2000). This is not an issue in Denmark nor, per-
haps unexpectedly, in the Netherlands, as these systems are purely in-
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dividually-based. This was not the case in the uk and Belgium. Such a 
(male) breadwinner bonus indeed undermines women’s financial inde-
pendence, but does it also reduce female employment rates? oecd (1996) 
calculations show that an unemployed Belgian men with a dependent wife 
receives around 70 percent of his previous wage. He sees his income re-
duced to 47 percent of his previous wage when his wife enters the labour 
market. In the uk this income is reduced from 75 to 44 percent. Why, 
then, should a wife of an unemployed man go to work? ‘This additional 
money destroys the incentive to work for a dependent spouse, because 
finding a job would lead to losing the extra income’ (De Graaf and Ultee 
2000: 280).
 The question is why in an individualised welfare state like Denmark do 
gendered unemployment patterns exist that are similar to those in the uk. 
Additionally, British researchers show that the disincentive for spouses to 
work is still smaller than the incentive to work. Marsh and McKay (1993) 
studied the employment behaviour in couples and calculated that due to 
the existence of in-work-benefits in the uk (such as ‘family credit’, now 
the Working Families Tax Credit), paid employment would always lead to 
a higher income. They also question whether people really do calculate as 
the researchers did, and whether they are knowledgeable of the specific 
financial rules. ‘Out of work couples do not engage much in working out 
the relation between what they might earn in work and they might get in 
in-work benefits’ (Marsh and McKay 1993: 121).
Lone Mothers
There must be a relation between the absence of the obligation to work 
and the high number of women on social assistance. In Belgium and Den-
mark lone mothers are not exempted from work obligations and their 
labour market participation is much higher (table 5.9; chapter 4). Yet it 
is unclear how the welfare state works. Why do lone mothers make the 
choice to care full-time and postpone a working career that would lift 
them out of poverty? Social policy analysts often argue that lone mothers 
are confronted with the ‘poverty gap’: once they enter the labour mar-
ket specific benefits, like housing, are lost. In addition, another economic 
barrier to work arises, namely the costs of childcare. Lone mothers do 
want to work, but they are blocked (Lister 2001).
 A substantial number of British studies however shows that also for 
lone parents, being employed gives the best protection against poverty, 
again because of in-work-benefits (Marsh and McKay 1993; Marsh 2001). 
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Employed lone parents are less likely to be poor than those not doing paid 
work (Kilkey and Bradshaw 2001). Poverty-wise, lone mothers are thus 
better-off in the labour market than receiving social assistance. The ques-
tion thus remains: ‘Why don’t they go to work?
 In their study of British lone mothers, Duncan and Edwards (1999) 
look at this issue. They concluded that lone mothers’ decisions are lead by 
gendered moral rationalities which are constructed, negotiated, and sus-
tained socially in particular contexts. At an individual level it may be eco-
nomically rational for a lone mother to take up paid employment, but it 
may be socially irrational, for instance because identities as a worker and 
good mother are difficult to balance and can be in conflict. Duncan and 
Edwards therefore argue that lone mothers try to behave in line with their 
socially constructed ‘self ’. Only when the identities as worker and good 
mother are reconciled do lone mothers take up paid employment. Rather 
than focusing on financial incentives – the underlying logic of compara-
tive welfare regimes theories – they point to cultural explanations. In the 
terms of this book, lone mothers’ behaviour is determined more by their 
ideal of care.
 Examining the Dutch law is also a great opportunity to ascertain wheth-
er changes in benefits alter the employment behaviour of lone mothers. 
In fact, the duty to work has not lead to a massive shift of lone mothers 
into jobs: no more than 12 percent of lone mothers stopped receiving ben-
efits into order to move into the paid workforce in recent years, as Knijn 
and van Wel show (1999). More recent statistics show that in a period 
of 14 months between 2001 and 2002, six percent stopped receiving so-
cial assistance because they entered employment (Knijn and van Berkel 
2003). One of the reasons for such an incremental change in lone moth-
ers’ employment pattern is that local officials do not implement the law; 
60 percent of mothers with children older than five were still (partly) ex-
Table 5.9 Lone mothers: Social beneﬁ ts and employment status, in percentages, 
1994, four countries
Social beneﬁ ts main 
income source
Employed Employed full time
BE 32.0 66.5 51.8
DK 32.1 77.6 70.8
NL 66.3 42.7 22.6
UK 65.6 37.6 18.4
Source: Pedersen et al. (2000), on the basis of the ECHP, 1994
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empted in the late 1990s. More recently, in line with the economic boom, 
activation offers increased (Knijn and van Berkel 2003). Although those 
working with social assistance claimants generally agree with the policy 
change, they reject the full-time work obligation for mothers who really 
want to care for for their children and are afraid to push them into jobs 
that do not increase their income.
 Th e latter is also an important consideration for lone mothers them-
selves. As they often are less educated, they have to work a minimum of 
32 hours a week to get oﬀ  welfare, as the level of welfare is relatively high 
and wages for less educated women relatively low. Th is is not what many 
of them want. Many lone mothers receiving social assistance have a high 
care ethos, they agree that ‘the best thing in life is to take care of one’s chil-
dren’. Knijn and van Wel (2001b: 244) therefore conclude that ‘because of 
this combination of low education and a high care ethos, lone mothers on 
welfare have problems in making use of ﬁ nancial and care incentives that 
are meant to help them out of welfare’. In other words, ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ts are 
not in line with lone mothers’ moral considerations, or their ‘ideal of care’.
To Conclude
This section shows that the labels of welfare state models are not always 
adequate, while most social security changes are not immediately linked 
to the ideology of the political powers in government. Right-wing parties 
in Denmark retrench less than in the uk or the Netherlands. Christian de-
mocracy is different in each country and many changes occur in consen-
sus, such as the paradigm shift in the Netherlands – the shift away from 
full-time motherhood – and the Danish labour market reform.
 This section also questions the connection between rights and duties 
in social security and women’s employment behaviour. Several puzzles 
came to the fore. The level of benefit, in contrast to economic theory, is 
not connected to women’s employment rates. Lone mothers in the uk 
and the Netherlands do not go to work, while receiving unemployment 
benefits makes them poor. Belgian women use unemployment insurance 
to facilitate a right to provide care while in Denmark they do not, even 
though prior to 1994 the welfare schemes resembled each other. But why 
did part-time work become popular in Belgium right at the moment fi-
nancial compensation was lowered? And why did women whose benefits 
were withdrawn due to article 80 drop out of the labour market altogeth-
er? Micro-economic theory would expect them to take a job, because now 
they have lost their financial compensation for care.
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 The next section will focus on more recent financial arrangements”care 
leave.
 Care Leave: For Women Only?
The expansion of care leave shows that the welfare state is not past per-
fect. Most European countries have now introduced the right to time for 
care, not in the least due to pressure from the European Commission, 
which in 1996 prescribed that all member states must implement a non-
transferable right to parental leave (O’Connor et al. 1999). The right to 
time to care is groundbreaking. The Norwegian sociologist Leira even 
goes as far as terming leave as ‘evidence of an interesting shift in the con-
ceptualisation of “the worker’, such that the demands of social produc-
tion take priority over those of production’ (1993: 333, also 2002). Leave 
schemes indeed value caregiving, but this is only temporary. In the end, 
citizens are supposed to work.
 This section deals with the consequences of these new rights for gen-
dered citizenship. On the one hand, care leave may have negative effects 
on women’s citizenship because women may be seduced into staying at 
home, thus injuring their employment careers (Leira 2002; Morgan and 
Zippel 2003). They are also likely to receive less income than when em-
ployed: caring is usually less valued financially. On the other hand, espe-
cially in countries with low female employment, labour market participa-
tion may increase. Rather than quit employment altogether, women remain 
attached to the labour market (Bruning and Plantenga 1999). Moreover, 
instead of being dependent on a male breadwinner, the payment, how-
ever modest, can contribute to women’s financial independence. Leave ar-
rangements may finally be a way to attract men to care. If allowed to stop 
working for a short period they may be encouraged into providing care. 
Care leave is a tangible translation of the citizenship right to give care. It 
allows men and women to participate in caregiving.
 This section consists of three parts. In the first, the conditions of pa-
rental leave will be compared. What welfare state has really implemented 
the right to time for care? I will then discuss the origins of leave schemes. 
Are they indeed a victory of conservative politics, which were dominant 
in the 1980s, as has been suggested by Morgan and Zippel (2003)? Finally, 
I will question the effects of leave on women’s participation in care and 
paid employment. Does the leave scheme reinforce the gender division of 
labour? Do women go back to work afterwards?
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Table 5.10 Rights to parental leave around 2000 in four countries
Denmark Belgium The Netherlands UK
Key 
arrang-
ement
Parental leave Voluntary career 
break
Parental leave
Parental leave Parental leave
Key year(s) 1994
2001
1985
1998
1990 1999
Maximum 
length
32 weeks per 
parent (1994)
32 weeks shared 
between parents 
(2001)
Five years (career 
break)
13 weeks 
(parental leave)
26 weeks 13 weeks 
Conditions 
and rights
Individual right 
for parents of 
children aged 
0-1 (excluding 
maternity) for 16 
weeks, and 13 
weeks for parents 
of children aged 
1-8 (1994)
Parental leave 
became an 
individual right 
for 13 weeks in 
1998
Individual right Individual right
Transferable 
(shared) leave 
scheme (2001) 
The voluntary 
career break (up 
to ﬁ ve years) is 
an individual 
right for 1% 
of employees 
within a 
company
Leave can be 
negotiated with 
the employer for 
up to 52 weeks. 
The break is part 
of all collective 
agreements 
but employer’s 
permission is 
needed
Payment About 55% of 
an APW, public 
employees 100% 
of their previous 
wage
About 20% of an 
APW
None, except 
for public 
employees and 
those covered 
by collective 
agreements
None, 
except when 
individually 
negotiated.
Part-time 
possibilities
Since 2001 only 
possible after 
negotiating with 
employer
Made possible in 
various steps in 
the mid-1990s
Obligatory at 
the introduction. 
From 1997 
onwards full-time 
leave is possible 
but part of just 
a few collective 
agreements
Yes
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Of the four country schemes, the Danish is still the ‘best’. In 1994, Dan-
ish parents received an uncontested individual right to childcare for a 
relativly long period (see table) and if parents could reach an agreement 
with their employer they could extend this leave up to one year, but on 
a full-time basis only (Fridberg and Rostgaard 1998; Rostgaard 2002). In 
2001, under the liberal-conservative government the length of leave has 
been reduced as the period has to be shared between the parents but the 
scheme has also been made more flexible – if employers agree – and pay-
ment has been increased, even though Danish leave payments were al-
ready the highest of all four countries.
 Denmark may have a relatively good leave scheme, but it was not the 
ﬁ rst of the four countries to institute parental leave: Belgium had the Euro-
pean debut. In 1981 a governmental agreement introduced the ‘voluntary 
career break’, which was legally enacted in 1985. Th is gave individual em-
ployees the possibility, not the right, to paid leave. An employee could take 
a pause from work for one year, ﬁ ve times in his (working) life – which is 
very considerable. Th e purpose of leave does not matter: one can use it for 
care, education, travelling, ﬁ shing, whatever. Reﬂ ecting the labour market 
rationale behind the scheme, the only condition is that a vacancy arising 
because of leave has to be fulﬁ lled by a long-term unemployed person, a 
demand which can be problematic in practice. Gradually steps were set to 
establish rights, and to make it more ﬂ exible, as leave used to be full time 
(Deven and Nuelant 1999). In 2002, the career break system was trans-
formed into a system of time credit for private employees – not public em-
ployees. Th e main diﬀ erences are that it now is a right, but the length has 
been reduced to one year full time and ﬁ ve years part time, and eligibility 
criteria have been introduced: a person must have worked for one year (De 
Backer et al. 2004). Payments for leave are not very high in Belgium.
 In the Netherlands, parental leave was introduced in 1991 and had a 
typical Dutch design: the leave could only be taken on a part-time basis 
and was exclusively aimed at those working more than 20 hours a week, 
excluding many women. While the Belgian and Danish schemes were at 
first not meant as part-time facilities, this was initially obligatory in the 
Netherlands. In 1997 the leave scheme was flexibilised and open to all 
employees, although taking up full-time leave is still problematic (Brun-
ing and Plantenga 1999). Still, the leave was generally unpaid – about five 
percent of collective agreements have included paid leave, while state em-
ployees were compensated well (75 percent of their wage) (Portegijs et al. 
2002). From 2006 onwards the Christian democratic/Liberal government 
introduced the individual arrangement ‘saving for leave’ (verlofsparen), 
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which encapsulates parental leave, now an unconditional right and paid 
(50 percent of the minimum wage). In addition, people can save time by 
not taking holidays or working overtime, or paying in, in order to take time 
oﬀ . Th e criticism is that it has little use for caregivers because one has to 
predict and anticipate life, and people with care responsibilities have few 
possibilities to save time or money (Van Luijn and Keuzenkamp 2004).
 The uk has only recently approved parental leave. The Labour govern-
ment kept its election promise and implemented the eu directive on leave 
in 1999. Before a child reaches the age of six, parents can take unpaid 
part-time or full-time parental leave of up to 13 weeks (three months). 
However, payment is left to the individual employers’ discretion. Before, 
British mothers – not fathers – could use a comparatively extensive ma-
ternity leave (maximum 40 weeks) which was poorly paid. But to be able 
to get this long maternity absence, the employee must have had two years 
of continuous employment: it was thus not a citizenship right but condi-
tional on a person’s employment record. Real parental leave, applicable 
also to fathers, became a right only in 1998.
 The establishment of care leaves shows convergence: most countries 
nowadays have some kind of right to give care, albeit with different de-
signs (payments and conditions) and timing of leaves. How are we to un-
derstand cross-national differences in the design of care leave?
Politics and the Design of Leave Schemes
After studying the leave schemes of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, 
and Norway, Morgan and Zippel (2003) conclude that care leave policies 
have an element of partisan power: centre and conservative parties have 
been the main advocates of childcare leave and the left has acceded either 
tacitly or actively to these policies. In their view, feminists have blasted 
care leave policies and called for an expansion of public care instead. It 
may be a coincidence, but in the four countries examined here, the devel-
opment of care leave cannot be ascribed to a conservative or anti-feminist 
movement. In fact, in many of these countries, women’s groups were in 
favour of care leave, although they were not always content with the spe-
cific end result – they often preferred better paid leave with better rights 
attached to them.
 What’s more, no specific political party – and certainly not the con-
servative parties – has been the main advocate of care leaves, as they were 
introduced by various political configurations. In three countries – the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark – leave schemes have been intro-
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duced with a strong consensus. In Denmark it was one of the crown jewels 
of the 1994 labour market reform, which was enacted by the social demo-
cratic government, agreed upon by various parties, including the trade 
unions, and already prepared when the right-wing government was still in 
office (Compston and Madsen 2001; Borchorst 1999). In Belgium, career 
breaks were strongly supported by the Christian democrats but gener-
ated a fair amount of consensus (Marques-Pereira and Paye 2001). In the 
Netherlands, eventually both social democratic and Christian democratic 
forces stressed the need for care leave.
 The only country in which a specific political party introduced care 
leave is the uk. The social democrats implemented the scheme while in 
the Conservative period parental leave was consigned to the margins of 
the political debate. For the ‘New Right’ welfare policies undermined and 
endangered the family, and the working/caring predicament is part of the 
private choices that have to be solved in the family (Abbott and Wallace 
1992). In addition, the Conservative government seemed more concerned 
about the economy than about the family. When the 1993 eu parental pro-
posal was rejected, the British Minister Forsyth said that it would impose 
‘added burdens on employers without regard to their impact on jobs’ (in 
O’Connor et al. 1999). State intervention would place a burden on employ-
ers, and for conservatives the wishes of employers are sacred – they are 
the ones seen to be building the country (Wilkinson 1998). Thus, except 
for the British case, party politics and party ideologies cannot explain the 
timing and composition of care leaves. What is more important is cross-
party consensus on the issue.
 What also helps to understand the leave schemes, particularly whether 
they are paid or not, is their objectives and framework. When leave is pri-
marily considered to be a labour market measure aimed at fighting unem-
ployment, it tends to be better paid. If leave is introduced for care reasons 
it is generally unpaid. In Denmark and Belgium, the leave scheme was 
introduced primarily as a labour market measure that can also support 
caregiving. In the early 1990s, when the economic crisis was at its peak, 
prime minister Rasmussen (Social democrats) wanted to do everything 
‘to break the curve of unemployment’ (int. 55). Job rotation became the 
leading concept in Danish employment politics. While many young par-
ents felt they had little time to care, particularly when their children were 
very young, many unemployed had the opposite problem: they had lots of 
time but no work (Kremer 1995). Full-time leave for sabbaticals, educa-
tion, and parental care would connect the two categories. Trade unions 
and social democrats were mostly attracted to the concept as a solution 
CARE LEAVE: FOR WOMEN ONLY?

to the employment problem, while more family-oriented groups – includ-
ing the women in trade unions and the Christian People’s Party – agreed 
with leave because they wanted to solve the care problem (Compston and 
Madsen 2001). Nevertheless, employment was the first rationale behind 
the new policy, the second being that parents would spend more time with 
their children (Borchorst 1999).
 The Belgian career break scheme was also motivated by employment 
policy. The francophone minister Hansenne from the psc, together with 
Prime Minister Deheane from cvp (both Christian democrats), intro-
duced the career break system chiefly as a measure to redistribute la-
bour. Belgium was facing a huge economic crisis, with one fifth of the 
population unemployed. But providing time for people to care was also 
an important motive. When Hansenne introduced the measure, he also 
stressed how wonderful the break could be for families as well as employ-
ers: ‘On January the 25th, 1985, a somewhat unnoticed law will change the 
lives of the Belgians … For six, nine, twelve months, it becomes possible 
to fully enjoy family life, to be with the children, to get a new diploma or, 
when you dream about it, to hitchhike around the world … The career 
break scheme is a social measure that offers the possibility to hire new 
employees who have to replace the employees who have chosen leave’ 
(Ministerie van Tewerkstelling en Arbeid 1997: 3).
 In the Netherlands and the uk, time to give care has been an objective 
of the parental leave scheme, not of employment policy. Two reasons for 
this objective were important in the Netherlands: the redistribution of 
paid and unpaid labour and softening the problem of women returning to 
the workforce (Bruning and Plantenga 1999). With parental leave, mothers 
can remain connected to the labour market rather than choosing between 
all or nothing. At the same time, leave should attract fathers to care. In 
the uk, the Labour government also introduced parental leave as a mea-
sure to integrate work and care. Parental leave helps women who would 
otherwise have to quit their jobs remain connected to the labour market. 
These motivations support the argument that payment during leave is not 
necessary – that women on leave would otherwise stay at home without 
pay: paying them is a deadweight loss.
 The lack of payment in the uk and the Netherlands also relates to the 
strong overall neo-liberal ideology, which is not linked to a specific politi-
cal party: general politics in both countries have been influenced by lib-
eralism, which assigns care to the private sphere. This has been described 
already for the British case, but is also true for the Netherlands: a liberal 
ideology is advocated by all parties, including the Christian democrats 
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and social democrats. It is particularly visible in the notion of ‘saving for 
leave’, which has become a very popular political concept even though 
statistics show that citizens with care responsibilities hardly make use of 
such an option (Van Luyn and Keuzekamp 2004). Saving up for care leave 
can be seen as a typical liberal answer to the problems of combining work 
and care: the state does not take responsibility, at least not financially, 
but facilitates individual freedom, which still has to be bargained with the 
individual employer.
 Finally, to what extent the right to leave has been established also de-
pends on the dominant state-social partner regime of recent decades. In 
the 1990s in Belgium, the state developed binding laws on leave as it want-
ed to intervene in the relationship of the historically strong social part-
ners (trade unions and employers); the government thought they were not 
progressing well on the issue of leave (Marques-Pereira and Paye 2001). In 
the Netherlands, by contrast, in the period in which leave became neces-
sary, neo-corporatism was the main model. Due to the ‘Dutch miracle’ 
– the success of the partnership between the state and social partners to 
save the Dutch economy (Visser and Hemerijck 1997) – the Dutch gov-
ernment left many social arrangements, including childcare and leave, to 
unions and employers. The social partners were not only considered to 
be very successful in intervening in Dutch economic and social life: the 
government also believes workplace issues should be fixed at the level of 
employer-employee arrangements, which resonates with the subsidiar-
ity principle (Kremer 2001). This practice has been highly debated in the 
Netherlands. To the disappointment of the Dutch Ministry of Social Af-
fairs, research shows that only in about half of the collective agreements 
– and often those in female dominated sectors – include arrangements 
for leave (van Luijn and Keuzenkamp 2004). The problem with depending 
on the social partners is that they have little interest in bargaining about 
leave and other ‘care business’, critics like Schippers (2004) argue, espe-
cially when women are no longer needed in the labour market.
 The British case also shows the importance of the state-employers-
employees regime, albeit not in a neo-corporatist but in an individuated 
way. Although the new parental leave scheme is a real breakthrough it 
has not completely broken with the notion, articulated well by the Con-
servatives, that the work/family balance is part of the domain of industry 
and not of the state. ‘Work and Parents: Competitiveness and Choice’, 
the consultation paper launched by the secretary of state for trade and 
industry, clearly states that any measures to help parents to balance work 
and family life must be based on giving families reasonable choices tak-
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ing the needs of business into account (Land 2001). When parental leave 
was introduced it was argued that the government is ‘committed to help-
ing parents achieve a better balance between their work and work lives, 
in ways which enhance competitiveness for business’. As a consequence, 
leave is still unpaid rather than paid.
 Care leave is thus not an element of partisan politics or conservative 
party politics, at least not in the countries discussed here. More than 
party ideologies, the objective and framework of the care leave relates to 
whether leave is paid or not. Other important factors are the dominant 
ideologies regarding the relationship between the private and the pub-
lic as well as between state and employers. They are important for the 
design of leave schemes. These ideologies are country specific, and are 
not directly related to the governing party. So far, I have discussed the 
composition and origins of care leave. The next question is: what are the 
consequences of the leave schemes?
The Gendered Consequences of Leave
According to Morgan and Zippel, who studied countries like Norway and 
Austria, the consequences of leave policies are undoubtedly women-un-
friendly. Leave schemes are ‘likely to reinforce the traditional division of 
care work in the home’ and ‘temporary homemaking is being institution-
alised as the norm for many women, who face potentially negative conse-
quences for their earning and long-term employment trajectories’ (2003: 
49). Th is implies that mothers are forced to practice the ideal of full-time 
motherhood. Th ey report a substantial decline in women’s employment 
rates, particularly for low-skilled women, and a re-entry of women into 
part-time, marginal, or temporary work. In the meantime, they argue, 
women have to rely on the income of a male breadwinner as payments are 
poor. Is this dark picture also visible in the four countries discussed here?
Table 5.11 Leave rates according to gender, 1995-2000, four countries
DK
1995
DK
2000
NL
1995
NL
2000
BE
1995
BE
2000
UK
Number of people 51,000 20,000 - 57,000 50,000 30,000 n.a.
% of women who 
take leave 
90 93 61 56 85 73 n.a.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of: Denis et al. (1995), Ministerie van Tewerkstelling 
en Arbeid (1997), AMS (DK) unpublished statistics, Grootscholte et al. (2000), Bruning and 
Plantenga (1998), www.rva.fgov.be
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Indeed, leave is nearly ‘for women only’. In Denmark, in its heydays in the 
mid 1990s, 50,000 people took leave, of which more than 90 percent were 
female, making it the least man-friendly scheme of the countries studied 
(table 5.10). In Belgium, 85 percent of leave takers were women, but this 
dropped to 75 percent in 2000. After the introduction of the time credit, 
the scheme became much more popular and was used by 150.000 people, 
only 61 percent of whom were women (Debacker et al. 2004). Howev-
er, men have not always taken leave to give care. Women used the leave 
scheme primarily to take time off to care for children and spend time on 
housekeeping, but older men used it mostly as a form of semi-retirement. 
The time credit scheme does show that more younger men than previ-
ously take leave, also full-time (Denis et al 1995; Ministerie van Tewerk-
stelling en Arbeid 1997; Debacker et al. 2004).
 Strikingly, Dutch fathers are much more likely to take leave than Bel-
gian or Danish fathers. In the Netherlands, the female percentage was 61 
percent in the 1993-1995 period, and even dropped to 56 percent in 1995-
1998 (Grootscholte et al. 2000). What is important, however, is the fact 
that on average, people take about eight or nine hours of weekly leave, 
which means that the Dutch parental leave should be interpreted as a 
temporary payment to work part-time.
 Few statistics are available for the British case yet. However commen-
tators such as Rake (2001) have warned that the new parental leave ar-
rangement will not change the cargiving patterns of fathers, which is one 
of the lowest in Europe (chapter 4). In the absence of payment, projec-
tions suggest that only two percent of men, compared to 35 percent of 
women, will make use of unpaid parental leave if they are entitled.
 So, the biggest problem with leave schemes is not that women take 
so much leave but that so few men do. Why don’t they go on leave more 
often? Why don’t they practice parental sharing? And why are Dutch fa-
thers doing better? The first factor is payment. A recent Eurobarometer 
survey (2004) shows that 42 percent of all men said they did not take 
leave because of insufficient financial compensation, and the more highly 
educated the more problematic the lack of payment seems to be. Research 
in both Denmark and the Netherlands shows that many men who did not 
use leave said they could not afford to (Madsen 1998; Grootscholte et al. 
2000). However, the country with the highest payments (Denmark) has 
the lowest proportion of men taking leave. Why is that? Men are prob-
ably more likely to take leave if they are paid a substantial percentage of 
their wage as this allows them to maintain their living standard. In such 
a case not taking leave would give them the feeling that they have missed 
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a very good opportunity: getting quite a lot of money for being at home 
(Grootscholte et al. 2000). Indeed, in the Netherlands, which has a high 
level of fathers taking leave, most fathers who do take leave (70 percent) 
are public employees and receive quite a high percentage of their wage 
(75 percent). Such high payments seem crucial to seduce men into care 
(Bruning and Plantenga 1999).
 Men are also more afraid to be disconnected from the labour mar-
ket (Eurobarometer 2004). Despite labour market shortages from the 
mid-1990s onwards, a Danish survey shows that nearly 30 percent said 
they fear losing their job if they take leave, cannot get permission to take 
leave, or are indispensable and therefore did not make use of the leave 
scheme. Women have hardly mentioned those arguments (Madsen 1998). 
The question is whether men’s fears are justified. Ironically, a recent sur-
vey shows that only nine percent of Danes believed that the negative at-
titude of employers regarding leave was the reason so few fathers took 
leave from work (Rostgaard 2002). Nevertheless, introducing flexibility 
increases men’s use. Especially in countries like Denmark and the uk, men 
say they would take leave if better part-time options existed (Eurobarom-
eter 2004). In the Netherlands, leave is flexible and even obligatorily part 
time, and many fathers actually use it. In Belgium, rates of taking leave de-
gendered as soon as part-time leave became an option. Hence when men 
do not feel confined in care settings, and remain connected to the labour 
market, they may indeed want to do more at home.
 While it would be preferable that more men take leave, from the per-
spective of degendering citizenship the question remains of how bad it is 
for women to go on leave. In none of the countries do leave schemes send 
women ‘back to the kitchen’: it is only a temporary break. Most women in 
Belgium and Denmark continue working (Denis et al. 1995). In the Neth-
erlands and in the uk, which were low-employment countries for women, 
leave is clearly used as a method to stay connected to the labour market. 
Dutch research shows that paradoxically, those who go on leave are very 
work-oriented. They take leave to remain in the labour market, although 
they often reduce the number of hours when they re-enter. In fact, the 
leave scheme prevents some women from quitting their job: 13 percent 
of women and two percent of men said they would quit their job if they 
could not take leave (Grootscholte et al. 2000; van Luijn and Keuzenkamp 
2004). British research by Callendar et al. (1997) showed that women with 
extensive rights to the previous maternity leave scheme were more likely 
to return to work after childbirth, return to the same employer, and return 
sooner.
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 The fact that leave is taken only by women can lead to statistical dis-
crimination: employers may be reluctant to recruit women with small 
children. One survey showed that half of private employers said that 
child-minding leave would imply that the firm will be more reluctant to 
recruit women with small children, while 90 percent of public employers 
said it does not make a difference (Madsen 1998). This may result in gen-
der segregation in the labour market, as being a public employee is (even) 
more attractive for women. But a Belgian study showed that those who 
go back to the same employer do not experience negative consequences 
from their breaks: they get just as many chances for promotion and wage 
increases as those who do not take leave. Men and women who return to 
their jobs have nearly the same careers (Denis et al. 1995).
 Although it is important to be alert to the consequences of leave 
schemes, there is not much evidence that it draws women back into their 
homes, at least not in these countries and in these economic contexts. On 
the contrary, in low-employment countries like the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands leave schemes may stimulate women to remain attached 
to the labour market.
 The final issue concerns differences between women. Is it true, as 
Morgan and Zippel argue, that low-skilled workers tend to make use of 
such leave, so they are the ones who will bear the long-term costs of 
these policies: they will feel the impact of leave policies more than oth-
ers? In other words, is the right to give care used mainly by less-educated 
women? The problem with leave schemes is in fact the other way around: 
they are more likely to be used by more highly educated women. In Bel-
gium, critics have always argued that leave is only for madammen in een 
bontmantel (ladies in a fur coat), and rates among those taking leave in-
deed show that more highly educated women are overrepresented (Denis 
et al. 1995). The picture is similar in the Netherlands. Taking leave is a 
practice of middle and highly educated women; less-educated women are 
less likely to use parental leave (only five percent do) than those with a 
secondary or higher education level (about one fifth to a quarter). In the 
uk, the pre-1994 arrangements were also a class-biased phenomenon. 
Women employed full-time, with higher educations often had good ar-
rangements, while part-time women workers who were less-educated 
were worse off (Callender et al. 1997). Only in Denmark, were payment 
is higher, do all kinds of women take leave, although those in social ser-
vice jobs are overrepresented and highly educated women tend to take 
only slightly more leave (Andersen et al. 1996; Wehner and Abrahamson 
2003).
CARE LEAVE: FOR WOMEN ONLY?

 This indicates that also highly educated women, as Hakim (2000) 
rightly pointed out, want to stay at home to care for their children – but 
only for a certain length of time. And perhaps they are more able to af-
ford it – as they are often married to highly educated men. Then again, 
we have to be critical about the financial argument: many less-educated 
women in these countries stay at home without extra payments (apart 
from tax relief ). Also, taking parental leave in a low female employment 
countries can be a sign of a high work ethos as leave is taken up by women 
who want to remain connected to paid work. Less-educated women in 
these countries are still likely to quit work rather than take leave or work 
permanently part time. The question is thus not only whether the labour 
market position of low-skilled women is hurt by taking leave, but whether 
less-educated women also have the right to take time to provide care.
Lessons from Leave
Leave schemes are a major breakthrough in today’s welfare states. They 
constitute attempts to develop new caring rights while connecting care-
givers to the labour market. In that sense they go beyond Wollstonecraft’s 
dilemma. The schemes were advocated by many groups: social democrats, 
Christian democrats, women’s alliances, and were put in place under 
pressure of the European directive which even forced the uk to introduce 
parental leave. The structure of the schemes seems to depend less on the 
political party background of the government than on the objectives of 
the schemes, as well as the consensual ideology on the private-public and 
the state-employer axis.
 When the leave schemes are indeed a right and are paid for, they con-
tribute to women’s citizenship. Such schemes should be long enough to 
ensure the possibility to give care but short enough to keep carers at-
tached to the labour market. The Danish and Belgian leave schemes come 
closest to fulfilling these conditions. The payment for caring, however, 
is always substantially lower than that for paid work. The main problem 
with leave is that men hardly ever take it, although this is more true in 
Denmark and Belgium than in the Netherlands. Crucial for men is that 
leave schemes are flexible – they do not want to be trapped in long peri-
ods of providing care – and they want to be well-paid. Parental leave in 
practice is thus not per se woman-unfriendly, it depends on the design. 
In fact, leave schemes are supposed to maintain or even increase women’s 
labour market participation, which is indeed the case in historically low 
female employment countries such as the Netherlands and the uk.
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 Conclusion: Financial Compensation for Caregiving
So far, we have studied the right to give care, or the financial care compen-
sations in taxation, social security, and leave schemes. In the last decades 
these schemes have been changing rapidly. Although it is still possible to 
be a full-time mother while receiving income, especially in Belgium and 
the uk (if you are a lone mother), most arrangements no longer prefer to 
support the ideal of full-time motherhood: employment for mothers is the 
new credo.
 Partly because it never has been correct, but also as a consequence of 
change, these financial systems do not – or no longer –completely fit the 
popular academic welfare models of Esping-Andersen (1990) and Lewis 
(1992). Indeed, there is no one-to-one relationship between ideology and 
caring regimes. That is to say: social democratic regimes do not always, at 
any time, in every country, produce individual gender-friendly schemes. 
In fact, there is a continuous struggle between what deserves most prior-
ity: class equality or gender equality. And while Christian democracy is 
not unfriendly per se towards working women liberal regimes may have 
caregiving arrangements. The design of compensation for caregiving is 
often a result of the efforts of (parts of the) women’s movement and are 
strongly related to the dominant – country specific – consensual ideology 
towards work and care, although this ideology is changing everywhere.
 Secondly, the right to care does not offer us a clear understanding 
of gendered employment patterns. To give a few examples: in a country 
such as Denmark, fiscal arrangements for caregiving have little effect on 
women’s employment patterns. Lone mothers’ labour market participa-
tion is indeed lower when social security offers time to provide care, as 
the Dutch and British case show, but at the same time, these lone mothers 
would be financially better off if they went to work. Mothers do not seem 
to respond to financial motives only. Finally, leave schemes do not neces-
sarily lower mothers’ rates employment – they may even connect mothers 
to the labour market.
 Since financial compensation for caregiving cannot fully explain moth-
ers’ (changing) employment patterns in Europe, we now turn to the right 
to receive care. Is the availability, cost, and design of childcare services 
more decisive for mothers’ employment behaviour?
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6 The Right to Receive Care: The State of Childcare Services
Without childcare there are no working mothers; only when women have 
their hands free from caring duties can they enter the labour market. Th is 
is the dominant logic in welfare state studies. Th e Scandinavian countries – 
Sweden and Denmark (not Norway) – oﬀ er proof of this. Both have excep-
tionally high female employment rates. What sets them apart from the rest 
of Europe is the early development and universal coverage of state-funded 
childcare. Informal care can also relieve women, but if women want to work 
en masse for a substantial number of hours, publicly funded and organised 
childcare is a necessary condition (Borchorst 2002; Esping-Andersen 1990; 
Lewis 1992a; Sainsbury 1996). Th is is also the reason why in the follow up to 
the Lisbon Strategy (2002) the eu agreed that member states must provide 
childcare for 33 percent of children under age three, although what these 
provisions entail is unspeciﬁ ed (Plantenga and Siegel 2004).
 The question central to this chapter is: how true is this logic? And 
would mothers in countries like the Netherlands and the uk indeed work 
en masse if plenty of childcare was available tomorrow? In other words: 
if the citizenship right to services were implemented tonight, would this 
change women’s and men’s decisions tomorrow? The question is also what 
comes first. Are childcare services a cause or a consequence of women’s 
paid employment (Leira 1992; Leira et al. 2005). Some scholars (Mahon 
and Michel 2002) have also pointed to the headlines under which child-
care has developed. The motives behind childcare services affect its de-
sign and eventually women’s citizenship status. Is childcare implemented 
as a labour market instrument, serving an egalitarian goal, or is the main 
objective the welfare of children? Only universal childcare is thought to 
grant opportunities to all women. A final question is what exactly is the 
driving force behind childcare policy: ideologies presented by dominant 
political parties, the women’s movement, or institutional factors?
 Th is chapter examines the origins, development, and design of childcare 
services in the four countries. According to the regime typologies, the uk as 
a liberal regime will leave care to the market, the Netherlands and Belgium as 

Christian democratic regimes leave it to the family, and Denmark as a social 
democratic welfare state will be the only one in which childcare is a state re-
sponsibility (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). Following the male breadwinner 
typology, however, Belgium should show moderate intervention in childcare 
(Lewis 1992a; Meyers et al. 1999). Th is chapter will give a country-by-country 
description of childcare policy. Since childcare is a regional responsibility 
in Belgium, the focus is on the region of Flanders. For the uk, the focus is on 
England because more information is available for this country.
 The Right to Childcare: Denmark
Denmark holds the world record in state-subsidised childcare: most young 
Danish children spend part of their lives in day care. In Denmark the fam-
ily goes public, as Wolfe (1989) argues, and parents have outsourced the 
moral obligation to care. More than half of the children younger than 
three go to public facilities and nearly all (90 percent) go when they reach 
the age of three (Rostgaard and Fridberg 1998). Denmark easily surpasses 
the Lisbon targets.
In contrast to popular thinking, you will find few children (only 15 per-
cent) younger than one in professional day care. Many Danish mothers 
nowadays take leave following childbirth, and when they resume work the 
child is often already one (Abrahamson and Wehner 2003). The majority 
of children under three are not likely to go to a crèche: most of them go to 
Table 6.1 State-subsidised childcare for children in percentages, age group 0-3, 
1985-2000, four countries
around 1985-1990 around 1995 around 2000
BE 20 30 41*
DK 48 48 56
NL 2 8 19
UK 2 2 8**
* Flanders: age category 0-2,5. From 2.5 to 3 the percentage is 86 (Kind en Gezin 2001)
** This is an estimated guess. The number of children using facilities is 15 percent according 
to Bradshaw and Finch (2002) and 20 percent according to the OECD (2001), but these 
are not state services. By and large, the state only pays childcare for lone mothers (WFTC; 
chapter Five), in urban deprived areas, and for those who have a social need.
Sources: ECNC (1990), ECNC (1996), Bradshaw & Finch (2002)
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family day carers. This is not a private arrangement, as the state or, more 
precisely, the municipalities employ these caregivers, who care for chil-
dren in the childminder’s home (chapters 7 and 9). Table 6.2 shows that in 
the mid-1990s more than a quarter of very young children visit family day 
care, while 17 percent go to a day care centre – either a vuggestue (literally 
‘cradle’) or an age-integrated centre. Little research exists on family day 
care. Older research shows that the actual choice of family day care is not 
related to class – both high-income and low-income families use family 
day care – but to geography: childcare centres are more available in Co-
penhagen than in the countryside (Bertelsen 1991).
Childcare in Denmark is not only widely available but also quite afford-
able; parents are responsible for a small percentage of the actual pay-
ments, the state pays by far the most. A place in a day care centre costs the 
Danish state nearly as much as unemployment benefits for one person. 
As table 6.3 reveals, for parents the costs of childcare are relatively low. 
This means that childcare is indeed a service for all, regardless of financial 
means. As a consequence, rates of use of day care services show few dif-
ferences between higher-educated and lower-educated parents. The dif-
ference between lone mothers and two-parent families is also negligible: 
especially in contrast to Flanders, lone mothers are even slightly more 
likely to use state-subsidised childcare (DS 2002). In Denmark, the use of 
state-subsidised childcare is indeed nearly a universal practice for chil-
dren above age one.
 The Danish childcare system is entirely built upon the assumption that 
both fathers and mothers work full time. Children go to childcare every 
day. It is even financially foolish to bring your child to day care on a part-
time basis, because you have to pay the full price anyway (int. 57, 65). 
Since the 1970s the number of hours that children spend in childcare has 
Table 6.2 Children 0-2 cared for by state-subsidised care, 1996, Denmark
Family day care Childcare
centre
Age-integrated Total
1982 21 12 2 45
1988 26 13 3 42
1993 29 10 6 45
1996 27 9 8 44
Source: Rostgaard & Fridberg (1998)
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dropped. In 1985 a child was at a crèche 7.2 hours a day, while in 1999 this 
went down to 6.9 or 6.2 hours (depending on the calculation). Although it 
is accepted and appreciated that children go to childcare every day, long 
hours are increasingly considered to be bad for a child. Consequently, 
even though parents work more hours combined than in the 1980s, they 
now probably have flexible working hours that allow them to coordinate 
their schedules in such a way that children spend less time at day care 
facilities (Abrahamson and Wehner 2003).
Origins and Highlights of Childcare Policy
How and when did this available and affordable childcare develop? Den-
mark has always been ‘ahead’ of other European countries. Already in the 
late 1950s, the level of state-subsidised childcare was higher than that of 
the uk and the Netherlands in the 1980s. In the 1950s, five percent of 
Danish children (between ages 0-3) went to a childcare centre, and with 
the expansion of the welfare state in the 1960s childcare expanded con-
comitantly. By 1964 a law was approved which gave municipalities the re-
sponsibility of securing adequate coverage of childcare services. This law, 
which was supported by all political parties – not only the Social Demo-
cratic – transformed childcare from a facility for working-class women to 
a universal service that should enable all women to work. Employment for 
women was no longer recognised as an economic necessity but as a uni-
versal desire. In addition, a pedagogic function was central to childcare; 
childcare was meant to increase the well-being of children (Borchorst 
2002). In 1974 another development occurred: the first step was made 
towards an individual entitlement. The 1974 Social Services Law stipu-
Table 6.3 Net costs of full-time childcare. Most prevalent type in each country, after 
direct and indirect subsidies and after taxes and beneﬁ ts, PPP pounds per 
month, with one child younger than age three, around 2000, four countries
Lone parent, 
half average 
earnings
Lone parent, 
average female 
earnings
Couple, average 
male, half-
average female
Couple, average 
male, average 
female
BE 68 83 128 147
DK 8 61 145 145
NL 8 8 375 375
UK 116 158 385 385
Source: Bradshaw & Finch (2002)
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lated that municipalities were assigned the task of securing the ‘necessary 
places’ (par. 69).
 An important catalyst for this early and forceful development of child-
care was the huge demand for women in the labour market and women’s 
desire to work. Work – and earning one’s own income – was seen as cru-
cial to the emancipation process. For Danish women it was natural to look 
toward the state to develop care services. Although the concept originates 
in Sweden, in Denmark the state is also seen as ‘the people’s home’, so it 
should offer support to families. What has reinforced the development of 
state services was the large influx of women into state employment (Bor-
chorst and Siim 1987). When public support for childcare was established 
in the 1970s, most families became deeply dependent on state services, 
not only because their children went there, but many mothers were em-
ployed as care workers (Hernes 1987).
 Also contributing to the early development of childcare is the typical 
Danish political culture, described as ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’, 
as in continental political models (Bergqvist 1999; Siim 2000). Danish 
political culture, stresses Siim (2000), is very integrative and directed 
towards conflict-solving. Defining and ‘doing’ politics is based on inter-
actions of social movements and the state. This competence for demo-
cratic self-organisation came from the experiences of the folk high schools 
(Grundtvig) and the working class movement. In Denmark women were 
not as integrated in the political arena as in other Scandinavian countries: 
they had relatively low levels of political representation, fewer women 
in government, and were less represented in the corporate channel. But 
Danish women could raise gender issues from below (see also Bergqvist 
1999). It was also important that women’s groups were not fragmented 
and had opposing views (as in the Netherlands and the uk), and have a 
long tradition of political networks and successful alliances (Siim 1998).
 Crucial too is that childcare has been organised and decided at the 
local level. The delivery of, subsidies for, and decision-making regard-
ing childcare is in the hands of the Kommune, the municipalities (Kröger 
1997). As Rold Andersen, a former Social Democratic minister in the 1970s 
and social scientist stressed:
Th is ideology or process was promoted very much by the fact that the 
caregiving professions and services were placed with the local authori-
ties and not the state. In the Kommune women meet the mayors and 
the councillors and other politicians every day in the supermarket, and 
there they tell them: “we need kindergartens, we need nursing homes 
THE RIGHT TO CHILDCARE: DENMARK

and we need home helpers and so on, please give us that’. So there was 
certainly a process at the bottom created by women. Th e huge expan-
sion of care services could not have taken place if the services were 
placed with the state, and governed by the oﬃ  cials in the ministries or 
in the state institutions (int. 40).
Economic Crises and Boom
Danish childcare expansion was quickly confronted with economic crises. 
‘Necessary places’, the key words of the 1974 law, became open to inter-
pretation; waiting lists became a very common phenomenon, especially in 
the 1980s. At that time, the minister responsible for childcare, Bjerregaard 
(social democrats) argued that in a period of economic crises the uni-
versalistic principle should no longer guide childcare policy. She argued 
for a revaluation of the need principle (Bertone 2000). But even under 
Bjerregaard’s regime childcare developed, although more incrementally: 
the number of places kept growing slowly. The right-wing minority gov-
ernments, which were in office from 1982 to 1993 (see appendix I), did not 
introduce major changes either, although they hardly extended childcare 
despite long waiting lists. Th erefore, Borchorst (2002) concludes that the 
Danish childcare system is characterised by stability and continuity, not by 
change. All political parties, from the 1960s up until today, have acknowl-
edged the importance of childcare. Childcare is not an exclusive social 
democratic enterprise, in Denmark it has large cross-political support.
 It was nevertheless the social democratic government which in the 
mid-1990s took the last step in recognising childcare services as an in-
dividual entitlement rather than as a human need. Childcare became a 
citizenship right for children. Generally more interested in services, the 
social democrats introduced the Pasningsgaranti: the promise that every 
child older than one has the right to use day care facilities. From the mid-
1990s onwards childcare expanded rapidly. While 59,000 children were 
on the waiting lists in 1993, this number was brought back to 8,500 by 
the late 1990s. In the same period a total of 173,000 extra childcare places 
were created. By fall of 2000, 90 percent of all municipalities had imple-
mented this guarantee (bupl 1999; Abrahamson and Wehner 2003).
 At the same time, both an increase and a decrease of professionalisa-
tion took place. To have as many places as possible, the quality standards 
in terms of staff ratios have been lowered. There are now fewer trained 
workers per child. For instance, in a vuggestuer (a day care centre for chil-
dren aged 0-3) 5.88 children were cared for by one trained pedagogue 
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(three years of higher education) in 1990, compared to 6.42 children in 
1998 (bupl 1999). One of the reasons is the development of a one-and-a-
half year training program to become an assistant pedagogue. This slight 
decrease of professionalisation goes hand in hand with an important step, 
the legal formalisation of pedagogical objectives. The new 1997 Social 
Services Act states that childcare has three equally weighted objectives: 
minding, and social and pedagogical targets. The latter means that ‘child 
care shall offer possibilities for experiences and activities which will stim-
ulate the child’s fantasy, creativity, and language development, and also 
provide the child with space to play and learn, being together, and the pos-
sibility to investigate the environment’ (subsection 3). Childcare shall also 
‘offer the possibility to participate in decision-making and responsibility, 
and as part of it contribute to the development of the children’s indepen-
dence and ability to enter binding communities’ (subsection 4).
 The most recent changes in Danish childcare policy – the introduction 
of frit valg (free choice) may also undermine professionalisation of child-
care because no requirements are set for the professional background of 
a childminder. Under pressure from the neo-liberal waves in Europe and 
the Danish right-wing party (Venstre), the new 1997 Social Services Act 
also makes it possible to undermine the monopoly of the municipality on 
childcare services. Parents can receive financial support if they arrange 
childcare themselves, although they cannot use it to stay at home – unlike 
in other Scandinavian welfare states, such as Finland. By the late 1990s not 
many people had used the option. If they did, they were often relatively 
better educated. In two-thirds of the cases they used the money to em-
ploy a maid so the child was cared for in its own home (Andersen 1998). 
Venstre also wants parents to be able to stay at home, but so far the social 
democrats have blocked this option. It would undermine the basis of the 
Danish childcare system and is at odds with the position that childcare is 
important for the well-being of children.
 In Denmark, children’s general and social development rather than 
preparation for education has informed pedagogy for pre-schoolchildren. 
Danish childcare services are based on social pedagogical ideas. Danish 
childcare policy is not only characterised by universalism but also by the 
transformation of human needs into individual entitlements. The right to 
childcare is not exclusively based on the right for working parents, it is a 
right for children to receive professional care. Although childcare policy 
is characterised by continuity, as Borchorst (2002) shows, the question is 
whether the latest introduction of free choice will bring more changes.
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 Flanders: From Necessary Evil to Approved Politics
Perhaps a surprise to some, Flanders comes in second in the childcare 
league. By 1988, 23 percent of children were cared for in state-subsidised 
day care, by 1993 this rose to 31 percent, and in 1999 more than 40 percent 
of Flemish children younger than three went to state-subsidised childcare, 
easily surpassing the Lisbon targets (table 6.1). The Flemish rates (as well 
as those for Belgium overall ) are not only higher than in the Netherlands 
and in the uk, but also much higher than in the country often compared 
to Belgium, namely France (23 percent in 1995 and 39 percent in 2000). In 
fact, the Belgian level in general and the Flemish level in particular is just 
as high as in Sweden (ecnc 1996). As in Denmark, full-time care is most 
common (Vanpée et al. 2000) and childcare is affordable (see table 6.3). 
Indeed, a Christian democratic welfare regime can build just as compre-
hensive a childcare service as a social democratic welfare state.
 How can this be explained? In Belgium and Flanders, Christian dem-
ocratic coalitions were indeed vital for the development of the welfare 
state, and the Christian democrats have always held the (Flemish) cabinet 
seats for welfare, childcare, and family policy. How could state-subsidised 
childcare expand as much in a Christian democratic regime as in a social 
democratic regime? The following section discusses the motives behind 
the Flemish childcare policy (given that since 1980 care is a regional re-
sponsibility). Are they the same as in Denmark?
A Labour Market – Working Class Logic
While the level of childcare in Flanders is nearly as high as in Scandi-
navian countries, the rationale behind it is clearly Christian democratic: 
childcare services are supposed to benefit low-paid workers. The 1983 law 
of the Flemish region stipulates that ‘priority should be given to children 
whose parents are not able to bring up their children themselves because 
of work, or to children who, because of social and/or pedagogical mo-
tives, are dependent on guidance and care outside the home, or children 
whose parents have the lowest income’ (par 5, December 30, 1983).
 Today, the practice is different. In Flanders, highly educated women 
use childcare more often than less-educated women, who, just as lone 
mothers, are more likely to use informal arrangements (such as the help 
of grandparents) (Storms 1995). This indicates what Merton (1968) has 
called ‘the Matthew effect’, after the passage in the Bible that states that 
those who have will receive more, and those who have nothing will have 
THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE CARE: THE STATE OF CHILDCARE SERVICES

what little they have taken. Hence those who are well-off are more likely 
to use welfare state services, while those who actually need subsidised 
services are less likely to access them. This is not only in contrast to the 
universal practice in Denmark, it also is at odds with the objectives be-
hind Flemish childcare policy.
 Another contrast with Denmark is Flanders’ firm roots in an anti-pov-
erty labour market paradigm. In Belgium, childcare investments are seen 
as a necessary evil. The first state-funded childcare organisation was set 
up in 1918 because women had to work to keep their families out of pov-
erty. The predecessor of the quasi-state organisation Kind en Gezin writes 
in 1940:
Th e kribbe (day care) is just an actual necessity. Many mothers work 
outside the home, but we hope that this situation will improve and they 
will meet a future where they do not have to leave their homely hearth 
(Lambrechts and de Dewispelaere 1980: 38).
But the situation did not change. Subsidising childcare has increased con-
tinuously since the 1960s. In 1965 childcare facilities came under a legal 
framework: in order to be recognised and subsidised, they had to fulfil 
certain criteria. Still, public childcare was considered bad for children, 
though it was seen as acceptable for parents on a low income. By the late 
1960s all crèches – 78 in total – were at least implicitly reserved for chil-
dren of parents with low incomes, and were based in urban surroundings 
(Deven 1998).
 An important economic investment was made in the mid-1970s. Be-
cause of rising wages and a growing pool of workers, the organisation that 
paid child benefit (drawn from insurance revenues) was well in the black: 
they had money to spend. What to do with this surplus? Social demo-
crats, especially their women’s organisations, gave priority to crèches. 
They argued that there were shortages, as parents could no longer turn 
to their own parents to provide care, because they were now also working 
in increasing numbers. Social democrats pointed out that Belgium lacked 
guaranteed and secure childcare solutions, and this was not good for the 
tranquillity of mothers and children. Social democrats also argued that 
investing in childcare centres would correct inequities; working mothers 
paid into the system but received no extra benefits.
 The influential League for Large and Young Families (bgjg), however, 
preferred a more generous child benefit, just as the trade unions. The lat-
ter also wanted women to have a free choice and a lack of childcare would 
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make this choice impossible, but they feared investing in childcare would 
only discriminate between families, because families with someone at 
home or those outside the urban areas could not make use these services. 
The women’s organisation of the Christian democratic party argued that 
childcare would not be a good option as it would benefit the higher edu-
cated. In the Christian democratic view, the state only has to support the 
very poor. Eventually, the social democratic minister made the decision 
and spent one billion Belgian francs to increase the child benefit and 400 
billion francs for public financing of childcare policy, which came into ef-
fect in 1974 (Marques-Pereira and Payne 2001).
 This money helped to develop childcare, which increased incremen-
tally. Due to the economic crisis, subsidies were frozen in the mid-1980s, 
but when shortages arose, investments increased again. As a result, real 
shortages of childcare were rare in Flanders. By 1983, 17 percent of chil-
dren aged 0-3 were using state-subsidised childcare. In 1988 this rose to 
23 percent, in 1993 to 31 percent, and in 2000 to 41 percent (Kind en Gezin 
1997, 2001, table 6.1). In the Walloon region state-subsidised childcare is 
also substantial, although less developed than in Flanders: while in the 
mid-1990s 43,000 places for children under age three existed in Walloon, 
Flanders had 70,000 places (Jenson and Sineau 2001).
 Since the 1980s, the bulk of Flemish state subsidies have gone to family 
day care: childcare within the home of a childminder. While in 1987 the 
state funded 10,000 places with day care mothers and 10,000 in childcare 
institutions, in the mid-1990s 12,000 places were available in day care 
institutions and more than 20,000 places were available with day care 
mothers (Kind en Gezin 1997). In French-speaking Belgium organised 
day care also exists and has grown substantially between 1988-1993, yet 
day care institutions are much more common than in Flanders. Jenson 
and Sineau (2001) calculated that for children under age three, more than 
9,000 children use family day care and more than 10,000 children are in a 
day care centre. In the Flemish region more than 11,000 children are in day 
care centres and 19,000 in family day care: 35 percent of the children stay 
with day care mothers who are connected to a dienst voor opvanggezinnen 
(services for family day care), while 24 percent go to a public childcare 
centre (Vanpée et al. 2000; table 8.3). These services are subsidised and 
controlled along ‘pillarised’ lines, although most of them are Catholic. 
They organise the access and mediation between parents and childmind-
ers, and give professional advise and support as well as training. They also 
pay the childminders (from the money the parents pay the organisation). 
Unlike the Danish situation, municipalities are not involved.
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 The continued increase of state-subsidised childcare in the 1980s was 
a silent intervention; few political debates or arguments took place on the 
issue. In the 1990s a crucial shift occurred: childcare became a more posi-
tive choice. The defensive attitude towards childcare was transformed 
into an offensive attitude. Childcare in Flanders is nowadays no longer 
seen as a necessary evil but as a pedagogical tool for the development of 
a child, although the labour market paradigm is still in place. Childcare 
helps women to take on jobs. The Flemish government has choosen to 
fully invest in childcare and continues to improve the quality of care (Van-
pée et al. 2000; Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap 2000).
Subsidiarity or Free Choice
According to researchers like Esping-Andersen (1990), Christian demo-
cratic welfare states are based on the principle of subsidiarity, a concept 
that explains the reluctance towards state intervention. But subsidiarity, 
as also Daly (1999) and van Kersbergen (1995) argue, is a flexible concept: 
it indicates when the state has to intervene, so it can help explain why 
the Belgian state has intervened in childcare. Salamink (1991), a Flemish 
theologian, points out that many Catholic politicians and thinkers have 
argued that upon carefully reading the Pope’s encyclical Quadragesimo 
anno (1932) they believe the state has the duty to support families. The 
original meaning of the Latin word subsidy means ‘help’. This duty of the 
state is nevertheless rather different from the social democratic concept 
of universal social rights of citizens: within Belgian Christian democratic 
ideology, childcare is not seen as a citizen’s right but as a measure to pro-
tect low-income families.
 Subsidiarity in Flanders means that the state has a duty to support low-
income families to protect them from poverty. Childcare was regarded 
as a necessary evil that could solve the financial problems of the fam-
ily. The microeconomics within households forced the state to intervene. 
The politicians responsible thought this would be a temporary measure 
and working women could return to their homes when the economy im-
proved, but mothers’ employment rates continuously increased. In the 
late 1960s and the 1970s, women’s employment was less an issue of finan-
cial necessity than of emancipation. Employed women as well as feminists 
defined work as such: working became a way to express oneself, meet 
other people, and have power in the public arena. In the late 1970s finan-
cial necessity became less crucial as a motive for working, although this 
was truer for more highly educated women, since less-educated women 
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were less likely to have well-paid work (Pauwels 1978). Women’s employ-
ment became a crucial issue of the women’s movement, which was broad 
and certainly not exclusively social democratic; Catholic Working Wom-
en (kva) for instance was a large and influential organisation with strong 
links to the Christian democratic Party. There was a consensus among all 
political parties that women’s labour should be facilitated. So economic 
necessity at a family level (until 1970) was transformed into women’s push 
for employment as a path towards emancipation (in the 1970s). At that 
time, the Belgian government could not excuse itself from a responsibil-
ity already taken. In this case path dependency, or Pierson’s (1994) term 
policy feedback, is applicable. Families became dependent on the state 
and adapted their work and family life accordingly.
 Th e question remains as to whether the notion of subsidiarity has really 
been that crucial. In the debates around women and work, as well as those 
regarding the role of the state, the concept of free choice is much more de-
cisive, as we already saw in the chapter on taxation (see also Kremer 2002; 
Marques-Pereira and Paye 2001). Th e Belgian interpretation of free choice 
contributes to our understanding of the development of childcare policy in 
a Christian democratic regime, much more than the subsidiarity principle. 
Free choice has been used in childcare policies on two levels: ﬁ rst, people 
(read: mothers) must have a free choice between paid employment and 
providing care. Secondly, if mothers do decide to work, they must have a 
free choice as to which type of care they use for their children.
 On the first level the Christian democratic view on working and car-
ing holds that it is not up to the state to decide whether women should 
work or provide care, but unlike the liberal perspective the state does have 
to facilitate this free choice. Incentives to both work and care should be 
embedded in social policies. On the one hand, financial structures should 
be in place to ensure that mothers can stay at home if they wish. This is 
also seen in the motivation of the Belgian tax system, with its marriage 
quotient. On the other hand, free choice has also been the key concept 
to advocate childcare services. When facilities are available and afford-
able for all families, people really have a free choice. This was one of the 
arguments the Christian unions used when debating what to do with their 
surplus of funds (described above).
 The quasi-state organisation Kind en Gezin, responsible for childcare 
in Flanders, has firmly based itself upon the free-choice principle. Guar-
anteeing free choice is the way this organisation defines its responsibility 
and task. Its 1988 white paper ‘Childcare: A Growing Choice for Parents’ 
emphasised that it was not their aim to influence the decision of families, 
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though it was the duty of the state to enable families to make the choice. 
When parents opt for childcare on a large scale, Kind en Gezin has to ac-
knowledge that choice and supply the necessary services. The increase in 
childcare thus reflects parental preferences since then, according to the 
organisation. The state is therefore obliged to follow the demands of the 
parents (Kind en Gezin 1988). This is in line with a Christian democratic 
ideology that the state is at the service of citizens and their needs, and 
should not have a prescriptive role.
 Today the notion of free choice is readily associated with liberalism, 
but it is also a Christian democratic concept in a pillarised and conflictive 
society. The Christian democratic emphasis on free choice has two mean-
ings. Daly (1999) argues that ideology is shaped by competing influences 
and rival models of social policy. She argues that the differences between 
Catholic countries – she herself studied Ireland and Germany – relate 
to the social forces and pressures Catholic politics have to battle, such 
as a powerful socialist labour movement or a rival Protestant Church. In 
Belgium and Flanders a strong fight took place starting in the late 1960s 
between the Christian democratic values of the family – which never-
theless accorded women’s need for autonomy – and a socialist claim, ex-
pressed more forcefully by women’s organisations, that mothers should be 
enabled to work in the labour force, this being the key to their economic 
and personal autonomy. Social democrats not only argued in favour of 
reducing inequalities in the workplace but also called for infrastructure 
of services. The notion of free choice expresses not only the social demo-
cratic right to work but also demands appreciation and acknowledgement 
for a traditional family model (see also Marques-Pereira and Paye 2001).
 But perhaps more important is the institutional setting of pillarisa-
tion, which gave ‘free choice’ its meaning. Because of the ideological and 
religious heterogeneity of society, it is believed that citizens should have 
free choice to decide, for instance, which schools their children attend. 
Belgian parents can choose between a Catholic or a secular school (and 
in the Netherlands between different religious schools). This principle 
of choice also applies to hospitals, sports clubs, homecare organisations, 
and the like. Freedom of choice would be an empty concept if the state did 
not guarantee choice. Pillarised societies are therefore characterised by 
‘subsidised freedom’: the state must have respect for people’s choices and 
enforce pluralism and diversity (Groof 1983). Free choice in the pillarised 
societies of Belgium and the Netherlands can be translated into the ob-
jective of ‘state pluralism’: the state enforces a pluralist society. This also 
means the state always has to be neutral in its outcomes.
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 Finally, the pillarised system not only shapes the origins of free choice, 
it also allows for a lively competition between providers of services. Both 
social democratic and Christian democratic organisations have been in-
volved in the ‘business of childcare’. If they provided good services, they 
could attach clients (or voters) to them. Both pillars have pushed the state 
to give more money to childcare. They have had much impact on govern-
mental decisions (Hellemans and Schepers 1992). The institutional set-
ting also demands that the state share money equally between the pillars, 
so that if Christian democratic organisations asked for money (often from 
their own minister), the Socialist organisation would also receive their 
share. With this system services were difficult to freeze, as it is difficult to 
say no to your own ‘family member’.
 In sum, Flemish childcare developed ﬁ rst of all because of the micro-
economic necessity of working women. When many women worked in the 
1960s and 1970s, they paid so many premiums to the state that investments 
in childcare were made. Besides, women increasingly wanted to work and 
stressed the need for childcare. Free choice became the crucial concept, 
largely embraced by Christian democratic forces: women should not only 
have the choice to stay at home, but also to work. Moreover, the typical 
structure of Belgian society, pillarisation, plays a double role in childcare 
policy: it gives meaning to the concept of free choice and creates what Pier-
son (1994) calls ‘lock in eﬀ ects’. Th e state can no longer withdraw its sup-
port. But while the right to receive care in Flanders is impressive and may 
in practice be universal, its motives are not: childcare is based on a labour 
market paradigm, it has to help women participate in the labour market.
 The Netherlands: Taking a Jump
Th e Netherlands has always been a childcare laggard, together with the 
uk, Ireland, and southern European countries such as Spain. Until the late 
1980s, as table 6.1 shows; only two percent of young Dutch children (aged 0-
3) used state-ﬁ nanced childcare. For a long time, childcare was considered 
as an antiphon to a modern welfare state: in a decent welfare state, families 
should be able to aﬀ ord to have their at children home. Th is changed only 
in the 1990s, when the increase in women’s labour market participation 
became a policy target. Th en the percentage of children who went to state-
funded services more than doubled, and in the late 1990s nearly one-ﬁ fth 
of young children (aged 0-3) used state-subsidised childcare. In contrast 
to Denmark, few Dutch children go to childcare every day. Th e norm is 
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that ﬁ ve days a week is not good for children’s development; day care is 
commonly used two or three days a week (Portegijs et al. 2002). Although 
Dutch childcare is just a shadow of the Flemish and Danish arrangements, 
the rapid increase is extraordinary. While in the mid-1990s waiting lists 
were a huge problem, more recently childcare for children under age four is 
less problematic, and shortages are more of an issue for after-school care.
 Th e organisation of state-subsidised care and the logic behind Dutch 
childcare is rather unique in Europe, as it developed in partnership with em-
ployers. Th e big increase in childcare in the Netherlands is due to two suc-
cessive ‘Stimulative Measures on Childcare’ that the government launched 
in 1990 and were in place until 1996. Th ese measures reveal the dominant 
ideology towards the state: the state contributes only when both employer 
and employee pay for childcare. Employers are supposed to buy bedrijfs-
plaatsen (company places) for their employees in childcare institutions. 
Over the years, employers’ contributions became increasingly important. 
In 1990, the state paid 58 percent, parents 26 percent, and employers 14 
percent. In 1996, this ratio changed to 36:21:40. In 1999 it was 29:19:49. As 
employers’ contributions increased substantially, contributions made by 
the state decreased (Keuzenkamp and Oudhof 2000; Portegijs et al. 2002).
 Dutch childcare policy is built on the trust of collective corporate ar-
rangements. The drawback of this manner of organising childcare is that 
not all employers pay for childcare, they only do so when they fall under 
collective agreement (about 80 percent of employees in the Netherlands 
are), but these agreements also have to include childcare arrangements. 
Less than half of the collective agreements in the Netherlands (45 percent) 
include any childcare arrangement (Portegijs et al. 2002). Only employ-
ers that employ many women (for instance in the care and welfare sector) 
have good agreements. This in turn attracts mothers to work in these sec-
tors, so gender segregation in the labour market can be reinforced by this 
specific childcare policy.
 Another measure was taken in 1996, subsidising childcare specifically 
for single parents and allocating a sum of money for childcare for these 
parents. As explained in the chapter on social security, since 1996 lone 
mothers with children over age four are obliged to work. The social demo-
cratic Minister Melkert arranged that lone mothers should be able to re-
ceive affordable childcare, so there are various flows of state subsidies. To 
give an impression of the distribution of places available for children: in 
1999 for children under age three there were 10,700 private places avail-
able, 35,600 company places, 14,600 subsidised places, and 1,700 places 
allocated to lone parents (Portegijs et al. 2002).
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 Although the Stimulative Measures in the Netherlands support child-
care centres as well as family daycare that are connected to state-subsidised 
bureaus, these oﬃ  cial childminders are not popular at all. Less than ﬁ ve 
percent of children aged 0-3 go to such families, in contrast to 21 percent 
who go to childcare centres (Knijn 2003; table 8.4). Th is is in stark contrast 
to Denmark and Belgium. Most popular in the Netherlands are unoﬃ  cial, 
unregulated childminders, which will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8.
 The Dutch system for financing and organising childcare resulted in 
care being relatively cheap for lone mothers while incredibly expensive 
for dual-earners (see table 6.3). Not deterred by the expense, higher-in-
come families are more likely to use childcare than low-income families. 
The reason is simple: highly educated mothers are more likely to work 
(Portegijs et al. 2002). As in Flanders, the Matthew principle is in place, 
but not when it applies to lone mothers, who are a little more likely to use 
state-funded childcare – at least when they do work. This is not the case 
in Flanders, as we have seen.
 In 2005, a new law on childcare was implemented – called the Ba-
sic Childcare Services Act. This title is very misleading as the organisa-
tion principles remain the same: employers, employees, and the state are 
jointly responsible for childcare. What does change is that parents are 
made into real consumers: via the tax system they receive their state com-
ponent so they can go to the childcare market and compare prices and 
quality. Municipalities are no longer allowed to offer childcare: childcare 
centres are obliged to become commercialised. This law has been seen 
as the crowning stage of the implementation of the liberal notion of free 
choice. Again, employers are not required to pay for childcare, they are 
asked. If they do not pay, the state will make up some of the deficit for low-
income families. The Christian democratic Minister De Geus has argued 
that the state filling in the gap for unwilling employers is a disincentive 
for employers to take childcare responsibility. Critics regard the law as a 
missed opportunity to establish childcare as a basic service that is open to 
all children and is based on the well-being of children (Schreuder 2001). 
From 2007 onwards, the scheme changed again. Because many employers 
failed to pay contributions it is now obligatory to contribute to childcare.
The Rise of Neo-liberalism in the Netherlands
Why did the Netherlands lag behind in the development of childcare? 
And why is the design of its childcare policy built upon trust between em-
ployers and employees? Until the late 1980s, most political and social par-
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ties – Christian democratic, liberal and social democratic – believed that 
women’s place was in the home (Bussemaker 1993). In the 1950s and 1960s 
nearly all Dutch mothers were at home, while Danish and Flemish women 
entered the labour market. Dutch male breadwinners, as Plantenga (1993) 
puts it, were rich enough to afford a woman at home, in contrast to Belgian 
breadwinners. The pillarised organisation of society also contributed, as 
it helped to keep norms in place. Childcare at that time was regarded as 
something that would be immoral in a well-developed welfare state such 
as the Netherlands. For this reason, public childcare services were only 
sporadically established in cities where there was a ‘demonstrated need’ 
and for cases with an ‘abnormal’ family situation (Bussemaker 1993).
 In the 1970s, childcare became a political issue: women from social dem-
ocratic and communist backgrounds (and not the Christian democrats as 
in Belgium) became strong advocates for public childcare. But the women’s 
movement itself lacked consensus on the question of whether childcare 
was important for women; moreover, the movement was not strong enough 
and had not built a viable, recognised constituency in the political arena. 
Dutch opponents of childcare always argued that bringing your child to 
childcare was only in the self-interest of mothers and would endanger the 
welfare of children (Bussemaker 1993, 1998; see also Singer 1989).
 It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that childcare became 
a serious political issue. At that time, the welfare state was criticised in 
two ways. First, it was argued that the welfare state contributes to an im-
moral ethos: people would become dependent on the state and this causes 
selﬁ shness (Adriaansens and Zijderveld 1981). To prevent this culture of 
dependency, the state should decentralise responsibilities and make the 
family responsible again for the well-being of society. In the Netherlands 
this became a Christian and social democratic critique of the perverse 
consequences of the state, but one framed in neo-liberal language. Dutch 
politicians became strong advocates of the market and the community. 
Secondly, as in the rest of Northwestern Europe, it was argued that the wel-
fare state was too expensive. A report by the Scientiﬁ c Council for Govern-
ment Policy entitled ‘A Working Perspective’ (wrr 1990) summarised the 
problem and in so doing marked a turning point, particularly for women. 
Th e report said that in the Netherlands a large amount of human capital 
was wasted because women were largely inactive. And for a sustainable 
welfare state, particularly in light of the aging of society, the Dutch needed 
to invest in female labour market participation and therefore in childcare.
 In the 1990s, all political and corporatist parties agreed that childcare 
was necessary to raise women’s productivity. The Dutch government un-
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derstood that the substantial number of inactive women contributed to 
the crisis of the welfare state. Using a macroeconomic rather than a mi-
croeconomic rationale, as in Belgium, the state introduced the first Stim-
ulative Measure and reserved 300 million guilders for investment. It is 
telling that this money was derived from the extra tax revenue generated 
by dual-earner couples (chapter 5).
 The organisational foundation of childcare was shaped in the 1990s, 
at a time when the state was experiencing large deficits. The language of 
the market, which was spoken by Christian democrats but obviously also 
by social democrats and liberals, became predominant in Dutch social 
policy. Why? In the Netherlands, democratisation and secularisation led 
to the erosion of the pillarised system. In the 1980s most of the pillarised 
movements merged and the end of pillarisation marked a new era. The 
vacuum was filled by a new ideology of the state and society relationship 
– that of neo-liberalism. The new language described society as a market 
of individuals, rather than as persons tied to pillars. As Duyvendak (1997) 
points out: faith in God became faith in the market. According to this 
ideology, the state should facilitate and not obstruct the natural processes 
of the market as it used to. According to Knijn (1998: 89), the language of 
the market has far-reaching consequences: it offers the image that ‘trans-
forming public goods into private goods sold for profit in a free market 
can reshape clients into consumers who have freedom to select the care 
they need’. Parents thus became consumers rather than clients.
 At the same time, neo-corporatism, popularly called the poldermodel, 
gained importance. In seeking a solution for the economic crisis of the 
1980s, the Dutch government fell back on an old habit: cooperation be-
tween the social partners. In a famous meeting in Wassenaar in 1982, al-
ready described in chapter 5, unions and employers’ organisations reached 
a consensus about the rigid renovation of the welfare state, the freezing 
of wages, and the promotion of part-time jobs to redistribute employ-
ment and raise the historically low rates of female employment (Visser and 
Hemerijkck 1997; Trommel and van der Veen 1999). Many politicians are 
convinced that the economic boom in the 1990s – the Dutch miracle – is 
the result of a pact between trade unions, employers’ organisations, and 
the state. Due to the successful cooperation between the partners and the 
(alleged) success of the Dutch solution, childcare – because it is a relatively 
new type of service – could be developed strictly according to the ideol-
ogy of the poldermodel. Hence the organisation and payment structure of 
Dutch childcare and the existence of company places at childcare facilities; 
the latter will nevertheless disappear when the 2005 law is implemented.
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Dutch-Flemish Diﬀ erences
While both Flanders and the Netherlands have a strong Christian demo-
cratic basis and are part of the same ‘family of nations’, their history of 
childcare is very different. The two pictures described above point to the 
fact that a strong political consensus against working women existed in 
the Netherlands. This could also hold true because in the Netherlands, 
at least in the 1950s and 1960s, families were rich enough and the pillars 
could conserve gender norms which positioned women outside the labour 
market. In addition, the Dutch women’s movement was too fragmented to 
change this ideology. In Belgium there was more pressure, especially on 
the Christian democratic party, to support women’s employment outside 
the home. Initially this was due to economic necessity and then, from the 
1970s onwards, because the women’s movement had a crucial position 
within the political establishment. Consequently, childcare policy was 
shaped much earlier and also according to the Christian democratic in-
terpretation of free choice, which stresses childcare’s institutionalisation. 
In the Netherlands, childcare policy developed because of a macro-eco-
nomic rationale: women need to work in order to maintain a sustainable 
welfare state. Childcare was shaped much later in a period in which the 
state had little money to spend. The notion of free choice is shaped by an 
individual and market paradigm.
 The final question is why the Flemish notion of free choice assumes 
a strong state intervention while the Dutch notion does not. Why is Bel-
gium not intoxicated with the language of the market to the extent that it 
too is guided by a Liberal notion of free choice in its childcare policy? In 
contrast to the Netherlands, pillarisation in Belgium is still the most im-
portant system of subsidising and delivering welfare. In the Netherlands, 
democratisation and secularisation have been much stronger. Moreover, 
the pillars became trapped by the state that subsidised them. By accepting 
state subsidies, they were no longer powerful (van Doorn 1978). By con-
trast, in Belgium the political elite connected to each of the pillars – and 
thus the heads of childcare services, trade unions, education, and the like 
– have always been powerful. The pillars ‘overruled’ the state, not the 
other way around as in the Netherlands (Hellemans and Schepers 1992).
 The state guarantee of having a free choice is necessary to pacify differ-
ences and to create consensus and stability in the system (Lijphart 1968). 
Much more than in the Netherlands of today, Belgium needs a system 
to keep the nation together. The Belgian political scientist Huyse (1983) 
pointed out that there are no less than three ideological folds: between 
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socialists and Catholics, between employers and employees, and between 
French- and Dutch-speaking Belgians. Much of public policy is focused 
on gluing these rifts and keeping the nation-state as it is. Childcare policy 
is part of that.
 England: Lethargic but Finally on the Move
Of all four countries, the uk has the lowest level of state-subsidised child-
care and is the least likely to reach the Lisbon criteria. The Conservative 
government that was in place from 1979 to 1997 never expanded childcare 
services. Childcare policy was at the margins of public policy. As table 6.1 
shows, in the 1990s the level of state-subsidised childcare was just two 
percent for children under age three. Provided by the local authorities, 
these services are directed towards children who have strictly defined spe-
cial needs. The local authorities’ nurseries only provided spots for 24,000 
children in 1994, a number which has been quite steady since the 1980s 
(Bull et al. 1994). This is only a fraction of the number of children cared 
for by the local authorities during the Second World War (Moss 1991).
 Apart from caring for the ‘most needy’, the Conservatives left child-
care to the responsibility of individuals and their employers. The market 
and employers were supposed to fulfil the demand for care: supply-side 
economics was the paradigm and employers were held responsible for the 
provision of childcare. The Conservative Member of Parliament Patten, for 
instance, argued that ‘employers in this country must realise that the only 
way to defuse the demographic time bomb ticking away underneath them 
is by taking the initiative themselves to support family life and to support 
mothers who want to work’ (Moss 1991: 137). This laissez-faire strategy 
turned out to be unsuccessful: day care was expensive, and the quality 
and availability variable depended on the region in which one lived. De-
spite the Conservative government’s faith in the creativity of the market, 
the demands of parents have not been met. At the same time, employers 
did not develop childcare provisions either. Tax deductions, in place from 
1984 until 1990, to stimulate employers to make childcare arrangements, 
had little success. Few employers did so (Brannen and Moss 1991). As a 
result, childcare shortages were constant (Day Care Trust 1997).
 In line with a liberal view of the state, two tasks were nevertheless taken 
seriously: helping to connect supply and demand and to prevent excesses 
of the market. Since 1948, when nurseries were also regulated, childmin-
ders have been obliged to register at the local authority: it is otherwise 
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illegal to care for a child in your home. Childminders have to reach mini-
mum standards of safety and for facilities. A childminder is not allowed 
to care for more than three children under the age of five, including one 
of her own. These rules, surprisingly, are much stricter than in Flanders 
and Denmark. In the Netherlands childminders do not have to register at 
all. On the other hand, childminders in England do not get much support 
from the local authority in terms of education, training, supervision, or 
money (Moss et al. 1995).
Why the Conservatives Did Not Develop Childcare
During the Conservative area, childcare was not on the agenda because 
it was associated with spending and with debates on the ideology of 
motherhood. In the 1980s the Conservative party had a small member-
ship rift between real classical liberals and moral authoritarians (Lewis 
2003). The first were willing to leave it to women to decide whether to 
work and seek childcare. Here the liberal notions of freedom of choice 
and equal opportunities applied. The second strand is more suspicious 
of the desirability of mothers’ employment. The authoritarians spread 
concerns about the morality of childcare. An example of the authoritar-
ian mindset is presented in the study by Morgan (1996), published by the 
IEA, the conservative think tank, in which she mops the floor with the 
protagonist of childcare. Research shows, Morgan argues, that only the 
very best childcare can hope to equal the outcomes of children who are 
cared for at home, and most childcare is not of this high standard. But 
it is much too costly to have really good care institutions, and besides, 
a large number of women want to stay at home anyway, she argues. ‘If 
the government has any duty to facilitate the successful rearing of the 
nation’s children, it would do well to enhance the opportunities for par-
ents to care for their own children. This is in line with most people’s as-
pirations and with what we know is best for the welfare of most children’ 
(Morgan 1996: 127).
 This type of critique was more common under the Thatcher regime 
than under that of Major (1992-1997). In the early years, Thatcher her-
self opposed childcare strongly: it would lead to ‘a whole generation of 
crèche children … who never understood the security of home’ (quoted in 
Ginsburg 1992: 173). But under Major’s premiership there was a shift away 
from this antipathy towards working mothers (Lister 1996; Randall 2002). 
When Major was still the chancellor of the Exchequer he said:
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We have always made it clear that it is not for the Government to en-
courage or discourage women with children to go out to work. But it is 
undeniable that an increasing number of mothers do want to return to 
work and many employers in private industry and in public services are 
keen to encourage them to do so. (quoted in Gardiner 1997: 212)
As time went by, and especially in the wake of the demographic time 
bombs panic, government utterances were positively supportive of work-
ing mothers. A conservative MP even concluded that the importance of 
childcare is not in dispute in the House (Randall 2002).
 But the problem was that in conservative ideology childcare arrange-
ments were essentially a private matter (Randall 1996). If parents wanted 
to work they would have to find childcare on the market. Or as Conserva-
tive Edwina Currie put it in 1988,
Our view is that it is for parents that go out to work to decide how best 
to care for their children. If they want to or need help in this, they 
should make the appropriate arrangements and meet the cost (quoted 
in Cohen and Fraser 1991: 9).
Moreover, for the Treasury-led perspective of Conservatives supplying 
childcare would merely mean a ‘dead-weight’ cost: they would just pay 
to people who already were in the economy (Gardiner 1997). They also 
argued that the growth in women’s employment had occurred without 
government intervention supporting childcare; childcare had grown to 
meet the demand anyway (House of Commons 1994/1995). Therefore, un-
der Major the private and public sectors were asked in a friendly way to 
develop services. The 1992 Manifesto summed up the government’s child-
care policy:
We shall continue to encourage the development of childcare arrange-
ments in the voluntary and independent sector and local authorities 
would be asked to ensure that the standards for which they are now re-
sponsible under the Children Act would be applied sensibly. (Lister 1996)
The Conservative government also did not exactly give the women’s move-
ment a ‘window of opportunity’, to put it mildly. The women’s movement 
has been in the margins and feminists were isolated from the political 
mainstream and political allies (O’Connor et al. 1999). Unlike Danish poli-
tics, British politics is known for its bureaucratic culture, and the British 
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system – no matter which party takes office – has been relatively cen-
tralised and difficult to penetrate for outsider groups, such as those asso-
ciated with the women’s movement. But perhaps more importantly, until 
the 1980s the British women’s liberation movement hardly mobilised on 
the issue of childcare. Campaigns for issues that fit the liberal logic were 
much more successful, such as abortion rights and the campaign against 
rape (Randall 1996). From the 1980s onwards, women’s organisations did 
make a claim on childcare, but at that time few listened on the other side. 
Indeed, at that time the Labour party seemed more receptive as it needed 
new constituencies, but women’s organisations had little power.
 Other advocates of childcare were not visible either. In England, lo-
cal authorities were the only providers of state-subsidised childcare, but 
only for the most needy. These local authorities have always had differ-
ent goals than those in Denmark; they are among the largest in Europe 
and very bureaucratic (Rhodes 1999). Under the Thatcher government 
a major operation took place which centralised the uk even more. After 
that, by introducing a purchaser-provider split, the provider function was 
removed from the hands of the local authorities. They became nothing 
more and nothing less than an organisational and controlling body, pre-
cisely in line with liberal notions of what a state should be (Lewis 1998). 
The local authorities could not serve as a protagonist of state-subsidised 
childcare either. As Pierson (1994) notes, the traditional activists against 
conservatism had all been dismantled.
New Labour
Since Labour took over the government, childcare investment did in-
crease and a remarkable shift in policy took place. For the first time since 
the Second World War, the state has taken responsibility for the develop-
ment of childcare. In 1998, the government presented the first National 
Childcare Strategy in their paper ‘Meeting the Childcare Challenge’. The 
motivation behind the policy is very different from that of the previous 
period. In the introduction the government explained that ‘the National 
Childcare Strategy is about supporting families. Families need childcare. 
Good quality childcare is good for children. And it helps parents to go out 
to work or to study’ (CM3959, 1998). New labour’s strategy includes four 
interventions: to subsidise start-up costs of nurseries in order to increase 
availability, to support children in deprived areas, to make childcare af-
fordable trough tax deductions, and to invest in early education (Lister 
2003; Lewis 2003).
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 The government promised to invest in nurseries and spent (in England) 
470 million pounds over a five-year period. This money is earmarked to 
offer capital grants or support towards the start-up costs of out-of-school 
services. Showing its liberal genetics, the Labour government argues that 
this should not be seen as a system of continuous public support but as 
an investment. Consequently, this intervention has raised criticism. Aside 
from not covering running costs, the strategy offers no guarantee of the 
level of out-of-school services, argue critics such as Rake (2001). Then 
there is the investment in the well-being and education of children liv-
ing in deprived areas. The Neighbourhood Nurseries Initiative will bring 
45,000 affordable new childcare places to deprived areas, stipulates the 
National Childcare strategy.
 In addition to making childcare available, the government aimed to 
make it affordable via substantial tax deductions. Both the Netherlands 
and Belgium have tax deductions for childcare, but none are as high as 
in the uk. The basic idea is that when parents have money to buy child-
care, the market will also develop. The Labour party believes in invest-
ing in a demand-driven economy. The childcare tax deduction is part 
of the Working Families Tax Credit (wftc). Only wftc recipients can 
apply for the childcare credit. This credit helps working parents with 
the cost of registered and approved childcare, such as a registered child-
minder or a nursery. Care provided in one’s own home is excluded, even 
when paid, along with any care provided by a friend or family member 
(Land 2001). Parents will be paid 70 percent of childcare costs, up to a 
ceiling. The condition is that lone parents and each partner in a couple 
work more than 16 hours a week. In practice the average childcare credit 
is 40.61 pounds a week and is used almost exclusively by lone mothers 
(nine out of 10 of claimants). This fits well with the government’s aim 
to provide a childcare place for all children or lone parents and get 70 
percent of them back to work by 2010 (Rake 2001).
Table 6.4 Children’s day care facilities in thousands, 1997-2001, England
1997 1999 2001 Diﬀ erence 
1997-2001
Day nurseries (0-4) 194 248 285 +91
Play groups (0-4) 384 347 330 -54
Childminders (0-7) 365 337 304 -61
Source: DfES (2001)
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Table 6.4 shows that a huge increase has taken place in children at nurs-
eries. At the same time, the number of children in playgroups dropped. 
Since playgroups are less helpful for working mothers – children can only 
go for a limited number of hours – this indicates that working women 
have now managed to find a place for their children at a nursery. On the 
other hand, the number of children with childminders also decreased. 
The net investment is thus ‘only’ 30,000 places between 1997-2001. How-
ever, a further injection of funds was scheduled to take place and by 2005-
2006 an additional 250,000 childcare places will be developed, promises 
the government (Lister 2003).
 What may have had a bigger impact is the focus on early learning. 
Education is one of the main themes of the ‘New Childcare Strategy’ (Cm 
3959). Early education is important for children, as it best prepares them 
to succeed in society. In addition, the uk needs a well-trained labour 
force. Labour therefore committed itself to pre-school nursery for all four 
year olds, extended to all three-year-olds in 2004. The claim was thus 
that every four-year-old would have the chance of a free education place. 
Huge investments were made. Of all three-year-olds in England, about 45 
percent in 2000 and 90 percent in 2002 used some type of facility (school 
or nursery) (dfes 2002). From the point of view of working mothers, the 
education program is rather useless. The free place consists of a minimum 
of three 11-week terms of five weekly sessions lasting 2.5 hours. This does 
not allow parents to work (Rake 2001).
 The fact that the first Childcare Strategy was one of New Labour’s 
primary goals shows that in England a change of party indeed makes for a 
change in policy. Day nurseries were extended and financial investments 
were made, but to what extent political parties matter remains question-
able. When Labour was in power before 1979, it did not develop childcare 
services although women worked anyway. As Lewis (1992a) argues, the 
Labour Party and trade unions have been dominated by a masculine ethos 
that has neglected the interests of working class women. When New La-
bour came into power in 1997 this was nevertheless profitable for women’s 
organisations, which had built a good relationship with Labour when they 
were in the opposition.
 Moreover, Labour’s ideology towards childcare shows many rem-
nants of the previous paradigm: ideologies are indeed path-dependent. 
The Conservative government under Major invested in early education 
(Randall 2002). Incentives for childcare mainly depart from demand-side 
economics, as parents have to stir the childcare economy. This was also a 
popular way of thinking under the Tories, in contrast to subsidising ser-
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vices as in Denmark. Labour’s National Childcare Strategy is certainly 
not social democratic in the sense that it is based on universal claims. 
Despite Labour’s belief that social policy should offer ‘opportunities for 
all’, the British system is more targeted than in the other countries, as evi-
denced by the specific support for lone parents. Childcare is still for the 
most needy, especially those in need of a working mother. However, the 
definition of need does include a much broader category of children and 
parents than under the Conservative governments.
 Conclusion: The Origins and Outcomes of Childcare Policy
This chapter on childcare should answer three questions: which welfare 
state has indeed implemented the right to receive care, what are the ori-
gins of childcare policy, and what does the right to receive care mean for 
gendered citizenship: do women work en masse when childcare is avail-
able and affordable?
 Denmark is indeed the European pioneer in childcare services: children 
– and not parents – really have the right to childcare services. Childcare is 
widely available and quite affordable. Surprisingly, Belgium, and particu-
larly Flanders, comes second in the childcare league. Although childcare 
policy in Flanders developed in response to the needs of working women, 
it now has coverage rates nearly similar to countries like Sweden. The 
Netherlands and the uk, on the other hand, are historically characterised 
by low state investments in childcare. Th is changed in the Netherlands in 
the early 1990s, when working women were seen as necessary for a sustain-
able welfare state. Due to the design of the intervention – the state only 
pays if employers and employees also take ﬁ nancial responsibility – child-
care remains expensive for dual-earner families. In England, childcare in-
vestments are even more recent and were launched by the Labour govern-
ment in the late 1990s. Th ose who proﬁ t the most are lone mothers.
 The second question is what are the origins of childcare intervention. 
Childcare services have always developed under the economic and social 
pressures of women going to work. In Ragin’s terms (2000), women want-
ing to work is a necessary condition for the development of state-subsi-
dised childcare, but it is not a sufficient condition: not all welfare states 
have been as responsive as the Danish or Belgian. England, for instance, 
was rather slow. It is striking that especially the traditional interpreta-
tion of social democratic or Christian democratic power regimes can-
not fully explain the level of state intervention. In Denmark (and in the 
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Netherlands), childcare policy developed when consensus was reached 
on the necessity of investments, not because of the intervention of one 
party. The Christian democratic label is not very telling either: concepts 
of subsidiarity as well as free choice have various faces and were shaped 
by institutional settings and rival ideologies.
 This chapter also highlighted other factors that shaped childcare inter-
ventions, such as the coherence and power of the women’s movement, the 
political culture within a country, and the institutional setting.
 The third question raised in this chapter was about the link between 
the right to receive care and gendered citizenship. At first glance, the link 
between mothers’ employment patterns and childcare services is unmis-
takable. In low-service countries like the uk and the Netherlands, few 
mothers work and they hardly ever work full time. In high-service coun-
tries like Belgium and Denmark more mothers work and they are also 
more likely to work full time. State-subsidised childcare services seem a 
necessary or even a sufficient cause. On second thought, the cases of the 
uk and Belgium raise questions. Denmark and the Netherlands fit the 
model neatly.
 In both the Netherlands and the uk employment rates of mothers in-
creased during the 1990s, although in the uk less than in the Nether-
lands (tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7). For the Netherlands, this is understandable as 
childcare became more available. How come British employment rates 
also increased while childcare investments were only made in the late 
1990s? One hypothesis is that up to a certain level of female employment, 
state-subsidised childcare is not a necessary condition: informal sources 
can also resond to the childcare needs of working women. But if the aim 
is for employment to surpass a specific level, for example if all women 
want to participate in the labour market, it will be conditional upon hav-
ing state-subsidised childcare. A second hypothesis is that a high level of 
state-subsidised childcare is necessary for full-time employment, but not 
for part-time work. Indeed, in the uk and the Netherlands – which have 
comparatively low levels of state investments in childcare – women often 
work part time. Full-time employment is more common in Denmark and 
Belgium, where state investments are higher. But there are more puzzles. 
Take the case of lone mothers. Why are lone mothers’ employment rates 
similar in the uk and the Netherlands? (table 4.8) Looking at the avail-
ability and affordability of childcare, Dutch rates should be higher.
 The Belgian case also raises doubts. Childcare in Belgium is relatively 
well developed – much more than one would expect from a regime typ-
ified as Christian democratic. Therefore, it is no surprise that Belgian 
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mothers’ employment rates are higher than the Dutch. But we can also 
look at it differently. If childcare facilities are so well developed – they 
reach Swedish levels – why don’t more mothers work? Why do they not 
work more hours? Why are less-educated women more likely to stay at 
home, while childcare is affordable? This chapter shows that a steady in-
crease of state-subsidised childcare took place in Flanders. While 17 per-
cent of children used state-subsidised facilities in 1983, this rose to 41 
percent in 2000. At the same time, mothers’ employment did not boom; 
instead more women went to work part-time (chapter 4). The relation-
ship between the existence of childcare services and type of employment 
is thus not that self-evident. Do countries have a cultural saturation point 
for mothers’ employment?
 Childcare services – the right to receive care – are of course part of the 
caring state as a whole. Perhaps Belgian mothers stay at home because of 
the substantial rights they have to give care? Belgium, after all, is a two-
track welfare state: mothers have the right to choose between work and 
care. This however cannot fully explain the relative modesty of mothers’ 
employment rates. The previous chapters also showed that the Danish 
welfare state has ‘work disincentives’ similar to the Belgian. Up to 1994 
the unemployment benefit system could easily be used by Danish mothers 
to stay at home, as Belgian women did; both welfare states have incorpo-
rated a male breadwinner bonus in taxation, and both have substantial 
care leaves. Still, Belgian (as well as Flemish) women and mothers work 
less. Indeed, less-educated women in Belgium are most likely to stay at 
home. Some will argue that in Belgium highly educated women will use 
the childcare track and less-educated women will use the financial com-
pensation available to them and stay at home. But even this is not true. 
The right to give care – implemented via tax policies, benefits, and the 
leave scheme – are not used exclusively by those who have the lowest em-
ployment rates, the less-educated mothers. The question thus remains: 
Why do Belgian women with good access to affordable childcare not work 
more?
 The right to provide care and the right to receive care do not directly 
result in an ungendered citizenship practice in each country. The cultural 
approach would immediately stress the negligible role of welfare states. 
But in broad lines, the previous chapters have shown that the design of the 
welfare state does loosely relate to gendered citizenship – there are just a 
few anomalies. These puzzles do not falsify the welfare state’s effects: they 
lead us to question how welfare states influence human actions. Doing so 
will help us to achieve a more profound understanding of the origins and 
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outcomes of caring states. The next part of this book explores the cultural 
dimension of welfare states. In the next chapters the same domains of 
welfare regimes – social security, leave, and childcare services – will be 
analysed. In the next two chapters we will look more explicitely through 
the lens of ‘ideals of care’. Perhaps this can contribute to solving some of 
the puzzles raised thus far.
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7 After Full-Time Mother Care: Ideals of Care in Policy
Few welfare states univocally and exclusively support the ideal of full-
time motherhood, today a fact that many welfare state theories have not 
taken into account. The previous chapters showed how the paradigm of 
full-time motherhood has changed in different countries at different pac-
es and times. Two conditions for this paradigm shift stand out. Women 
themselves encouraged the dismantling of the full-time motherhood ide-
al. They did so by entering the labour force and pushing for change but 
they also used political force (often together with other political groups 
– sometimes liberals, sometimes trade unions). The second condition is 
economic necessity, although economic necessity takes different shapes: 
labour-market shortage, micro-economics (families need two incomes to 
reduce poverty), or macro-economics (women need to work to save the 
welfare state) are presented as reasons to support women’s employment.
 But this does not explain the extent to which states became engaged 
in policy, or which ideal of care came to be promoted as an alternative to 
the full-time mother-care model. This chapter analyses the ideals of care 
– again in the domains of childcare services and financial arrangements 
– that replaced the traditional ideals. And seeks to explain why a certain 
ideal of care becomes dominant in a country.
 Denmark: The Ideal of Professional Care
In Denmark, the ideal of full-time motherhood – the male breadwinner 
model – ceased to be a dominant ideal long ago. From the 1960s onwards 
the Danish welfare state has had a relatively coherent care-and-work poli-
cy that was ‘perfected’ only in the mid-1990s with the 1994 Labour Market 
Reform and the formal right to childcare. The normative point of depar-
ture is that both women and men have the duty as well as the right to work 
while the state takes over caring responsibilities. For caring, another ideal 
has been put forward: the ideal of professional care.

 Danish citizens do not feel they make use of state controlled care, 
they use what they see as professional care. It is a common expression 
in Denmark that ‘every parent knows how to care for its own child, but 
you need a proper education to care for someone else’s child’ (int. 39, 
50, 65). Day care in Denmark does not mean ‘minding’, it is supposed to 
improve the child’s upbringing. As we saw in the previous chapters, the 
talents and aspirations of each individual child need to be developed 
while at the same time children are offered a possibility to feel attached 
to a larger community and become social and political citizens. This is 
even laid down in the 1998 Social Services Act. Childcare is more than 
the place where parents bring their children because they need care for 
them, it provides children with a type of care that parents can never 
provide.
 The emphasis on professional care can be traced back to the childcare 
workers who played an important role in the history of state childcare. 
During the initial phase in the development of state childcare, the driving 
force came from individuals connected to pedagogical ideas like those 
of Fröbel and Montessori. Already in the late 1940s, the organisation of 
professionals working in childcare demanded a universal element in the 
law on childcare. Their objective was to accommodate children from dif-
ferent backgrounds, so facilities for children from well-off homes should 
also be funded. Their argument was that all children need social contacts, 
personal inspiration, and development. In the 1950s, professionalisation 
of childcare workers really took off. Common standards were defined and 
special training courses for childcare workers were established. In 1969 
the education of professionals was extended to three years, strengthen-
ing the social-pedagogical aspects. The number of trained professionals, 
many of them women, rose significantly, as did the number of employees 
in childcare facilities (Borchorst 2002).
 This went hand-in-hand with the growing importance of pedagogues 
in defining the childcare question. The first universal law for childcare, in 
1964, shows that pedagogues’ organisations were protagonists, flanked by 
the women’s organisations who agreed on the issue of childcare (Bertone 
2003). The alliance with the social pedagogues made it feasible to pro-
mote childcare that was not at the expense of children’s interests.
Th e women themselves said … we want to join the labour market and 
become equal with our husbands, but it shall not be at the cost of the 
children or the elderly, 
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according to Bent Rold Andersen, the former Social Democratic minister 
(int. 40). Quality professional childcare would take the issue of women’s 
work beyond the question of what the consequences are for children. It 
silenced the moral debate.
 Until 1960, the more traditional Danish women’s society (dk) promot-
ed free choice for women. They believed that women themselves should 
decide if they wanted to work or not. In the 1970s, they moved towards de-
fining children (rather than women) as the central objects of their claims 
for childcare. In this way, writes Bertone (2000) in her comparison of the 
Danish and Italian cases, the DK could avoid debates on whether mar-
ried women should work or not. Also the Redstockings, an organisation 
that was part of the second wave of the Danish women’s movement, first 
saw children’s needs as secondary, but in the late 1970s they also recog-
nised the importance of children’s interests for quality childcare. The po-
litical scientist Dahlerup (1998,) once a Redstocking herself, writes that 
the demand for improved childcare centres for all children was crucial. 
The women’s movement, traditional as well as second-wave, was strongly 
engaged in the discussion on pedagogical goals. It sided with the peda-
gogues in their claims for quality childcare. Also later, when childcare 
was under severe pressure in the 1980s, the pedagogues together with 
the women’s groups were again among the most active forces against the 
cutbacks (Bertone 2000, 2003).
 It is thus no coincidence Danish children are cared for by the best-
trained workers compared to other countries: they are real profession-
als (oecd 2001). Childcare workers need three years of higher education 
and have a recognised title (social pedagogues). Unlike in many other 
countries, there is little wage differential between childcare workers and 
schoolteachers and ratios between child and staff are the lowest in Europe 
(3:1 for children up to age three) (oecd 2001). They are organised in a 
relatively strong trade union (bupl), which is important as in Denmark 
the corporate channel is powerful (int. 39,43, 57, 65). In that sense, trade 
union strength, a feature of the social democratic regime, is important in 
understanding Danish childcare policy. Protecting the quality of care is 
considered one of the roles of social pedagogues. The higher their level of 
education, the higher the quality of care.
 In the 1990s social pedagogues gained a new ally. The parents (and 
their organisation) have become powerful clients in the Danish system 
and now have a statutory voice in it. They often side with the bupl in 
keeping the number of trained workers in childcare facilities as high as 
possible (int. 43, 57). When in the late 1990s the social democratic govern-
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ment decided to reduce the number of social pedagogues per child, there 
was an outcry in the media by professionals as well as parents. The system 
itself, as Pierson (1994, 2001) and Alber (1995) pointed out, created its 
own defenders. Childcare services resulted into a new constituency: pow-
erful parents who, as individuals and collective actors, became important 
childcare advocates.
 In short, the alliance between organised professionals and womens’ 
groups, which in the 1980s and particularly the 1990s was strengthened 
by parents’ organisations, is crucial to understand the content of childcare 
policy in Denmark. Th e ideal of professional care binds them together and 
solves the socially constructed dilemma in which children’s interests are 
placed against women’s interests. Th is opened up support from many po-
litical parties. Th e stress on the pedagogical function of childcare services 
also legitimised universal childcare services. Th e ideal of professional care 
can be seen as a precondition for claiming the right to receive care.
Surrogate Mothers as the Black Sheep of Childcare
Th e Danish welfare state also pays for family day care, (further discussed 
in chapter 8). Should this not be seen as stressing the ideal of the surrogate 
mother? Not at all. In Denmark, day care mothers – dagpleje as they are 
called – have always been opposed to professional care: they were never 
promoted as a substitute for mother care. In the period before the ﬁ rst law 
on childcare some political parties promoted the existence of state-em-
ployed day care mothers. Both social democrats and the bourgeois parties 
argued that family day care could be a more gradual break with the model 
of full-time caring (Bertone 2000). But when the 1964 law on childcare was 
written, day care mothers were considered to be a nødlusning, an ‘emer-
gency solution’. Th e future ideal was that all children would be cared for in 
day care centres by professionals. At that time, the Danish Women’s Society 
(dk) was already very much against family day care as it would undermine 
the pedagogical ideal of childcare (Bertone 2000). Day care mothers were 
nevertheless a cheap solution, and in the rural areas of Denmark it was the 
only solution for childcare. And thus what was presented as an emergency 
solution became a structural local practice (int. 45, 65).
 Two parties are traditionally in favour of family day care. One is Ven-
stre, the right-wing farmers’ party, although they did not actively promote 
the model. For them, this type of childcare was necessary in the country-
side and day care mothers provided care in a homely atmosphere. Indeed, 
family day care is more a rural phenomenon than an urban phenomenon. 
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The second advocate were the municipalities, a crucial actor in the Dan-
ish political setting. Some rural municipalities pointed out that childcare 
centres could not survive in the countryside. Other municipalities had 
a financial and pragmatic argument: day care families are more flexible 
because they can be easily established and dismantled. Family day care is 
also cheaper for parents than a vuggestue, a childcare centre for the very 
young (int. 41, 43, 45, 48, 57, 65).
 Initially, working conditions for the day care mothers were poor. But 
women organised in the trade union for public employees fought for work-
ers’ rights, and as a result the first collective agreement was made in 1971. 
The main issues were wages and the number of children, not training. 
Since then, day care mothers are no longer seen as an emergency solution, 
but as a ‘supplement’. The government nevertheless explicitly stated it was 
better if children were cared for by professionals in day care centres. The 
trade union of social pedagogues (bupl), women’s organisations, and the 
social democrats strongly agreed: they were strongly opposed to family 
day care (int. 41, 48, 57).
 In the 1980s it was a social democratic minister, Ritt Bjerregaard, who 
officially stated that day care centres and family day care have the same 
status. Family day care was no longer seen as supplementary. At the same 
time she stressed that family care can only be given to young children 
(aged 0-2). Older children should get professional care. She also demand-
ed that municipalities stop building new day care centres, indicating that 
the reluctant acceptance of family care was not inspired by ideology or 
pedagogical motives but by an economic crisis. It showed a social dem-
ocratic pragmatism that exchanged an ideal of (professional) care for a 
practical solution.
 Due to the efforts of the family day care workers who used the cor-
porate channel to gain proper wages and working conditions, today they 
are no longer the black sheep of childcare (int. 41, 48, 57). Nearly all have 
followed a basic course offered by their trade union, which consists of just 
76 hours of training, and almost half followed a supplementary course in 
1999. More recently, the Danish government set up a new 42-week train-
ing programme (int. 41, 48). In addition, the wages and working condi-
tions of the 24,000 dagpleje are now relatively good, nearly as good as 
those working in childcare centres, and they are fully paid during sickness 
and maternity leave. Furthermore, about 1,000 supervisors employed at 
the municipalities give guidance and support to the childminders. Family 
day care workers are obliged to meet other day care mothers at least once 
a week, so that their children can meet other children. The idea behind 
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this is that social contact is better for children’ upbringing than when 
children are home alone with one mother (int. 41, 48). If parents who use 
day care mothers are critical, it is mostly of the lack of education of the 
childminder and the weaker pedagogical element involved in this type of 
day care (Bertelsen 1991). In that sense, this municipal family day care no 
longer fits the cultural ideal of the surrogate mother, it is closer to the ide-
al of professional care. To put it differently, after a long struggle, the ideal 
of professional care now also includes day care families. In Denmark, the 
dominant ideal in policy is that of professional care.
Intergenerational Care: Elderly as Individuals
In Denmark it has never been suggested that grandparents should take 
care of their grandchildren. Denmark has a strong policy of individuali-
sation of the elderly (Koch Nielsen 1996). Since the 1974 Social Services 
Law, elderly people have had the right to receive care so that they can live 
autonomously from their families. The Danish elderly also receive by far 
the largest amount of care in Europe. While many welfare states had seri-
ous cutbacks in the mid-1990s, in Denmark 20 percent of the elderly (65+) 
still received homecare and six percent were living in residential settings 
(Anttonen and Sipilä 1996). The number of hours of home care that a 
needy person receives (five hours per week) is especially high compared 
to the rest of Europe (Rostgaard and Fridberg 1998; Rostgaard 2004).
 In many other countries (including the Netherlands), family members 
can be asked to care for the elderly, but in Denmark home care is a right, 
even if a partner or daughter is available in the near surroundings. The 
1974 law stipulates complete individualisation and it is even illegal for 
the municipality to demand a family member to help. A study from the 
mid-1990s shows that elderly people with children receive more formal 
support than those without. The explanation is that, rather than being in-
volved in physical and practical care, children are good advocates for their 
parents (Juul Jensen and Krogh Hansen 2002). The elderly are thus not 
supposed to be dependent on their children but on the state. Conversely, 
children are not supposed to be dependent on their parents to provide 
care for their own children, thus their parents’ grandchildren. The ideal 
of intergenerational care is absent.
 This individualisation is not only a principle that applies to the elderly, 
it is central in Danish public policy. Unlike other countries, the Danish le-
gal system even includes a ‘Law on Individualisation’ (Koch Nielsen 1996), 
which is the showpiece of the Radical Party. This law stipulates that all 
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new legislation has to be assessed on whether it is based on the individual 
and not the family as legal entity. Exceptions are only allowed when good 
reasons are given. This is the case for social assistance, which is based on 
family-means testing. This notion of complete individualisation in Danish 
public policy has far-reaching consequences. It has for instance limited 
the conceptual space for another ideal, that of parental sharing.
Parental Sharing
Parents and children are not supposed to be dependent on each other, 
nor are partners. In other words, vertical and horizontal dependencies 
are not encouraged in Denmark. Individualisation is a key concept. This 
has had an impact on the discussion on the role of fathers. Danish policy 
distinguishes itself from the social democratic model, writes Sainsbury 
(1999a), as it lacks advanced policies for men’s careers in the home and no 
statutory rights based on fatherhood. Although fathers’ involvement have 
been on the agenda for a long time, it has not had much influence on the 
content of social policy.
 In the 1980s, the Commission on Childcare had argued that fathers are 
important for the well-being of children and proposed the right to time 
off when a young baby is born – paternity leave. But the Commission 
stood rather isolated (int. 43, 58). Nowadays Danish fathers have this right 
but it came rather late, though not as late as in the uk. More recent de-
bates on parental leave show that politicians are not very concerned about 
the lack of fathers’ involvement in caring for their children. Their main 
concern is that children are away from home for too long when they are 
little, which is a critique of the ideal of professional care. Danish parental 
leave is aimed at ensuring that children spend time at home, with which 
parent does not matter. Gender equality or fair parental sharing is not the 
main issue (Borchorst 1999; Rostgaard 2002).
 Rostgaard (2002, 2004) argues that in Denmark the father and mother 
are seen to have an equal position in the family, but the negotiation of 
time to care is considered a private matter. Freedom to choose is a central 
element. Parents are regarded as free-standing from each other and free 
in regard to gendered distribution of work in the family, thus being able 
to choose freely whether or not to take leave (Olsen in Rostgaard 2002). 
Therefore Danish politicians, unlike their Scandinavian neighbours, are 
against what they consider to be forcing fathers to take up care duties. Pa-
rental sharing is not an ideal that should be promoted by the state through 
incentives or punishments.
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 Danish labour market policy and labour market law have not promot-
ed the notion of parental sharing either: individual part-time work has 
not been seen as a route toward redistribution of work and care; childcare 
taken up on a part-time basis has to be paid for full time; part-time work is 
not covered well in social security; and a part-time parental leave option 
has just recently been introduced , as discussed in chapters 6, 7, and 8. If 
people in Denmark decide to work part time, they say they work ‘reduced 
hours’, giving the impression that it is temporary and that they are still 
very committed to a career. Part-time work has connotations of having a 
marginal job or being marginalised.
 Both the Danish government and the powerful trade unions (with 80 
percent membership) have been very much against part-time jobs, which 
are not considered to be ‘real’ jobs. This trade union antagonism tends 
to have two causes, according to Blossfeld and Hakim (1997): one con-
scious and explicit, the other unstated and implicit. First, trade unions’ 
patriarchal and sexist attitudes led unions to give unthinking priority to 
the interests of male members over the concern of any female members. 
Indeed, much more than in other Scandinavian countries, the Danish 
corporate channel is very male-dominated (Bergqvist 1999). Second, the 
trade unions’ long campaign to establish and maintain the standard full-
time permanent job as the norm meant that they were always explicitly 
opposed to other types of contracts, seeking to prevent their growth if not 
abolish them altogether. In Denmark, trade unions struggled for a general 
reduction of working hours. Individuals who gave in to part-time arrange-
ments could get individual advantages but hurt the case for all. Part-time 
work, it was said, erodes solidarity between workers.
 Finally, parental sharing has not been strong in the Danish care his-
tory because of the dominance of the ideal of professional pedagogical 
care. These ideals seem to conflict with each other. If professionals are so 
well equipped to care for children, and if it is so important for children to 
have the crèche experience, why would a parent, including a father, stay at 
home to share in the caring duties?
 Flanders: The Ideal of Surrogate Mothers and 
Intergenerational Care
In Belgium the notion of full-time motherhood has never been the only 
ideal expressed in public policy. As described in chapter 5 and chapter 
6, the notion of free choice has been crucial, most strongly promoted by 
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Christian democratic forces, although pressure from social democratic 
forces and economic necessity have also been decisive. Free choice in 
the Belgian pillarised context means that women have the right to stay 
at home and therefore tax allowances and leave schemes are in place to 
facilitate this. Also, unemployment benefits can be seen as an implicit 
financial compensation for caregiving. On the other hand, women should 
have the right to work; childcare services are thus affordable and available, 
and labour market schemes cater especially to (less-educated) women. In 
Belgium, women have the right to provide care as well as the right to re-
ceive care. While Hobson (1994) wondered if it was possible to validate 
both routes of working and caring, the Belgian welfare state seems to be a 
successful example. In other words, the undeniable stress on familialism 
does not necessarily mean that women should stay at home.
 Chapter 5 on social security already showed that small steps have been 
set to limit the ideal of life-long full-time motherhood, and part-time em-
ployment and flexible leave are more intensively promoted. Is Belgium 
moving towards parental sharing? A close look at the development of 
childcare services also shows that the state has never been neutral. Do 
people really have a free choice? The type of childcare promoted strongly 
resembled the ideal of the surrogate mother.
Surrogate Mothers Triumphs Over Professional Care
Although it was never openly declared, Flemish governments, which al-
ways had a Christian-Democratic minister responsible for welfare, seem 
to prefer the ideal of the surrogate mother (int. 1, 6, 7). The official stand-
point is that the state is neutral: the government does not prefer any type 
of childcare above another. ‘The state has to follow parents’ wishes’, stress-
es the quasi-state organisation Kind and Gezin (1988). And since parents 
seem to prefer the system of formalised day care mothers, the state has to 
put people’s preferences into practice.
 Until the 1970s, the dominant type of state-subsidised day care in Flan-
ders were day care centres. Th ey were mostly an urban phenomenon, cater-
ing to working-class families in cities. Historically, they have been part of a 
medical-hygienic regime. Th e institutions were large, the staﬀ  was made up 
of nurses, and the places were labelled as beds (Hermans 1984). As a coun-
terpart to them, organisations of day care mothers developed; they were 
seen as the answer to collective ‘cold and formal’ institutions as well as to 
the increased employment of rural women. Th e Catholic agrarian women’s 
movement (kvlv-Katholieke Vrouwen van de Landelij ke Beweging) was the 
FLANDERS: SURROGATE MOTHERS AND INTERGENERATIONAL CARE

ﬁ rst to call for childminding services: these were the founding mothers of 
state-subsidised family daycare. At that time, the Catholic women’s move-
ment was a very strong force and not only included the agrarian women 
(kvlv) but also the organisation of Catholic women workers (kav). Th ey 
had strong links with the political decision makers, and many women who 
attained a position in parliament or the government did so after a career 
in the Christian democratic women’s movement (including Smet, whose 
important role was discussed previously in the chapter on social security).
 The concept of day care mothers was not widely known – at that time 
grandparents cared for young children – the initiative was very new (int. 
6, 16). When they launched their family daycare plan in the early 1970s, 
the agrarian women had to convince day care mothers to join in, they had 
to convince mothers to use the service and, last but not least, they had to 
persuade the government to fund the initiative. At that time, both moth-
ers as well as potential childminders were suspicious though curious. The 
women organised in kvlv were motivated to set up a childminding service 
because they needed and wanted to be engaged in employment. Childcare 
at that time was often seen as a necessary evil. For this reason, the agrar-
ian women argued in their pamphlet that ‘bringing up children also at 
the “second” home is not necessarily worse, if the quality was guaranteed’ 
(kvlv 1977: 5). Organised day care mothers, with the help of the state, 
could guarantee this level of quality: ‘in the countryside many women and 
families are prepared, with some guidance and information, to give care 
successfully’ (kvlv 1977: 6).
 Another argument in support of the initiative was that organised day 
care mothers would activate family and neighbourhood life, which was al-
legedly eroding at that time too. This was especially powerful: rather than 
arguing that childcare would diminish family and community life – the 
Cinderella story – the women of kvlv stressed that this type of childcare 
would strengthen family and community life.
 Financially speaking day care mothers were also surely an attractive 
bargain. The state only had to play a small role, just to ensure that peo-
ple would support and help each other. Organising and subsidising day 
care mothers was very cheap compared to day care institutions. Since no 
buildings have to be rented – as children are cared for in a mother’s home 
– and day care mothers do not receive wages for which tax and social 
security payments have to be paid, family day care is half the price of day 
care centres (int. 1, 6, 16).
 The arguments the Catholic Agrarian Women (kvlv) used fitted 
smartly with Christian democratic interests – low costs and social cohe-
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sion – while at the same time concern was shown about the quality of care 
for children. The Catholic women thus sought an ideological alliance with 
their Christian democratic Party.
 The initiative was ‘crowned’ in 1975: day care families would indeed 
be subsidised and a service could be set up. The mothers were paid fees 
and did not have to pay tax and social security premiums. They were 
not employees and were not professionals. They were not protected by 
social security. From then on, day care mothers were ‘embraced’ by the 
Christian democratic Party and the ministers in charge of childcare. The 
increase in childcare subsidies from the late 1980s onwards was to a large 
extent used for the development of the Diensten voor Opvanggezinnen, 
the ‘Bureau for Day Care Families’. Today many more children are cared 
for by subsidised day care mothers than in day care institutions, and the 
number of children in family care continues to increase (this is discussed 
further in chapter 8).6
 Services for childminding are now a much more universal practice, it 
is no longer a Christian democratic phenomenon only. It is true that as 
an urban phenomenon, crèches are very much associated with the social 
democratic movement. For a long time the social democrats were against 
family day care and strived for crèches as they treated all children equally 
and engendered solidarity between children. Consequently, most organi-
sations for day care mothers – first in the countryside, later in cities – be-
long to the Catholic pillar. More recently, after the success of family day 
care services, the social democratic pillar also started to develop family 
day care networks, primarily in cities (int. 28).
 The importance of formal and subsidised childminding in Flanders 
however is not only ideological: it was also an unintended consequence 
of tax policy. In 1987 a law was passed in order to allow parents to de-
duct bfr 345 per day (approximately 8.55 euros) from their taxable income 
when they use childcare, but only if their children are in registered and 
state-controlled facilities. This fiscal measure unintentionally ‘whitened’ 
the grey market of childcare; informally paid childminding has become a 
rare phenomenon in Flanders (Kind en Gezin 1997).
 Subsidising day care mothers has been a way out of a deadlocked situ-
ation. As in many welfare states, in Belgium ‘warm’ care – represented by 
a dedicated mother who continuously cared for children – was contrasted 
with ‘cold’ institutional care, in which indifferent professionals cared for 
children for long hours. In the first case mothers have to sacrifice for their 
children, while in the second children suffer because of mothers’ selfish-
ness. Caring at home was weighted against day care institutions; the in-
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terests of children against the interests of mothers (Somers and Peeters 
1991). In no way did the existing (urban) day care institutions resemble 
home-based care. Day care mothers provided an alternative to the cold 
professionals that was much more in keeping with the wishes and values 
of Flemish parents as well as Christian democratic ideology: children are 
cared for in homelike surroundings. Th is highlights the ideal of the surro-
gate mother: It is more appropriate for a mother to care for children, even 
though they are not her own children. Th is also helps explain the develop-
ment of state-subsidised childcare under a Christian democratic regime. It 
is because of these surrogate mothers that state investments in childcare 
took place. Th e type of care promoted ﬁ t well with Christian democratic 
ideology, not only the ideology towards childcare but also the gender ide-
ology that stressed (economic) dependency relations within the family.
 It is important to stress that several ideals of care can operate at the 
same time, but also that one dominant ideal of care is often replaced by 
another. The Flemish quasi-state organisation Kind en Gezin has slow-
ly tried to alter the model of the surrogate mother in the direction of 
professional care. Professional care has so far not been a strong ideal in 
Flanders, but Kind en Gezin (2003) increasingly stresses that childcare 
outside the home also contributes to the welfare of children. This is also 
underlined by the Flemish ministry (2000). One way of supporting profes-
sional childcare is to work on the improvement of the quality of care. The 
medical-hygienic regime has thus been transformed into a welfare regime 
with the concomitant education, training, and control. This however has 
not lived up to the oecd expectations (2001) yet, as the oecd finds Bel-
gian childcare still too scholarly and worries about the low educational 
level of childcare workers. Moreover, about 75 percent of those employed 
in childcare services have not completed the lower level of professional 
training (Kind en Gezin 2003). In addition, staff-child ratios are the high-
est of all four countries (1:7 for children under age three.
 The most recent move towards professional care is to grant surrogate 
mothers basic rights. Since April 2003, day care mothers receive social se-
curity rights such as pensions and unemployment benefits, although they 
are still not considered ‘employees’. The Flemish federal state is putting 10 
billion euros into this expansion of social security coverage. The reasons 
are pragmatic: first a court case deemed childminders to be employees in-
creasing their rights, and secondly the number of women seeking jobs as 
family day care providers has decreased dramatically. Professionalisation 
may attract more people to work in childcare, perhaps even some men 
(Delva et al. 2003).
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Intergenerational Care
Another dominant ideal in Flemish policy is that of intergenerational 
care. It is good when parents and children are dependent on each other 
and exchange care and trust. In Flanders, state-subsidised childcare is de-
veloped more than elderly care, which is in line with public support (Van 
Peer and Moors 1996). State services for elderly care are not widespread: 
10 percent of the elderly received some kind of help in the mid-1990s, 
compared to 18 percent in the Netherlands, 26 percent in Denmark and 
14 percent in the uk (Anttonen and Siplilä 1996; see also Jamieson 1991, 
oecd 1994b). Although home care has expanded more recently, statistics 
from the mid-1990s show that six percent of people aged 65 and over re-
ceive home help, which is less than in the Netherlands (eight percent) and 
much less than in Denmark (20 percent). In Belgium a limited number of 
people live in residential facilities (four percent).
 In Flanders, home care is commodified – state-subsidised help is based 
on income. The law stipulates that ‘priority is given to the most dependent 
and to those who are financially most needy’ (Belgisch staatsblad 1988). In 
countries like Denmark and the Netherlands care services are more uni-
versal – selection takes place not on the basis of income but on the need 
for care (oecd 1994b). Care for the elderly is also based on the family. 
When children or other relatives can provide informal care, home care is 
denied (Baro et al. 1991). In addition, local authorities (ocmws) that sup-
port the elderly have to collect all costs for financial and material services 
from spouses, parents, and children. This is no leftover from the past: the 
law was only enforced in 1983. Sociologists have warned that this liabil-
ity for maintenance can disturb family relations (Lammertijn and Bavel 
1996). Flemish local authorities know that and in practice they hardly en-
force the law. Only when the elderly go to (expensive) nursing homes are 
the costs for these caring arrangements sometimes recovered (Meulders 
et al. 1990).
 The ideal of intergenerational care is also visible in the Belgian tax sys-
tem, being the only system that has specific deductions for dependants, 
such as children and elderly living in (although the elderly dependants 
should not be well-off ). This is not an archaic remnant either. When the 
Christian democratic minister De Meester gave a lecture on family and 
fiscal policy, she dreamed about a gulf of ‘moral sacrifice’ in which grand-
parents cared for their children and children cared for their parents. She 
said: ‘The state can perhaps push this trend a little?’ (in Van Haegendoren 
and Moestermans 1994: 103).
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 Tax deductions for childcare also reflect the intergenerational ideal 
of care. When in 1987 the law was discussed which offered tax relief for 
state-recognised childcare, the influential Organisation for Big and Young 
Families (bgjg) and other family-minded forces argued that this would 
discriminate against all those families in which grandparents provide 
childcare. The amount they eventually gained however is less than in the 
case of childminders or crèches, but it does have an important symbolic 
meaning. Belgium is one of the few countries that provides direct finan-
cial support for the intergenerational care of children. Unmistakably, Bel-
gian social policy emphasises the ideal of intergenerational care.
Parental Sharing
During the 1980s the Christian democratic movement became more fa-
vourable towards part-time work, especially because of the recession. 
Minister Smet even praised the Dutch ‘one-and-a-half ’ model and want-
ed to mimic her Northern neighbours. She believed that this would give 
space to employers to hire more people and would be a more humane way 
of living (De Standaard 1995). As mentioned in chapter 5, Smet argued 
that part-time work should be considered as a decent job. At that time, 
part-time workers were awarded the same right to unemployment ben-
efits as full-time workers.
 Advocates of part-time work framed their arguments in gender-neu-
tral terms: parents should have more time at home – time for children 
and time for the family, this was the issue, not gender equality (Marques 
Pereira and Paye 2001). Opponents of part-time work argue that it per-
petuates the gender division of labour at home: it does not lead to fa-
thers’ involvement or parental sharing. Critics dismiss the one-and-a-half 
model saying that ‘he will get the one job and she will get the half ’ (int. 29, 
33, also Marques-Pereira and Paye 2001). If women work part-time, men 
have no need to help them out. To support the concept of sharing care 
duties, Smet launched a public campaign to encourage discussion of gen-
der role stereotypes in relation to working and caring duties. Postcards 
were distributed of a woman repairing a car and a man ironing a shirt. It 
was striking that the campaign only dealt with domestic chores, not with 
men’s role as fathers.
 Belgian opponents of part-time work blame the Dutch model for se-
ducing their policymakers (e.g., Marques-Pereira and Paye 2001). The 
next section shows that the Belgian welfare state is not heading for the 
Dutch model of parental sharing yet: Belgian part-time workers are still 
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very likely to receive some extra pay (via social security or via the system 
of time credit), while Dutch men as fathers have received much more at-
tention from the state.
 The Netherlands: The Ideal of Parental Sharing
Until the mid-1980s, the dominant ideal in Dutch childcare policy was the 
ideal of full-time mothering (Bussemaker 1993). Few welfare states have 
been as consistent as the Dutch. This ideal had an impact on every area 
of social policy. In the late 1980s and particularly in the 1990s, this ideal 
changed: the women’s movement stressed the importance of employment 
as the key to emancipation, and at the same time the Dutch Scientific 
Council published a report arguing that women’s labour market partic-
ipation was crucial to the survival of the expensive welfare state (wrr 
1990). However, women did not receive the right to work, instead they 
were given the duty to work. An important icon of this paradigm shift is 
the new law on social assistance, described in chapter 5, which notably 
requires lone mothers to take up employment when their children reach 
the age of five.
 Perks of the male breadwinner model are still lingering (Plantenga et 
al. 1999). In 1998, 25 billion Dutch guilders were still being spent on single 
breadwinner support (Bekkering and Jansweijer 1998). Yet, the care ideal 
that replaced the full-time motherhood model has been the ideal of pa-
rental sharing, which has been univocally preached by most political par-
ties, trade unions, and the women’s movement and consolidated in the 
1990s. Ironically, this ideal is not suitable for lone mothers.
Parental Sharing
The Dutch ideal of parental sharing has been summarised and highlighted 
in one of the most crucial policy papers of the 1990s, ‘Unpaid care equally 
shared’ (Commissie Toekomstscenario 1995). The social democratic min-
ister of employment (Melkert) formed a commission to develop scenarios 
on the future of paid work and unpaid care. The Commission found that 
the most desirable scenario was the ‘combination scenario’, meaning that 
that all people, men as well as women, should share available paid and 
unpaid work equally. In practice, they recommended a 32-hour workweek 
and investments in childcare, calling for professionals to take over some 
of the caring work, but certainly not all.
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 The combination model was the idea of women’s organisations in al-
liance with academic women and had already been put forward by the 
Emancipation Council in the late 1980s. It tries to find a balance between 
the Dutch culture of ‘self care’ and improving women’s position in the 
labour market, and clearly aims at gender equality outside and inside the 
home. Thus on the one hand, the Commission sided with the strong anti-
Scandinavian sentiments that stressed that parents should do the bulk 
of the parenting themselves – ‘if you choose to have children, you have 
to care for them yourself ’. This shows, as Billig (1991) has pointed out, 
that ideals are constructed as the opposite of one another. But on the 
other hand, it was stressed that men should work less and women should 
work more: women now had too many small jobs and more investments in 
childcare were needed. The assumption was also that when men do more 
in the home, women would like to work more outside the home. The com-
bination model pleads for a shift from the practice of the ‘one-and-a-half ’ 
model to the ‘twice-three-quarter’ model (Plantenga et al. 1999).
 The Purple government agreed with the Commission: the combina-
tion scenario, with its emphasis on parental sharing, should be the basic 
model for modernising the Dutch welfare state. In all policy papers and 
evaluation research since then the combination model has been the point 
of reference; it has become the policy target (e.g. Ministerie van Sociale 
Zaken 1996; Portegijs et al. 2002, 2004). One of the reasons, again, is that 
parental sharing is seen as not only fair, it is also considered to be as a 
pre-condition for women’s increased labour market participation. Dutch 
policy is built on the assumption that if he does more in the home, she can 
work more outside the home.
 Parental sharing means two things: part-time rather than full-time em-
ployment is the norm and while women should not reduce all their caring 
activities, men should be more involved in caring. Starting off with the 
latter, sharing care duties has received much attention in the Dutch public 
and governmental debate. The first emancipation policy paper stated that 
not only women should have choices, men too should be able to choose 
more freely (preferably choosing to provide more care). Rather unique in 
Europe, the central objective of emancipation policy was that men and 
women should not only be economically independent, but also ‘care inde-
pendent’ (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 1992). Both 
men and women should be able to care for themselves and their family 
members.
 Encouraging men to take up care duties is primarily considered to be 
an issue of socialisation and consciousness raising. In 1993 a course on 
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caring (verzorging) became part of the national curriculum throughout 
the country. All children up to the age of 15 were supposed to learn to care, 
although it was implicitly aimed at boys. The objective was to degender 
caring and emphasise the importance and difficulty of caring (Grünnel 
1997). Men were also addressed more directly: the government intensively 
used the mass media to communicate the message that men should care. 
One advertisement on TV was set in the 1950s and featured the slogan 
‘who’s that man who cuts the meat every Sunday’. The message was that 
absent fathers are not very modern. Such campaigns were also run in the 
early 1990s by one of the biggest trade unions: ‘Hi, I am your dad think 
about a part-time job’. More recently, the Ministry of Social Affairs, with 
the support of the European Commission, started a multimedia project, 
which includes a website with information and discussion, a TV program 
on fatherhood, and all kinds of courses and public debates. Mass media 
and education have been important routes in the Netherlands to persuade 
men to give care.
 Dutch care policy also supports the idea that men should have the op-
portunity to be fathers. Since many studies show that men want to work 
less and care more, allowing time for fathers to care is seen as the most 
important policy intervention (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgele-
genheid 1996). Hence the individual right to unpaid parental leave which 
came into force already in the early 1990s. In the Netherlands, however, 
no additional measures were made taken to make it financially attractive 
for fathers to take up care duties or to force them to engage in caregiving, 
as in the Nordic parental leave schemes. Instead, ideological persuasion 
and giving men the opportunity to become involved in care duties seems 
to be the policy strategy.
 The importance of part-time work is the second important feature 
of Dutch government policy on parental sharing of childcare respon-
sibilities. In the 1990s, part-time work was embraced by individuals, 
the state, and trade unions (Visser 2002). It was in the 1970s that many 
women who wanted to marry and become mothers asked their employ-
ers if they could work part time. Particularly in sectors experiencing la-
bour market shortages, such as education and nursing, it became com-
mon for women to continue to work part-time after they married. In 
the late 1970s, more than one-third of all jobs in the service sector were 
part-time jobs. In the 1980s and 1990s this became even more institu-
tionalised. Due to the lack of childcare facilities, part-time work was 
considered the most viable option because it was seen to be a compro-
mise between working full-time and staying at home. Instead of ‘all-or-
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nothing’, part-time work developed as an alternative to not working at 
all (Plantenga 1996).
 In the early 1990s, part-time work was thus approached positively while 
at that time the international community (eu and oecd) still saw part-
time work negatively. In ‘Shaping Structural Change: The Role of Wom-
en’ the oecd (1991) presented part-time work as a reconfirmation rather 
than a negotiation of the implicit gender contract. Of course, in the 1970s 
and early 1980s Dutch trade unions and the women’s movement were not 
positive towards this type of work either. As in most countries, they were 
worried about the marginalisation of part-time workers and their lack of 
social rights. The unions and women’s organisations struggled with the 
dilemma of giving in to individual part-time work or supporting shorter 
workweeks for everyone, but after the Wassenaar Regulations (1982) part-
time employment became a more feasible option. The Organisation of 
Employers asked their members to accept part-time work as it was an al-
ternative for firing people in times of recession. They also found out that 
it was not too expensive to reorganise and reschedule labour in order to 
allow for part-time employment.
 It was crucial that trade unions became pro-part-time. When in 1990 
the fnv (trade union) pleaded for part-time employment, it was the first 
trade union in Europe do so (Visser 1999). The trade unions supported 
the demands of many female workers. Why women wanted to work part-
time at that point is a matter for debate. Was it because they were afraid 
of losing their jobs during the recession? (Visser 2002) Was it because no 
childcare was available at that time? (Plantenga 1996) Or was it because 
they preferred to spend more time with their children? (Hakim 2000). 
In any event, the change in the trade union’s position was a result of a 
strong women’s lobby within the trade union as well as lobbying by ex-
ternal women’s organisations. In addition, members of the trade unions 
increasingly worked part-time themselves, which also initiated a debate 
within the trade unions. The trade union policy of ‘right to part-time work 
for men and women’ and ‘equal rights for part-time workers’ is the trophy 
of years of women’s union lobbying, argues Grünnel (2002).
 Most rules discriminating against part-time workers have been dis-
mantled since the 1990s (chapter 5). Part-time work has become a normal 
job with equal pay, labour market conditions, and social rights. Moreover, 
in the modernised Labour Time Act (Arbeidstijdenwet) of 1996 the defini-
tion of employee has been altered to ‘employee with care responsibilities’. 
Employees must be able to combine work and care, and therefore find 
variable and personal solutions in matters of working time. The crown 
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jewel so far has been the law, put forward in 1993 but not enacted until 
2000, which gives individual workers (except in very small companies) the 
right to adjust working hours from full-time to part-time or vice versa, 
unless employers prove that compelling business reasons make this im-
possible (Grunnel 2002; Visser 2002). Finally, the 2001 Tax Reform gives 
people who combine work and care a symbolic sum of money (Dierx et al. 
1999). Indeed, the Dutch welfare state is moving from a male breadwinner 
model to a combination model.
Professional Care and Surrogate Mothers
Pleas for the ideal of parental sharing have not only been promoted as 
the alternative for full-time motherhood, they are also the opposite of 
full-time professional care. The Scandinavian model was seen as a liv-
ing nightmare for Dutch parents, professionals, and politicians. A strong 
consensus exists that that young children should be taken care of by their 
mothers: there is a strong culture of self care (Knijn 1994; Plantenga 1996). 
For a long time, in the Netherlands, as anywhere else, the opponents of 
childcare argued that such services were only in the self-interest of moth-
ers and that working women endangered the well-being of their own chil-
dren by sending them out of the home to be cared for. Childcare services 
were only acceptable for very needy women with low incomes who were 
unable to care for their children. The children’s interests were played 
against mothers’ interests in working. This was still visible in the 1980s. 
Eelco Brinkman, the Christian democratic welfare minister who rejected 
government-subsidised childcare, argued that
many families no longer exist as such because both man and women 
have to work or want to work, and that value is considered more worthy 
than raising a child (quoted in Bussemaker 1993: 85).
The women’s movement was not coherent and strong enough to break 
this dominant rationale of children’s interests through which childcare 
was seen as a dangerous expression of mothers’ self-interest (Bussemaker 
1993). Although the second-wave women’s movement – the feminist group 
Dolle Mina and the Man Woman Society (mvm) – carried out actions de-
manding more and free crèches, and childcare expanded, childcare did 
not become a universally available service (van Rijswijk Clerx 1981; Sing-
er 1989). When the state finally intervened on a larger scale in the early 
1990s, the influence of the women’s movement was negligible, argues 
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Peters (1999). Some individual women nevertheless did have an impact, 
notably Minister D’Ancona (social democrats). The Christian democratic 
women’s organisation also made a difference, as it argued against its party, 
which had always been opposed to universal childcare subsidies.
 Social pedagogues and day care workers have not had a strong impact 
on governmental policy or childcare debates in the Netherlands either. Th e 
organisation of childcare centres (wkn) had little inﬂ uence on childcare 
policy (Peters 1999). One of the reasons is that playground workers are 
overrepresented within this organisation. Th e playground movement be-
came very strong in the 1970s. Set up by higher-class women and supported 
by the medical establishment, the playground movement stressed that full-
time professional care was not in the interest of children. Th eir main aim 
was to help mothers with the pedagogical relationship with their children. 
As childrearing – at that time too – became more intense and expectations 
rose, mothers needed more support as carers and not as workers. Accord-
ing to Van Rijswijck Clerx (1981), the playgroup movement even hampered 
the development of childcare centres. Parts of the women’s movement 
– mvm as well as Dolle Mina – also supported the playground movement 
as they thought it would at least lead to universal services.  Rijswijk Clerx 
(1981) argues that the playground movement forgot the interests of work-
ing women; the playground movement was even at odds with women’s in-
terests. Th is movement helped strengthen the public perception that child-
care centres were bad for children. Herewith the playground movement 
placed a break on the emancipation of women as workers.
 Professional care is still not a strong ideal in the Netherlands. Th is was 
again revealed in the summer of 2002, when Riksen-Walraven, a professor 
of childcare, spread the news that bringing your child to a childcare facility 
can disturb the child’s development. Although her intention in raising this 
warning was to encourage the government to improve the quality of care in 
day care centres, others used this as ammunition to argue for the closure of 
childcare centres altogether. A second indication that the ideal of profes-
sional care is weak is the staﬃ  ng situation at state-subsidised centres. In 
terms of staﬃ  ng the Netherlands takes an average position, with 4:1 child 
to staﬀ  ratios for the very young (0-1) and 6:1 for ages 1-4. Dutch day care 
workers are usually trained, but only for three years on a middle level. Th is 
is more than in Flanders – where training is on a low level – but less than 
in Denmark, where the level of training is high (oecd 2001). Th e ideal of 
professional care is thus neither widespread nor robust.
 A second question is why surrogate mothers have never become an 
alternative to full-time mother care as was the case in Flanders. There 
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is no obvious answer. More than in Belgium, childcare policy has been 
laissez faire, implementing a liberal notion of free choice. In 1984, when a 
tax deduction for childcare was introduced, the government argued that 
because of parents’ own responsibility and free choice the cabinet pre-
ferred to give them a tax deduction instead of raising the budget for child-
care. With this small policy intervention the Dutch government explic-
itly chose to indirectly stimulate informal childcare supply (Bussemaker 
1993). Rather than putting forward the ideal of the surrogate mother, the 
government hoped that people would sort out their caring themselves, 
preferably informally.
 At the same time, the women’s movement and particularly the trade 
unions were fervently against childminding at home. Th ey saw it as a di-
saster for women’s labour market participation. Rather than trying to for-
malise such childcare, they simply ignored it. Th e Stimulative Measures, 
which are described in chapter 6, an important ﬁ nancial investment in 
childcare services, made it possible to set up bureaus for host families, as 
described in the previous chapter. But this, according to experts, may even 
have harmed the development of state-regulated childminders as the ﬁ -
nancial measure was mostly equipped for supporting the set up of day care 
centres (int. 70, 71).
Intergenerational Care
In Dutch social policy, partner dependencies (horizontal dependencies) 
have always been assumed and promoted, and also the modernisation 
of care – the ideal of parental sharing – is built upon solidarity within 
couples. Conversely, vertical solidarity, dependency of children on their 
parents and vice versa, has been rejected. While in Denmark both verti-
cal and horizontal dependencies are diminished, in Belgium both types of 
family dependencies are reinforced. This final section on the Netherlands 
deals with the absence of the ideal of intergenerational care. Why is this 
the case?
 The ideal of intergenerational care was eradicated from social policy as 
early as the 1960s. Unlike caring for children, caring for the elderly is con-
sidered a state responsibility. While the Danish state cares for the elderly 
as well as for children, the Belgian state cares for children and less for the 
elderly, while the Dutch state cares less for children than for the elderly. 
This has important consequences for childcare: in the Netherlands grand-
parents are not supposed to be involved in caring for their grandchildren. 
Dutch people – both the elderly and the younger generation – argue that 
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the state rather than the family is responsible for elderly care. If the elder-
ly are ill they want to be cared for by professionals, not by their children. 
For the elderly, the ideal of professional care is in place (Voorn and Meijer 
1999; Dykstra 1998). The comparative statistics, presented in the section 
on Denmark, also show that the Netherlands is high in the league of care 
services, right after Denmark. This is especially due to a substantial num-
ber of elderly in residential care (Alber 1995; Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; 
Rostgaard and Fridberg 1998; Rostgaard 2004).
 Th e rejection of intergenerational care – the right to individualisation 
of the elderly – can be traced back to the 1950s, the time of rebuilding a 
country that was hard hit by the Second World War. Many houses were 
destroyed during the war – although a shortage of housing was already 
foreseen in the 1940s – and at the same time a baby boom took place. Th ere 
was a constant need for big houses, which were occupied at that time by el-
derly couples or individuals. Children often had to live with their parents. 
Th e idea was that if the elderly moved to and lived in residential care, this 
would solve the housing problem for families with children.
 Th is was however not only a purely functional solution for the housing 
shortage; the state also wanted to pay back the elderly who had survived 
the war and had worked hard. It was felt that these elderly people should 
be relieved of all daily care burdens; this would particularly relieve women. 
Th e newly established residential homes were not aimed at frail, sick elderly 
people: both the housing and the services attached to them were universal. 
Class or income did not matter. Th e individualisation of the elderly was ﬁ n-
ished oﬀ  by universal and individual pensions in 1965, when the ﬁ nancial 
responsibilities of children for frail parents were also cancelled. Th e elderly 
were now free from care burdens and dependencies (Bijsterveld 1996).
 In the 1980s, the move from residential care to home care resulted in 
a re-evaluation of the principle of individualisation. First, formal elderly 
care was reduced. Residential care was broken down (literally), although 
home care did not fill the care gap. Unlike the Danish case, in the Neth-
erlands state expenditure was not transformed from residential to home 
care: the budget of elderly care was significantly reduced in 1980 and 1983 
(Goewie and Keune 1996) and did not expand between 1980 and 1990, 
unlike in many other European countries (Tester 1996). Home care be-
came particularly scarce: in 1999, 23,000 people were on waiting lists. 
This caused a huge outcry. A court case in 2001 concluded that the Dutch 
elderly in need of care indeed do have a right to receive care, and in the 
late 1990s substantial investments in home care took place (Ministerie 
van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2002).
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 Th e increasing importance of home care revealed that the law on home 
care does not entail the same rights to individualisation as residential care. 
In fact, the provision of state subsidised care is only allowed when ‘the nec-
essary help is absent or insuﬃ  cient in a dependable way by family, neigh-
bours or volunteers’ (art 10, paragraph sub d.e. Regeling Ziekenfondsraad). 
In the Netherlands a debate has started on what the ﬁ nanciers of home 
care can expect from children and other relatives. What type of caring 
obligations are ‘normal’? Although this has been changing during the last 
decade, the elderly in the Netherlands still have more of a right to live in-
dependently from their family and children than in a country like Belgium. 
Intergenerational care is still not a dominant ideal in the Netherlands.
 The United Kingdom: From Surrogate Mother to Professional Care
Up until Major’s second term (the mid-1990s), the British government 
was still flirting with the notion of full-time mothering, despite a con-
tinuous discourse on the importance of working women. In the 1980s, the 
Conservative government even wanted to introduce a male breadwinner 
bonus in taxation. Had it not been so expensive, women would have been 
paid to stay at home. The ideal of full-time motherhood has thus long 
been under the surface of liberal policy. Under Major this slowly changed, 
as consensus arose that women should work outside the home. It still took 
until the New Labour government came into office in 1997 for a British 
government to wholeheartedly become committed to working women: 
the pendulum swung in the direction of facilitating women to work.
 Due to both a liberal stance and the full-time motherhood ideal, the 
British state at that time did not actively support an alternative ideal of 
caring. Implicitly, the Tory government preferred the ideal of the surro-
gate mother over professional care and supported intergenerational care. 
Under New Labour childminding lost out to the ideal of professional care, 
although this ideal applies more to children older than three and is pri-
marily aimed at education.
How Surrogate Mothers lost
In the uk, the ideal of professional care has received a boost under the 
New Labour program. Before that, state-subsidised professional care was 
out of sight, except for the most needy – children with specific problems, 
often from low-income families. As described in chapter 6, the Conserva-
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tive governments – up until Major’s second term – showed no consensus 
as to whether women should work or not. Regardless of the answer, caring 
for children was seen as a private matter.
 At the same time, the women’s movement was weak and was divided 
on the issue of whether professional childcare should be for a demand: 
they distrusted the state and questioned whether it could provide quali-
tatively good childcare. According to Randall (1996), the British women’s 
movement was very cynical and suspicious of the service state; they could 
not imagine it could provide any good-quality services. This British dis-
trust of the state is opposite to the Danish belief in the ‘people’s home’. 
Moreover, British feminists, as Randall shows, were until the 1980s very 
critical about having children at all, and were very fragmented when it 
concerned motherhood and employment. They wondered whether it was 
really women’s choice to go out to work, or if it was just economic neces-
sity; they were very critical of the capitalist and patriarchal workplace. 
Similar to the Dutch but unlike the Danish and Belgian women’s move-
ment, the British women’s movement could not say in one voice: we want 
state-subsidised childcare!
 At the same time, the Conservatives implicitly emphasised the ideal 
of the surrogate mother. If young children (aged 0-2) really had to be 
cared for by someone other than their mother, home-based care was the 
implicit ideal in social policy in the 1980s and early 1990s. The British 
childcare expert Moss writes:
Childminding has received oﬃ  cial support for several reasons, includ-
ing its low cost and its ﬂ exibility but it has also been supported because 
it is regarded as the type of care closest to the ideal, that is, the child 
cared for by its mother. (Moss 1991: 134)
The Tory government in 1992 showed its empathy by a change of law 
which allowed childminding for children between ages five and seven. 
This was expected to lead to a boost in this practice. The ideal of sur-
rogate mothers was also perceivable at an organisational level: many day 
care institutions at that time did not even admit children younger than 
age two. Reasons could be practical and commercial, caring for chil-
dred aged 0-2 is very intensive, but there could also be cultural reasons: 
professionals may not believe themselves that young children should be 
cared for outside a home (int. 37, 38).
 In the early 1990s, most organisations in the field of childcare, the Equal 
Opportunity Commission, the Trade Unions Congress, major childcare 
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organisations, and specialised scholars advocated a National Childcare 
Strategy (Daguerre and Bonoli 2003). When New Labour came into office 
they expanded the number of childcare places in nurseries to a large de-
gree, and have planned further expansion (chapter 6). The New Childcare 
Strategy is based on the ideal of professional care rather than that of the 
surrogate mother. Indicative of a shift in policy was that childcare policy 
aimed at doubling the number of nursery places for three year olds, double 
the number of out-of-school places for school-age children, provide uni-
versal nursery education for all four-year olds, and improve childcare staff 
regulation and training (Baldock 2003). Under the Labour government 
the guidelines for childminding were also strengthened (Lewis 2003).
 One reason why the ideal of surrogate mothers was no longer stressed 
under New Labour was its weakened support in public opinion or, more 
precisely, parents’ wishes. Parents have been very dissatisﬁ ed with the 
childcare available and have especially lost trust in childminders (Th om-
son 1995, see chapter 8). As New Labour listened carefully to the middle 
classes it would be politically harmful to promote an ideal that was criti-
cised so much by parents. Catering to the middle-class parents would be 
to support the ideal of professional care. Again we see a change of ideal.
 As described in the previous chapter, the content of the ideal of pro-
fessional care is early education, not so much the social-pedagogical care 
as has been advocated in Denmark. This stress on education for young 
children is not completely new. Even in the uk, ideological continuity is 
visible after a government change. If the Conservative government gave 
any attention to the provision of care for children, it was under this flag. 
The over-five initiative, for instance, a program running from 1993 to 
1996, gave support for services providing care and recreation for school-
age children. Moreover, in 1994 the Conservative government installed a 
voucher system to provide a pre-school place for all four-year olds. Each 
parent was given a voucher worth 1,100 pounds a year which could be 
used to buy a variety of approved services in the education or welfare sys-
tem. Most parents however bought a place at school, which meant losing 
welfare services (Land and Lewis 1998).
 New labour has invested in childcare for instrumental reasons, be-
cause it was seen to be strategic to combat poverty and social exclusion 
via social investment in children; it would also move the uk into the dual-
earner model which was also one of New Labour’s aims. Children are seen 
as either potential workers or childcare recipients who enable parents to 
earn a sufficient income. Or as Lewis (2003: 220) describes New Labour’s 
policy:
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thinking about childcare was thus framed primarily by an economic 
approach that saw childcare as a means of raising children’s future 
prospects by improving early years provision and by allowing their par-
ents (especially lone mothers) to earn.
Childcare is thus part of the new ‘investment state’. These are also the 
grounds on which Esping-Andersen et al. (2002) plea for state invest-
ments in childcare services. Lister is very critical about this approach to 
childcare. She argues that it is the child as ‘citizen-worker’ of the future 
rather than the ‘citizen-child’ of the present who is invoked by the new 
discourse of social investment (2003: 437). In this line of thinking, child-
care is not child-centred, she argues. It is not about the better lives that 
children will lead as children. This is very different from the Danish ob-
jective of professional care based on social and pedagogical goals. Lister 
(2003) also questions how stable this ideal of professional care can be. If 
children seem to matter instrumentally, not existentially, expenditure on 
them will only be justifiable where there is a demonstrable pay off.
 Another question is how much the ideal of professional care is put into 
practice. Although child-staﬀ -child ratios are average (4:1 public but 8:1 pri-
vate for children aged 0-3), staﬀ  qualiﬁ cations are comparatively low (oecd 
2001). A survey found that 22 percent of day nursery heads and 33 percent 
of other day nursery workers had no qualiﬁ cations (Lewis 2003). Th e oecd 
(2001) warns that childcare personnel in the uk is not well-trained, and 
working conditions and pay are low. Finally, the ideal of early education 
stresses that children younger than three should not have other childcare 
arrangements than a mother being at home. It may well be that, analogously 
to the Dutch playground movement, this ideal of care hampers the develop-
ment of childcare for the very young (children under age three).
Parental Sharing
The importance of parental sharing as well as the focus on men are surely 
important breakthroughs of New Labour policy. Parental sharing is re-
ally a recent policy issue, even though commentators argue that the focus 
on men’s involvement is still too weak (Rake 2001). For the first time in 
the uk, working times as well as men’s involvement in caring have been 
discussed – first, by introducing limited leave schemes, as we have seen 
in chapter 5; secondly, by the possibility of reducing working hours; and 
thirdly, by installing a minimum wage, which should limit the necessity to 
work many hours per week (Daly and Rake 2003). Compared to the Dutch 
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case, state support for parental sharing is limited, but the recent develop-
ments are crucial in the British context.
 It is important to note that the Conservative government would never 
have put forward the notion of parental sharing. Even though one strand 
of conservatism does have a clear notion about who should do the caring 
– the mother at home – a stronger voice said these issues were private. Th is 
private view of the family can be illustrated well by a speech of the conser-
vative Minister Virginia Bottomley. For her, the most important task for 
the state was
to acknowledge the privacy of the family, stressing the responsibility of 
parents and the importance of keeping the state out of private family 
matters (in Jones and Millar 1996:4). 
In addition, the Conservative government was more concerned about the 
economy than about the division of labour in the family. Th ey rejected pa-
rental leave because it would impose ‘added burdens on employers without 
regard to their impact on jobs’, said Minister Forsyth (in O’Connor et al. 
1999: 86). For conservatives the main argument is that state intervention 
would place a burden on employers, and their wishes are more important 
then those of parents.
Intergenerational Care
While parental sharing is a very recent policy objective, the implicit ideal 
of intergenerational care has a long history. Indeed, the uk has a long 
tradition of state support for the elderly. Residential care as well as home 
care have been important elements of local authority policy. In the uk 
there are no legal obligations between parents and children (Millar and 
Warman 1996). At the same time, since the 1970s policies towards elderly 
care went hand in hand with the notion of community care, which was 
supported by all parties in different times. This comes close to a (limited) 
ideal of intergenerational care. Moreover, British elderly care is based on 
the need principle. Those who suffer the most receive the most help.
 The concept of community care, so crucial in British caregiving policy, 
has many meanings. According to Tinker et al. (1994) it not only involves 
public recognition of the importance of the family and caring within mar-
riage – informal care – but also the recognition of the family’s limitations. 
It invokes the idea of neighbours and friends helping but recognises a 
limit to the sort of care they will provide. Community care also means 
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that people want to stay as long as possible ‘in the community’. The no-
tion became more crucial when the Conservative government came into 
office, and was made explicit in the 1990 National Health Service and 
Community Act. This act also organised the introduction of quasi-mar-
kets, where different care providers are supposed to compete for local 
authority money (Land and Lewis 1998).
 In the uk, care policy for the elderly has been increasingly built upon 
selectivity. The money for the ever-aging population of elderly was lim-
ited, although unlike the Dutch case the budget still grew slowly (Baldock 
2003). Comparative statistics show that in the mid-1990s the uk had nine 
percent of elderly (65+) people covered by home help and five percent in 
residential care (Anttonen and Sippilä 1996). This is more than in Belgium 
but less than in the Netherlands and Denmark. Cross-national research 
by Rostgaard and Fridberg (1998; also Rostgaard 2004) shows a darker 
picture: home help covers only five percent of the population, although 
it is given for a substantial number of hours (more than five hours per 
week). This indicates that the British home care scheme is highly selec-
tive: it caters to the worst-off citizens, the most needy. Only one-fifth 
of those with some degree of dependency were receiving home care in 
the mid-1990s. This means that a large number of frail elderly who are 
not frail or sick enough have to depend on informal sources. Those who 
receive informal care have been less able to receive home care since the 
mid-1990s (Baldock 2003).
 Another indication of the ideal of intergenerational care is the support 
of informal carers. Uniquely in Europe, informal care in the uk has been 
financially supported by successive governments. Since 1976 the Invalid 
Care Allowance pays informal carers who put in long hours providing 
care a kind of wage-replacement benefit. Equally, the 1995 Carers (recog-
nition and services) Act gave caregivers entitlements to have their needs 
assessed; i.e. they also have the right to get support from professionals. 
As Finch (1990) had foreseen in the late 1980s, care in the community has 
become ‘care by the community’. Hence, although never stressed as such, 
the intergenerational ideal of care has become particularly strong in the 
uk as a consequence of the highly selective home care policy, the rhetoric 
on community care, and the stress on carers’ rights.
 This notion of intergenerational care does not fit with the recent 
childcare policy, which explicitly excludes informal, intergenerational 
care. Different from the Belgian situation, the uk’s Childcare Credit 
excludes tax deductions when children are cared for by grandparents 
(Land 2001; Weelock and Jones 2002). In that sense, the British ideal 
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of intergenerational care stands in a ‘flamingo position’: it stresses the 
importance of caring for the elderly but does not support childcare by 
grandparents.
 Conclusion: Ideals of Care after the Full-time Motherhood Norm
This chapter demonstrates that the childcare paradigm has changed in 
all four countries. The ideal of full-time mother care has been eradicated 
in each country, though at different points in time. However, the policy 
responses to the moral predicament of care has varied from country to 
country. In other words, what is considered to be the most appropriate 
solution for providing childcare when parents are at work is country-spe-
cific. In Denmark, the full-time mother care model was in place only in 
the 1950s. The Danish alternative for the upbringing of children when 
mothers are at work is the ideal of professional care: social-pedagogical 
aims are placed central. Danish childcare is about socialising children as 
social beings as well as stressing their self-development. This ideal is not 
clearly related to specific political parties, such as the social democrats, 
but to the alliance of the women’s movement with the organisation of 
childcare professionals, the social pedagogues (who were also women), 
and more recently with parents/clients.
 In Belgium, free choice has been the articulate policy principle: wom-
en should have a free choice as to whether to work or not, and what type 
of childcare they need if they enter the labour market. But this free choice 
is not real. Flemish governments invested much more in the ideal of the 
surrogate mother, and childminders became linked to subsidised organ-
isations. This ideal has been put forward by the women’s group of the 
Catholic agrarian movement, which found a natural ally in the Christian 
democratic government – not only because it was a cheap solution, but 
also because this type of childcare is considered to be warm, motherly, 
and to strengthen social cohesion. In addition to the ideal of the surrogate 
mother, intergenerational care is an important policy objective. This is 
of course not a new alternative but is seen as a remnant of the past that 
should be allowed to live on.
 In the Netherlands, the eradication of the ideal of full-time motherhood 
happened comparatively late. Women started to work in larger numbers 
only in the late 1980s. An alternative ideal of parental sharing was put for-
ward and consolidated in the 1990s. Th is ideal is based on part-time employ-
ment and on seducing men to behave as caring fathers. Th e ideal of parental 
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sharing is seen as an appropriate alternative for mother care: the child is still 
cared for at home, but now the father is involved too. Th e advocacy coalition 
for this ideal of care was the women’s movement in the widest sense of the 
word – including scholars – together with the trade unions.
 The British case, finally, is more mixed and at the same time shows 
clearer transformations. During the Conservative governments no clear 
ideals of care were put forward to offer parents an alternative care solu-
tion, although full-time motherhood as well as surrogate mothering and 
intergenerational care were implicit in many interventions. The Labour 
government has more clearly bid farewell to full-time mothering as well 
as to the surrogate mother, and shifted to the ideal of professional care, at 
least for children over age three. Different from the Danish case however 
is the fact that childcare is seen as education, which also limits the impact 
of the ideal for young children.
 This chapter thus showed that in most countries women tried to orga-
nise themselves to find a way out of the deadlock situation in which the 
interests of children were played against the interests of women. Women, 
individually and in groups, have been vital in developing and striving for 
new policy ideals of care. The very moment women were able to ally with 
groups that were powerful in a specific country at that time – a govern-
ing political party, trade unions, professional groups, parents, or scholars 
(often women themselves) – new ideals arose and became paradigmatic. 
Specific ideals took shape mostly in relation to the existing care prac-
tice as well as the orientation of the women’s movement, whose direction 
was different in each country. Whether women as actors had power is an 
important factor in understanding caring states, but what ideals of care 
they strived for is just as important. In other words, in understanding the 
development of new care ideals we have to reinterpret the recent history 
of welfare states and study various factors such as the orientation of the 
women’s movement and the possibility to form (female) alliances with 
other dominant groups such as trade unions, professional organisations, 
the dominant political coalition and parents’ opinions, or in other words, 
the advocacy coalition (Jenkins and Sabatier 1994) in the broadest sense.
 While this chapter was devoted to ideals of care in policy, the next 
chapter focuses on ideals of care in practice. Are they the same in each 
country? Moreover, what are the consequences of embedding specific 
care ideals in welfare states? Do ideals of care indeed result in gender-
specific employment and care patterns? How do ideals of care relate to 
citizenship?
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8 How Welfare States Work: Ideals of Care in Practice
Care ideals are helpful in understanding the (changing) content and ori-
gins of caring states. The previous chapter showed that welfare states pro-
mote different ideals of care. But ideals of care also help to explain why 
mothers do or do not work. When mothers make decisions about work, 
they always refer to whether their children are cared for well. Appropriate 
care solutions that fit people’s ideals are a necessary condition for taking 
up employment. This also entails that welfare states are more than a set of 
financial structures that limit and provide people’s choices, as compara-
tive welfare state theories often assume. Seemingly neutral procedures 
and structures embody particular values, norms, interests, identities, 
and beliefs. Social policy – through regulations, financial measures, and 
content of provisions – influences the normative structures that provide 
people with choices, but also limit those choices. In other words, a welfare 
state is a moral agent, as Wolfe (1989) has put it.
 Welfare states give messages to their citizens about what the most ap-
propriate way is to care for children when mothers are at work. In other 
words, the welfare state is not merely a merchant connecting supply and 
demand or a judge safeguarding justice and people’s basic rights, but also 
a priest: it tries to tell people how to behave. The state is a messenger 
whose institutions help to shape appropriate behaviour. This means that 
social policy can also be read as a sermon, or a set of sometimes contra-
dictory messages. The question is of course whether people still listen to 
this priest. Is the state still a source of moral authority? Or do people only 
follow their own life goals as Hakim (2000, 2003) argues?
 Th is chapter shows that ideals in care policy indeed relate to care ide-
als in practice. Welfare states matter. Speciﬁ c ideals of care also have an 
important impact on citizenship: diﬀ erent ideals of care relate to diﬀ er-
ent gendered citizenship practices. For instance, the ideal of the surrogate 
mother produces diﬀ erent gendered patterns of paid employment, care, and 
income than the ideal of professional care. In fact, women’s labour market 
participation can be hampered by some ideals of care, such as the surrogate 
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mother ideal, and stimulated by others, like the ideal of professional care. In 
addition, speciﬁ c ideals of care have a diﬀ erent impact on diﬀ erent catego-
ries of women (by age, class, or profession). Th e set of hypotheses presented 
in this section is illustrated with examples from the four countries.
 Denmark: Professional Care
Denmark, as we saw in the previous chapter, was the first country that 
eradicated the model of full-time mother care from its social policy, and 
this is also true in practice. Today, the phenomenon of the housewife has 
practically disappeared: just 4 percent of women are engaged in full-time 
mothering (Eurostat 1997). More than in other Scandinavian countries, 
most parents (90 percent) also reject the husband as a sole provider (El-
lingsaeter 1998). Most children, as described in the chapter on childcare, 
use state-subsidised facilities. Especially from age three and up, children 
go to childcare five days a week. Even when parents are at home – for 
instance due to unemployment – most parents want their children to go 
to day care, where highly professionalised workers care for them. They 
believe that children are better-off at day care than at home with their 
mother (Cristensen 2000).
Many young children go to family day care nevertheless (table 8.1, see also 
chapter 6). But as was argued in the chapter 7, these women can no lon-
ger be labelled as surrogate mothers: they are closer to professional care. 
Table 8.1 Care arrangements for children under three in percentage around 1990 
and 2000, Denmark
Care arrangement for children under age three 1989/1990 1999/2000
No public scheme:
Private family day care
Grandparents and others 
Cared for at home by parents (not leave)
12
11
20
approximately 24 
for informal 
arrangements
Parents taking leave 9 approximately 25
Local government family day care 28 35
Local government childcare institution 20 21
Total 100 100
Source: Juul Jensen and Krogh Hansen (2003)
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In Denmark, as table 8.1 also shows, the ideal of the surrogate mother is 
not found in the market either (see also Mogensen 1995). The explana-
tion must be the widely available and affordable state-subsidised facilities; 
other sources of paid childcare are rare. Also in line with messages found 
in social policy, few grandparents are involved in the day-to-day care of 
their grandchildren, especially compared to the other countries (Eurostat 
1997). Danish research in the mid-1990s even showed that only one per-
cent of young children were cared for by family and friends (Mogensen 
1995). Grandparents do not provide childcare on a regular basis. They 
are more likely to provide help in emergency situations (Juul Jensen and 
Krogh Hansen 2003).
 An interesting aspect of the Danish case is that the ideal of parental 
sharing is not really promoted in social policy, is not practiced, but is 
much more preferred. Danish couples work full-time (chapter 4) and pa-
rental leave is not taken by men (chapter 5). But if Danes are asked about 
their wishes, they either want to share the work and caregiving duties or 
they want the junior model: the man working full-time, the woman work-
ing part-time (Ellingsaeter 1998). In fact, in 1999 not more than three per-
cent of parents preferred the dual-earner model, the most common Dan-
ish family model. This is not a recent phenomenon. Since the 1970s, few 
Danes have wanted the model of both partners working full time. Danish 
women and men do not want to work long hours, and never did. But the 
practice is the opposite (Christensen 2000: 149).
 This indicates that Danish people do not follow what they put forward 
as ‘preferences’. Denmark is a country that neatly fits Hakim’s conditions 
(2000, see chapter 2) of a place where men and women for the first time 
in history have real choice over their lives, with equal opportunity policy 
and reproductive rights in place (see Siim 2000). But in this country peo-
ple do not follow their work-life preferences or pursue their own life goals. 
On the contrary, they practice the ideal promoted in social policy, which 
they also support: the ideal of professional care.
 Belgium: A Mammoth Alliance of Mothers
The Belgian case also shows clear linkages between policy and practice. 
Slowly, the ideal of full-time mothering is disappearing in policy and prac-
tice, more than in the uk and the Netherlands (table 8.2). Parental shar-
ing, which is hardly alive as an ideal in social policy, has not yet gained 
much ground. Few Belgian fathers work part-time and if men take leave 
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it is not for caring practices, although this is recently changing under the 
new Time Credit Scheme (chapter 5). The only ones who have listened to 
the call of part-time work are working mothers (chapter 4). Belgian moth-
ers increasingly work part-time and, as we see in table 8.2, many more 
would like to do so.
When parents are at work, a mammoth alliance of mothers enables moth-
ers to work. The first source of mothers are day care mothers: one-third 
of young children stay with them during the day. These day carers are un-
officially called onthaalmoeders (the term onthaal has the connotation of 
a warm welcome). In contrast to Denmark, these women are surely ‘sur-
rogate mothers’. The second are the mothers of the working mothers: the 
grandmothers. They support their daughters’ entering the labour market. 
This means that the ideal of the surrogate mother as well as the ideal of 
intergenerational care are present in both policy and practice. Flemish 
parents are generally very content with the practice of their care arrange-
ments: they get the childcare they want (Vanpée et al. 2000).
 Although literally every year fewer grandparents take care of their 
grandchildren, 84 percent of very young Flemish children are still cared 
for by grandparents (table 8.3). Or more precisely, they are cared for by 
grandmothers – often those from the mothers’ side (Jacobs 1996; Vanpée 
et al. 2000). In other words, Flemish women have a social contract with 
their own mother, a contract fathers and grandfathers are not really part 
Table 8.2 Actual and preferred employment patterns for two-parent families with 
children under six, 1998, three countries
Man full time/
woman full 
time (dual-
earners)
Man fulltime/
woman part 
time (junior 
model)
Man full 
time/woman 
not employed 
(male 
breadwinner 
model)
Other (e.g., 
parental 
sharing, 
female 
breadwinner 
model)
BE actual
preferred
46.0
54.8
19.4
28.8
27.3
13.4
 7.3
 3.0
NL actual 
preferred
 4.8
 5.6
54.8
69.9
33.7
10.7
 6.7
13.8
UK actual
preferred
24.9
21.3
31.9
41.8
32.8
13.3
10.4
23.6
Source: OECD (2001)
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of. About 60 percent of grandparents are regularly involved in caring for 
their grandchildren, providing care one day a week for at least five hours, 
many of them for two grandchildren. On average, the job these grandpar-
ents have is quite substantial. Their ‘workweek’ is nearly 26 hours (Hede-
bouw and Sannen 2002).
 Although it is important that grandparents are a cheap solution for 
childcare, research on this practice also reveals that it is indeed fitting 
to speak about a culturally defined moral ideal of care. Grandparents not 
only feel a strong moral duty to support their children, they feel that they 
‘are the best carers when mothers work’ (liso 1991). They consider the 
responsibility given to them by their daughters as a recognition that they 
were good mothers. One working mother explained:
My mother found it really terrible that I had registered my children at 
a kindergarten without asking her. I had thought that she would ﬁ nd 
it too heavy with my sister’s baby and therefore I brought them to a 
crèche. But she was oﬀ ended. (Van Haegendoren and Bawin-Legros 
1996: 31)
Grandparents want to be valued above professionals, as they do not consider 
childcare facilities to be the best solution (liso 1991, Van Haegendoren and 
Bawin-Legros 1996). Many parents, but also the grandmothers themselves, 
see care provided by grandmothers to be the best alterative to mother care. 
After all, who can care better than the mother’s own mother?
Table 8.3 Care for children younger than 2.5, 1999, Flanders
Care arrangements
Informal care
Grandparents 84.3
Relatives, neighbours 13.9
Formal care
Day care mother employed by a service 34.0
Private day care  9.8
Subsidised childcare centre 24.0
Private childcare centre  7.6
Other arrangements at home (au pair, nanny)  1.4
Note: Children begin school at age 2.5.
Source: Vanpée et al. 2000
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 The Netherlands: Surrogate Mothers
In the Netherlands, the ideal promoted in social policy is parental shar-
ing. This resembles Pfau-Effinger’s label for the Dutch model: the dual 
carer/dual breadwinner model (1998, 1999). But unlike other ideals, pa-
rental sharing is difficult to put into practice. Depending on calculations 
just 2.3 percent (Eurostat 2002) – six percent (Portegijs et al. 2004) to 
nine percent (Knijn and van Wel 2001a) – of parents with young parents 
actually ‘share’ (meaning both have a job of about 32 hours). Most of them 
are highly educated. On the other hand, Dutch couples are more likely to 
work part-time than in any other country (Eurostat 2002). And more than 
in other countries, men seem to be more involved in caregiving. Dutch 
fathers for instance are more likely to take parental leave than in oth-
er countries (chapter 5), and recent research shows that half of working 
mothers have a partner who stays at home to give care on one weekday 
(Portegijs et al. 2004). Thus, although fathers are more likely to care, pa-
rental sharing is too optimistic a label for the Dutch practice.
 In practice, the ideal of parental sharing turns out as the junior model 
(he works full-time, she works part-time) : the woman, ironically, is doing 
the ‘sharing’ on her own. The problem may be that the ideal of parental 
sharing is the most preferred model for women, while most men prefer 
both working full-time. When women then become mothers they never-
theless abandon their preferred ideal of sharing: they want to practice the 
junior model (Portegijs et al. 2002). Is it because they have experienced 
men’s absence of caring and stopped the fight for equal sharing, or be-
cause they really prefer to spend more time on caring? In any case, women 
are very adaptive to the policy that promotes the ideal of parental sharing. 
This may relate to the fact that they also have put forward this model, as 
the previous chapter shows. Men on the other hand seem less adaptive 
to this particular social policy, although some of them take up the moral 
messages and act upon this ideal. In short, the Dutch case shows that the 
caveat of the ideal of parental sharing is that ‘it takes two to share’.
 If children are not cared for by their parents, parents piece together a 
jigsaw of childcare. Least popular are host families, which are regulated 
childminders (4.4 percent; see table 8.4). More popular are childcare cen-
tres (21 percent). Highly educated parents prefer childcare centres as they 
value children having social contacts, but at the same time parents who 
use day care centres are the least content of all parents with their care 
solution (Portegijs et al. 2002, 2004). Most popular childcare are child-
minders (52 percent). This has really been a booming business. In 1987 
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only nine percent of young children of working parents were cared for by 
a private childminder (Knijn 2003, Portegijs et al. 2002).
 In contrast to most other countries, these childminders are neither reg-
istered nor controlled, they are indeed market players. Many (although not 
most) of the children are cared for in their own home between their own 
toys; the childminders are nannies, while Danish and Flemish childminders 
nearly always take their children to their own home, where they play with 
other children. In the Netherlands, parents prefer their child to be brought 
up according to their own wishes in the kids’ ‘natural environment’. Th is 
is indeed the ideal of the surrogate mother. Th e parents who choose such 
childcare prefer a woman who is a mother herself and who has the qualities 
that are traditionally ascribed to a mother: loving, familiar, and fully avail-
able. Th ey want the child to feel as if the parents were still at home, so the 
childminder is a good imitator of the care of the real mother.
 Parents also try to find a person that they believe can pass on the val-
ues they find important. This is in contrast to a professional in a day care 
centre, the parents say, as she listens to various parents (and also follows 
her professional standards), while a childminder will only listen to them. 
Parents therefore believe that they can have a strong say in the upbringing 
of their child (Nievers 2002).
 Clearly the most practiced childcare solution, the surrogate mother, is 
not explicitly promoted in Dutch social policy. More in line with the moral 
messages spread via social policy is the fact that grandparents are not sub-
stantially involved in caring. Th ey of course do care for their grandchildren, 
but not for extensive hours, as in Flanders, so that their daughters can 
work (Eurostat 1997; Remery et al. 2000). Intergenerational care is hardly a 
practiced ideal in the Netherlands. Remery et al. (2000) show that the pri-
macy of the family is not a shared belief: only 12 percent of the respondents 
said that they prefer care provided by the family. Moreover, very few highly 
Table 8.4 Use of types of childcare of all children in care, in percentage of the age 
category, 1999, the Netherlands
Childcare 
centre
Host 
family
Childminder 
elsewhere
Childminder 
at home
One or 
more
Age child 0-3 21 4.4 31 21 70
Child 0-12 single 
parent
 7.6 1.9 26 17 58
Double parent 0-12  7.3 2.8 21.7 17
Source: Knijn (2003), based on Portegijs et al. (2002)
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educated families have a caring contract with their parents, while they are 
generally the parents most in need of care for their children. Remery et al. 
(2000) speculate that parents of highly educated people may be too old 
and frail because in the Netherlands highly educated women have children 
when they are age 30 and over. Th ese grandparents also live further away. 
More recently, however, grandparents seem to be more involved in child-
care, but only for a day or so per week (Portegijs et al. 2004).
 The UK: Intergenerational Care and Moving Away From the 
Surrogate Mother
As in the Netherlands and Belgium, the full-time motherhood ideal in 
the uk is still practiced by nearly one-third of the couples with young 
children (table 8.2). The question here is: what ideal is practiced by the 
majority of women, the ones who have entered the labour force? Which 
ideal has replaced the ideal of full-time care is not clear though. Caring 
practice shows that intergenerational care is the most dominant practice, 
and more recently a shift has taken place from the ideal of the surrogate 
mother to professional care. This is perfectly in line with the transforma-
tion in caring policy described in chapter 7.
 Strikingly, parental sharing is hardly part of the practice and mindset 
of parents. British men do not have a good record on this issue: Brit-
ish fathers are the least likely to be involved in caring for young children 
(Eurostat 1997). They are likely to work many hours a week, much more 
than their continental peers (chapter 4). In addition, those men who do 
work part-time do not do so because of childcare. Only 17 percent of all 
men working part-time do so because they spend time taking care of their 
children (Matheson and Summersfield 2001).
 Since British parents could not depend on professional state-subsidised 
childcare, most of them bought care on the market, hiring childminders: 
surrogate mothers. Many of them are registered at the local authority, as 
parents only tend to trust these (Ford 1996). More recently, however, par-
ents have moved away from childminding as a solution for day care. Table 
8.5 shows that in the late 1990s nurseries were a much more common care 
practice than childminders. Although research is difficult to compare, in 
the mid-1990s the use of childminders were the most common care prac-
tice. At that time, childminders were responsible for a quarter of all chil-
dren while nurseries cared for about 14 percent of the very young children 
(Thomson 1995, personal correspondence 1998). More recent statistics 
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show that childminders only care for about 11 to 13 percent of young chil-
dren (see table 8.5). Other research shows the same picture: children be-
ing cared for by childminders decreased from 365,200 in 1997 to 304,600 
in 2001 (dfes 2001; chapter 6).
This decrease in the use of ‘surrogate mothers’ is probably related to the 
widespread dissatisfaction with childminders. All British parents have 
been very unsatisfied with their care arrangements, but this applies most 
to those using childminders. In the mid-1990s only four out of ten parents 
using childminders thought their childcare arrangements were ‘very con-
venient’ or ‘very satisfactory’ (Th omson 1995). Childminders have a very 
high turnover: parents change childminders more often than nurseries 
Most parents said that they would prefer nannies, who would come to the 
childrens’ homes, instead of childminders, and even more said they would 
prefer nurseries (Brannen and Moss 1991; Th omson 1995; Gardiner 1997).
 What also contributed to the decrease in the use of childminders is that 
parents in the uk – unlike other countries in this book – are continuously 
exposed to media coverage of unreliable and untrustworthy childmind-
ers. Accidents have occurred in the uk as well as in the us which caused 
the death of small children. Research on lone parents and childcare (Ford 
Table 8.5 Types of providers used for children aged 0-4 in England, 1999
Type of care 0-2 (%) 3-4 (%)
Childminder
Daily nanny
Live-in-nanny
Babysitter
11
 2
 1
13
13
 2
 1
15
Creche/nursery
Playgroup
Nursery/reception class
26
20
10
38
44
30
Family centre
Out-of-school club
 1
 4
*
 6
Ex-partner
Grandparent
Older sibling
Other relative or friends
 5
64
 2
37
 5
57
 3
36
Other  1  1
Base (unweighted) 1575 1071
Source: La Valle et al. (2000)
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1996) showed that half of the respondents specifically referred to distrust 
of potential resources of care as one reason why they would have difficulty 
using childcare. They no longer see childminders as ‘surrogate mothers’ 
that are trustworthy, familiar or resemble themselves, but as unreliable 
strangers. One mother said: 
It always worries me because you see these programmes on the telly 
about these childminders that battered kids and that put me oﬀ  it. Like 
these childminders that have sexually abused children they’ve been 
minding, that have been registered. No, I couldn’t have a registered 
childminder. No. (Ford 1996: 128). 
Parents seem to be in constant doubt about the quality of care; will the 
childminder really care well for their beloved child?
 This move away from surrogate mothers is also visible at the policy 
level. In this case, the British government seems to have listened to the 
parents and taken their worries seriously. Consequently, childcare policy 
is moving towards the direction of professional care, at least for older 
children (age three and up).
 Most British children are cared for by grandparents. Table 8.5 shows 
that grandparents are the most common source of caregiving for young 
children. As in Belgium, a mother often signs a social contract with her 
own mother, and this type of care is relatively cheap. Research by Wee-
lock and Jones (2002) also shows that parents as well as grandparents see 
intergenerational care as ‘the next best thing’ if mothers go out to work. 
Outsiders or strangers who work in formal childcare centres do not give 
love to the children, the parents argue, and there is nobody they trust 
more than their own parents.
 In general, British parents, in contrast to the other countries, still 
express their unhappiness with the childcare arrangements they have. 
Three-quarters of working parents said their current childcare arrange-
ments were not ideal and the figure for poorer households and lone par-
ents was even higher (La Valle et al. 2000). In an ideal world of affordable 
and accessible childcare, nearly one in five parents said they would prefer 
an informal carer, which is often a grandparent. The problem is, as Land 
(2001) and Weelock and Jones (2002) argue, that the ideal of intergenera-
tional care is not sufficiently supported by social policy. The Childcare 
Strategy even excludes informal care. These researchers therefore plea for 
recognition rather than a downgrading, demotivating, and discourage-
ment strategy of intergenerational care.
HOW WELFARE STATES WORK: IDEALS OF CARE IN PRACTICE

 Policy, Practice, Preference
This section showed that ideals promoted in welfare states are indeed 
linked to actual practices, although the correlation is stronger in Den-
mark, Belgium, and the uk than in the Netherlands. People are thus in-
deed guided by the normative messages of welfare states. Their action is 
inspired by notions of ‘what is the proper thing to do’ and the state is still 
one of the moral authorities to offer such scripts. This section also indi-
cates, in contrast to Hakim’s theory (2000, 2003), that people cannot or 
do not want to follow their own preferences. In the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and the uk, where the male breadwinner/full-time caregiver model is still 
practiced on a substantial scale (about one-third of families with young 
children), this is not the preferred practice: more mothers want to work. 
In a country like Denmark, parents prefer to share the provision of care 
and have more time to engage in caregiving duties. But the practice is 
the opposite: in none of the other three countries do mothers and fathers 
work as many hours. Danish people work much more than they want to.
 Individual preferences clearly cannot explain cross-national differ-
ences in work and care, but they are nevertheless important in another 
way. The British case shows that parental preferences can be important 
in explaining changes in social policy, albeit in a modest way. The recent 
Labour government moved away from the ideal of the surrogate mother, 
as parents no longer trusted this type of care. At the same time, the Brit-
ish case shows that preferences are not always implemented. Many British 
parents prefer that grandparents take care of their children, while state 
support for such type of care is lacking. Ideals of care are only enforced 
when they are advocated by a larger coalition of women’s organisations 
and powerful actors (chapter 7).
 Finally, of all policy ideals, parental sharing has been the most difficult 
to put into practice. Women are much more adaptive towards this ideal 
and want to work part time. This is not a strange conclusion, if one keeps 
in mind that women were also the ones who actively promoted this ideal 
(chapter 7). Men are less flexible though. As a result, the ideal of parental 
sharing in practice often transforms to the ‘junior model’.
 So far, we have discussed whether care ideals in policy affect care ide-
als in practice. Now we come to the last question, which is central to this 
book. What are the impact of ideals of care on women’s citizenship? The 
next section outlines a ‘light’ theory on the consequences of ideals of care, 
illustrating these impacts with examples from the four welfare states.
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 Ideals of Care and Citizenship
How do ideals of care influence women’s citizenship? This section dis-
cusses two hypotheses. The departing point of the first hypothesis is that 
social change is linked with the change of norms (March and Olsen 1989). 
This means that women’s route to employment is paved with a different 
set of care ideals. In other words, when women want to enter the labour 
market, a new ideal of care has to replace the old full-time mother care 
model. Of course, women have always worked, even when the dominant 
norm prescribed that they stay at home. Up to a rather low level of fe-
male employment, welfare societies can even stick to the ideal of full-time 
mother care. Women are also able to sort out their own work-and-care 
problems individually, and some women work even though they are un-
happy with their childcare arrangements.
 The crucial point though is that employment rates only pass a critical 
level if women believe their children are cared for well. The majority of 
women are likely to work only when a solution is found for childcare that 
fits their notions of satisfactory care. This means that a new, robust, ideal 
of care must have the potential to fit parents’ wishes. In Ragin’s (2000) 
terms, the replacement of the ideal of full-time mother care with a new 
ideal in both policy and practice is a necessary (but not sufficient) condi-
tion for a substantial number of working women. Up to a specific level 
of employment, women can do without official alternatives, but beyond 
a critical level state intervention is necessary and can then even act as a 
catalyst (Leira et al. 2005).
 This is illustrated by the British case. While the Conservative govern-
ment, especially under Major, wanted women to work in the 1990s, no 
new ideal was univocally and institutionally supported. In other words: 
not only did a practical void exist, since affordable childcare was hardly 
available, but there was also a moral void. Families had no alternative ideal 
of caregiving. The state did not promote any ideas on how to care for chil-
dren in a decade where women wanted and were supposed to work. If the 
Conservatives promoted an ideal – and they did so in a very manner – it 
was the surrogate mother. This however turned out to be a misfit: British 
parents increasingly distrusted this type of care. Although women have 
tried to find their own solutions, an entirely personal pick-and-mix strat-
egy does not seem to lead to substantial participation rates for all British 
women.
 This is different in the three other countries, where new ideals have 
been put forward. In the Netherlands, women’s participation rates in-
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creased substantially when the government proposed a new ideal of care 
in the mid-1990s – rather late, in fact. The ideal of parental sharing had 
the relatively strong support of people as it fits with notions of self-care, 
the nuclear family, and gender equality. In Denmark the ideal of full-time 
mother care was quickly replaced from the 1970s onwards by the ideal of 
professional care, while in Belgium the government actively supported 
ideals such as intergenerational care and the surrogate mother, which also 
fit or had the potential to change preferences and practices.
 In other words, women’s employment increases when an alternative 
ideal of childcare is embedded in policy that fits or has the potential to 
fit with parents’ ideals. The development of alternative care ideals is a 
condition for employment changes. A parallel can be drawn with Kuhn’s 
(2003, or. 1962) description of paradigm shifts: a new paradigm can help 
to dismantle the old. This logic also predicts that, for instance, as soon as 
an alternative ideal of care is publicly supported in the uk, i.e. through 
laws or financial structures that fit people’s notions about good enough 
childcare, mothers’ employment rates will increase more rapidly. People 
simply cannot change behaviour radically without some change of ideal. 
Thus, without a moral and practical solution for how children are cared 
for, mothers will hesitate to enter the labour market.
 So far the relation between the bare existence of ideals of care and 
employment rates. A second question is how can the changes and dif-
ferences in gendered employment, care, and income patterns in the four 
countries be explained? The second set of hypotheses is that the different 
alternative ideals of care – parental sharing, surrogate mothers, inter-
generational care, and professional care – go hand in hand with specific 
citizenship practices, just as was the case of full-time mothering. Ideals 
of care relate to specific gendered patterns of paid employment, care, and 
income.
 Table 8.6 presents the hypothetical relationship between ideals of care 
and ideals of citizenship, showing how ideals of care can reinforce as well 
as improve the hierarchy within gender relations. To make it even more 
complicated: some ideals are profitable for ‘certain dimensions of citizen-
ship’ for ‘some categories of women’, as noted by Hakim (2000), while oth-
er dimensions or categories of women loose. The indicators for citizen-
ship used here are the same as in the earlier chapters: (a) labour market 
participation, (b) participation in caregiving, (c) income and economic 
dependency relations, and the overall questions: (d) to what extent do 
ideals of citizenship change the hierarchical relations between men and 
women, and (e) how do ideals of citizenship gender or degender caregiv-
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ing. The table also shows that welfare states are more than Janus-faced, 
they have many ambivalent features. In the following pages I will discuss 
the impacts that each of the ideals of care have on citizenship.
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Full-time Mother Care
As has been well-documented, the consequences of the ideal of full-time 
motherhood is that it reinforces women’s second-class citizenship. The 
ideal is built upon the notion that a mother needs to care full time for her 
children. No time is left for working outside the home and paid employ-
ment is considered harmful for those in need of care. This leaves women 
financially dependent on men. Men on the other hand have little poten-
tial to be involved in caregiving. While women are locked in the private 
sphere, men are locked out. Thus this ideal reinforces caring as a feminine 
phenomenon and is extensively based on partner dependencies. House-
hold dependencies are common. Since this has been well documented and 
the ideal is slowly fading away, the consequences of the other ideals are 
more interesting to investigate. By and large the other four ideals of caring 
have developed as alternatives to the ideal of full-time motherhood.
 The ideal of the surrogate mother as well as that of intergenerational 
care, which will be discussed first, come closest to the ideal of full-time 
motherhood: they do not contest caring as a gendered phenomenon, yet 
both models give opportunities to certain categories of women.
Surrogate Mothers
The ideal of the surrogate mother, in practice often a childminder, allows 
other women – often highly educated – to take up paid employment and 
become financially independent. The ideal is thus based on hierarchal 
class dependencies between women. Gregson and Lowe (1994) describe 
the phenomenon of the surrogate mother as ‘servicing the middle classes’, 
and O’Connor et al. (1999: 35) speak about better-off women ‘off-loading’ 
care work onto other women of less-advantaged social status (for example 
immigrants and poor women).
 In all countries this book focuses on, highly educated women are in-
deed more likely to use formal childcare, thus also childminding. In the 
uk childminders are less educated and wages are extremely low, between 1 
and 3.5 pounds per hour per child in the late 1990s (Day Care Trust 1998). 
Dutch and Flemish research nevertheless shows that within these regimes 
class differences are less pronounced. In Flanders, the surrogate mothers 
are not women with little or no education; many have an average level of 
education. Some are even trained as caregivers, often in the health care 
sector (Werkgroep Vlaamse Diensten voor Opvanggezinnen 1992). Inter-
estingly, these surrogate mothers are particularly sought after by lower 
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middle-class parents. Highly educated as well as much less educated 
women prefer childcare centres (family day care) (Vanpée et al. 2000). In 
that sense, lower middle-class women are ‘servicing’ other women of the 
same social strata. Moreover, the money that onthaalmoeders receive is 
not negligible, as for a long time they did not have to pay tax and premi-
ums. When they care for four children, income is quite substantial and 
excedes the rate of pay earned by professional childcare workers. Most 
of them enjoy the freedom of being self-employed and see themselves 
as entrepreneurs (Werkgroep Vlaamse Diensten voor Opvanggezinnen 
1992).
 A study by Nievers (2002) also shows that Dutch surrogate mothers 
are less dependent on the family they work for than the family is on them. 
Due to scarcity of childminders and the intense relationship between 
the caregiver and the parents’ child, parents are very dependent on the 
childminder. In fact, the Dutch (unregulated) childminders are not really 
‘mothers’ but ‘grandmothers’. These older women are literally ‘grey ladies’, 
especially because they are not poor – their husbands often earn a decent 
living. In fact, the childminder’s family can even be more well-off than the 
family she works for. As in Flanders, a class divide in caring should not be 
exaggerated. Because of the inverse dependency relation, Niever’s study is 
aptly entitled ‘We Have to Cherish Her’.
 However, what is at stake in both countries is women’s citizenship. 
Although this has recently changed in Flanders, surrogate mothers were 
completely dependent on their partner for security. Day care mothers did 
not pay any social security premiums. Since they were not considered to 
be professionals but to be mothers who have expanded their caregiving 
activities, they had no social rights. The ideal of the surrogate mother as-
sumes that these ‘mothers’ are dependent on their husbands.
 The practice of the ideal of the surrogate mother has thus important 
consequences for the citizenship potential of certain categories of women. 
In addition, as with the ideal of full-time mothering, the consequences of 
its moral undertones are strong. The ideal of the surrogate mother per-
petuates the notion that caregiving is a feminine phenomenon and is best 
performed in the home, preferably by someone who resembles the moth-
er. Professionalisation of care is no issue here. The underlying assumption 
is that care is still best performed by the mother: other types of care are 
always surrogate. This legitimises a low citizenship status for carers and 
legitimises the moral notion that for children, the mother should be at 
home if possible. Surrogate mothers are nearly as good as real mothers, 
but the idea of childminders being second-best constantly puts a moral 
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pressure, the pressure of guilt, on working mothers. In other words, the 
ideal of the surrogate mother reinforces the norm that the appropriate 
behaviour for mothers is still to be at home.
 This helps to explain one of the main puzzles raised in this book. Why 
don’t Belgian mothers participate more in the labour market, given that 
their welfare state so closely resembles the Danish state? The level of 
childcare is also equal to the Swedish, yet Belgian mothers have lower 
rates of employment. The ‘light theory’ of ideals of care thus argues that 
this relates to the type of childcare being offered – the fact that Flemish 
policy has promoted the ideal of the surrogate mother for a long time. 
This ideal projects the moral message that mothers still care best for their 
children. This has contributed to an incremental increase of mothers’ em-
ployment. As soon as institutional barriers for part-time work were lifted 
in Belgium, mothers reduced their working hours. Full-time work is less 
of an option for working women if in the end mothers are perceived to be 
the take the best care of their children. This is emphasised by the ideal of 
intergenerational care, which is also strong in Belgium.
Intergenerational Care
Like the ideal of the surrogate mother, the ideal of intergenerational care 
also does not degender caring. This ideal maintains that care is best per-
formed in the home, by someone who resembles the mother most, and 
that is her mother. Daughters or daughters-in-law on the other hand, are 
thought to be the best caregivers when parents grow old. This ideal per-
petuates notions of care and gendered citizenship: children and the elder-
ly are best cared for at home by a woman, preferably by a family member 
whose care stems from feelings of benevolent love. An important differ-
ence from the ideal of the surrogate mother is that this ideal does not 
directly reinforce class differentials but generational differences between 
women (although it does so indirectly). The generation of ‘daughters’ is 
much more able to participate in the labour market and be economically 
independent than the generation of ‘mothers’ and ‘grandmothers’, but less 
likely to be able to participate in caregiving. This may also lead to strong 
dependencies within the extended family.
 These generational differences are somewhat visible in the employ-
ment statistics of older women in the four countries. In 2000, just 15 
percent of Belgian women aged 55-65 were employed, in the Netherlands 
26 percent, in Denmark 46 percent and in the uk 41 percent (Eurostat 
2001b). Of course, older women’s employment rates relate to many fac-
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tors, such as their past careers or pension policy. British rates, in contrast 
to the other countries, do not fit the intergenerational practice. Older 
British women are involved in childcare but they nevertheless work. At 
the same time there is some evidence that grandmothers in the uk are 
more eager to stop working or work less because they want to care for 
their grandchildren, not only because they want to support their daugh-
ters in their labour market earnings but also because they very much 
enjoy providing care. They see it as a reward in and of itself or feel that 
it is a second chance at parenting that will keep them ‘young at heart and 
fit in mind and body’; it is a form of a ‘social career’ (Weelock and Jones 
2002).
 The ideal of intergenerational care does have some indirect class ef-
fects. In most countries, the provision of regular informal care by rela-
tives, particularly grandparents, increases with decreasing social class 
(La Valle et al. 2000; Vanpée et al. 2000; Remery et al. 2000 ). Flemish 
research, for instance, shows that particularly less-educated parents and 
parents with less money are happy with care provided by grandmothers. 
Highly educated parents instead are more hesitant: they fear the problem 
of spoiling , a problem that grandparents readily admit that they contrib-
ute to. Grandmothers living in rural areas are more involved in caregiv-
ing than those living in the big cities (Hedebouw and Sannen 2002). The 
regional factor is again important in understanding differences between 
women (Vanpée et al. 2000), and categories of class still matter.
 Lone working mothers are also strongly dependent on informal sourc-
es of childcare, particularly on grandparents in many of the countries, but 
especially in the uk and the Netherlands (e.g., Ford 1996; Storms 1995; 
Knijn and van Wel 1999). This is certainly another consequence of eco-
nomic concerns as it is the cheapest solution available, but as Ford (1996) 
argues, it is also their wish, not in the least because the grandmother can 
substitute the role of the absent father. One lone mother quoted by Ford 
says of her mother: ‘I do involve her a lot, because his dad’s not involved’ 
(1996: 122). The other side of the coin, according to the same study, is that 
informal arrangements require a great deal of attention and create the 
feeling that another person is doing you a favour, while at the same time 
lone parents need the stability and continuous care of a trustworthy per-
son such as a family member.
 Intergenerational care has consequences for women’s work because on 
the one hand it allows daughters to work but at the same time does not 
degender caregiving. As grandfathers and fathers are hardly involved, it 
reinforces the motherhood norm. In that sense it does not ﬁ t well with 
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a high level of full-time female employment. But there are other reasons 
why intergenerational care does not facilitate full-time work for women. 
As Brannen and Moss (1991) explain, women who depend on informal care 
become considerably indebted to relatives who look after their children. 
Full-time workers do not have time to ‘pay back’ informal caregivers.
Professional Care
The next two ideals, professional care and parental sharing, could be con-
sidered to be from a different planet than the ideals discussed above. They 
contest the notion that caring is best performed by ‘mothers’. These two 
ideals do challenge the notion that childcare by ‘other people’ is a neces-
sary evil. Professional care or parental sharing are positive alternatives to 
full-time mother care and are considered to improve the upbringing of 
children.
 The ideal of professional care means that all women, both as moth-
ers and as professionals, can achieve the possibility of working and being 
relatively economically independent. Professional care corresponds with 
universalism. In theory, the notion of professional care has the potential 
to degender caring, as professionals can also be men. In practice they 
hardly ever are. Few men are involved as professional childcarers, even in 
Denmark (oecd 2001).
 Professional care means that care is valued, as it is paid for, but it may 
also result in citizens having less time to care for their loved ones. Profes-
sional care as an ideal implies that care performed by a professional – a 
pedagogue, a nurse, a home carer, or a teacher – is just as good or even 
better than care for the elderly or children provided at home by a mother 
or daughter. This significantly changes the traditional logic of what is ap-
propriate, legitimising women’s entry into the labour market, as it may 
even be viewed as better for the children when professionals rather than 
family members are primarily responsible. In fact, it is the only ideal in 
which women receive moral support to work full-time. The ideal of pro-
fessional care significantly reduces the guilt felt by employed parents.
 Finally, professional care reduces intergenerational family dependen-
cies as well as partner dependencies. Women can work full time and can 
earn a professional-level salary. This gives a large group of women the 
possibility to develop themselves professionally and receive concomitant 
wages and recognition as workers. It also enhances the financial position 
of these female workers, although care work always pays less than other 
types of jobs.
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 Denmark is the icon of the ideal of professional care: this ideal is strong-
ly embedded in both policy and practice. Th e ideal of professional care in 
Denmark and the relative lack of it in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the 
uk may explain why this is the only country in which mothers not only 
have high employment rates but also have moved, and are still moving, 
towards full-time work. Even though many parents say they want to spend 
more time with their children, there is in fact little need for it, as childcare 
is as professional as they want it. Th e underlying idea is that during the 
day a child is better-oﬀ  at a care centre than at home, because this helps 
the child to become a real social being, a social citizen. Th is light theory 
of professional care implies that as soon as other welfare states promote a 
professionalisation strategy for young children, mothers’ employment will 
increase, but only if the content of the care ﬁ ts the wishes of parents.
 Two places are therefore particularly interesting at the moment and 
should be monitored. In Flanders, the quasi-state organisation Kind en 
Gezin and the Flemish government are investing in professionalisation, as 
described in this and previous chapters. If this strategy proves successful, 
in a decade or so there is a big chance that mothers will work more and 
move again towards full-time work. In the uk, the ideal of professional 
care is now being stressed for children over age three. Th e key theme is 
education, which is rather diﬀ erent from the Danish social pedagogical 
goals. Such an ideal of care may legitimate mothers of children over three 
to enter the labour market. At the same time, it may imply a barrier for 
mothers with younger children, as it may stress that professional childcare 
is only good for older children. Th ese two cases oﬀ er good test cases of this 
light theory. Future research may show whether they support this theory.
Parental Sharing
The ideal of parental sharing also strongly contests the ideal of full-time 
motherhood. It assumes that children are better cared for when both par-
ents are involved. Sharing the parenting duties means that fathers are in-
volved in caring and are also valued for their (specific) input in raising the 
child. Since fathers then have to reduce their labour market participation, 
they become more economically dependent on their partner. At the same 
time, women are more likely to participate in the labour market and be-
come less economically dependent on their male partner. All in all, paren-
tal sharing is based on partner dependencies, but in contrast to the male 
breadwinner model it departs from interdependency between partners 
simultaneously on all levels: work, care, and income.
HOW WELFARE STATES WORK: IDEALS OF CARE IN PRACTICE

 The Netherlands is certainly the test case for such a hypothesis. What 
are the practical consequences of such an ideal? It is indeed no coinci-
dence that so few Dutch mothers work full time. Parental sharing stresses 
that children need to be cared for in a home environment and spend more 
time with their parents. The problem is that fathers are less adaptive to 
the model. The ideal of parental sharing often turns out to be the junior 
model in reality, although Dutch parental leave for public employees has 
been very successful in attracting fathers because this leave is well paid. 
The caveat of the ideal is that women’s citizenship is entirely dependent 
on the hope that men will do more in the home. But if he doesn’t want to 
participate in caregiving, or the household income does not allow him to, 
what happens to a woman’s aspirations? Perhaps the woman will not be 
able to work as much as she would like to.
 The ideal of parental sharing can also result in two distinctions be-
tween women. The first is between highly and less-educated women. 
Highly educated women are more likely to partner with a man who works 
part time, or are more able to persuade their partners to work full time. 
Highly educated parents practice the ideal of parental sharing more often; 
nearly 17 percent of highly educated couples with children share childcare 
duties, while as many as half of them prefer this model (Knijn and van Wel 
2001a; Portegijs et al. 2002).
  Second, lone mothers have less to gain with the ideal of parental shar-
ing than married women. Lone mothers have no one with whom to share 
caring duties. In the Netherlands, the combination scenario lies at the 
heart of emancipation policy. It assumes a certain level of childcare ser-
vices (though not too high), a 32-hour job, the financial sharing of child-
care costs, and economic interdependency between partners. While these 
assumptions may be inadequate for married mothers, they certainly are 
for lone mothers. Lone mothers in fact may be supported more by another 
ideal of care, that of professional care. It is no coincidence that employ-
ment rates as well as poverty rates for example for Danish lone mothers, 
where professional childcare is more widely available, are better than the 
Dutch (chapter 4).
Care Ideals and Citizenship
This light theory of ideals of care and its consequences for gendered citi-
zenship can be summarised as follows: parental sharing and professional 
care share the ideal that women should enter the labour market. Paid em-
ployment is regarded as positive and care has the potential to be degen-
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dered, i.e., men are also considered to be good caregivers as either sons, 
fathers, or professionals. This opens up a space to challenge the logic of 
appropriateness and legitimises different types of behaviour. While paren-
tal sharing assumes partner interdependencies and strongly correlates to 
part-time work, the notion of professional care goes along with full-time 
employment. In other words, parental sharing cannot be combined, prac-
tically or morally, with full-time labour for both men and women while 
professional care cannot be combined with much time to care.
 In the other two models, surrogate mothers and intergenerational 
care, mothers remain at the heart of care. This does change the logic of 
appropriateness somewhat, but not the gendered notion of caring. In 
the end, it may even reinforce rather than contest the ideal of full-time 
motherhood since it implicitly reproduces gendered notions of care. This 
has huge consequences for gendered citizenship. The women who work 
as caregivers are often fully dependent on their husbands. In the case of 
grandmothers they are dependent on their husbands for income, while for 
surrogate mothers they are dependent for social security. While the ideal 
of the surrogate mother may produce class differences between women, 
especially in liberal regimes, generational differences are produced by the 
ideal of intergenerational care.
 Conclusion: The Moral Impact of Welfare States
This chapter shows that welfare states are more than a set of financial 
structures that limit and provide people’s choices, as comparative wel-
fare state theories assume. Seemingly neutral procedures and structures 
embody particular values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs. Social 
policy – through regulations, financial measures, and the content of pro-
visions – influences the normative structures that provide people with 
choices and also limit those choices.
 Considering ideals of care contributes towards an understanding of the 
changes in as well as the cultural consequences of welfare states. When 
women have babies they do not reach for a calculator to decide whether 
they will work or not: they ask themselves, what would be the most ap-
propriate way to care for my child when I am away? If this type of care is in 
place, women are more likely to work. Ideals of care provide the answer to 
the moral predicament of work and care. Women do not or cannot follow 
their individual care preferences. Women, more than men, are adaptive 
to the different ideals promoted in welfare states. In other words, there 
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is a close link between the ideals of care promoted in social policy, as de-
scribed in the previous chapter, and real practice.
 Finally, specific ideals of care produce differences in women’s citizen-
ship across countries. The dominance of the ideal of professional care 
in Denmark, for instance, has been a crucial vehicle for mothers’ full-
time employment. It has been a very effective ideal for reducing guilt: why 
would women stay at home when their children are better-off together 
with other children, guided by professionals? The dominance of the ideal 
of intergenerational care and in particular the surrogate mother in Flemish 
social policy helps to explain why mothers there do not continue to work 
full time. The type of care promoted by the state has helped women enter 
the labour market but at the same time sends the message that the most 
appropriate care for children is that provided by a child’s own mother. No 
wonder that Belgian mothers’ employment levels do not match those of 
Danish mothers and that part-time work has become more popular, even 
though childcare is fully available and affordable. Welfare states are thus 
still a source of moral authority.
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9 Conclusion: Care and the Cultural Dimension of 
 Welfare States
For women, welfare states matter. But they matter in a different way than 
is often assumed. Welfare state scholars often presume that diversity in 
women’s employment across Europe is based on financial (dis)incentive 
structures embedded in welfare states. In other words: if childcare is avail-
able and affordable, most mothers will work. If tax and benefit schemes 
have no financial employment obstructions, women will work. Welfare 
states are captured as structures of financial incentives and disincentives 
(e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; 2002; Lewis 1992a, 1997b; Sainsbury 
1996, 1999; O’Connor et al. 1999; Daly and Rake 2003). Policymakers at 
European as well as national levels also argue along those lines. It is no 
coincidence that ‘financial incentives’ have been the keywords in Euro-
pean welfare state restructuring. The crucial task has been minimising 
(financial) traps so that people are encouraged to work.
 This book shows that such an approach cannot sufficiently explain the 
gendered division of labour and care and the most recent changes in the 
four countries of this study: Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the 
uk. Instead, welfare state analysis would improve by making use of the 
concepts of culture and care. Both concepts come together to form the 
explanatory notion of ‘ideals of care’.
 Puzzles
This book shows that there is no simple correlation between the design 
of welfare states and women’s employment. Take the British case. Brit-
ish mothers have the lowest employment rates of all four countries. In 
2003, only 52 percent of mothers (of children aged 0-3) worked compared 
to the Netherlands (70 percent), Belgium (63 percent) and Denmark (72 
percent) (Eurostat 2005; chapter 4). At the same time, given the finan-
cial structures of the welfare state more British mothers are expected to 
work. The British tax regime has a long history of being favourable to-

wards working women. In addition, benefits are comparatively low: both 
the insurance scheme and social assistance produce the highest poverty 
rates of all countries (chapter 5). British mothers are thus financially en-
couraged to work. Still, mothers have not taken up paid employment to 
the same extent as in the other countries. Indeed, the availability and cost 
of childcare are also important factors in terms of whether mothers will 
work, and childcare in the uk is particularly expensive (chapter 6). Even 
taking this into account, British mothers would be financially better-off 
working, yet they do not enter the labour market en masse.
 A similar story holds when comparing Dutch and British lone mothers. 
Many of them receive social assistance. After a cost-and-benefit analysis 
they would still be financially better-off working, but employment rates in 
both countries are similarly low. In 1999, only 38 percent of lone mothers 
(with children 0-6) worked in the Netherlands and 34 percent in the uk 
(oecd 2001; chapter 4). So why don’t they work more?
 Take also the comparison between the other two countries of this 
study, the Danish and Belgian welfare states. Danish mothers’ employ-
ment rates have always been higher than the Belgian – not only today but 
also in the early 1990s, when 61 percent of Belgian mothers and 70 percent 
of Danish mothers with a child under age three worked (chapter 4). In 
both countries mothers have always been more likely to work full time. 
More recently, however, Belgian mothers increasingly work part time, 
while Danish mothers increasingly work full time. Welfare state analysts 
point out that the Belgian welfare state is of the conservative or Christian-
democratic brand: it discourages mothers from working (Esping-Ander-
sen 1990, 1999; Gornick et al. 1997; Sainsbury 1999a; Cantillon et al. 1999). 
If we look more closely, the way welfare states care is more similar than 
expected.
 Let us consider whether caring is financially compensated. Not only 
in Belgium but surprisingly in Denmark too, a system of fiscal care theo-
retically supports caregivers to stay at home. They both include a ‘single 
breadwinner bonus’ (chapter 5). The benefit system also shows similari-
ties – at least until the mid-1990s. At that time in Denmark the onus was 
on the duty (and right) to work. Before that, Danish mothers could use 
unemployment benefits to stay at home if they wanted to do so. Access 
to unemployment insurance was good and control negligible, but moth-
ers did not use benefits to stay at home (at least not on a large scale). In 
Belgium, where women also had high access to unemployment benefit, 
this was used as a ‘wage for bringing up children’. When in 1991 this pos-
sibility was reduced and financial compensation was cut, women did not 
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go out to work, they withdrew from the labour market (De Lathouwer et 
al. 2003). Moreover, both Danish and Belgian parents have the possibility 
of paid parental leave, although it is true that until recently Belgian leave 
could be longer, while in Denmark more rights were attached to leave and 
it was better paid (chapter 5). Still, these rights to care cannot explain the 
substantial differences between both countries.
 Childcare services may then be more important for explaining wom-
en’s employment levels, but in both countries childcare is well available 
and affordable. In Denmark, as the regime typologies predict, 56 percent 
of children under age three used state-subsidised childcare in 1999. This 
is 41 percent of young children. Flemish childcare services – unlike what 
is expected in such a regime – reached Scandinavian levels and are simi-
lar to Swedish rates. Both countries are in the top rank of the ‘childcare 
league’ (Bradshaw and Finch 2002; chapter 6).
 Comparative welfare regime theories can thus not fully explain why 
employment rates for Belgian mothers are lower than the Danish. It can-
not explain recent changes either: why do Belgian mothers increasingly 
work part-time (chapter 4)? Given such a high level of childcare, it is sur-
prising that there are not more Belgian mothers working, and working 
more hours. Comparative welfare regime theories also cannot explain why 
Dutch mothers work more than Belgian mothers nowadays, while histori-
cally Dutch women hardly worked (Pott-Buter 1996; Plantenga 1996).
 The Welfare State as a Cultural Catalyst
Welfare state analysis has difficulties explaining these cross-national dif-
ferences. This is not just empirical ‘noise’, as the countries studied are rep-
resentative of the dominant explanatory welfare regime models (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 1999, 2002; Lewis 1992a). One of the reasons why such 
welfare analysis falls short is because it is based on inadequate assump-
tions about the way mothers decide how much to work or to provide care. 
The comparative welfare regime approach is often implicitly and some-
times unintentionally based on an image of homo economicus, for want 
of something better. Micro-level studies (Hochschild 1989, 2003; Dun-
can and Edwards 1999; Duncan et al. 2004; Finch and Mason 1993; Knijn 
and van Wel 1999) show that mothers’ actions are not primarily based 
on economic cost-and-benefit analyses. They do not base their decision-
making exclusively on the financial costs of childcare nor on the finan-
cial (dis)incentives embedded in tax and benefit policy. In other words, a 
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mother is not primarily the homo economicus welfare state scholars tend 
to presume. ‘To work or to care’ is above all a moral predicament.
 As care responsibilities are gendered, women in particular are con-
cerned about what happens to care when they take up paid employment. 
Hence for women’s decisions about work, care is crucial. This means that 
women are more likely to engage in paid employment when they find a 
solution for care, but this solution should fit their notions of what good 
care is (see also Lewis 2003). European mothers only take up a job when 
they are satisfied with the solution for childcare. Good quality childcare 
– which suits their view of what constitutes satisfactory care – is a neces-
sary condition for going to work.
 A more suitable approach towards understanding women’s decisions is 
therefore to study what March and Olsen (1989) call ‘the logic of appropri-
ateness’. Women’s (and men’s) human actions are based on what they think 
is most appropriate in a given context. This is also a very different point 
of departure of human behaviour than the ‘preference person’. According 
to Hakim (2000, 2003a), women’s preferences can only explain diversity 
and change in Europe. Danish women work more because they want to 
work, British women work less because they want to care. Hakim argues 
that individuals pursue their own life goals and that this leads to diversity 
within Europe. Indeed, micro-level studies show that women make active 
decisions about work and care and that these decisions are rational. They 
are also relational however and people take into account moral consider-
ations. The homo complex or homo morales which is adaptive to notions 
of appropriateness comes closer to the care reality than the image of hu-
man behaviour that only refers to preferences or financial motives.
 Welfare state studies would thus gain if their focus did not lie exclu-
sively on the structure of financial (dis)incentives, but on how welfare 
states influence the logic of appropriateness. Financial schemes are then 
studied as an indication of what is appropriate, while intentions behind 
policies, symbols, laws, and implementation practices are also taken into 
account. A welfare state is a moral agent, as Wolfe (1989) rightly suggests. 
Even the most liberal welfare state – in this book the uk – is not neutral. 
Welfare states send culturally defined moral messages. A state is not only 
a lawyer drawing up contracts between citizens and between citizens and 
the state, or a merchant connecting supply and demand, but also a priest 
trying to give people an interpretation of the world and of the most ap-
propriate behaviour in a specific context. Of course, not everybody listens 
to the state, as not everybody listens to a priest. In democratic systems, 
citizens themselves also influence which images states can promote. Its 
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symbols and scripts are nevertheless important in people’s daily lives. In 
Western European societies the state is still a crucial moral institution 
(see also Rothstein 1998).
 This means that we have to bring sociology, and more specifically cul-
tural theories, back into the study of welfare states. However, the problem 
is that cultural theories – those put forward by Hakim (1998, 2000, 2003) 
as well as by Pfau-Effinger (1998, 1999) – tend to downplay the role of the 
welfare state in their theoretical frameworks, and locate culture primarily 
as a power that radiates from below. But the welfare state is not something 
that is the opposite of or separate from culture. Culture is located within 
rather than outside the welfare state (see also van Oorschot 2003; Clarke 
2004).
 Ideals of Care
This book presents a cultural analysis of welfare states. In the case of car-
ing and paid employment, welfare states send culturally-defined moral 
images of satisfactory care in the form of ideals of care. An ideal of care 
implies a definition of what is good care and who gives it. These ideals 
of care are embedded in welfare states and their regulations, laws, and 
implementation processes. Each welfare state promotes specific ideals of 
care, which change over time.
 Reading the childcare policies and care practices in the four countries, 
five ideals can be traced. As in a cultural analysis (Pfau-Effinger 1998), 
these ideals compete with each other, but in one country only one or two 
are dominant. The first ideal is that of full-time motherhood, which was in 
place after the Second World War in most West European welfare states. 
This ideal is no longer hegemonic (Lewis 1997a). When women entered 
the labour market, new ideals arose or old ones were revived.
 The second ideal is that of the surrogate mother. According to this 
model, good care is still best provided by a mother, even if it is not the 
mother of the children. Care is provided by a childminder, babysitter, or 
family member and because it is offered in the caregiver’s home, it most 
closely resembles home-based care. Surrogate mothers are considered to 
have the same kind of qualities that mothers have – motherly warmth, at-
tention, and patience – but they remain substitutes.
 The third ideal is parental sharing. This model is based on the assump-
tion that men are able to care for children just as well as women. Advo-
cates for this model sometimes go so far as to argue that an increase in fa-
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thers’ care would be better for children. Another line of reasoning is that 
it would be more just for women, who now also work outside the home, if 
men took up some of their responsibilities. This increases gender equal-
ity. Parental sharing is rooted in two ideas: that both the care provided 
at home and paid employment should be shared, and thus both partners 
work on a part-time basis. The ideal of parental sharing is subversive be-
cause it degenders caregiving.
 The ideal of intergenerational care is based on the notion that the first 
generation (grandmothers) cares for the third generation (children). In 
return, the second generation (the daughters who are now mothers) will 
care for the grandparents when they age. This is not just a calculated sys-
tem of family exchange. It also guarantees good childcare in the eyes of 
the parents, because who could care better than the mother’s mother? 
She is not only experienced and can be trusted more than anyone else, she 
will also love the children the most. The ideal of intergenerational care is 
not gendered in theory, but still is in practice. Grandmothers, daughters, 
daughters-in-law, and granddaughters are the ones most likely to provide 
care.
 The ideal of professional care strongly contests the ideal of full-time 
motherhood because it maintains that professionals provide a different 
type of care than that provided by mothers, but offer something extra 
that should still be a part of every child’s upbringing. Professional care 
is sometimes considered to be even better than parental care, as it offers 
professional guidance to children and socialises them. In the model of 
professional care, the education of professionals guarantees quality. Pro-
fessional care often takes place in childcare centres or is part of the edu-
cational system, and its purpose is defined in various ways: to improve 
children’s welfare, enhance their development, socialise them, or prepare 
them for school or for the labour market. Crucial to the ideal of profes-
sional care is the fact that caregivers are educated and are accountable in 
a professional way.
 Care ideals are a detailed instrument to capture an often too broadly 
and vaguely defined notion of culture and gender culture. Culture is most 
poorly described with a few nouns like traditions, values, beliefs, norms, 
and practices. At best, culture is defined as shared values legitimating 
different patterns of social practices (Freeman and Rustin 1999; Inglis 
2004). Gender culture is not a very useful concept either, at least when 
it only refers to the dilemma of whether women want to work or want to 
care, as it usually does. Surveys often ask people to respond to statements 
like ‘being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay’ or ‘a work-
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ing mother can have an equally intimate relation with her children as a 
mother who does not work’ (Halman 1999/2000; Kalmijn 2003). This is 
also how Pfau-Effinger (1998) tries to capture gender culture. The answers 
to such surveys however, do not correspond with employment practices 
(Hakim 2003b).
 This book argues that what provides the most insight into women’s 
and men’s changing employment and care patterns is not an analysis of 
whether or not women want to work, but of what is considered to be the 
most appropriate form of childcare when mothers are at work. Studying 
ideals of care can provide more detailed information than more general 
notions of ‘gender culture’. One can throw further using a small stone.
 Care Ideals and Citizenship
How do ideals of care affect gendered citizenship? The ‘light theory’ of 
care ideals helps to explain the cross-national differences and changes 
in women’s and men’s gendered division of work, care, and income in 
three ways. First, this study shows that without state support of an al-
ternative ideal for full-time motherhood, women’s employment would be 
hampered. Up until a certain level of employment, women – sometimes 
together with men – will be able to make their own arrangements. To put 
it differently, state investments in childcare are important but they are 
not a necessary condition towards increasing mothers’ employment. If 
employment rates ‘need’ to go beyond a specific level, such as the Lisbon 
target of 60 percent of women in employment by 2010, state intervention 
becomes decisive in meeting that goal. Such logic is not only visible in the 
four countries of this study but also in Spain, Norway, and Italy, as Leira 
et al. (2005) show.
 This study shows that welfare state support is not only a necessary con-
dition in practical terms but is also needed to fill a moral void. Only when 
a new care ideal has been put in place will full-time motherhood become 
outdated and mothers will enter the labour market. After the full-time 
motherhood norm, an alternative ideal of care supported by welfare poli-
cies is an important pre-condition for mothers’ employment on a large 
scale. A parallel can be drawn with Kuhn’s (2003, or 1962) description of 
paradigm shifts: a new paradigm helps dismantle the previous.
 The British case illustrates what happens when a welfare state does 
not promote an alternative care ideal, and there is no new ‘logic of appro-
priateness’. While British women – more than in Belgium and the Neth-
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erlands – have always been financially encouraged to work (see the work 
incentives in taxation), they have not entered the labour market en masse. 
The problem is that for a long time, during the 18 years of Conservative 
dominance, no appropriate alternative for care was presented. Support 
for care policy was off the agenda. If the Conservatives had any ideal of 
care it was that of surrogate motherhood in the form of childminders, but 
they promoted childminders as a solution for care while parents increas-
ingly distrusted them. The promoted ideal of care has to fit the image that 
citizens, or more precisely that parents have of ‘appropriate care’. Other-
wise the ideal will be very short-lived, like that of the British childminders 
(chapters 7, 8). It is thus an important insight into the cultural approach 
towards welfare states that the norms of parents matter a great deal, as 
policy has to fit parent’s preferences (Pfau-Effinger 1998, 1999; Hakim 
2000, 2003).
 The story of the uk is much different than those of the other three 
countries. In Denmark the ideal of professional care reflected a kind of 
care that parents felt was appropriate and was promoted by social policies 
for several decades, while in Flanders the ideal of the surrogate moth-
er and intergenerational care have been the most dominant alternatives 
since the 1980s, although the first is also undergoing change. In the Neth-
erlands, since the 1990s parental sharing has been the governmental ideal, 
supported by many parents. Unlike the British case, in the past decades an 
appropriate ideal of care was established in the Netherlands, one that fit 
with parents’ wishes.
 Secondly, some ideals of care perpetuate gendered notions of care 
while other ideals are more subversive. In other words, the ideal of the 
surrogate mother and intergenerational care perpetuate the gendering of 
care. The more gendered the caring, the more difficult it is for mothers 
to justify taking on paid employment. Surrogate mothers, often but not 
always childminders, are considered to have the same kind of qualities 
mothers have – motherly warmth, attention, patience – but they remain 
substitutes. This means that it remains preferable for children to receive 
motherly warmth and attention provided by their real mother. The same 
story applies to intergenerational care. This is not just a neutral, calcu-
lated system of family exchange, it is also based on the normative assump-
tion that childcare is best performed by the mother’s mother.
 Care in both ideals is still assigned to mothers. If such images of ap-
propriate care were supported in public policy, not all mothers would 
want to work, and certainly not for long hours. These gendered notions 
of care hamper mothers’ (full-time) employment. As soon as it is possible 
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– financially or career-wise – mothers would want to spend more time 
with their children. Hence the lower employment rates of Belgian moth-
ers compared to the Danish (and recently to the Dutch), as well as the 
tendency to move towards part-time jobs. The kind of care promoted in 
the Belgian welfare state – intergenerational as well as surrogate mother-
hood – attracts women to work less rather than more.
 Parental sharing and professional care, on the other hand, can theo-
retically degender caregiving. Parental sharing assumes fathers will be 
more involved in caring duties and mothers less so. It assumes a de-
crease of fathers’ working hours and an increase of mothers’ employ-
ment. Women and men become interdependent. The Dutch welfare state 
promotes such an ideal. The ‘combination scenario’ is based on the idea 
that when men work less, women work more. Indeed, the ideal of pa-
rental sharing has paved the way for mothers’ spectacular entrance into 
the Dutch labour market. Since the ideal of parental sharing disconnects 
women from being the only person responsible for caring, mothers have 
also started to work.
 At the same time, this study shows that the ideal of parental sharing 
has difficulty coming into practice fully (in any country). The actual con-
sequence of parental sharing is that it reinforces the notion that full-time 
work is not appropriate, and women are especially sensitive to this moral 
message. Women, not men, are more likely to work on a part-time basis. 
In other words – ironically – women are more adaptive to the ideal of pa-
rental sharing than men. The caveat of the ideal of parental sharing is thus 
that it takes two to share. On the other hand, Dutch men are slightly more 
likely to shoulder care responsibilities than elsewhere. The promotion of 
parental sharing thus has had some impact on men’s behaviour – albeit 
more watered-down – than is promoted in the Netherlands.
 Professional care, supported and practiced in Denmark, is the best 
‘guilt-reduction strategy’ for working mothers and stimulates them to 
work full-time. Only the ideal of professional care goes hand in hand with 
high full-time employment rates for mothers. This ideal assumes that chil-
dren are best-off when they are cared for by professionals who are highly 
educated and that such care contributes to the upbringing of children. 
Danish childcare workers are the most highly educated among such work-
ers in all four countries. These professionals are seen as able to do things 
that parents cannot: they can raise children to be social citizens. This 
also means that it is not appropriate to take care of children at home. In 
Denmark, the ideal of professional care has released parents from heavy 
care responsibilities. It has made full-time employment for both fathers 
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and mothers fully legitimate. Danish parents do not have to work to make 
ends meet. They work the number of hours they do because childcare is 
not only available and affordable, it is also professional. It offers the child 
more than when mothers stay at home to provide care.
 Finally, specific ideals affect different categories of women. Women 
are to often seen as one category. The ideal of intergenerational care lim-
its the possibility of women of the older generation to be involved in paid 
employment or even gives them a double burden. Especially in Belgium 
and the uk, older women are heavily involved in caring for their grandchil-
dren, which limits their employment careers. The ideal of the surrogate 
mother also supports (higher) middle-class womens’ working but reduces 
the citizenship of childminders, who often lack social security rights and 
earn little. It assumes that these women are dependent on their husbands. 
In some countries, notably the uk, the ideal of surrogate motherhood re-
veals class differences. Interestingly, this is not the case in Flanders or 
the Netherlands, where surrogate mothers are more often middle-class 
(chapter 8). Moreover, the ideal of parental sharing is not very useful to 
lone mothers as they have no one with whom to share care duties. They 
may need a different ideal of care, for instance that of professional care. 
Hence the low employment rates of Dutch and British women. The ideal 
of professional care brings employment opportunities to all women. It 
does not exclude certain categories of women. Therefore the Danish em-
ployment rates for women have been the highest in Europe.
 Analysis from the perspective of care ideals not only helps to under-
stand changes in womens’ employment during the last two to three de-
cades but also helps us to understand the many anomalies and puzzles of 
the welfare states presented in this book. Welfare states do matter for the 
gendered division of labour, care, and income, but we can only understand 
how they matter when we add a cultural dimension to the analysis. As the 
comparative welfare regime approach rightly shows, the welfare state is an 
important catalyst for women’s participation in work – although less for 
men’s participation in care. It is especially a cultural catalyst. The role of 
the state is pivotal for women’s participation in the labour market, much 
more so than cultural theories would have us think.
 Such a cultural welfare state approach also questions the effectiveness 
of employment policy that is dominant in Europe. In Lisbon, the Euro-
pean leaders came together to set targets for women’s and men’s employ-
ment rates. If Europe wants to hold the broad ambition of solidarity with 
the needy, now and in the future, it needs more growth and more people 
at work, argued the high-level group formed to review the Lisbon strategy 
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(European Communities 2004: 12). This book shows that it is no easy task 
to raise (all) women’s employment rates across Europe. Simply changing 
the financial incentive structures of social policy is certainly not suffi-
cient. Employment practices only change when ideals of care change. In 
other words, new employment patterns only arise when an ‘appropriate’ 
solution is found for care in each country.
 The caveat is that this should fit the country-specific ideals of care 
that parents have. This may be a difficult conclusion, as at the same time 
this book shows that the ideal of professional care is more likely to result 
in the highest full-time employment rates for mothers compared to other 
ideals. It is most inclusive for all women and is the best strategy for reduc-
ing the guilt that mothers feel when leaving their children to go to work, 
yet this ideal may not be suitable for all European welfare states.
 Origins of Welfare States
In this book welfare states are studied through a ‘care lens’. This has shed 
new light on how welfare states work and how they affect people’s lives. 
Another advantage of looking at caring states is that it helps to rethink 
the development and origins of welfare states. Are the stories of welfare 
states, often built upon an analysis of social security and workmen’s pro-
tection, similar to the stories of caring states? It is now common to argue 
that welfare state austerity cannot be explained by the same theories as 
its erasure. Power resource theory is helpful in understanding the origins 
of social policy (Esping-Andersen 1990; O’Connor et al. 1999), whereas 
neo-institutionalism or ‘the new politics’ is helpful for understanding its 
recent history (Pierson 1994, 2001; Alber 1995).
 This book shows that class-based power resources, especially the ap-
proach of the three welfare regimes, are useful as a heuristic frame but 
cannot fully explain the origins of and changes within care policy. We 
have come across many empirical anomalies and puzzles within the re-
gimes. As is well documented, in the liberal model of the uk caregivers are 
protected from market forces: caregivers such as lone mothers are offered 
specific benefits (chapter 5; see also Lewis 1992a; O’Connor et al. 1999). 
Less documented is that in the Danish case, a representative of the social 
democratic model, a single breadwinner bonus in taxation is still in place, 
although individualisation of taxation took place much earlier than in 
other countries. This is however not a trophy of the social democrats but 
of the liberals (chapter 5). More important however are the significant dif-
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ferences within the Christian democratic world. Flemish childcare levels 
are much higher than the Dutch; they almost reach Scandinavian levels. 
Why does a so-called Christian democratic welfare state invests nearly as 
much in childcare as social democratic regimes?
 In addition, it is unclear whether specific ideologies have a direct ef-
fect on the ‘women-friendliness’ of welfare states. Liberalism or Christian 
democracy do not necessarily oppose women’s right to work – on the 
contrary – while social democratic dominance does not necessarily pro-
mote women’s citizenship. This is not only because the right to give care 
is often under pressure, but also because in each country social demo-
crats have struggled with the question of what is more important, class 
or gender. In the Netherlands this is aptly labelled as the ‘Mrs. Philips’ 
dilemma – should this woman be viewed as the wife of a rich man or as an 
individual without beneficial ties (chapter 5)? In reality, in many countries 
gender tends to lose.
 To understand differences in the origins and development of caring 
states, institutional factors are important. More useful for understanding 
Flemish childcare policy than the often-stressed concept of subsidiarity is 
the concept of free choice. In the Belgian context it means that the state 
should support both working women and those who want to stay at home. 
Such interpretation of free choice opposes its liberal interpretation, which 
stresses that choice does not need state intervention. The stress on state 
support for enabling choice is shaped by the Belgian institutional frame-
work of pillarisation. The point of departure is that people should be able 
to choose their own schools, hospitals, and insurance according to their 
own background. This manner of societal organisation is vital for Belgium 
as a nation-state; it is necessary to keep rival ideologies, beliefs, and lan-
guages together (chapter 6).
 Ideals of Care and Policy Origins
Care ideals are not only helpful for studying policy outcomes but also pol-
icy origins. Following the full-time motherhood norm, new ideals of care 
have been proposed. These new ideals are often a way out of the dead-
locked situation in which mothers’ interests are placed against children’s. 
Institutional care was regarded as ‘cold’ while mother’s care was consid-
ered to be ‘warm’. Especially working women benefited from ending such 
moral debates. It is therefore no coincidence that alternative ideals of care 
were often proposed by women, although always in alliance with more 
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powerful actors in the specific welfare regimes, such as the political party 
in government, professional organisations, women in trade unions, and 
newly-established client organisations such as those for parents. This was 
often an alliance between women within and outside women’s groups.
 It is therefore impossible to study the origins of care policy without 
including women’s power resources and women’s actions (Skocpol 1992; 
O’Connor et al. 1999; Naumann 2005). It was not only important whether 
women had power and their actions fit the institutional setting of a coun-
try (Skocpol 1992), but also what women (as collective agents) wanted 
(O’Connor et al. 1999; Naumann 2005). What has been the direction of 
the care dreams of the women’s movement (in a broad sense): which ideal 
of care was considered appropriate when mothers went to work?
 In the Netherlands, the ideal of parental sharing and the stress on part-
time work can be traced back to the women’s movement, which promoted 
the sharing of paid and unpaid work in alliance with women working in the 
pro-part-time trade union. In Denmark, professional care has been pro-
moted by the women’s movement along with the pedagogues. In Flanders, 
the ideal of the surrogate mother – in this case organised childminders – 
has been put forward by the Catholic Agrarian Women’s Movement, which 
was supported by the Christian democratic party. In the uk, on the other 
hand, the women’s movement distrusted the state as a service provider and 
was very hesitant to get involved in childcare policies (chapter 6).
 This cultural welfare state approach borrows much from gender-based 
power resources: care policy is understood as the result of a political 
battle between normative ideals. Ideals of care that are promoted always 
counter other ideals (Billig 1991; Pfau-Effinger 1998). Welfare states are 
not composed of sedimented values. Social policy is not a mere reflection 
of culturally embedded ideals. Ideals have to be promoted by a powerful 
alliance to become embedded in social policy.
 Finally, looking at which care ideal has been dominant also helps to un-
derstand the composition of welfare states, and especially to what degree 
investments took place in childcare services. Flemish childcare services 
are much more developed than in the Netherlands because the state large-
ly invested in surrogate mothers. It invested in state-subsidised family day 
care – that is, mothers who receive pay but have no workers’ rights. This is 
not only a cheap solution but also fits well with the Christian democratic 
ideology that stresses solidarity within the community, motherhood, and 
dependence within the family. State investments could then take place 
and lead to a top ranking in terms of European provision of childcare. In 
the Netherlands, investments in state-subsidised professional care were 
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lower because of the emphasis on parental sharing. Children, according 
to this view, are best-off when fathers as well as mothers are involved in 
childcare. This is seen as a ‘warm’ solution.
 In Denmark, by contrast, professional care is not considered to be 
‘cold’. In the ‘people’s home’, the Scandinavian label of the state, it is ‘warm’. 
Such an ideal of care is a pre-condition for the universalisation of child-
care. When professional childcare is not seen as a ‘pleasure’ for working 
women but as important for the well-being of children, it is more logical 
that all children should have the right to professional childcare. Thus ide-
als of care also help to explain the content of the childcare policy in place, 
for instance how much state support takes place and whether childcare 
services are universal or targeted (chapter 7).
 Looking Through the Lens of Caring
The study of welfare states – of origins and outcomes – benefits from 
taking into account caring, not only as a cultural and moral practice as 
described above but also as a normative point of departure and as a set of 
policies. Such an approach can also help to explain cross-national differ-
ences in gendered employment and income patterns (Anttonen and Sipilä 
1996; Daly and Lewis 1998; Jenson and Sineau 2001; Daly 2002; Daly and 
Rake 2003; Anttonen et al. 2003; Bettio and Plantenga 2004 ).
 The problem with many social policy studies are the concepts used to 
capture the outcomes of welfare states, such as de-commodification (Esp-
ing-Andersen 1990) or de-familialisation (Esping-Andersen 1999, 2002; 
Lister 1994; McLauglin and Glendinning 1996). These concepts position 
citizenship as being independent from either the market or the family. 
Considering care, both in terms of receiving and giving, not only ques-
tions notions of independence but also cuts through all boundaries: it has 
no assigned location. Care can be provided by states, markets, families, 
and by childminders (paid by the state or the parents), grandparents, fa-
thers, mothers, or professionals. Most important for the citizenship of 
caregivers – who are primarily women – is under which conditions and 
terms care is given (chapter 2).
 Looking at welfare states through the lens of care also forces us to 
rethink the normative concept of citizenship that is central to the study 
of welfare states. This book stresses that in a European conception of citi-
zenship, care should be recognised in addition to work. This is important 
because care is part of living the life of a human being, it can contribute 
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to human flourishing: people should also have the possibility to provide 
care. In addition, when care is valued well it may also lead to a degender-
ing of care. This will increase gender equality as both women and men are 
freer to choose to work and/or to care. Finally, caregiving will be increas-
ingly important in the light of aging societies and the socio-economic 
future of the welfare state.
 In much welfare state analysis, and especially in social democratic and 
feminist traditions, care is often described as the work of Cinderella. Care 
is considered to be a burden that keeps women from working. The best 
solution is when the state takes over this ‘unpaid work’ and pays profes-
sionals for it. At the other end, the Christian democratic and communi-
tarian traditions see caregivers as Snow Whites: caring is a joy, a moral 
attitude that spreads social cohesion. It is women’s gift to society. People 
should take an example of this moral attitude. Citizens should not care 
less, but care more. Both care stories are fairytales. In the real world car-
ing can go either way. Caring can be hard work, but also a pleasure. It can 
destroy family ties but also strengthen them. All depends on the condi-
tions under which care is given and how much (moral) force is used.
 When T.H. Marshall described the concept of citizenship he did not 
include care, but his definition of ‘citizenship as participation in the com-
munity’ easily allows for the inclusion of caregiving. Including care in the 
concept of citizenship means that people, both men and women, have a 
freer choice as to whether or not they want to care or not. Citizenship 
would then mean the right to care and the right not to care, but without 
locking a person into one activity. In other words, the right to give care 
as well as to receive care are important for modern welfare states. These 
rights indicate how welfare states care and under which terms care is pro-
vided (see also Knijn and Kremer 1997).
 These rights are not utopian. Care is increasingly becoming part of cit-
izenship in European welfare states (Daly 2002; Jenson and Sineau 2001; 
Anttonen et al. 2003). This book shows that the four welfare states have 
also given special attention to the right to receive care. In recent decades, 
childcare services expanded in all countries – although the headlines vary 
and so do the level of affordability and availability of care. Denmark is still 
the pioneer: all children older than age one now have the right to profes-
sional childcare services (chapter 6).
 At the same time, the right to give care is under pressure. Parental 
leave can indeed be considered to be a genuine new care right that is 
gaining ground in all countries (chapter 5). But so far, it does not seem to 
compensate changes in social security. In many countries – the uk, the 
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Netherlands, and Belgium – implicit as well as explicit care rights existed 
which have now have been (partly) dismantled. The right to care lost out 
to the obligation to work (Lister 2003; Orloff 2006; chapter 5). In other 
words, participation in work – both as a right and a duty – has become the 
dominant translation of citizenship.
 In Why We Need a New Welfare State Esping-Andersen et al. (2002) 
promote a new welfare architecture that actively supports mothers’ em-
ployment, specifically by subsidising childcare. Working women are seen 
as the weapon against child poverty and the saviours of the economy and 
the welfare state. At the same time, women have to deliver more babies, as 
European birth rates are too low. Although this modern ‘Beveridge plan’ 
offers an important break from the traditional male breadwinner welfare 
state model, it raises some questions.
 First of all, what are men supposed to do when women enter the labour 
market en masse and rescue the welfare state: sit back and wait? When 
women become more active outside the home, perhaps men can be asked 
to become – a little – more active inside the home. In Lisbon, eu targets 
were set to increase female workforce participation. No targets have been 
set for male care participation. But if women are expected to work more, 
should the Lisbon agreement not demand that men work less?
 Time to care should not be a right for only one category of citizens. 
This right used to be confined to women only, but today both men and 
women want and need time to care. Wouldn’t it be a missed opportunity if 
a European conception of citizenship only included the right to work and 
not the right to care? A modernised interpretation of citizenship needs to 
recognise caregiving in society.
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 Appendix I Governments In Belgium, Denmark,
   The Netherlands and the UK 1980-2000
Table Ia Governments in Belgium, 1980-2000
Prime minister Party composition Character
1979-1980 Martens I 
(CVP, Christian 
democrats)
Christian democrats (CVP/PSC)
Social democrats (PS/SP) and 
FDP
Centre left
1980-1980 Martens II (CVP) Christian democrats and Social 
democrats
Centre left
1980-1980 Martens III (CVP) Christian democrats, Social 
democrats and Liberals
Mixed
1980-1981 Martens IV (CVP) Christian democrats and Social 
democrats
Centre left
1981-1981 Eyskens (CVP) Christian democrats and Social 
democrats
Centre left
1981-1985 Martens V (CVP) Christian democrats and Liberals Centre right
1985-1987 Martens VI (CVP) Christian democrats and Liberals Centre right
1987-1988 Martens VII (CVP) Christian democrats and Liberals Centre right
1988-1991 Martens VIII (CVP) Christian democrats, Social 
democrats and People’s party
Mixed
1991-1992 Martens IX (CVP) Christian democrats, Social 
democrats
Centre left
1992-1995 Deheane I (CVP) Christian democrats and Social 
democrats
Centre left
1995-1999 Deheane  II (CVP) Christian democrats and Social 
democrats
Centre left
1999-2003 Verhofstadt 
(Liberals)
Liberals, Social democrats, 
Green party 
Mixed 
(rainbow 
coalition)
Source: Kuipers (2004), www.premier.fgov.be
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Table Ib Governments in Denmark, 1980-2000
Prime minister Party composition Character
1982-1984 Schlüter 
(Conservatives)
Conservatives, Liberals, Centre 
democrats, Christian people’s 
party (minority)
Centre right
1984-1987 Schlüter 
(Conservatives)
Conservatives, Liberals, Centre 
democrats and Christian 
people’s party (minority)
Centre right
1987-1988 Schlüter 
(Conservatives)
Conservatives, Liberals, Centre 
democrats and Christian 
people’s party (minority)
Centre right
1988-1990 Schlüter 
(Conservatives)
Conservatives, Liberals and 
Social liberals (minority)
Centre right
1990-1993 Schlüter 
(Conservatives)
Conservatives and Liberals 
(minority)
Right
1993-1994 Nyrup Rasmussen 
(Social democrat)
Social democrats, Social liberals 
and Centre democrats, Christian 
people’s party (majority)
Left
1994-1998 Nyrup Rasmussen 
(Social democrat)
Social democrats, Social liberals 
and Centre democrats (stepped 
out in 1996) (minority)
Left
1998-2001 Nyrup Rasmussen 
(Social democrat)
Social democrats and Social 
liberals (minority)
Centre Left
2001- Fogh Rasmussen 
(Right-wing 
Liberals)
Liberals, Christian people’s Party
(minority)
Right
Note: In Denmark minority governments are possible and very common.
Source: Green-Pedersen (2000)
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Table Ic Governments in the Netherlands, 1980-2000
Prime minister Party composition Character
1982-1986 Lubbers I (Christian 
democrats)
Christian democrats, Liberals Right
1986-1989 Lubbers II (Christian 
democrats)
Christian democrats and Liberals Right
1989-1994 Lubbers III Christian democrats and Social 
democrats
Centre left
1994-1998 Kok I Social democrats, Liberals and 
Social liberals
Mixed 
(Purple 
Coalition I)
1998-2001 Kok II Social democrats, Liberals and 
Social liberals
Mixed 
(Purple 
Coalition II)
Table Id Governments in the UK, 1980-2000
Prime minister Party composition Character
1979-1983 Thatcher Conservative Right
1983-1987 Thatcher Conservative Right
1987-1990 Thatcher Conservative Right
1990-1992 Major Conservative Right
1992-1997 Major Conservative Right
1997-2001 Blair Labour Left
Source: O’Driscoll (2002)
GOVERNMENTS IN BELGIUM, DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UK


 Appendix II List of Interviewees
 Belgium
Interviews took place in spring and summer 1997
 1. Bea Cantillon, director, Centre for Social Policy, University of Ant-
werp, ufsia.
 . Agnes Bode, Family Services, Familiehulp, Catholic Organisation for 
Homehelp, Brussels.
 . Jef Breda, University of Antwerp/ufsia, Antwerp.
 . Bea van Buggenhout, Catholic University Leuven, Leuven.
 . Bea Buysse, Research Office Child and Family (Studiedienst Kind and 
Gezin), Brussels.
 . Yvan Daelman together with Jannie Hespels, Thuishulp, Social Dem-
ocratic Organisation for Home Help, Brussels.
 . Lieve De Lathouwer, Centre for Social Policy, University of Antwerp, 
ufsia.
 . Christian Deneve, director, Research Office Ministry of Labour, Brus-
sels.
 . Walter van Dongen, Centre for Population and Family Studies, cbgs, 
Brussels.
. Gilbert Dooghe, Centre for Population and Family Studies, cbgs, 
Brussels.
. Wilfried Dumon, Catholic University Leuven, Leuven.
. Mark Elchardus, Free University Brussels, vub, Brussels.
. Theresa Jacobs, University of Antwerp, uia, Antwerp.
. Ria Janvier, University of Antwerp, uia, Antwerp.
. Mieke van Haegendoren together with Greet Verreydt, Limburg Uni-
versity Centre, Diepenbeek, Hasselt.
. Mia Houthuys, director, Catholic Women of the Agrarian Movement, 
(kvlv), Leuven.
. Dirk van Kappelen, director, Regional Employment Office, Ant-
werp.

. Walter Kaesen, Ministry of the Flemish Community, Department of 
Welfare, Brussels.
. Marleen Lambrechts, Ministry of the Flemish Community, departe-
ment of Family and Welfare.
. Frans Lammertijn, Catholic University of Leuven, Leuven.
. Magda Linthout, together with Patricia van Dessel, Catholic Women 
Workers Movement (kav), Brussels.
. Ive Marx, Centre for Social Policy, University of Antwerp/ufsia.
. Fons de Neve, director Research Centre of the League of Young and 
Large Families (bgjg), Brussels.
. Hedwige Peemans-Poullet, Committee Liasons des Femmes, Univer-
site des Femmes, Brussels.
. Patricia Sabbe, Organisation of Flemish Cities and Municipalities, 
Brussels.
. Mieke Slingerland, Family Help and Help to Elderly of the Agrarian 
Movement, Leuven.
. Berenice Storms, University of Antwerp/ufsia.
. Linda van Torre, Socialist Day Care Services, Brussels.
. Linda Turelinkx, Christian Democratic Trade Union (acv), Brussels.
. Lieven Vandenberghe, director, Child and Family (Kind en Gezin), 
Brussels.
. Lieve Vanderleyden, Centre for Population and Family Studies, c.b.g.s, 
Brussels.
. Joris Vanseveren, advisor on career breaks, Ministry of Labour, De-
partment of Unemployment, Brussels.
. Myriam Van Varenberg, chairperson, Council of Equal Opportuni-
ties, Brussels.
 UK
Interviews took place in spring and summer 1998
. Ruth Lister, University of Loughborough, Loughborough.
. Jane Millar, University of Bath, Bath.
. Clare Ungerson, University of Southampton, Southhampton.
. Peter Moss, Thomas Coram Instititute, London.
. Beryl Braggs, Council of Wiltshire, childcare services.
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 Denmark
Interviews took place in autumn and winter 2000
. Peter Abrahamson, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen.
. Bent Rold Andersen, former minister of social affairs, Social Demo-
crat, social researcher.
. Christina Barfoed-Høj, Trade Union of Public Employees, foa, Co-
penhagen.
. Thomas Boje, University of Roskilde, Roskilde.
. Anette Borchorst, University of Århus, Århus.
. Hanne Marlene Dahl, Trade Union for Public Employees (foa) Co-
penhagen.
. Jan Dehn, Organisation of Municipalities, kl, Copenhagen.
. Liesbeth Denkov, Ministry of Social Affairs, Copenhagen.
. Bent Greve, University of Roskilde, Copenhagen.
. Karen Halling-Illum, Trade Union of Public Employees, foa, Copen-
hagen.
. Torben Hede, Ministry of Social Affairs, Copenhagen.
. Finn Kenneth Hansen together with Henning Hansen, Centre for Al-
ternative Social Analysis, casa, Copenhagen.
. Hans Hansen, Danish National Institute for Social Research, Copen-
hagen.
. Kurt Hjørtso Kristensen, organisation of municipalities, kl, Copen-
hagen.
. Helle Holt, Danish National Institute for Social Research, Copenha-
gen.
. Peter Foxman, Ministry of Taxation, Copenhagen.
. Per Kongshøj Madsen, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen.
. George Leeson, research director, Danage, Ældresagen, Copenhagen.
. Stig Lund, Trade Union for Childcare Workers, bupl, Copenhagen.
. Mogens Nygaard Christoffersen, Danish National Institute for Social 
Research, sfi, Copenhagen.
. Sanne Ipsen, Centre for Alternative Social Analysis, casa, Copenha-
gen.
. Aase Olesen, former member of the Social Commission, former mem-
ber of parliament, Radikale Venstre, Copenhagen.
. Yvonne Olesen together with Lilly Søndergaard, Labour Market Of-
fice (arbejdsmarkedstyrelsen), Copenhagen.
. Liesbeth Pedersen, Danish National Institute for Social Research, sfi, 
Copenhagen.
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. Klaus Petersen, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen.
. Merete Platz, Danish National institute for Social Research, Copen-
hagen.
. Neils Plough, Danish National Institute for Social Research, sfi, Co-
penhagen.
. Anne Birte Ravn, University of Aalborg, Aalborg.
. Birte Siim, University of Aalborg, Aalborg.
. Michael Teit Nielsen, Organisation for Elderly, Copenhagen.
. Claus Ryde, Ministry of Labour, Copenhagen.
 The Netherlands
Interviews took place over the period 1996-2004
. Marianne Duvalier, director, Women’s Alliance, Utrecht.
. Josette Hoex, Netherlands Institute of Care and Welfare, nizw, Utrecht.
. Janneke Plantenga, University of Utrecht, Utrecht.
. Hetty Pott-Buter, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
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 Notes
1 Other ways to analyse care in welfare states can be found in Anttonen and 
Sippilä (), Anttonen et al. (), Daly (), or Bettio and Plantenga 
().
2 In addition to or instead of the class-based interpretation, it has been stressed 
that other power resources have been important in shaping or obstructing 
collective welfare arrangements, such as Christian democracy (Van Kersber-
gen ), the petty bourgeoisie (De Swaan ), and the old establishment 
(Hoogenboom ).
3 Becker more recently argued that many economists, including himself, have 
relied excessively on altruism to tie the interests of family members together. 
He proposes including guilt, affection, obligation, anger, and fear of physical 
abuse as factors that need to be taken into account (Nussbaum ).
4 Hochschild (, ) uses different ideals than the ones I propose. She 
distinguishes between traditional, postmodern, cold modern, and warm 
modern ideals of care. These models are not only normative a priori, they 
also cannot explain the differences between the four countries. Hence I de-
veloped new ideals of care. 
5 This chapter is based on a secondary analysis of six surveys covering the 
- period: the oecd Labour Force Study, the European Labour Force 
Study, the (European Community Household Panel  (echp), the Employ-
ment Options for the Future Survey (eofs), and the Luxembourg Income 
Study (lis). It is necessary to use that many sources because there is no com-
parative labour force survey that can answer all of the questions raised in 
this chapter. One of the main problems in data selection for this study is the 
fact that the European Labour Force Survey tends to lack recent information 
on employment patterns of Danish parents. The main problem of the oecd 
Labour Force Study is that, in contrast to the eu surveys, its focus on mother-
hood and fatherhood is only recent. Historical developments can hardly be 
chased. As the tables will show, oecd labour force statistics and European 
Labour Force surveys show different employment and part-time rates, but 
the patterns are by and large the same. 

6 In the French-speaking region organised day care also exists and has grown 
substantially between  and , yet day care institutions are much more 
common than in Flanders. Jenson and Sineau () calculated that for chil-
dren under age three, more than , children use family day care and more 
than , children are in day care centres. In the Flemish region more than 
, children are in day care centres and , in family day care.
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